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Moral	  Rationalism	  and	  Independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  in	  




Abstract	  Within	  Shī	͑  ī	  works	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  legal	  theory	  (uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh)	  there	  is	  a	  theoretical	  space	  for	  reason	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  normativity	  alongside	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Prophetic	   tradition.	   This	   space	   stems	   from	   a	   meta-­‐ethical	   moral	   rationalism	  considered	   fundamental	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theology.	   The	   position	   holds	   that	   unmediated	  reason	   is	   capable	   of	   understanding	   the	  morally	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  morally	  blameworthy	   independently	   of	   revelation.	   Describing	   themselves	   as	   ͑Adliyya	  (literally	   the	   people	   of	   Justice)	   this	   meta-­‐ethical	   position	   allows	   the	   Shī	  ͑a	   to	  attribute	  a	  substantive	  rational	  conception	  of	  justice	  to	  God,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  His	  actions	  and	  His	  regulative	  instructions	  (aḥkām).	  	  	  Despite	   the	   Shīʿī	   adoption	  of	   this	  meta-­‐ethical	   position,	   and	   the	   jurisprudential	  space	  held	   for	   independent	   rationality	   that	   implies	   rational	  morality	  must	  be	  a	  condition	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   any	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   attributed	   to	   a	   Just	   God,	  independent	   judgements	  of	   rational	  morality	  play	   little	  or	  no	   role	   in	   the	  actual	  inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   norms	   within	   mainstream	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought.	   As	  part	   of	   a	   search	   for	   an	   ʿAdliyya	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   this	   study	   examines	   the	  theoretical	  reason	  for	  why	  this	  moral	  rationalism	  plays	  no	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precpets	  through	  a	  close	  examination	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  in	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  The	   obstacles	   preventing	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	   moral	   rationalism	   from	   impacting	   the	  reading	  of	  fiqh	  in	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  	  purely	  epistemic.	  In	  line	  with	   the	   ‘emic’	   approach	   adopted	   through	   the	   study,	   these	   epistemic	   obstcales	  are	  revistsed	  with	  the	  view	  of	  identifying	  scope	  for	  allowing	  a	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  that	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   fundamental	   theological	   moral	   rationalism	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   judgements	   of	   rational	   morality,	   even	   when	   not	  definitively	   certain,	   can	   not	   be	   ignored	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   apparent	  meaning	   of	  texts	  that	  are	  themselves	  also	  not	  certain.	  	  A	  move	  towards	  an	  	͑  Adliyya	  reading	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   demands	   that	   the	   strength	   of	   independent	   rational	   evidences	   be	  reconciled	   against	   the	   strength	   of	   any	   other	   apparently	   conflicting	   evidences	  such	   that	   independent	   judgements	   of	   rational	   morality	   act	   as	   a	   substantive	  condition	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  precpets	  attributed	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  moral	  God.	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Notes	  
	  The	   transliteration	   style	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   follows	  what	   is	   now	   recognised	   as	  standard	  conventions	  for	  Arabic.	  The	  tāʾ	  marbūṭa	  is	  left	  as	  –a,	  as	  opposed	  to	  –ah,	  except	  in	  cases	  of	  iḍāfa	  constructions	  before	  ḥamzat	  al-­‐waṣl.	  All	  dates	  are	  noted	  in	  the	  format	  of	  Hijrī	  Qamarī/Common	  Era,	  unless	  qualified	  otherwise.	  	  Citations	   from	   the	   Qur’ān	   are	   noted	   by	   reffering	   to	   the	   number	   of	   the	   ṣūra	  followed	  by	  the	  number	  of	  the	  āya	  or	  āyāt,	  for	  example	  mention	  of	  āyāt	  65-­‐82	  of	  
ṣurat	  al-­‐Kahf	  appears	  as	  Qur’ān	  18:65-­‐82.	  References	  are	  provided	  in	  full	  as	  a	  footnote	  on	  the	  first	  citation	  including	  the	  full	  name	  of	  the	  author	  and	  other	  additional	  details.	  Subsequent	  citations	  of	  the	  same	  source	  are	  provided	  in	  an	  abbreviated	  manner.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“The	  copyright	  of	  this	  thesis	  rests	  with	  the	  author.	  No	  quotation	  from	  it	  should	  be	  
published	  without	  the	  author's	  prior	  written	  consent	  and	  information	  derived	  from	  
it	  should	  be	  acknowledged.”	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1.	  General	  introduction	  
	  
1.1	  Introduction	  Twelver	   Imāmī	  Shī	  ͑a	   scholars1	  have	  been	   concerned	  with	  making	   space	   for	   the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  (reason	  or	  rationality)	  as	  a	  normative	  source	  since	  the	  very	  earliest	  moves	   towards	  a	   systematization	  of	   their	   ideas	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   first	  began2.	  Uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	  is	  the	  theoretical	  discipline	  that	  studies	  the	  general	  principles	  involved	  in	  the	   inference	  of	  religious	   instructions,	  or	  orthopraxic	  precepts	  (Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām),	  from	   their	   sources.	   As	   the	   discipline	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   developed	   it	   was	   not	   long	  before	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   as	   an	   independent	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām,	   became	   explicitly	  incorporated	  into	  this	  theoretical	  system	  in	  the	  form	  of	  what	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	  theorists	   (Uṣūliyūn)	   now	   refer	   to	   as	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   independent	  rationality.	  The	   theoretical	   role	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   as	   a	   normative	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna3,	  is	  linked	  inextricably	  to	  the	  Shī	  ī͑	  acceptance	  of	  the	  theological	  doctrine	  of	   the	   rational	   intelligibility	  of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	   the	  blameworthy	  (al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  al-­‐qubḥ	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyān).	  This	  meta-­‐ethical	  doctrine,	  often	  identified	  as	  a	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	   position	   and	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   ‘rationalistic	   objectivism’4,	   is	   a	   kind	   of	  moral	  rationalism,	  a	  cognitivist	  theory	  of	  ethics	  that	  maintains	  that	  the	  values	  of	  acts	   are	   knowable	   through	   natural	   human	   reason.	   This	   offers	   a	   rational	  moral	  framework	   for	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   position	   now	   dominant	   across	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Henceforth	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  Shī	  ͑a	  or	  Imāmī	  .	  2For	  the	  early	  formulation	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  legal	  theory	  and	  the	  consciousness	  of	  a	  need	  to	  accommodate	  a	  role	  for	  rationality	  see;	  M.	  Aftab	  Uddin	  Ahmed,	  ‘The	  Origin	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐Fiqh	  and	  its	  Systematization	  up	  to	  the	  5th	  Century,	  A.H.’,	  unpublished	  MA	  thesis,	  (Montreal,	  McGill	  University,	  1970)	  and	  Norman	  Calder	  	  ‘The	  Structure	  of	  Authority	  in	  Imāmī	  	  Shī	   ͑ī	  Jurisprudence’,	  unpublished	  PhD	  dissertation,	  (London,	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,	  1980),	  especially	  chapter	  VIII	  ‘Reason	  and	  Revelation’	  pp.	  206-­‐222.	  3	  Technically,	  Sunna	  consists	  of	  the	  statements	  (aqwāl),	  actions	  (af	  ͑āl)	  and	  tacit	  approvals	  (taqrirāt)	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muḥammad	  and	  the	  Twelve	  Imāms.	  See	  ‘͑A͑bd	  al-­‐Hādī	  al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabādi	  al-­‐
uṣūl	  (Qum,	  Matbū‘āt	  Dīnī,	  1962)	  p.	  22.	  To	  reflect	  this	  specific	  notion	  of	  sunna	  (literally	  custom	  or	  practices)	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  transliteration	  of	  the	  term	  has	  been	  capatilised.	  4	  George	  Hourani,	  Islamic	  Rationalism	  (Oxford,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1971),	  p.	  10.	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Muslim	  thought,	  a	  position	  largely	  sharped	  by	  the	  contrasting	  Ash	  ͑arī	  conception	  of	  value5.	  	  	  The	  Ash	  ͑arī	  ‘theological	  voluntarism’	  or	  ‘divine	  command	  theory’6	  holds	  that	  the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  of	  acts	  are	  predicated	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  God’s	  ‘subjective’	  command,	  and	  are	  unknowable	  except	  through	  revelation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  the	  substantive	  notion	  of	  justice	  generated	  in	  the	  position	  taken	  by	   the	   Shī	  ͑a	   and	   the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	   (collectively	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Adliyya,	   literally	   the	  people	   of	   justice)	   holds	   the	   theoretical	   foundations	   for	  what	  may	   be	   termed	   a	  ‘moral	   jurisprudence’,	   where	   a	   conception	   of	   rational	   morality	   is	   not	   only	   a	  substantive	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  but	  also	  a	  condition	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  derived	   from	  textual	   sources	  provided	  by	  a	  God	  who	   is	   Just	   in	  His	  Essence,	  His	  Actions	  and	  His	  Commands.	  Yet	  despite	  this	  meta-­‐ethical	  position,	  and	  the	  resultant	  inclusion	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  an	  independent	   source	   of	   religious	   precepts	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   jurisprudence,	   independent	  normative	  judgements	  of	  morality	  seem	  to	  have	  little	  or	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  inference	   of	   religious	   regulations	   found	   in	   the	   corpus	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	  properly	  referred	  to	  as	  furū	͑  	  al-­‐fiqh	  or	  simply	  fiqh.	  A	  legal	  positivism	  theoretically	  associated	  with	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  meta-­‐ethics7,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  considerations	  of	  legal	  validity	   are	  detached	   from	  moral	  worth,	   appears	   as	  prevalent	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   fiqh	   as	   it	  does	   in	   any	   other	   Muslim	   legal	   school.	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theologians	   do	   recognise	   that	   the	  principle	  of	  the	  independent	  intelligibility	  of	  moral	  values	  is	  foundational	  to	  their	  theology,	   influencing	   their	   conception	   of	   God,	   the	   nature	   and	   purpose	   of	  Prophecy,	   the	   objectives	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   and	   the	   theoretical	   role	   of	   rationality	   as	   a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  Yet	  when	   it	  comes	   to	   the	  actual	   inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  a	  survey	  of	  different	  ethical	  trends	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theory	  of	  value	  see	  George	  Hourani,	  Reason	  and	  Tradition	  in	  Islamic	  Ethics	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985).	  In	  contrast	  Al-­‐Attar	  sees	  the	  historical	  dominance	  of	  an	  Ash	  ͑arī	  meta-­‐ethics	  as	  being	  only	  perceived,	  arising	  from	  a	  misreading	  of	  Muslim	  intellectual	  history,	  see	  Mariam	  al-­‐Attar,	  Islamic	  
Ethics;	  Divine	  Command	  Theory	  in	  Arabo-­‐Islamic	  thought	  (Oxon,	  Routlegde,	  2010).	  6	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  this	  contrasting	  meta-­‐ethical	  position	  as	  described	  in	  Philosophy	  of	  Religion	  see	  Mark	  Murphy,	  ‘Theological	  Voluntarism’,	  Stanford	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-­‐theological/],	  2	  November	  2008.	  7	  The	  link	  between	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theology	  and	  legal	  positivism	  has	  been	  well	  noted,	  see	  George	  F.	  Hourani,	  ‘Ethics	  In	  Medieval	  Islam:	  A	  Conspectus’	  in	  George	  F.	  Hourani	  (ed.)	  Essays	  on	  Islamic	  
Philosophy	  and	  Science	  (New	  York,	  State	  University	  Press,	  1975),	  pp.	  128-­‐135	  and	  Hourani,	  
Reason	  and	  Tradition	  in	  Islamic	  Ethics,	  pp.	  57-­‐66.	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the	   influence	   of	   independent	   judgements	   of	   reason	   are	   almost	   non-­‐existent.	  Muḥammad	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   (d.	   1400/1980),	   author	   of	   one	   of	   the	   most	   widely	  taught	  Shī	  ͑ī	  courses	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  explicitly	  accepts	  that	  independent	  rationality	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  and	  that	  it	  was	  not	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  source	  for	  any	  of	  his	  own	  fiqhi	  judgements8.	  This	  apparent	  tension	  between	  theoretical	  resources	  and	  actual	  juristic	  practice	  offers	  the	  context	  for	  the	  central	  question	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  engage	  with.	  	  After	   the	   schools	   historic	   decline,	   the	   influence	   of	   Mu	  ͑tazilī	   thought	   amongst	  Sunni	  Muslim	   intellectuals	   took	  on	  renewed	   importance	  with	   the	  emergence	  of	  Islamic	  modernist	  thinking	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Although	  few	   modernist	   thinkers	   explicitly	   identify	   themselves	   as	   Mu	  ͑tazilī,	   Mu	  ͑tazilī	  ‘rationalism	   and	   free-­‐thinking’	   have	   been	   described	   as	   becoming	   ‘symbols’	  upheld	   by	   a	   range	   of	   Muslim	   intellectuals	   that	   demonstrate	   ‘the	   ability	   of	  Muslims	   to	   encounter	   change	   and	   external	   challenges	   in	   ways	   that	   can	   be	  construed	  as	  Islamic’9.	  With	  this	  symbolic	  background	  and	  the	  typical	  eclecticism	  of	   much	   Muslim	   modernist	   discourse,	   Muslim	   scholars	   and	   intellectuals	   have	  been	   selectively	   employing	   ‘particular	   aspects	   of	   Mu	  ͑tazilī	   doctrine	   and	  intellectual	   history’	   as	   a	   platform	   to	   offering	   Muslim	   religious	   thought	   an	  alternative	  paradigm	  to	  the	  dominant	  readings	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a10.	  Despite	  the	  breadth	  of	  resources	  held	  within	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	   tradition,	   it	   is	   the	  potential	  specifically	   in	  the	   ͑Adliyya	  meta-­‐ethical	  doctrine	  of	  the	  rational	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  (al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbiḥ	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyān),	  with	  its	  corresponding	  role	  for	  reason	  as	  an	  independent	  source,	  which	  seems	  to	  hold	  the	  key	  to	  offering	  a	  more	  morally	   and	   rationally	   informed	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	  Acknowledging	   the	  presence	   of	   these	   pre-­‐existing	   resources	   that	   can	   offer	   a	   framework	   for	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  Al-­‐Durūs	  fi	  ͑ilm	  al-­‐uṣūl	  (Qum,	  Markaz	  al-­‐Abḥāth	  wa	  al-­‐Darāsāt	  al-­‐Takhuṣṣaṣiyya	  lil	  Imām	  al-­‐Shahīd	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  2003)	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  203;	  al-­‐Fatāwa	  al-­‐wāḍiha	  (Beirut,	  Dār	  al-­‐ta	  ͑āruf	  lil-­‐matbu	  ͑āt,	  1983)	  p.	  98	  and	  Hossein	  Modarressi	  Ṭabātabā’ī,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Law	  (London,	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1984)	  p.	  4.	  	  9	  Richard	  C.	  Martin,	  Mark	  R.	  Woodward	  and	  Dwi	  S.	  Atmaja,	  Defenders	  of	  reason	  in	  Islam;	  
Mu‘tazilism	  from	  medieval	  school	  to	  modern	  symbol	  (Oxford,	  Oneworld	  Publications,	  2003)	  p.	  200.	  For	  a	  comparative	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘eclecticism’	  within	  the	  interpretive	  schemes	  of	  Muslim	  ‘modernists’	  see	  Abdullah	  Saeed,	  ‘Some	  reflections	  on	  the	  Contextualist	  approach	  to	  ethico-­‐legal	  texts	  of	  the	  Quran’	  Bulletin	  of	  SOAS,	  Vol.	  71	  2	  (2008),	  pp.	  221–237.	  	  	  10	  Ibid,	  pp	  200-­‐217.	  For	  a	  comparative	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘eclecticism’	  within	  the	  interpretive	  schemes	  of	  Muslim	  ‘modernists’	  see	  ͑͑Abdullah	  Saeed,	  ‘Some	  reflections	  on	  the	  Contextualist	  approach	  to	  ethico-­‐legal	  texts	  of	  the	  Quran’	  Bulletin	  of	  SOAS,	  Vol.	  71	  2	  (2008),	  pp.	  221–237.	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theological	  interpretation	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  capable	  of	  addressing	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  arising	   from	   the	   practice	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   in	   the	   contemporary	  world,	   does	   however	  raises	   the	   question	   of	   why	   this	   potential	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   realised	   even	   by	  proponents	  of	  this	  meta-­‐ethical	   theory	  themselves11.	  Examination	  of	  the	   impact	  of	  moral	   rationalism	   on	   Shī	  ͑ī	   readings	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   seeks	   to	   explain	   this	   gap	   in	   a	  tradition	   that	   maintains	   a	   Mu	  ͑tazilī	   like	   moral	   rationalism	   and	   a	   living	   and	  vibrant	  fiqhi	  system	  adhered	  to	  by	  millions	  of	  Muslims	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Although	  moral	   rationalism	   is	   undoubtedly	   a	   characteristic	   feature	   of	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  theology,	   it	   is	  not	  a	  doctrine	   that	   the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  alone	  can	  claim	  to	  hold.	  Despite	  the	   persisting	   stereotypical	   demarcation	   of	   a	   dividing	   line	   in	   ethical	   theory	  between	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  and	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazlī	  schools,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  scholarship	  adherents	  to	  a	  moral	  rationalism	  can	  be	  found	  from	  a	  range	  of	  scholars	  hailing	  from	  across	  Sunni	  theological	  and	  legal	  school	   affiliations12,	   whilst	   the	   fundamental	   position	   of	   a	  moral	   rationalism	   in	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theology-­‐	   as	   shall	   be	   shown	   in	   this	   study-­‐	   is	   beyond	  question.	   	   This	   study	  aims	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  potential	  in	  this	  moral	  rationalism	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  realised	  at	  the	  level	  of	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh	  in	  the	  Shī	  ī͑	  tradition,	  identifying	  both	  the	  epistemic	  obstacles	  to	  this	  potential	  and	  the	  scope	  for	  overcoming	  them.	  Not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  A	  distinctive	  system	  of	  law	  was	  never	  developed	  by	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila,	  even	  the	  giant	  Mu	   ͑tazilī	  theologian	  Qāḍī	  	  ͑Abd	  al-­‐Jabbār	  pronounced	  his	  legal	  verdicts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Shāfi	  ͑ī	  school	  of	  
fiqh.	  For	  the	  ‘theocentric	  nature	  of	  Mu	  ͑tazilite	  moral	  enquiry’	  see	  Sophia	  Vasalou,	  Moral	  Agents	  
and	  Their	  Deserts;	  The	  Character	  of	  Mu‘tazilite	  Ethics	  (Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  pp.	  12-­‐26,	  and	  for	  a	  more	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  theology	  and	  law	  in	  Muslim	  thought	  see	  Fazlur	  Rahman,	  ‘Functional	  Interdependence	  of	  Law	  and	  Theology’	  in	  G.	  E.	  Von	  Grunebaum	  (ed.),	  Theology	  and	  Law	  in	  Islam	  (Wiesbaden,	  Otto	  Harrassowitz,	  1971)	  pp.	  88-­‐99.	  	  12	  That	  the	  theory	  has	  a	  long	  history	  of	  proponents	  beyond	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  and	  the	  Shī	  ͑a	  has	  now	  been	  well	  noted.	  Ibn	  Taymiyya,	  in	  his	  Minhāj	  al-­‐Sunna,	  lists	  Sunni	  scholars	  from	  across	  the	  Karrāmiyya,	  Hanafī,	  Mālikī,	  Shāfi	  ͑ī	  and	  Hanbalī	  schools	  all	  of	  whom	  upheld	  a	  rationalist	  meta-­‐ethics	  and	  even	  describes	  how	  some	  of	  them	  actually	  accused	  al-­‐	  Ash	  ͑arī	  of	  being	  amongst	  the	  ahl	  
al-­‐bid	  ͑a	  	  (people	  of	  reprehensible	  innovation)	  on	  account	  of	  his	  theistic	  subjectivism.	  Elsewhere,	  in	  his	  Kitāb	  an-­‐Nubūwwāt,	  Ibn	  Taymiyya	  makes	  clear	  that	  he	  too	  rejects	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  position	  and	  affirms	  that	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘evil’	  are	  not	  dependent	  on	  divine	  commands	  and	  prohibitions,	  see	  George	  Makdisi,	  ‘Ethics	  in	  Islamic	  Traditionalist	  Doctrine’	  in	  Richard	  G.	  Hovannisian	  (ed.)	  Ethics	  in	  Islam	  (Malibu,	  Undena,	  1985),	  pp.	  47-­‐63.	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  study	  showing	  the	  range	  of	  Sunni	  legal	  thinkers	  who	  adopted	  what	  is	  here	  being	  described	  as	  an	   ͑Adliyya	  meta-­‐ethics	  see	  Kevin,	  A.	  Reinhart,	  Before	  Revelation;	  The	  Boundaries	  of	  Muslim	  Moral	  Thought	  (New	  York,	  SUNY	  Press,	  1995).	  However,	  according	  to	  Khalid	  Abou	  El	  Fadl,	  it	  seems	  that	  this	  breadth	  of	  early	  and	  classical	  Muslim	  scholarship	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  theblameworthy	  has	  been	  ‘dogmatically	  ignored’	  by	  contemporary	  Sunni	  traditionalist	  legal	  scholarship;	  Speaking	  in	  God’s	  Name;	  Islamic	  Law,	  Authority	  and	  Women	  (Oxford,	  Oneworld,	  2003),	  p.	  160.	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only	  can	  this	  be	  instructive	  of	  possible	  shifts	  in	  the	  actual	  body	  of	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh	  for	  adherents	  to	  the	  Shi	  ͑ī	  tradition	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  instructive	  of	  fertile	  trajectories	  for	   the	   broader	   on	   going	   efforts	   for	   alternative,	   theoretically	   consistent	   and	  justifiable,	   readings	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  which	   seek	   to	  build	   their	  hermeneutics	   from	   the	  theological	  conception	  of	  a	  Just	  and	  moral	  God.	  	  The	  moral	  rationalism	  from	  which	  such	  conceptions	  of	  Divine	  Justice	  stem	  offer	  a	  framework	   for	   what	   may	   be	   termed	   an	   ʿAdliyya	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   where	  independent	   judgements	   of	   rational	   morality	   are	   afforded	   the	   status	   of	   an	  independent	   source	   for	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	   and	   where	   the	   interpretation	   of	  religious	   texts	   can	   only	   be	   deemed	   valid	   if	   they	   do	   not	   contradict	   basic	   and	  rationally	  determined	  principles	  of	  morality.	  	  Yet	  rational	  morality	  seems	  to	  play	  little	   or	   no	   role	   in	   the	   actual	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   in	  mainstream	   Shī	  ͑ī	  fiqh.	  This	  study	  is	  directed	  then	  to	  understanding	  the	  reasons	  why	  a	  distinctively	  moral	  or	  	   ͑Adliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  -­‐	  which	  would	  incorporate	  a	  substantive	  role	  for	  independent	  judgements	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  -­‐	  has	  not	  emerged,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  the	   aforementioned	   fundamental	   resources	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   and	  jurisprudential	  thought.	  With	  the	  recognition	  of	  my	  own	  positioning	  as	  an	  active	  participant	  within	   the	   contemporary	  Muslim	   scholarly	  discourse	   -­‐	  more	  of	   this	  positioning	  and	   its	   implications	   for	   the	  study	  will	  be	  said	   in	  the	  section	  dealing	  with	  methodological	  concerns	  -­‐	  it	  is	  somewhat	  natural	  that	  this	  central	  question	  be	  annexed	  with	  a	  further	  normative	  concern-­‐	  how	  can	  the	  theological	  resources,	  of	  an	  acceptance	  of	   the	   intelligibility	  of	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  actions,	  fundamental	   to	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   tradition	   come	   to	   have	   a	   greater	   bearing	   on	   the	  independent	  role	  of	  al-­‐	   ͑aql	  in	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  readings	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  ?	  	  
1.2	  Research	  Context	  	  The	  implications	  for	  such	  a	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  are	  of	  course	  broad	  reaching,	  but	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  ethical	  theory	  upon	  which	  it	  is	  based,	  claiming	  that	  basic	  moral	  values	  are	  universally	  and	   independently	   intelligible,	  has	  been	  picked	  up	  by	   theorists	   searching	   for	   cross	   cultural	   or	   plural	   foundations	   for	   the	   human	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rights	  discourse13.	  A	  rights	  discourse	  grounded	  in	  a	  theological	  and	  philosophical	  conceptual	  infrastructure	  native	  to	  Muslim	  religious	  thought	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  effective	   in	  Muslim	   societies	   than	   a	   discourse	   fundamentally	   rooted	   in	   a	   euro-­‐centric	  philosophical	  and	  theological	   framework,	  and	  also	  more	  effective	  than	  a	  discourse	   claiming	  no	  philosophical	   foundations	   at	   all14.	   	   Abdul	  Aziz	   Sachedina	  identifies	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   theological	   framework	   as	   being	   pivotal	   to	   a	   reading	   of	  Islamic	  thought	  that	  can	  provide	  such	  a	  foundation;	  Islamic	   political	   theology	   based	   on	   the	   central	   doctrine	   of	   a	   just	   and	  merciful	  God	  bound	  by	  His	  own	  moral	  essence	  to	  guide	  humanity	  to	  create	  a	   just	  public	  order	   can	  serve	  as	   the	  major	   theological-­‐ethical	   foundation	  for	  human	  rights	  and	   its	  prerequisite,	  namely,	  democratic	  governance	   in	  Muslim	  societies15.	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  framework	  for	  an	  ‘Islamic	  political	  theology’	  which	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  Muslim	  thought	  and	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  Qur’ān,	  Sachedina	  claims	  that	  as	  its	  fundamental	   components	   were	   only	   upheld	   by	   the	   Mu	  ͑tazila	   and	   the	   Shī	  ͑a,	   its	  potential	  impact	  was	  never	  felt.	  The	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  and	  Shī	  ͑īte	  theology,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  a	  substantial	  role	  for	   human	   reason	   to	   discern	   moral	   truth,	   and	   with	   its	   potential	   to	  expound	   a	   thesis	   about	   the	   teleological	   understanding	   of	   nature	   within	  the	   parameters	   of	   revelation	   was	   abandoned	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   divine	  command	  ethics...16	  The	  divine	  command	  ethics	  characteristic	  of	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theory	  of	  value	  that	  came	  to	  bear,	  all	  be	   it	   in	  differing	  degrees,	  upon	  almost	  all	   readings	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  meant	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  inherent	  human	  dignity	  in	  Muslim	  societies	  ‘had	  to	  await	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  a	  preliminary	  argument	  demonstrating	  the	  ‘conceptual	  resources	  to	  explicate	  and	  justify	  contemporary	  human	  rights	  discourse’,	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  tradition,	  see	  John	  Mikhail,	  ‘Islamic	  Rationalism	  and	  the	  Foundation	  of	  Human	  Rights’	  in	  Arend	  Soeteman	  (ed.)	  Pluralism	  and	  
Law:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  20th	  IVR	  Congress,	  Global	  Problems,	  Vol.	  3,	  (2005)	  pp.	  61-­‐70.	  14	  Whether	  a	  ‘foundationless’	  theory	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  actually	  possible	  is	  still	  up	  for	  debate.	  For	  a	  prominent	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  a	  formulation	  see	  the	  two	  essays	  of	  Michael	  Ignatief	  and	  the	  responses	  to	  them	  in	  Amy	  Gutman,	  (ed.)	  Human	  Rights	  as	  Politics	  and	  Idolatry	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  	  15	  Islam	  &	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  25.	  16	  Ibid.	  p.	  86.	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modernizing	  human	  rights	  discourse’17.	  Although	  Sachedina’s	  analysis	  reflects	  a	  concerted	  and	  welcome	  effort	  to	  offer	  a	  reading	  of	  Muslim	  theology	  and	  scripture	  which	  may	  succeed	  in	  engaging	  Muslim	  intellectuals	  and	  secularists	  proponents	  of	  Human	   rights	   in	   a	   constructive	   dialogue	   towards	   enhancing	   a	   global	   human	  rights	  regime,	  it	  leaves	  many	  questions	  relevant	  to	  the	  current	  study,	  and	  to	  the	  success	  of	  his	  own	  project	  unanswered.	  	  Despite	  claiming	  to	  be	   ‘non	  sectarian’18	  in	  his	  approach	  he	   identifies	  the	  pivotal	  notion	   of	   an	   innate	   human	   ability	   to	   discern	   moral	   values	   as	   solely	   being	   a	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  and	  the	  Shī	  ͑a,	  failing	  to	  identify	  the	  breadth	  of	  classical	  scholarship	  which	  accepted	   this	  notion	   from	  beyond	   these	  groups19.	  What	   is	  of	  greater	  concern,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  prospects	  of	  Sachedina’s	  own	  thesis	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  study,	  is	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  engagement	  with	   the	  problematic	   of	  why	   and	  how	   the	   Shī	  ͑a	   (and	  historically	   the	  Mu	  ͑tazila)	  can	   have	   a	   fiqhi	   or	   juridical	   system	   which	   is	   as	   problematic	   with	   respect	   to	  human	  rights	  as	  any	  other	  Muslim	  legal	  system.	  This	  being	  the	  case	  despite	  the	  Shī	  ͑a	  and	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  affirming	  that	  humans	  have	  an	  innate	  ability	  to	  discern	  moral	  values	  and	  their	  upholding	  of	  the	   ‘doctrine	  of	  a	   just	  and	  merciful	  God	  bound	  by	  His	   own	   moral	   essence’20-­‐	   the	   two	   theological	   pillars	   upon	   which	   Sachedina	  wishes	  to	  build	  his	  new	  Islamic	  political	  theology.	  	  	  Sachedina	   does	   identify	   what	   he	   considers	   to	   be	   ‘the	   epistemic	   problem’	  confronting	  Muslim	   jurists,	   in	   that	   they	   need	   to	   find	   a	  way	   to	   re-­‐establish	   the	  ‘historically	   severed	   connection	   between	   theological	   ethics...	   and	   prevalent	  Islamic	   jurisprudence’21.	   It	   seems	   clear	   that	   any	   such	   attempts	   would	   benefit	  greatly	  from	  an	  investigation	  in	  to	  why	  schools	  of	  thought	  who	  do	  adhere	  to	  the	  theological	  notions	  of	  a	  rational	  morality,	  and	  a	  correspondingly	   Just	  God,	  have	  not	   adopted	   a	   jurisprudential	   system	   significantly	   shaped	   by	   these	   theological	  doctrines.	   The	   fiqhi	   opinions	   of	   the	   Shī	  ͑a,	   and	   historically	   the	   Mu	  ͑tazila,	   are	  testament	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   theological	   position	   conferring	  human	   reason	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Sachedina,	  Islam	  &	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  p.	  86.	  18	  Ibid,	  p.19.	  19	  See	  supra	  12.	  20	  Sachedina,	  Islam	  &	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  p.	  25.	  21	  Ibid,	  p.	  109	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the	  ability	  to	  understand	  good	  and	  bad	  coupled	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  a	  Just	  God,	  on	  their	  own,	  does	  not	  necessitate	  a	  ‘moral’	  jurisprudence.	  To	   come	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   such	   theological	   principles	   have,	   or	   have	  not,	  informed	  Muslim	  religious	  jurisprudence	  calls	  for	  an	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  hermeneutical	   theories	  which	  govern	   the	  respective	  systems	  of	   interpretation	   -­‐	  and	   thus	  requires	  engagement	  with	   the	   traditional	   literature	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	  
fiqh.	   The	   absence	   of	   such	   an	   endeavour	   in	   Sachedina’s	   work	   is	   all	   the	   more	  surprising	   in	   view	   of	   his	   claim	   to	   having	   mastered	   the	   juridical	   tradition	   of	  Islam22,	   and	   his	   aim	   of	   engaging	   in	   his	   conversation,	   not	   only	   secularists	   and	  Muslim	  intellectuals,	  but	  also	  traditional	  seminarians23.	  Although	  in	  my	  view	  he	  falls	   some	   way	   short	   of	   achieving	   a	   meaningful	   engagement	   with	   these	  seminarians,	   he	   is	   absolutely	   right	   in	   identifying	   them	   as	   key	   actors	   in	  legitimising	   any	  movements	  within	  Muslim	   religious	  discourse	   that	   seek	  broad	  appeal.	   It	   is	   the	   voice	   of	   the	   traditionalist	  Muslim	   scholars,	   or	   	  u͑lamā,	  which	   is	  still	   the	  most	  authoritative	   in	  the	  religious	  affairs	  of	  Muslim	  societies,	  and	  their	  ‘language’	   of	   choice	   is	   still	   predominantly	   embedded	   in	   the	   frameworks	  of	   fiqh	  and	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh24.	   It	   is	   the	   continued	   importance	  of	   this	   framework	  which	   calls	  for	   a	  detailed	  examination	  of	   the	   role	  of	   independent	   rationality	  as	   a	   source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑ā	  precepts	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  for	  one	  in	  search	  of	  an	   ͑Adliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑ā.	  
Al-­‐ʿaql	   represents	   the	   theoretical	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑ā	   which	   directly	   relates	  from	  	   ͑Adliyya	  theological	  ethics	  and	  thus	  offers	  an	  ideal	  prism	  through	  which	  one	  can	   asses	   why	   these	   theological	   premises	   have	   not	   informed	   Muslim	  understandings	   of	   religious	   normativity,	   simultaneously	   offering	   insights	   into	  how	   the	   development	   of	   a	   moral	   jurisprudence	   may	   emerge	   from	   within	   the	  most	  authoritative	  discourse	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  thought	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   importance	   of	   examining	   the	   role	   of	   al-­‐	   ͑aql	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   has	   not	   gone	  unnoticed.	  Anver	  Emon	  uses	  natural	   law	   as	   an	   ‘analytic	   concept’	   to	   investigate	  how	   pre-­‐modern	   Sunni	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   dealt	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   reason	   as	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Sachedina,	  Islam	  &	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  p.	  42.	  23	  Ibid,	  p.	  113.	  24	  It	  has	  been	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  the	  Wittgentsteinian	  ‘language	  game’	  of	  Shī	  ͑a	  jurists.	  	  Seyed	  M.	  Ghari	  S.	  Fatemi,	  ‘A	  Hermeneutical	  Amalgam:	  A	  Conceptual	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Shī	  ͑īte	  
Uṣūl	  al-­‐Fiqh’,	  unpublished	  conference	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Durham	  University	  International	  conference	  Seminary	  Education;	  Shia	  and	  Christian	  perspectives,	  (Durham,	  2010)	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authoritative	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	   Demonstrating	   that	   debates	   on	   the	   issue	   ‘were	  fundamentally	   linked	   to	   theological	   and	   philosophical	   considerations’ 25 ,	   he	  rightly	  identified	  that	  it	  was	  how	  jurists	  engaged	  with	  the	  theological	  question	  of	  moral	  epistemology	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  study,	  ‘whether	  their	  use	  of	  reason	  (	   ͑aql)	  alone	  can	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  knowing	  the	  good	  (ḥusn)	  and	  the	  bad	  (qubḥ)’26,	  which	  was	   the	   frame	   for	   their	   deliberations.	   Again	   he	   notes	   that	   the	   justification	   of	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑ā	  was	  not	  unique	  to	  any	  particular	  school;	  rather	  what	  he	  terms	  the	   ‘fusion	  of	   fact	  and	  value’	  which	  allowed	  natural	  reasoning	  in	  cases	   where	   textual	   sources	   are	   silent	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   ‘jurists	   of	   varying	  theological	  and	  legal	  school	  affiliations’27.	  	  The	   varying	   modes	   of	   natural	   reasoning	   that	   he	   describes	   within	   the	   dual	  typology	  of	  either	  a	   ‘hard	  naturalism’	  or	  a	   ‘soft	  naturalism’,	  did	  however	   justify	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  quite	  different	  theological	  premises-­‐	  premises	  which	  have	  impacted	  on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  natural	   reasoning	   is	   actually	   afforded	  a	   space	  within	   the	   respective	   methodologies.	   The	   ‘Hard	   Natural	   Law’	   of	   al-­‐Jaṣṣāṣ	   (d.	  370/980),	   Qāḍi	   	   ͑Abd	   al-­‐Jabbār	   (d.	   415/1025)	   and	   Abū	   al-­‐Ḥusayn	   al-­‐Baṣrī	   (d.	  477/1085)	  was	  formulated	  on	  distinctly	  	   ͑Adliyya	  theological	  principles;	  ‘that	  God	  only	   does	   good	   and	   is	   incapable	   of	   doing	   evil’28.	   Although	   ‘Voluntarist	   jurists’	  were	  vociferous	  in	  their	  critique	  of	  what	  was	  deemed	  a	  doctrine	  that	  undermined	  God’s	  omnipotence,	   they	   ‘were	  not	  so	   jurisprudentially	  naive	  as	   to	  assume	   that	  sufficient	  source-­‐texts	  exist[ed]	  to	  address	  every	  potential	  legal	  issue’29.	  	  This	  pragmatic	  recognition	  leads	  to	  the	  first	  of	  two	  ‘ironies’	  described	  by	  Emon.	  Despite	  their	   theological	  stance,	   the	  voluntarist’s	  still	  managed	  to	   ‘fuse	   fact	  and	  value’,	  allowing	  space	  for	  al-­‐	   ͑aql	  to	  act	  as	  a	  source	  of	  natural	  reasoning.	  This	  was	  achieved	   with	   only	   a	   subtle	   twist	   to	   the	   Hard	   Naturalist	   theological	   premise	  whilst	   preserving	   the	   voluntarist	   concern	   for	   maintaining	   Gods	   absolute	  omnipotence.	  Although	  the	  voluntarist	  jurists	  continued	  to	  uphold	  that	  God	  was	  not	  obliged	  to	  act	  in	  line	  with	  ‘the	  good’,	  they	  argued	  that	  due	  to	  His	  evidentially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25Anver	  M.	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  p.3.	  	  26	  Ibid,	  p.	  21.	  27	  Ibid,	  p.	  189.	  28	  Ibid,	  p.	  25.	  29	  Ibid,	  p.	  31.	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consistent	  grace	  (faḍl	  or	  tafaḍḍall),	   it	  could	  be	  seen	  that	  nature	  has	  indeed	  thus	  far	  been	  imbibed	  with	  a	  constant	  good.	  The	  resultant	  picture	  of	  nature	  was	  one	  that	  can	  be	  empirically	  investigated	  to	  demonstrate	  that	   ‘God	  created	  the	  world	  for	   the	   purpose	   of	   supporting,	   maintaining	   and	   preserving	   the	   interests	   of	  people’30.	  This	  second	  model	  of	  fusing	  fact	  and	  value	  is	  designated	  ‘soft’	  by	  Emon,	  as	  although	  it	  also	  deems	  nature	  a	  source	  of	  normative	  value	  and	  thus	  subject	  to	  investigation	   through	   independent	   rationality,	   ‘it	   is	   not	   an	   unchangeable,	  indubitable	   good’31,	   the	   value	   in	   nature	   investigated	   by	   al-­‐	   ͑aql	   is	   a	   contingent	  quality	  still	  dependent	  on,	  and	  subject	  to	  God’s	  will.	  	  Although	  not	  referred	  to	  by	  Emon,	  it	  has	  been	  previously	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  natural,	  or	  independent,	  reasoning	  of	  soft	  naturalists	  that	  display	  the	  ‘irony’	  which	  required	  the	  recourse	  to	  God’s	  grace	  to	  circumvent.	  Aron	  Zysow	  showed	  that	   the	   much	  more	   central	   legal	   mode	   of	   reasoning	   by	   analogy	   (Qiyās)	   in	   its	  
munāsaba	   or	   ‘appropriateness’	   form,	   as	   preferred	   by	   the	   Voluntarist	   jurists	  discussed	   by	   Emon,	   also	   raised	   such	   issues	   by	   demonstrating	   ‘an	   apparent	  incompatibility	   between	   Asha‘rite	   ethics	   and	   that	   method	   of	   analogy	   which	  embodies	   legal	   rationality’32.	   The	   fusion	   of	   fact	   and	   value	   that	   this	   form	   of	  reasoning	   necessitates	   identifies	   God’s	   purposes	   with	   those	   of	   man.	   This	   has	  clear	   implications	   to	   the	   congruence	   between	   theology	   and	   legal	  method,	   ‘[i]n	  identifying	  God’s	  purposes	  with	  those	  of	  man,	  the	  Ash‘arites	  admitted	  that	  there	  were	  common	  standards	  for	  rational	  human	  action.	  But	  they	  could	  do	  so	  only	  by	  retreating	   from	   the	   ethical	   relativism’33.	   Despite	   the	   sophisticated	   means	   of	  reconciling	  such	  inconsistencies	  described	  by	  Emon,	  Zysow	  noted	  that	   ‘the	  bulk	  of	   jurists	   seem	   to	   have	   proceeded	   without	   regard	   to	   the	   question’	   of	   how	   to	  reconcile	   their	   legal	   practice	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   their	   theological	   premise	  regarding	  moral	  cognition34.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	   Emon	   shows	   that	   both	   groups	   of	   Sunni	   jurists,	   Hard	   and	   Soft	  Naturalists,	  did	  in	  fact	  accord	  reason	  a	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑ā,	  he	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories	  p.	  32.	  31	  Ibid,	  p.	  33.	  32	  Zysow,	  Aron,	  ‘The	  Economy	  of	  Certainty:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Typology	  of	  Islamic	  Legal	  Theory’,	  unpublished	  PhD	  thesis	  (Harvard	  University,	  1984),	  p.	  341.	  33	  Ibid,	  p.	  347.	  34	  Ibid.	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point	   out	   that	   the	   differing	   theological	   premises	   they	   set	   out	   from	   did	   have	   a	  significant	   impact	  upon	  how	  the	  role	  of	  reason	  was	  subsequently	  developed	  or,	  in	   the	   case	   of	   Soft	   Naturalists,	   circumscribed.	   ‘The	   poignancy	   of	   this	   ironic	  congruence	   in	   natural	   law	   theories,	   given	   the	   fierce	   theological	   differences	  between	   both	   groups	   is	   undercut	   by	   the	   theories	   of	   practical	   reasoning	  developed	  by	  Soft	  Naturalists’35.	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  al-­‐Tūfi	  (d.	  716/1316),	  the	  soft	   naturalists	   examined	   by	   Emon	   ‘developed	   theories	   of	   practical	   reasoning	  that	   limited	   the	   epistemic	   role	  of	   reasoned	  deliberation	  of	   the	   law’36	  (emphasis	  added).	  The	  resultant	  theories	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  through	  maṣlaḥa	  (public	  or	  societal	   utility)	   as	   ‘a	   mediating	   concept	   between	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   law	  (maqāṣid)	   and	   the	   ratio	   legis	   of	   a	   new	   rule	   of	   law	   (ḥukm)’37,	   was	   a	  means	   for	  jurists	  such	  as	  al-­‐Ghazāli	   (d.	  04/1111),	  al-­‐Rāzi	   (d.	  605/1209),	  and	  according	   to	  Emon	   even	   al-­‐Shāṭibi	   (d.	   790/1388)	   ‘to	   circumscribe	   the	   role	   of	   reason,	  permitting	   reasoned	   deliberation	   only	   on	   the	   most	   serious	   and	   necessary	  matters	   affecting	   a	   polity’ 38 .	   This	   resonates	   with	   Zysow’s	   ‘contention’	  that	  	   ͑Ash	  a͑rī	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  were	  not	  unaware	  of	  the	  apparent	  theological	  complications	   inherent	   in	  the	  munāsaba	  model	  of	  analogy,	  which	   itself	   is	  at	   the	  heart	   of	   the	   maṣlaḥa-­‐maqāṣid	   hermeneutic,	   and	   that	   in	   fact	   ‘significant	  developments	  in	  their	  theory	  were	  meant	  to	  resolve	  this’39.	  	  The	  second	  of	  Emon’s	   two	   ironies	  stems	  directly	   from	  this	   recognition	   that	   the	  model	  of	  natural	  reasoning	  developed	  by	  Soft	  naturalists	  was	  expressly	  designed	  to	  curtail	   the	  scope	  of	  such	  natural	  reasoning.	  Yet	  the	  current	  trend	  of	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	   reference	   to	   the	   maṣlaḥa-­‐maqāṣid	   model	   by	   a	   range	   of	   Muslim	  reformers	  is	  being	  employed	  to	  legitimise	  the	  very	  manor	  of	  reasoning	  which	  ‘the	  pre-­‐modern	   theorists	   who	   articulated	   the	   maqāṣid-­‐maṣlaḥa	   model’	   actually	  aimed	   to	   limit	   and	   proscribe 40 .	   David	   Johnston	   has	   also	   shown	   how	  developments	   in	   the	   current	   discourse	   of	   Maqāṣid	   assume	   an	   implicit	   shift	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories,	  p.	  194.	  36	  Ibid.	  37	  Ibid.	  38	  Ibid.	  39	  	  Zysow,	  ‘The	  Economy	  of	  Certainty:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Typology	  of	  Islamic	  Legal	  Theory’,	  p.	  341.	  40	  	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories,	  p.	  195.	  
	  	   20	  
towards	   the	   ͑Adliyya	  objective	  moral	   framework41.	   Emon	   describes	   this	   only	   as	  ironic,	   but	   this	   description	   seems	   to	   underplay	   the	   significance	   of	  what	   I	   have	  referred	   to	   elsewhere	   as	   a	   theoretical	   inconsistency 42 .	   Not	   only	   are	  contemporary	  efforts	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  maṣlaḥa-­‐maqāṣid	  model	  subject	  to	   this	   criticism,	  but	   the	  similarly	   important	   trend	  of	   ‘contextualist’	   readings	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  also	  seem	  to	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  same	  concern.	  	  From	   amongst	   the	   many	   diverse	   contextualist	   approaches	   to	   reading	   Muslim	  normativity	  that	  have	  emerged,	  the	  work	  of	  Fazlur	  Rahman	  still	  seems	  to	  be	  most	  influential43.	  In	  line	  with	  his	  ‘double	  movement	  theory’44	  contextualists,	  who	  are	  often	  more	  focussed	  on	  the	  Qur’ān	  than	  the	  Sunna,	  give	  special	  attention	  to	  both	  the	  specific	  context	  and	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  religious	  source	  texts.	  The	  specific	  context	   refers	   to	   the	   particular	   situation	   that	   the	   text	   is	   believed	   to	   have	  responded	   to	   whilst	   the	   broader	   context	   refers	   to	   both	   the	   socio	   historical	  context	  of	   the	   revelation	  and	   that	  of	   the	   reader45.	  Contextualists	   aim	   to	  extract	  the	  principles	   informing	  the	  specific	  response	  of	  the	  Prophet	  Muḥammad	  to	  the	  situations	  he	   encountered	  and	   seek	   to	   actualise	   these	  principles	   in	   the	   current	  context	  even	  if	  this	  requires	  different	  means	  for	  their	  fulfilment.	  Underpinning	   both	   the	   contextualist	   and	   the	   maṣlaḥa-­‐maqāṣid	   hermeneutical	  approaches	   is	   an	   aim	   to	  understand	  God’s	   purpose	   and/or	   to	   ‘create	   good	   and	  just	   societies’46.	  However	   the	   substantive	  usage	  of	   terms	   such	  as	  purpose,	  good	  and	   just	  within	  these	  emergent	  hermeneutical	  methods	  cannot	  be	  supported	  by	  the	   Ash	  ͑arī	  meta-­‐ethical	   theory	   that	   formed	   the	   theological	   premise	   of	   Emon’s	  ‘Soft	   Naturalist’.	   Both	   the	   method	   and	   the	   language	   used	   to	   describe	   the	  contextualist	  and	  the	  evolving	  maṣlaḥa-­‐maqāṣid	  models	  assume	  a	  shift	   towards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  David	  Johnston,	  ‘A	  Turn	  in	  the	  Epistemology	  and	  Hermeneutics	  of	  Twentieth	  Century	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐
Fiqh’,	  Islamic	  law	  and	  Society,	  Vol.	  11	  (2003),	  pp.	  233-­‐282.	  42	  Ali-­‐reza	  Bhojani,	  ‘Critical	  Realism:	  from	  legal	  positivism	  in	  Muslim	  jurisprudence	  towards	  a	  natural	  law	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a’,	  unpublished	  paper	  presented	  to	  the	  Warwick	  Law	  School	  Conference	  ‘re-­‐imaging	  Sharī	  ͑a’	  at	  the	  Palazzo	  Pessaro-­‐Pappafaaza,	  Venice	  (2009).	  43	  For	  a	  brief	  biographical	  survey	  of	  Fazlur	  Rahman,	  his	  scholarly	  contribution	  and	  influence	  see	  Ebrahim	  Moosa,	  ‘Foreword’	  in	  Fazlur	  Rahman,	  Major	  Themes	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  (Chicago,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009)	  pp.	  ix-­‐xiv.	  44	  For	  the	  ‘double	  movement	  theory’	  of	  interpretation	  see	  Islam	  and	  Modernity;	  Transformation	  of	  
an	  Intellectual	  Tradition	  (Chicago,	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1982)	  pp.	  5-­‐8.	  	  45	   ͑͑Abdullah	  Saeed,	  ‘Some	  reflections	  on	  the	  Contextualist	  approach	  to	  ethico-­‐legal	  texts	  of	  the	  Quran’	  Bulletin	  of	  SOAS,	  Vol.	  71	  (2008),	  p.	  223.	  46	  Ibid.	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an	   ͑Adliyya	   meta-­‐ethics.	   	   Until	   this	   theoretical	   inconsistency	   between	   the	  methodological	  assumptions	  and	  actual	  method	  of	  interpretation	  are	  resolved	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  these	  emerging	  hermeneutical	  methods	  can	  compete	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  traditional	  text	  based	  interpretations	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  Modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  thought	  recognises	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	  doctrine	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  moral	  values	  and	  the	  subsequent	  affirmation	  of	  a	  substantive	  morality	  to	  God	  as	  fundamental	   to	  their	  system	  of	   theology.	  Unlike	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila,	   the	   ‘legal’	  Sharī	  ͑a	  tradition	  within	   Shī	  ͑a	   thought	   continues	   to	   flourish	  having	   significant	   influence	  on	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   Islam	   is	  understood	  and	  practiced	  by	  both	   individuals	  and	   nation	   states	   across	   the	   world.	   Its	   rich	   legal	   and	   jurisprudential	   tradition	  offers	   a	   great	   resource	   for	   identifying	   any	   theoretical	   obstacles	   within	   the	  traditional	  theory	  itself	  that	  may	  be	  preventing	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  theological	  premises	  from	  allowing	  the	  development	  of	  a	  moral	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  that	  affords	  al-­‐ʿaql	  an	   independent	   role	   in	   the	   inference	  of	  aḥkām.	   Identifying	   these	  obstacles,	   the	  primary	  aim	  of	  this	  study,	  will	  not	  only	  offer	  insight	  into	  how	  a	  moral	  reading	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  may	  come	  to	  inform	  the	  Shī	  ͑a	  vision	  of	  Islam	  but	  may	  also	  be	  invaluable	  in	  demonstrating	   to	   the	  wider	  Muslim	  discourse	   the	   complexities,	   challenges	   and	  potential	   that	   traditional	   Muslim	   theological	   discourse	   has	   in	   offering	   a	  theoretically	  consistent,	  rational	  and	  moral	  interpretation	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
1.3	  Methodological	  concerns	  The	   study	   seeks	   to	   explore	   the	   apparent	   distance	   between	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  theological	  assumptions,	  with	  its	  fundamental	  role	  for	  rational	  morality,	  and	  the	  actual	   process	   employed	   by	   Shī	  ͑a	   jurists	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   -­‐	   a	  process	   that	   marginalises	   independent	   rationality	   and	   seems	   to	   produce	   an	  amoral	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	   First	   and	   foremost	   this	   analysis	  will	   seek	   to	   explain	  this	   distance	   through	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   jurisprudential	   obstacles	   as	  determined	   in	   the	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theory	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   itself.	   Thus,	   in	   terms	   of	  Kenneth	   Pike’s	   dual	   distinction	   of	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	   behaviour,	   the	  current	  analysis	  represents	  an	  ‘emic’	  or	  ‘insider’	  approach,	  seeking	  to	  outline	  the	  elements	   of	   a	   system	   as	   propounded	   by	   the	   proponents	   of	   that	   system	  
	  	   22	  
themselves	   rather	   than	   contextualizing	   the	   ideas	   within	   a	   broader	   scheme	   of	  comparative	  analysis	  that	  an	  ‘etic’,	  or	  ‘outsider’,	  approach	  would	  adopt47.	  	  My	   attempt	   to	   provide	   this	   ‘emic’	   account	   recognises	   that	   any	   explanation	   of	  religious	  ideas	  in	  a	   language	  other	  than	  the	  primary	  language	  of	  that	  religion	  is	  necessarily	   going	   to	   employ	   a	   linguistic	   framework	   and	   thus	   an	   underlying	  conceptual	  framework	  alien	  to	  the	  system	  under	  investigation,	  raising	  doubts	  as	  to	   whether	   a	   truly	   ‘emic’	   account	   is	   possible	   at	   all.	   However	   the	   method	   of	  analysis	   can	   at	   least	   be	   described	   as	   ‘emic’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   aims	   only	   to	  explain	   how	   Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   themselves	   justify	   the	   positions	   they	   adopt,	   and	  resists	   any	   detailed	   comparison	   of	   their	   ideas	   with	   either	   the	   many	   historical	  competing	   Muslim	   trends	   or	   with	   the	   relevant	   contemporary	   ideas	   found	   in	  ethics,	  epistemology	  and	  legal	  philosophy	  -­‐	  all	  of	  which	  would	  have	  much	  to	  say	  on	  the	  central	  issues	  at	  hand.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Whether	  the	  study	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  thought	  in	  the	  West	  is	  yet	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	   shadow	   of	   Orientalism	   is	   still	   up	   for	   debate.	   Methodological	   criticism	   of	  Orientalism,	  ‘the	  colonial	  and	  postcolonial	  project	  to	  recover	  and	  reconstruct	  the	  classical	  religions	  and	  civilizations	  of	  colonial	  subjects’48,	  has	  been	  an	  established	  project	   in	   itself	   for	  some	  time	  now49.	  The	  birth	  of	  what	  Hallaq	  describes	  as	   the	  constructed	   tradition	   of	   ‘Islamic	   legal	   studies’,	   the	   discipline	  within	  which	   this	  study	  may	  be	  situated,	  was	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  political	  motivations	  of	  that	  colonialist	  enterprise;	  	  This	  tradition,	  to	  be	  sure,	  was	  not	  constructed	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  nor	  was	  it	  merely	  an	  appurtenance	  of	  intellectual	  curiosity	  in	  European	  academe;	  for	  it	  would	  be	  naive	  of	  us	  to	  think	  that	  the	  fields	  nowadays	  subsumed	  under	  the	   humanities	   and	   social	   sciences	   were	   created	   in	   isolation	   from	   the	  colonial	   project,	   itself	   subordinate	   to	   the	   larger	   project	   of	   modernity.	  Thus,	   due	   to	   sheer	   relevance-­‐	   quite	   evident	   when	   compared,	   say,	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  For	  the	  coining	  of	  ‘insider’	  	  and	  ‘outsider’	  accounts	  of	  behaviour	  as	  ‘emic’	  and	  ‘etic’	  respectively,	  see	  Kenneth	  L.	  Pike	  ‘Etic	  and	  Emic	  Standpoints	  for	  the	  Description	  of	  Behaviour’	  in	  Russell	  T.	  McCutcheon	  (ed.),	  The	  Insider/Outsider	  Problem	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  (London,	  Casell,	  1999),	  pp.	  28-­‐36.	  	  48	  Martin	  et	  al,	  Defenders	  of	  reason	  in	  Islam,	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  49For	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  certainly	  the	  most	  famous	  ‘deconstruction’	  of	  Orientalism	  see	  Edward	  W.	  Said,	  Orientalism	  (London,	  Routledge	  &	  Keegan	  Paul,	  1978).	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psychoanalysis-­‐	  the	  tradition	  came	  to	  serve	  (in	  the	  most	  systemic,	  though	  not	  always	  systematic,	  of	  ways)	  the	  imperatives	  of	  the	  colonialist	  project.	  The	   invented	   narrative	   of	   “Islamic	   legal	   studies”	   aided	   not	   only	   in	  fashioning	   colonialist	  policies	   that	   transformed	   the	  native	   legal	   cultures,	  but	  also	  in	  shaping	  the	  culture	  of	  empire	  itself50	  Despite	   the	   increased	   awareness	   of	   the	   power	   relations	   involved	   in	   these	  processes,	  and	  the	  resultant	  gradual	  dismantling	  (or	  at	   least	  rebranding)	  of	   the	  Orientalist	   infrastructure,	   there	  still	   seems	  to	  be	  a	  range	  of	   legitimate	  concerns	  over	   the	   study	   of	   Muslim	   religious	   thought	   in	   a	   post–orientalist	   environment.	  Amongst	  these	  concerns	  is	  a	  ‘neo-­‐orientalism’	  that	  had	  initiated	  an	  editing	  out	  of	  all	  but	  the	  most	  ‘traditionalist’	  readings	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  thought,	  even	  before	  9/1151.	  This	  study	  of,	  both	   the	  centrality	  and	   the	   implications,	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought-­‐	   a	   Muslim	   tradition	   which	   is	   itself	   increasingly	   subject	   to	   the	  reductionism	   entailed	   in	   prevalent	   political	   science	   approaches	   to	   Islamic	  movements-­‐	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  counterweight	  to	  such	  discourse.	  	  In	  the	  light	  of	  such	  competing	  and	  problematic	  discourses,	  and	  the	  tentative	  aim	  of	  an	  insider	  or	  ‘emic’	  account,	  a	  phenomenological	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  texts	   in	   question	   may	   have	   seemed	   appropriate.	   Phenomenology	   proposes	  techniques	  for	  understanding	  the	   insider	  position	  whilst	  suspending	   judgement	  with	   regards	   the	   truth	   claims	   of	   a	   believer	   and	   his	   system	   of	   thought.	   This	   is	  aimed	   to	   be	   achieved	   through	   imaginative	   re-­‐experience	   and	   non-­‐critical,	  empathetic	   descriptions 52 .	   However	   its	   goal	   of	   objectivity	   and	   proposed	  ‘methodological	  agnosticism’53	  may	  not	  take	  seriously	  the	  epistemic	  critique	  that	  the	   deconstruction	   of	   Orientalism	   rested	   upon.	   Within	   the	   discipline	   of	   the	  History	   of	   Religions	   or	   the	   Sciences	   of	   Religion,	   phenomenology	   emerged	   in	  response	   to	   the	   reductive	   tendencies	   of	   the	   then	   prevalent	   naturalistic	  approaches	   to	   understanding	   religion.	   Phenomenologists’	   had	   as	   a	   central	  concern	   something	   that	   they	   believed	   the	   naturalists	   had	   completely	   ignored,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Wael	  B	  Hallaq,	  Sharī‘a	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  press,	  2009)	  p.	  10.	  51	  Martin	  et	  al,	  Defenders	  of	  reason	  in	  Islam,	  p.	  5.	  	  52	  Russell	  T.	  McCutcheon,	  ‘General	  Introduction’	  in	  Russell	  T.	  McCutcheon	  (ed.),	  The	  
Insider/Outsider	  Problem	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  (London,	  Casell,	  1999),	  p.	  3.	  53	  See	  Russell	  T.	  McCutcheon	  ‘Neutrality	  and	  Methodological	  Agnosticism;	  Introduction’	  in	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  215-­‐220.	  	  	  
	  	   24	  
and	   due	   to	   their	   methods	   of	   choice,	   were	   incapable	   of	   detecting.	   This	   central	  concern,	   which	   the	   naturalists	   were	   deemed	   to	   be	   oblivious	   to,	   was	   the	   very	  essence	   of	   religion-­‐	   something	   which	   phenomenologists	   often	   located	   within	  religious	  experience.	  However	   in	   trying	   to	   intuit	   the	   essence	   of	   religious	   phenomena,	  phenomenologists	  may	   have	   been	   prone	   to	   inserting	   their	   own	   normative	   and	  subjective	   conclusions	   about	   religion	   into	   their	   descriptive	   endeavours 54 .	  Acknowledging	   the	   historicity	   of	   any	   process	   of	   knowledge	   production	   and	   at	  least	   a	   degree	   of	   the	   epistemic	   relativism	   so	   emphasized	   in	   post-­‐modern	  discourse	   necessarily	   tempers	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   one	   can	   accept	   that	  phenomenology	   can	   give	   an	   unadulterated	   and	   completely	   non-­‐judgemental	  insider	   account.	   Beyond	   this	   the	   notion	   associated	   strongly	   with	   the	  phenomenology	  of	  religion	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  religion	  is	  non-­‐rational,	  does	  not	  suggest	   that	   the	   techniques	   proposed	   therein	  will	   be	   ideally	   suited	   for	   a	   study	  explicitly	  attempting	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	   issues	  related	  to	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  a	  faculty	   widely	   conceived	   as	   rationality,	   in	   an	   intellectual	   and	   philosophical	  discipline	  such	  as	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  	  More	  appropriate	  may	  be	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  methodological	  framework	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  my	  own	  complex	  position	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  the	  research	  subject,	  namely	  that	  of	  insider	  with	  respect	  to	  being	  a	  Muslim	  seeking	  religious	  responses	  to	  modernity,	  an	  active	  participant	  within	  the	  tradition	  I	  engage	  in,	  and	  outsider	  with	  respect	  to	  the	   distance,	   in	   both	   time	   and	   social	   space,	   from	  my	   primary	   source	  material.	  	  Whether	  one	  is	  aware	  of	  it	  or	  not,	  negotiating	  such	  dynamics	  may	  be	  inseparable	  from	   the	   very	   endeavour	   of	   Muslim	   scholarship	   in	   the	   contemporary	   context.	  Ebrahim	  Moosa	  recognised	  the	  complexity	  involved	  in	  such	  scholarship	  in	  a	  way	  that	  resonates	  with	  my	  own	  methodological	  dynamics	  when	  he	  said;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  In	  his	  phenomenological	  move	  towards	  a	  theology	  of	  world	  religions	  Wilfred	  Cantwell	  Smith	  emphasized	  the	  personal	  aspect	  of	  the	  faith	  of	  individuals,	  repelling	  against	  the	  impersonal	  concept	  of	  ‘reified’	  religion.	  However	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  his	  protestant	  background	  informed	  the	  tone	  of	  such	  a	  movement	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  On	  Wilfred	  Cantwell	  Smith	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  development	  and	  debates	  in	  phenomenological	  approaches	  to	  the	  study	  of	  religion	  see;	  James	  L.	  Cox,	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Religion;	  Key	  Figures,	  Formative	  Influences	  and	  
Subsequent	  Debates	  (London,	  The	  Continuum	  International	  Publishing	  Group,	  2006)	  pp.	  171-­‐208.	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  55	  Ebrahim	  Moosa,	  Ghazālī	  &	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Imagination	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  North	  Carolina,	  2005)	  p.	  34.	  56	  Gavin	  Flood,	  Beyond	  Phenomenology;	  Rethinking	  the	  Study	  of	  Religion	  (London,	  Cassell,	  1999),	  p.	  223.	  57Ibid.	  	  p.	  226.	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1.4.	  The	  function	  and	  relevance	  of	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  The	   aim	   of	   seeking	   to	   explore	   the	   jurisprudential	   obstacles	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  which	  prevent	  	   ͑Adliyya	  notions	  regarding	  moral	  epistemology	  from	  impacting	  the	  actual	   role	   of	   reason	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   in	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	  thought,	  necessitate	  that	  the	  study	  is	  primarily	  conducted	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh.	   Although	   the	   influence	   of	   	   ͑Adliyya	   theological	   ideas	  upon	  Shi	  ͑ī	  jurisprudence	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  role	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   the	   identification	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   as	   a	   direct	  jurisprudential	  consequence	  of	  the	   ͑Adliyya	  meta-­‐ethics58	  makes	  a	  detailed	  study	  of	   how	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   conceives	   of	   its	   role	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   an	   ideal	  fulcrum	   for	   engaging	  with	   questions	   that	   drive	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	  theology,	  ethics	  and	  law	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.	  However	  at	  another	  level	  using	  the	  treatment	  of	  al-­‐	   ͑aql	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  try	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  specific	   aspects	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   theology	   and	   fiqh	   is	   not	   so	  straightforward,	   due	   to	   the	   underlying	   assumptions	   this	   approach	   implies	  regarding	   the	  somewhat	  disputed	   function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  The	   literature	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	   itself	   sees	   the	   function	  of	   its	  discipline	   in	  decidedly	  unambiguous	   terms	  with	  a	  seemingly	  universal	  agreement	  ‘that	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  and	  sole	  purpose	  of	  
uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	   the	   formulation	   of	   positive	   law’59.	   Yet	   scholars	   of	   Islamic	   legal	  studies	  have	  shed	  considerable	  doubt	  on	  this	  depiction,	  in	  some	  cases	  describing	  it	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  ‘fiction’60.	  Despite	   the	   considerable	   debate	   over	   what	   influence	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   has	   played	  
historically	   in	   informing	   the	  actual	  process	  of	   interpreting	  and	  deriving	  Muslim	  religious	   normativity	   (aḥkām)	   form	   its	   sources,	   it	   will	   be	   argued	   that	   the	  discourse	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  now,	  and	  will	  be	  increasingly,	  central	  to	  any	  significant	  shifts	   which	   are	   currently	   occurring	   in	   how	   Muslims	   engage	   with	   the	   central	  questions	   of	   their	   religious	   normative	   system.	   This	   makes	   understanding	   the	  jurisprudential	   obstacles	   found	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   especially	   relevant	   to	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Muḥammad	  Riḍā	  al-­‐Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  (Qum,	  Intishārāt	  Ismā	  ͑īlīyān,1970),	  	  Vol.	  1	  p.185.	  	  59Wael	  B.	  Hallaq,	  ‘Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  Beyond	  Tradition’	  Journal	  of	  Islamic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  3	  (1992),	  p.	  183	  found	  in	  Wael	  B.	  Hallaq	  Law	  and	  Legal	  Theory	  in	  Classical	  and	  Medieval	  Islam	  (Aldershot,	  Variorum,	  1994).	  	  60	  Sherman	  A.	  Jackson,	  	  ‘Fiction	  and	  Formalism:	  Towards	  a	  Functional	  Analysis	  of	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐Fiqh’	  in	  Bernard	  G.	  Weiss	  (ed.)	  Studies	  in	  Islamic	  Legal	  Theory	  (Leiden,	  Brill,	  2002)	  p.	  178.	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examination	   of	   why	   the	   foundational	   theological	   resources	   of	   the	   ͑Adliyya	  tradition	  –	  the	  recognition	  of	  independent	  epistemic	  access	  to	  moral	  values	  and	  the	   affirmation	   of	   a	   substantive	   notion	   of	   justice	   to	   God	   -­‐	   have	   not	   led	   to	   the	  employment	  of	  rational	  morality	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  normativity	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  when	  the	  study	  is	  being	  conducted	  with	  the	  explicit	   objective	   of	   investigating	   if	   and	   how	   these	   resources	   could	   come	   to	  inform	  fresh	  readings	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.4.1	  The	  relation	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  fiqh	  as	  seen	  in	  Islamic	  legal	  studies	  Despite	   the	   characteristically	   hair	   splitting	   debates	  which	   have	   evolved	  within	  the	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  regarding	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   and	   the	   precise	   nature	   of	   its	   subject	   matter61,	   the	   general	   picture	   of	   the	  function	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   amongst	   its	   theoreticians	   is	   largely	   uncontested.	   It	   is	   a	  discipline	  aimed	  at	  offering	  a	  systematic	  method	  of	  interpretation,	  a	  hermeneutic	  methodology	  which	  allows	  the	  fully	  versed	  to	  derive	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  from	  their	  sources.	  Hallaq	  writes	  that	  this	  portrayal,	   ‘on	  first	  impression’	  gives	  a	  picture	  in	  which	  the	  one	  who	  has	  mastered	  this	  science	  could,	  with	  the	  necessary	  exertion	  of	  effort	  and	  the	  proper	  application	  of	  theory	  to	  the	  raw	  materials,	  produce	  the	  entire	  system	  of	  fiqh	  from	  scratch62.	  Despite	  there	  being	  ‘little	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  legal	  theory	  to	  forewarn	  the	  jurist-­‐mujtahid	  of	  the	  hermeneutical	  need	  to	  reckon	  with	   a	   formidable	   pre-­‐existing	   body	   of	   fiqh	   law’63,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   the	  serious	   student	   of	   uṣūl	   would	   ever	   have	   been	   so	   naive	   as	   to	   think	   that	   his	  mastering	   of	   the	   science	   would	   actually	   lead	   him	   to	   such	   an	   independent	  construction.	  The	   study	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   has	  always	  gone	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   fiqh,	  and	  in	  fact	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  as	  an	  independent	  discipline	  at	  least,	  emerged	   through	   the	   developments	   in	   the	   discipline	   of	   fiqh.	   However	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  These	  debates	  over	  the	  definition	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  within	  the	  Imāmī	  context	  at	  least,	  have	  seen	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  its	  subject	  matter-­‐for	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  discipline	  to	  have	  an	  identifiable	  subject	  matter	  rather	  than	  simply	  an	  overriding	  objective	  that	  is-­‐	  from	  an	  early	  focus	  upon	  the	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām	  themselves	  to	  now	  centring	  on	  the	  ‘common	  elements’	  in	  the	  inferential	  process	  of	  aḥkām	  and	  not	  simply	  the	  sources.	  For	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  this	  progression	  form	  Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  (d.	  1044/436)	  to	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  see	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Hādī	  Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Durūs	  al-­‐uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  al-­‐Imāmiyya	  (Beirut,	  Markaz	  al-­‐Ghadīr,	  2007)	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  105-­‐109.	  62	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  p.	  76.	  63	  Ibid,	  pp.	  75-­‐76.	  
	  	   28	  
recognition	  of	   this	  emergence	  of	   the	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   subsequent	   to	   the	  discipline	  of	  fiqh	  brings	  into	  focus	  the	  concerns	  of	  many	  regarding	  the	  function	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  if	  fiqh	  existed	  before	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  what	  actually	  does	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  do?	  	  	  	  The	  position	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  early	  western	  scholarship	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  fiqh	  can	  be	  readily	  inferred	  from	  the	  statement	  of	  Jospeh	  Schact	  that	  ‘common	  legal	  theory,	  the	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fikh,	  has	  little	  relevance	  to	  the	  positive	  doctrine	  of	  each	  school’64.	  Developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Islamic	  studies	  in	  general	   and	   within	   Islamic	   legal	   studies	   in	   particular,	   have	   ensured	   that	   any	  further	  unqualified	  endorsement	  of	   this	  opinion	   is	  now	  quite	  unlikely.	   	  Despite	  some	  rigorous	  contributions	  to	  the	  field,	  on	  this	  point	  at	  least,	  Schacht’s	  position	  reads	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  an	  essentialising	  trend	  within	  the	  Orientalist	  scholarship	   of	   old,	   a	   scholarship	   which	  Wael	   Hallaq	   identified	   as	   commencing	  from	   a	   premise	   which	   dismissed	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   any	   originality	   within	  Muslim	  religious	  thought65.	  	  Hallaq	  has	  engaged	  consistently	  with	   the	  still	  under	  researched	  question	  of	   the	  function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	   its	   relationship	   to	   fiqh.	  His	  early	   scholarship	  on	   the	  matter	  strongly	  challenged	  the	  received	  wisdom	  of	  his	  predecessors	  in	  the	  field,	  asserting	  that	  it	  ‘cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  Islamic	  legal	  theory	  as	  a	  hermeneutical	  logical	   and	   ultimately	   juridical	   system	   is	   disconnected	   from	   actual	   reality	   and	  positive	   law’66.	   His	   critique	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   Orientalist	   reading	   of	   this	  relationship	  introduced	  an	  element	  which	  he	  felt	  had	  been	  seriously	  ignored	  by	  Western	   scholarship	   in	   their	   appraisal	   of	   the	   intellectual	   output	   of	   Muslim	  thinkers	  in	  general,	  and	  Muslim	  jurisprudential	  thought	  in	  particular,	  an	  element	  he	  referred	  to	  in	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘worldliness’	  of	  scholarship67.	  	  The	  ‘worldliness’	  of	  an	  author	  is	  the	  very	  source	  of	  originality	  that	  Hallaq	  claimed	  had	   previously	   been	   undervalued	   or	   ignored.	   Any	   analysis	   of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  must	  account	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   element	   ‘defined	   as	   the	   aggregate	   of	   the	  components	   of	   reality	   surrounding	   and	   affecting,	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Joseph	  Schact,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Islamic	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1964),	  p.	  60.	  65See	  ‘Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  Beyond	  Tradition’.	  66	  Ibid,	  p.	  177.	  67	  Ibid.	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consciously	  or	  subconsciously,	  the	  thinking	  processes	  and	  hence	  the	  intellectual	  production	  of	  the	  Uṣūlī’68.	  His	  reading	  of	  the	  ‘inextricable’69	  relationship	  between	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	   fiqh,	   informed	  by	  developments	   in	   the	   field	  which	   ‘increasingly	  and	  consistently	  point	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  a	  close	   link	  between	  positive	   law	  and	  socio-­‐economic,	  political	  and	  other	  realities’,	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  function	  of	  his	  recognition	   that	   ‘juridico-­‐social	   reality	   constitutes	   the	  most	  obvious	  element	  of	  worldliness	  for	  an	  Uṣūlī’70.	  This	  strong	  affirmation	  of	  a	  necessary	  relationship	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  fiqh	  does	   not	  mean	   to	   say	   that	   scholars	   of	   Islamic	   legal	   studies	   have	   jettisoned	   the	  early	  position,	  represented	  above	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Schacht,	  altogether.	  A	  prevalent	  scepticism	  still	  remains	  in	  endorsing	  the	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	  and	  fiqh	  as	  portrayed	  by	  the	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  themselves.	  Islamic	  legal	  studies	  has	  continued	  to	  criticise	  how	  participants	  within	  the	  discipline	  portray	  the	   function	   of	   the	   discipline,	   and	   often	   in	   uncompromising	   terms.	   Sherman	  Jackson	   argues	   that	   ‘the	   commonly	   accepted	   dictum	   that	   Islamic	   legal	   theory	  (uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh)	   is	   the	   exclusive	   determinant	   of	   the	   content	   of	   Islamic	   law’	   is	   no	  more	  than	  a	  ‘fiction’71.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  demands	  of	  legal	  practicalities	  and	   the	  desire	   for	  a	   theoretical	   consistency	   in	   the	  hermeneutic	  of	  interpretation,	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   attempting	   to	  systematically	   justify	   the	   pre-­‐occurring	   legal	   disposition	   found	   in	   early	   fiqhi	  doctrine	   or	   the	   actual	   social	   practice	   of	  Muslim	   communities.	   Thus	   for	   Jackson	  the	  entire	  endeavour	  that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  ‘routinely	  amounts	  to	  [,]	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  sophisticated	  exercise	  in	  “theory	  talk”...	  [I]n	  this	  capacity,	  it’s	  essential	  function	  is	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  discourse	  via	  which	  views	  can	  be	  validated	  by	  rendering	  them	  legal’72.	  He	  sees	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  a	  normative	  means	  of	  rendering	   constraints	   to	   the	   process	   of	   validating	   those	   responses	   to	  circumstances	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  ‘acceptable	  (if	  not	  true)	  embodiments	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  ‘Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  Beyond	  Tradition’,	  p.	  177	  69	  Ibid,	  p.182.	  70	  ‘Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  Beyond	  Tradition’,	  p.178.	  Beyond	  the	  juridico-­‐social	  reality,	  amongst	  the	  other	  factors	  highlighted	  by	  Hallaq	  as	  influencing	  this	  ‘worldliness’,	  are	  the	  intellectual	  traditions	  drawn	  upon	  by	  the	  Uṣūlī	  and	  the	  audience	  to	  which	  he	  speaks.	  	  71Sherman	  A.	  Jackson,	  	  ‘Fiction	  and	  Formalism:	  Towards	  a	  Functional	  Analysis	  of	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐Fiqh’	  in	  Bernard	  G.	  Weiss	  (ed.)	  Studies	  in	  Islamic	  Legal	  Theory	  (Leiden,	  Brill,	  2002)	  p.	  178.	  	  72	  Ibid,	  pp.	  178-­‐179.	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scriptural	   intent’	   as	   distinguished	   	   ‘from	   the	   views	   that	   are,	   say,	   scientific,	  ideological	  or	  simply	  pragmatic’73.	  This	  view	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  above	  cited	  position	  of	  Hallaq	  where	  he	  argues	  that	   the	   two	   disciplines	   are	   ‘inextricably	   linked’74,	   for	   to	   say	   that	   there	   is	   a	  relationship	   between	   the	   two	   disciplines	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   this	  association	   is	   as	   it	   is	   conceived	   by	   the	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   themselves,	   it	  simply	   states	   that	   there	   is	   some	   form	   of	   relationship.	   Despite	   bemoaning	   the	  continued	  ambiguity	  over	  how	  this	  relationship	  has	  been	  viewed	  by	  non-­‐Muslim	  scholars75,	  in	  his	  later	  work	  we	  find	  Hallaq	  also	  describing	  the	  function	  of	  uṣūl,	  at	  least	  partially,	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  resonates	  highly	  with	  Jacksons	  portrayal	  when	  he	   identifies	   the	   early	   legal	   theory	   as	   being	   ‘normatively’	   and	   ‘eclectically’	  descriptive76.	  	  Aside	   from	   this	   descriptive	   element,	   Hallaq	   does	   however	   maintain	   that	   the	  prescriptive	  function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  more	  sophisticated	  ‘than	  we	  have	  thus	  far	  allowed	   for,	   and,	   juridically	   speaking	   it	   had	   far-­‐reaching	   consequences’77.	   It	   is	  this	  prescriptive	  function	  which	  takes	  centre	  stage	  in	  most	  definitions	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh,	  conferring	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  is	  a	  theory	  which	  ‘was	  intended	  to	  afford	  jurists	  all	   the	   interpretive	   tools	   	   needed	   to	   address	   any	   eventuality,	   from	   those	   novel	  unprecedented	   cases	   to	   the	   pre-­‐existing	   ones	   that	   require	   a	   minor	   or	   not	   so	  minor	   hermeneutical	   tweak’78.	   There	   is	   little	   doubt	   in	   the	   validity	   of	   Hallaq’s	  appraisal	   that	  the	  actual	  application	  of	   this	  theory	  to	  novel	  cases	  was	  relatively	  rare	  and	  that	  the	  theory	  pre-­‐dominantly	  serviced	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  type.	  However	  the	   vast	   political,	   social	   and	   cultural	   changes	   experienced	   by	  Muslim	   societies	  means	  that	  it	  is	  this	  aspect	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  that	  is	  now	  taking	  centre	  ground.	  Rather	  than	   having	   become	   ‘largely	   decimated’	   as	   Hallaq	   claims79 ,	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	  increasingly	  pivotal-­‐	  in	  ways	  which	  it	  previously	  may	  never	  have	  been-­‐	  to	  Muslim	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  ‘Fiction	  and	  Formalism’,	  p.179.	  74	  Hallaq,	  ‘Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  Beyond	  Tradition’,	  p.182.	  75	  	  According	  to	  Hallaq	  this	  ambiguity	  persists	  largely	  on	  account	  of	  two	  factors;	  the	  theological	  prism	  through	  which	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  has	  become	  increasingly	  viewed	  and	  the	  persistence	  of	  colonialist	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  fiqh,	  and	  thus	  by	  priority	  uṣūl,	  to	  social	  and	  political	  reality,	  Sharī’a,	  p.	  73.	  	  76	  Hallaq,	  Sharī‘a,	  pp.73-­‐74.	  77	  Ibid,	  p.75.	  78	  Ibid,	  p.	  76.	  79	  Ibid.	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endeavours	   of	   understanding	   and	   implementing	   their	   normative	   ideals 80 .	  Hallaq’s	   engagement	   with	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   although	   impressively	   deep,	   has	   been	  predominantly	  in	  historical	  and	  Sunni	  trajectories,	  neither	  of	  which	  are	  a	  direct	  concern	  here.	  However	   the	   findings	  pertaining	   to	   the	   function	  of	   Sunni	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   through	   the	   history	   of	   Muslim	   religious	   thought	   are	   not	   entirely	   without	  relevance	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  function	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  particularly	  in	  its	  formative	  period,	  evolved	  within	  and	  subsequent	   to	   the	  context	  of	  developments	   in	   the	  Sunni	   field81.	  Yet	   the	  current	  state	  of	  Shī	  ī͑	  and	  Sunni	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  clearly	  not	  entirely	  analogous	  for	  a	  plethora	  of	   reasons,	   reasons	   whose	   investigation	   here	   would	   require	   a	   substantial	   and	  unwarranted	  diversion,	  and	  it	  is	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  the	  function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   is	   described	   in	   the	   Shī	  ͑ī	   context	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   the	   immediate	   focus	   for	  further	  deliberation	  here.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Serious	  engagement	  with	  Shī	  ī͑	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  per	  se,	  never	  mind	  the	  specific	  question	  of	   the	   function	   of	  uṣūl	   fiqh	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought,	   is	   still	   a	   relatively	   underdeveloped	  area	  of	  study	  within	  Islamic	  legal	  studies.	  The	  works	  of	  Robert	  Gleave,	  along	  with	  his	   late	  doctoral	  supervisor	  Norman	  Calder,	  are	  amongst	  the	  most	   important	  of	  the	   scarce	   engagements	   with	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   from	   scholars	   who	   would	   not	  somehow	  position	  themselves	  within	  the	  folds	  of	  the	  tradition	  itself.	   	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Sunni	  theory,	  Gleave	  notes	  that	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  dual	  aim	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  being	  on	  one	  hand	  	  ‘prescriptive’,	  in	  a	  normative	  sense	  of	  how	  fiqh	  ought	   to	  be	  derived,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  as	   justificatory,	   ‘justifying	  the	   law	  as	   it	   is	  already	   known’,	   and	   how	   these	   aims	   relate	   to	   others	   genres,	   is	   a	   ‘debated	  point’82.	  Hope	   of	   resolving	   such	  debates	   is	   not	   limited	   solely	   by	   the	   scarcity	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  For	  an	  explicit	  example	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  this	  centrality	  within	  Sunni	  discourse	  see	  Imran	  Ahsan	  Khan	  Nyazee,	  Theories	  of	  Islamic	  Law;	  The	  Methodology	  of	  Ijtihād	  (Kuala	  Lumpur,	  The	  Other	  Press,	  2002),	  where	  he	  states	  ‘It	  will	  not	  be	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  any	  development	  in	  Islamic	  law	  today	  depends	  upon	  the	  comprehension,	  development,	  and	  adaptation	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh’	  p.	  8.	  81	  In	  al-­‐Dharīʿa	  ilā	  uṣūl	  al-­‐Sharīʿa,	  arguably	  the	  earliest	  systematic	  treatment	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  al-­‐Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  makes	  reference	  throughout	  to	  a	  range	  of	  Sunni	  authorities.	  Although	  this	  engagement	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  critical	  one,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  issues	  of	  ijtihād	  (Independent	  Juristic	  reasoning),	  qiyās	  (syllogistic	  reasoning)	  and	  al-­‐khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid	  (Isolated	  reports	  of	  the	  Sunna),	  al-­‐Murtaḍā’s	  treatment	  is	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  shaped	  by	  his	  response	  to	  the	  established	  positions	  in	  the	  prevalent	  Sunni	  discourse	  of	  the	  day.	  Also	  See	  ʿ͑͑Abd	  al-­‐Hādī	  Al-­‐Faḍlī	  
Durūs	  al-­‐uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  al-­‐Imāmiyya	  (Beirut,	  Markaz	  al-­‐Ghadīr,	  2007)	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  68-­‐69.	  82	  Inevitable	  Doubt.	  p.3.	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research	   in	   the	   area,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   individual	   nature	   of	   the	  Muslim	   scholarly	  endeavours	   in	  question,	   so	  much	  so	   that	  generalisations	  about	   the	   relationship	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh	  are	  noted	  to	  become	  ‘difficult’83	  even	  within	  a	   distinct	   scholarly	   trend	   of	   a	   particular	   tradition.	   This	   study	   being	   concerned	  with	   the	   potential	   in	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   to	   offer	   an	   ͑Adliyya	   reading	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   thus	  warrants	   a	   brief	   sketch	   of	   how	   the	   function	   of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	   its	  relation	  to	  fiqh	  is	  portrayed	  within	  Uṣūlī	  thought,	  the	  dominant	  juristic	  tradition	  of	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought84.	  	  1.4.2	  The	  relation	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  fiqh	  in	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  scholarship	  	  That	   a	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   and	   fiqh	   is	  rarely	   found	   in	   the	   advanced	  works	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	   particularly	   in	  view	   of	   its	   tendency	   to	   dissect	   and	   analyse	   even	   the	   most	   tangential	   of	  discussions,	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  a	  relationship	  whose	  nature	  is	  largely	  uncontested	  and,	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   themselves	   at	   least,	   one	   which	   is	  obvious	   to	   all	   but	   the	   uninitiated.	   	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   treatment,	   interestingly	  included	  only	   in	   the	  most	  elementary	   level	  of	  his	   three	  part	   text	  book	  al-­‐Durūs	  
fi	  	   ͑Ilm	  al-­‐Uṣūl,	  gives	  a	  sophisticated	  analysis	  of	  how	  this	  relationship	  has	  come	  to	  be	   viewed	   amongst	   the	   contemporary	   theoreticians	   themselves.	   Uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	  defined	   by	   him	   as	   ‘the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   common	   elements	   (	  ͑anāsir	   al-­‐
mushtarika)	   in	   the	   process	   of	   inference	   of	   religious	   regulation	   (al-­‐ḥukm	   al-­‐
shar	͑  ī)’85,	  is	  described	  as	  the	  manṭiq	  or	  logic	  of	  fiqh86,	  where	  fiqh	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  inference	  of	  aḥkām87.	  For	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  just	  as	  the	  discipline	  of	  manṭiq	  engages	  in	  the	  study	  of	  general	  principles	  whose	  application	  ensures	  that	  one’s	  modes	  of	   thinking	  or	  deductive	  reasoning	   per	   se	   be	   correct,	   the	   discipline	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   studies	   those	   general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Inevitable	  Doubt,	  p.	  3.	  84	  For	  discussion	  on	  the	  development	  and	  ascendency	  of	  the	  Uṣūlī	  ‘rationalist’	  school	  see	  Zackery	  Hearn,	  Uṣūli	  Shī	  ͑īsm:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  an	  Islamic	  Reform	  Movement	  in	  Early	  Modern	  Iraq	  and	  Iran,	  Unpublished	  PhD	  Dissertation	  (Department	  of	  History,	  University	  of	  Utah,	  2011).	  	  	  85	  Durūs,	  Vol	  1.	  p.46.	  86	  Ibid,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  50.	  87	  Ibid,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  45.	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principles	  whose	  purpose	   is	   to	  ensure	  that	  one’s	   fiqhi	   reasoning	   is	  correct-­‐	  and	  thus	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  can	  be	  termed	  the	   logic	  of	   fiqh88.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	   interrelated	  disciplines	   is	  one	  of	   ‘theory	  and	  application’89,	  where	  both	   the	  theory	   (uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh)	   and	   its	   proper	   application	   (fiqh)	   require	   their	   own	  intellectual	  exertion	  (juhūd	  	  ͑ilmī)	  for	  their	  proper	  formulation90.	  	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  picture	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  governing	  the	  appropriate	  mechanics	  and	  thus	  offering	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   the	   actual	  practice	  of	   fiqh	   does	  not	  entirely	  ignore	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  scholars	  of	  Islamic	  legal	  studies	  regarding	  the	  historical	  reality	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  fiqh	  prior	  to	  that	  of	  uṣūl.	  In	  his	  definition	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	   indeed	  recognises	   this	  priority,	   for	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   is	   characterised	   as	   the	   study	  of	   the	   common	  elements	   found	   in	   the	  actual	   inferential	   process	   that	   is	   fiqh.	   Yet	   this	   does	   not	   preclude	   a	   mutual	  interplay	  between	  the	  two	  disciplines,	  for	  although	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  an	  independent	  disciple	   emerged	   subsequent	   to	   fiqh,	   fiqh	   was	   never	   practised	   in	   complete	  isolation	  of	  the	  theoretical	  questions	  that	  would	  later	  become	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh;	  The	   discipline	   of	   uṣūl	   emerged	   within	   the	   embraces	   (aḥḍān)	   of	   the	  discipline	   of	   fiqh,	   just	   as	   the	   discipline	   of	   fiqh	   emerged	   within	   the	  embraces	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  ḥadith.	  At	  first,	  the	  science	  of	  uṣūl	  was	  not	  independent	  of	  fiqh,	  as	  the	  discipline	  of	  
fiqh	   developed	   and	   the	   horizons	   of	   fiqhi	   thought	   broadened,	   general	  trends	  and	  common	  elements	  became	  revealed	  and	  apparent91.	  It	  was	   the	   recognition	  of	   these	   common	   threads	  within	   the	   inferential	   process,	  ‘without	   which	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   could	   not	   be	   extracted’	   that	   signalled	   the	  birth	  of	  the	  independent	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  a	  discipline	  which	  would	  allow	  these	  theoretically	  common	  elements	  to	  be	  discussed	  and	  analysed	  in	  isolation	  of	  the	  specific	  cases	  dealt	  with	  in	  fiqh92.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  50.	  89	  Ibid,	  p.	  54.	  90	  Ibid,	  p.	  53.	  91	  Ibid.	  	  92	  Ibid,	  p.	  54.	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Accepting	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  explanation	  of	   the	  manner	  of	   the	  development	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh,	  somewhat	  tempers	  the	   impact	  of	   the	  primary	  historical	  data	  referred	  to	  by	  scholars	  of	  Islamic	  legal	  studies	  who	  have	  questioned	  the	  function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   based	   on	   their	   observation	   that	   ‘the	   legal	   doctrine	   represented	   by	   fiqh	  historically	  preceded	  the	  conscious,	  deliberate	  and	  discursive	  elaboration	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	  theory’93.	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  point	  is	  that	  although	  the	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  emerged	   subsequently,	   the	   practice	   of	   fiqh	   was	   never	   possible	   without	  engagement	  with	   the	   theoretical	   questions	   and	  presupposition	  which	   form	   the	  subject	  matter	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  In	  the	  formative	  years	  the	  theoretical	  issues	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	   were	   not	   isolated	   from	   the	   applied	   questions	   of	   fiqh.	   The	   theoretical	  elements	  that	  are	  now	  the	  subject	  matter	   for	  the	   independent	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	  were	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  actual	  process	   involved	   in	   fiqh	  during	   those	  formative	  years	  albeit	   in	  a	  simpler	  and	  less	  sophisticated	  form	  than	  they	  would	  later	  take	  on.	  In	  this	  early	  period	  the	  need	  to	  independently	  explicate,	  codify	  and	  elaborate	  these	  principles	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  felt,	  a	  need	  that	  would	  subsequently	  increase	   with	   the	   ever	   widening	   distance	   between	   the	   revelatory	   period	   and	  those	  seeking	  to	  interpret	  and	  practice	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   depiction	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   fiqh	   and	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   although	  convincingly	   arguing	   for	   a	   concomitancy	   between	   theory	   and	   application	   since	  the	  earliest	  developments	  of	  fiqh,	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  questions	  of	  whether	  the	  role	   of	   this	   theory	   historically	   was	   actually	   more	   justificatory,	   normatively	  descriptive	   and	   directed	   to	   providing	   a	   hermeneutic	   for	   rendering	   particular	  norms	   legal	   and	   authoritative	   rather	   than	   being	   an	   actual	   independent	   engine	  room	   for	   the	   production	   of	   norms	   as	   depicted	   in	   his	   characterisation	   of	   the	  discipline	  as	   ‘the	  manṭiq	  of	   fiqh’.	   It	   is	  more	  than	  plausible	  that	  on	  occasions	  the	  driving	   force	   in	   this	   dialectic	   was	   an	   established	   fiqhi	   position	   which	   needed	  justifying	  and	  legitimising	  whereas	  at	  other	  times	  it	  was	  the	  theoretical	  position	  determined	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   which	   genuinely	   drove	   the	   opinion	   in	   fiqh.	   It	   is	  conceivable	  that	  such	  a	  variation	  between	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  relationship	  was	   likely	   even	  within	   a	   particular	   jurists’	   thought,	   however	   such	  complexities	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   disciplines	   are	   yet	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Hallaq,	  Sharī‘a,	  p.	  73.	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explored	   through	   the	   detailed	   and	   rigorous	   scholarship	   that	   such	   questions	  demand.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  A	  solitary	  study	  contributing	  to	  this	  question	  within	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  context	  is	  Gleave’s	  comparative	   work	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   legal	   theory	   on	   positive	   law	   across	   the	  Akhbārī-­‐Uṣūlī	   divide,	   where	   he	   examines	   the	   question	   of	   the	   permissibility	   of	  marrying	   more	   than	   one	   Fāṭimid	   women	   in	   the	   thought	   of	   Yūsuf	   Baḥrāni	   (d.	  1185/1772)	   and	   Waḥīd	   Biḥbahānī	   (d.	   1205/1791)94.	   Gleave	   sees	   Baḥrāni’s	  approach	  to	  the	  particular	  legal	  issue	  at	  hand	  representing	  ‘a	  direct	  application	  of	  the	   principles	   of	   uṣūl	   to	   a	   matter	   of	   furū	  ’͑95,	   furthermore	   in	   this	   particular	  instance	  the	  work	  of	  furū	  ͑	  al-­‐fiqh	  seems	  to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  reaffirm	  and	   justify	   distinctive	  Akhbārī	   positions	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	   In	   an	   ironic	   contrast	   to	  this,	   Biḥbahānī’s	   appraisal	   of	   the	   question	   is	   characterised	   as	  madhhab-­‐driven.	  Although	  Biḥbahānī’s	  arguments	  contain	  sophisticated	  argumentation	  based	  on	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  theory,	  the	  theory	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  inference	  of	   the	   fiqhi	   position,	   rather	   it	   is	   the	   limits	   of	   school	   tradition	   which	   are	   the	  driving	  force	  in	  an	  argument	  which	  proceeds	  from	  madhhab	   to	  uṣūl	  rather	  than	  from	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  fiqh96.	  	  Whether	  this	  single	  case	  is	   indicative	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh	  in	  each	  case	  of	  the	  vast	  body	  of	  issues	  which	  make	  up	  
furū	  ͑	   al-­‐fiqh,	   even	   for	   Biḥbahānī	   himself,	   never	   mind	   wider	   Uṣūlī	   discourse,	  cannot	  be	  established	  from	  this	  study	  alone-­‐	  such	  a	  generalisation	  would	  need	  a	  greater	  body	  of	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  breadth	  of	  its	  claim.	  Yet	  these	  findings	  do	  reiterate	  the	  caution	  necessary	  in	  accepting	  the	  almost	  rhetorical	  depiction	  of	  a	  causal	   relation	   between	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   and	   fiqh	   still	   found	   in	   the	   contemporary	  literature	   of	   scholars	   who	   would	   firmly	   position	   themselves	   within	   the	   a	  tradition	   whose	   contemporary	   dominance	   owes	   much	   to	   the	   scholarly	  endeavours	  of	  Biḥbahānī	  himself97.	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  Robert	  Gleave,	  ‘Marrying	  Fāṭimid	  Women:	  The	  relationship	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  Legal	  Theory	  and	  Substantive	  Law	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  95Ibid,	  p.	  49.	  96	  Ibid,	  pp.	  66-­‐67.	  97	  On	  Biḥbahānī,	  his	  influence	  and	  most	  important	  students	  see	  Heern,	  Uṣūli	  Shī	  ͑īsm,	  especially	  chapters	  2	  and	  3,	  pp.	  25-­‐87.	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In	  Inevitable	  Doubt,	  a	  broader	  ranging	  theoretical	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  same	  two	  thinkers	  encountered	  in	  Marrying	  Fatimid	  Women,	  Gleave’s	  treatment	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	   ‘as	  a	  largely	  independent	  genre,	  works	  of	  which	  were	  written	  and	  taught	  in	   an	   educational	   setting,	   the	   main	   aim	   of	   which	   was	   to	   hone	   the	   intellectual	  skills	   of	   students’98	  does	   not	   seem	   entirely	   consistent	  with	   his	   earlier	   findings.	  Having	  established	  the	  complexity	  and	  differing	  function	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  between	  the	   two	   thinkers,	   and	  having	  noted	   the	  difficulties	   of	   generalisations	   regarding	  the	  role	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  to	  then	  apparently	  treat	  the	  role	  of	  the	  discipline	  in	  both	  cases	  of	  Baḥrāni	  and	  Biḥbahānī	  to	  a	  closed	  intellectual	  exercise	  is	  a	  curious	  step.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  purely	  pedagogical	  element	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  should	  be	  underestimated,	   for	   it	   is	  well	   known	   that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   is	   amongst	   the	  peak	  of	   the	   sciences	   studied	   in	   the	  Muslim	  scholarly	  milieu,	   a	  priority	  which	   is	  arguably	  more	  pronounced	  in	  a	  Shīʿī	  educational	  context	  which	  continues	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  need	  to	  produce	  Mujtahid’s	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Twelfth	  Imam99.	  This	   intellectual	   exercise,	   has	   produced	   an	   output	   whose	   relevance	   to	   the	  inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   at	   times	   may	   well	   be	   only	   oblique,	   but	   whose	  contributions	   to	   wider	   philosophical	   and	   theological	   issues,	   particularly	  questions	   of	   philosophy	   of	   language	   and	   hermeneutics,	   are	   vast	   and	   as	   yet	  relatively	  unexplored.	  Amongst	  the	  subsidiary	  outcomes	  envisaged	  for	  this	  study	  is	   to	  demonstrate	   the	   relevance	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   beyond	   its	   core	   remit	   of	   how	   to	  interpret	  normative	  implications	  of	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  sources	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  theological	  questions	  and	  issues	  of	  moral	  philosophy	  entailed	  within	  discussion	  of	   the	   rational	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   are	  approached	  with	  a	  sophistication	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  which	  advances	  the	  engagement	  found	  within	  other	  disciplines.	  	  	  	  	   	  	  1.4.3	  The	  continued	  relevance	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  questions	  of	  Muslim	  normativity	  	  Despite	   any	   persistent	   doubts	   which	   may	   remain	   over	   the	   picture	   offered	   by	  insider	  accounts	  of	  the	  role	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  has	  played	  historically	  in	  determining	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Inevitable	  Doubt,	  pp.	  3-­‐4.	  	  	  99	  On	  the	  occultation	  of	  the	  Imām	  see	  Jassim	  M.	  Hussain,	  The	  occultation	  of	  the	  Twelfth	  Imam:	  a	  
historical	  background.	  (London,	  Muḥammadi	  Trust,	  1982).	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positive	  doctrine	  of	  fiqh,	  its	  current	  and	  future	  relevance	  in	  	  this	  regard	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  Differences	  of	  opinion	  amongst	  the	  major	  Shī	  ͑ī	   jurists	  in	  recent	  times	   can	   often	   be	   directly	   attributed	   to	   their	   different	   theoretical	   positions	   in	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh100.	   That	   these	  uṣūl	   driven	   differences	   exhibited	   in	   positive	   doctrine	  may	  still	  be	  firmly	  within	  madhhab	  boundaries,	  and	  thus	  not	  completely	  refuting	  the	  implications	  of	  Gleave’s	  findings	  with	  respect	  to	  Biḥbahānī’s	  madhhab	  driven	  approach	   to	   furū	  ͑	   al-­‐fiqh,	   reaffirms	   the	   necessity	   of	   further	   close	   study	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   two	   disciplines	   of	   the	   theoretical	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	   the	  applied	  science	  of	   fiqh.	  Yet	   it	   is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  historical	  role	  that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  might	   have	   played	   in	   determining	   fiqh	   that	   this	   study	   seeks	   to	   justify	   its	  tenability.	  It	  is	  only	  the	  potential	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  in	  the	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  context	  to	  maintain,	  rediscover	  or	  even	  apply	  in	  previously	  only	  theoretically	  conceived	  ways,	   its	   prescriptive	   function	   that	   this	   study	   needs	   to	   assume	   to	   justify	   its	  endeavour.	  	  In	   a	   context	   where	   Muslims	   have	   and	   continue	   to	   experience	   change	   in	  previously	  unprecedented	  ways,	  the	  prescriptive	  element	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  theory	  is	  becoming	   ever	   more	   important.	   In	   fact	   it	   matters	   not	   whether	   changes	   in	   the	  theory	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  can	  actually	  be	  prescriptive	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  manṭiq	  of	  fiqh)	  or	  whether	  they	  would	  simply	  reflect	  the	  needed	  justification	  for	  a	  changing	  body	  of	   juristic	  opinion,	  a	  body	  of	  opinions	  which	  in	  itself	   is	   intimately	  related	  to	  the	  social	   reality	   of	   the	   opinion	   seeking	   Muslims.	   Many	   of	   these	   opinion-­‐seeking	  Muslims	  may	  be	  unsatisfied	  with	  traditional	  interpretations,	  yet	  still	  seek	  to	  live	  their	  lives	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  perceived	  as	  authentically	  legitimised	  within	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  framework.	  Ultimately,	   all	   questions	   regarding	   interpretation	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   and	   all	  efforts	  to	  interpret	  Sharī	  ͑a	  require	  or	  assume	  methodological	  discourse.	  The	  vast	  array	  of	  emerging	  and	  evolving	  hermeneutical	   techniques,	   some	  well	  grounded	  in	   traditional	   discourse	   others	   explicitly	   distancing	   themselves	   from	   the	   vast	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  For	  example	  in	  the	  context	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐	  ʿaql	  (rationality	  as	  a	  source)	  different	  opinions	  regarding	  the	  Uṣūlī	  question	  of	  mas’alat	  al-­‐ḍid,	  which	  asks	  whether	  a	  command	  upon	  a	  thing	  necessitates	  (iqtiḍā)	  a	  prohibition	  upon	  its	  opposite,	  leads	  to	  differing	  opinions	  at	  the	  level	  of	  fiqh.	  Those	  who	  affirm	  that	  such	  a	  necessitation	  exists	  reject	  the	  validity	  of	  supererogatory	  fasts	  whilst	  one	  has	  an	  unfulfilled	  duty	  for	  an	  obligatory	  fast	  pending,	  whereas	  those	  who	  don’t	  accept	  the	  necessitation	  maintain	  that	  the	  supererogatory	  fast	  can	  be	  valid.	  For	  further	  details	  on,	  and	  an	  outline	  of	  debates	  regarding	  the	  form	  of	  such	  rational	  hermeneutics	  see	  Chapter	  2.	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body	  of	  historical	  tradition101,	  necessarily	  engage	  with	  core	  questions	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   such	   as;	   what	   are	   the	   sources	   of	   normativity	   and	   how	   should	   they	   be	  interpreted?	   Whether	   the	   emerging	   maqāṣidī,	   contextualist	   Qur’ān	   centred	  readings,	  or	  neo-­‐Mu	  ͑tazilī	  approaches	  can	  challenge	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  range	  of	   traditional	   ‘textualist’	   methods,	   which	   still	   command	   such	   authority	  throughout	  Muslim	   societies,	   is	   to	   a	   large	   extent	  dependent	  on	   these	   emerging	  hermeneutical	   techniques	   being	   supported	   through	   a	   rigorous	   theoretical	  framework.	  A	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  it	  stands,	  having	  continued	  to	  be	  infused	  with	  a	  philosophical	  impetus	  and	  method	  throughout	  its	  development	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent	  than	  in	   the	   Sunni	   equivalent,	   has	  much	   to	   offer	   these	   new	   emerging	  methods.	   This	  study	  wishes	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  it	  also	  has	  a	  hitherto	  unrealized	  latent	  potential	  to	  inform	  a	  significant	  shift	  within	  the	  traditional	  theory	  itself,	  the	  importance	  of	  which	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated	  at	  a	  time	  where	  the	  authority	  of	  tradition	  is	  still	   paramount	   for	   many	   Muslims.	   It	   is	   shifts	   from	   within	   the	   traditional	  discourse	  and	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  traditional	  discourse	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  maintain	   the	   legitimising	   quality	   and	   authoritative	   significance	   for	   the	   widest	  range	  of	  both	  interpreters	  of,	  and	  would	  be	  adherents	  to,	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  With	  such	  a	  context,	  examining	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  has	  not	   allowed	   the	   rich	   theological	   resources	   of	   the	   ͑Adliyya	  tradition	   to	  bear	   fruit	  with	  a	  substantive	  role	  for	  rational	  morality	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  and	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  these	  resources	  cold	  come	  to	  significantly	  impact	  the	  fiqhi	  process	  is,	  I	  feel,	  more	  than	  well	  justified.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  For	  example	  in	  Radical	  Reform;	  Islamic	  Ethics	  and	  Liberation	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  Tariq	  Ramadan	  sets	  out	  his	  agenda	  and	  indicates	  a	  methodology	  for	  change	  which	  is	  placed	  firmly	  within	  the	  context	  of	  classical	  debates	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  diverse	  projects	  of	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Asma	  Barlas,	  or	  in	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī,	  context	  	  Abdul	  Karim	  Saroush,	  are	  explicitly	  anti-­‐traditionalist.	  Such	  anti-­‐traditionalist	  approaches,	  which	  admittedly	  range	  in	  their	  rigour	  and	  scope,	  still	  have	  to	  directly	  deal	  with	  the	  questions	  regarding	  method	  and	  methodology	  of	  interpreting	  the	  relevant	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  that	  may	  come	  to	  inform	  our	  understanding	  of	  religion	  and	  revelatory	  texts-­‐	  all	  of	  which	  are	  questions	  that	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  remit	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	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1.5	  Sources,	  structure	  and	  outline	  of	  the	  study	  	  Despite	  significant	  internal	  diversity	  amongst	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  scholarship	  on	  issues	   of	   both	   fiqh	   and	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   the	   overall	   framework	   within	   which	   this	  diversity	   is	   limited	   is	   shaped	   by	   the	   continued	   dominance	   of	  what	  Modarressi	  terms	  ‘The	  School	  of	  Shaykh	  al-­‐Anṣārī’102.	  	  The	  developments	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  seen	  through	   the	  works	  of	  Murtaḍā	   Ibn	  Muḥammad	  Amīn	  al-­‐Anṣārī	   (d.	  1281/1864),	  and	  his	   students,	   represents	   the	   culmination	   and	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   the	  Uṣūlī	  theory	   as	   the	   dominant	   authoritative	   trend	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought103.	   	   The	   works	   of	  Anṣārī	  himself	  are	  still	  central	  to	  the	  training	  of	  Shī	  ͑i	  scholars	  and	  the	  epistemic	  framework	  that	  he	  set	  out	  has	  become	  paradigmatic	  of	  the	  modern	  period	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh.	   This	   epistemic	   framework	   emphasised	   the	   sharp	   distinction	   between	  certainty	   (qaṭʿ)	   and	   all	   forms	   of	   probable	   or	   suppositional	   knowledge	   (ẓann),	  where	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  authority	  of	  religious	  sources	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  
qaṭʿ	   and	   any	   less	   than	   certain	   sources	   of	   knowledge	   are	   deemed	   to	   require	   a	  certain	  validation	  before	  they	  can	  be	  considered	  authoritative.	  Not	  only	  are	  these	  epistemic	  ideas,	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  at	  length	  in	  what	  follows,	  paradigmatic	  of	  modern	   and	   contemporary	   Uṣūlī	   thought,	   they	   are	   pivotal	   to	   explaining	   the	  systemic	   redundancy	  of	   independent	   rationality	   as	   a	   source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  across	   a	  the	   vast	   majority	   of	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	   scholarship.	   Attempts	   to	   explain	   the	  theoretical	   reasons	   why	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   moral	   rationalism	   fundamental	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  has	  not	  resulted	  in	  independent	  rationality	  playing	  a	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	   inference	   of	   fiqh,	   are	   here	   thus	   focussed	  primarily	   on	   the	   study	   of	  modern	  Shī	͑  ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  The	  continued	  dominance	  of	  Anṣārī’s	  epistemic	  scheme	  is	  all	  the	  more	   vivid	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   those	   contemporary	   Uṣūlī	   scholars	   such	   as	  Mohsen	   Kadivar	   or	   Yusef	   Saanei,	   who	   claim	   or	   have	   been	   described	   to	   have	  adopted	   significant	   shifts	   in	   their	   theory	   from	   the	   characteristic	   picture	   of	  modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   still	   seem	   to	   operate	   within	   Anṣārī’s	   epistemic	  framework104.	  Such	  diversity	  and	  dynamism	  	  within	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  means	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  law,	  pp.	  57-­‐58.	  	  103	  For	  a	  dedicated	  study	  dealing	  with	  theoretical	  aspects	  of	  the	  thought	  of	  Anṣārī	  and	  his	  most	  important	  students,	  along	  woth	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context	  in	  which	  they	  emerged,	  see	  Heern,	  
Usuli	  Shī	  ͑īsm.	  	  104	  For	  Mohsen	  Kadivar’s	  theory	  of	  ‘Islam	  as	  an	  End	  in	  Itself’	  see	  his	  ‘From	  Traditional	  Islam	  to	  Islam	  as	  an	  End	  in	  Itself’	  Die	  Welt	  des	  Islams,	  Vol.	  51	  (2011)	  pp.	  478-­‐483	  and	  Yasuyuki	  Matsunaga,	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this	  framework	  is	  being	  increasingly	  challenged	  and	  reconsidered,	  both	  directly	  and	   indirectly,	   yet	   this	   study	  will	   limit	   its	   focus	   to	   examining	   the	   reasons	  why	  independent	   rationality	   is	   redundant	   through	   examination	   of	   the	   ideas	  represented	   in	   modern	   works	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   situated	   firmly	   within	   the	  school	  of	  Anṣārī.	  	  Accordingly	   one	   of	   the	   central	   sources	   relied	   upon	   in	   this	   study,	   particularly	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   analysis	   of	   the	   epistemic	   framework	   for	   the	   authority	   of	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge,	  is	  of	  course	  the	  seminal	  collection	  of	  Anṣārī’s	  own	  work,	  Farā’id	  al-­‐	  uṣūl	   also	  known	  simply	  as	  al-­‐Rasā’il.	  The	  next	  most	   important	  work	   of	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   both	   for	   the	   value	   of	   the	   text	   itself	   and	   the	  numerous	  sophisticated	  and	  in	  depth	  commentaries	  to	  which	  it	  has	  given	  rise,	  is	  the	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl	  of	  Muḥammad	  Kāḍim	  Al-­‐Khurasānī	  (d.	  1329/1911).	  This	  study	  has	  referred	  extensively	  to	  both	  the	  commentaries	  and	  the	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl	   itself.	  However	  the	  pivot	  upon	  which	  the	  study	  revolves	  has	  been	  neither	  the	  work	  of	  Anṣārī	  nor	  Khurasānī,	  but	  instead	  centres	  on	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  found	  in	  one	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  of	  ‘the	  most	  important	  works’105	  of	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   Muḥammad	   Riḍā	   al-­‐Muẓaffar’s	   textbook	  
Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  Muḥammad	  Riḍā	  Muẓaffar	  (d.	  1384/1964)	  is	  arguably	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  figures	  of	  modern	  Hawza	  history.	  His	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  moves	  to	  reform	  religious	  learning	  in	  Najaf	  and	  beyond,	  initially	  through	  his	  educational	  society	   Muntaḍā	   al-­‐Nashr	   and	   later	   through	   the	   Kulliyāt	   al-­‐fiqh,	   saw	   the	  successful	   implementation	   of	  what	  was	   seen	   as	   radical	   changes	  which	   built	   on	  earlier	  calls	  for	  reform	  from	  Lebanese	  scholars	  such	  as	  Muḥsin	  al-­‐Amīn106,	  and	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ‘Human	  Rights	  and	  New	  Jurisprudence	  in	  Mohsen	  Kadivar’s	  Advocacy	  of	  “New-­‐Thinker”	  Islam’	  
Islam	  Die	  Welt	  des	  Islams,	  Vol.	  51	  (2011),	  pp.	  358-­‐381.	  Although	  Kadivar	  refers	  to	  the	  	  ͑Adliyya	  heritage	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  central	  theme	  in	  his	  hermeneutics,	  he	  explicitly	  does	  so	  only	  when	  judgements	  of	  rationality	  are	  ‘definitive’	  or	  certain,	  thus	  reflecting	  his	  continued	  debt	  to	  the	  epistemic	  framework	  of	  Anṣārī.	  	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  ‘paradigm	  shift’	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Saanei	  see	  Hamid	  Mavani,	  ‘Paradigm	  Shift	  in	  Twelver	  Shi’I	  Legal	  Theory	  (uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh):	  Ayatullah	  Yusef	  Saanei’	  The	  Muslim	  World,	  Vol	  99	  (2009),	  pp.	  335-­‐355.	  105	  For	  Modaressi’is	  list	  of	  the	  sixteen	  ‘most	  important’	  works	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  see	  An	  
Introduction	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  law,	  pp.	  10-­‐12.	  	  106	  See	  Sabrina	  Mervin,	  ‘The	  clerics	  of	  Jabal	  ‘Amil	  and	  the	  Reform	  of	  Religious	  Teaching	  in	  Najaf	  since	  the	  Beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  Century,’	  in	  Rainer	  Brunner	  and	  Werner	  Ende	  (eds.)	  The	  Twelver	  
Shia	  in	  Modern	  Times:	  Religious	  Culture	  &	  Political	  History,	  (Leiden,	  Brill,	  2001),	  pp.	  79-­‐93.	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a	  lesser	  extent	  Muḥsin	  Sharāra107.	  Amongst	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  movement	  was	  the	   establishment	   of	   a	   number	   of	   primary	   and	   intermediate	   level	   schools	  throughout	   Iraq	   where	   students	   could	   study	   a	   range	   of	   modern	   disciplines	  including	   foreign	   languages,	   psychology	   and	   sociology	   alongside	   their	   study	   of	  Arabic	   syntax,	   grammar,	   literature	   and	   Islamic	   jurisprudence108.	   Within	   the	  Hawza	  itself	  he	  was	  also	  able	  to	  drive	  changes	  to	  both	  the	  method	  and	  substance	  of	   instruction	   in	   the	   elementary	   and	   intermediate	   stages	   of	   an	   age-­‐old	   Shī	  ͑ī	  religious	  higher	  learning	  system.	  Regular	  examinations	  would	  come	  to	  feature	  as	  a	  check	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  studies	  that	  had	  been	  broadened	  to	  include	  previously	  sidelined	   disciplines,	   such	   as	   philosophy,	   within	   the	   central	   remit	   of	   Hawza	  training.	  As	  a	  precursor	  to	  these	  changes	  Muẓaffar’s	  society	  set	  about	  writing	  a	  new	  range	  of	  text	  books	  to	  replace	  the	  sometimes	  centuries	  old	  texts	  which	  had	  become	  the	  staple	  of	  the	  Hawza	  education.	  Two	  texts	  written	  by	  Muẓaffar	  himself,	  al-­‐Manṭiq	  and	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  eventually	  achieved	  widespread	  recognition	  and	  both	  continue	  to	   be	   a	   central	   part	   in	   the	   training	   of	   Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   to	   this	   day,	   playing	   an	  extensive	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   thinking	   of	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	   scholars	   prior	   to	  their	  entry	  into	  the	  most	  advanced	  (khārij)	  level	  of	  their	  studies.	  	  The	   continued	   centrality	   of	   Muẓaffar’s	  Uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   within	   Shī	  ͑ī	   higher	   learning	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   written	   as	   a	   textbook	  with	   a	   systematic	   approach	  more	  accessible	  than	  many	  modern	  works	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  are	  not	  however	  the	  primary	  reason	   for	   selecting	   it	   for	   a	   close	   reading	   here.	   Rather	   it	   is	   the	   unique	  way	   in	  which	  Muẓaffar	  deals	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  independent	  rationality	  (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
ʿaqliyya)	   itself	   that	  makes	   it	   an	   ideal	   source	   from	  which	   to	   build	   the	   intended	  analysis.	  As	  has	  already	  been	  indicated,	  in	  their	  treatment	  of	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  have	  engaged	  with,	  and	  sometimes	  significantly	  advanced,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  theological	   presuppositions	   of	   the	   issue	   entailed	   in	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  See	  Werner	  Ende,	  ‘From	  Revolt	  to	  Resignation:	  The	  Life	  of	  Shaykh	  Muḥsin	  Sharāra’	  in	  Asma	  Afsaruddin	  and	  A.H.	  Mathias	  Zahniser	  (eds.),	  Humanism,	  Culture	  and	  Language	  in	  the	  Near	  east,	  Studies	  in	  Honour	  of	  Georg	  Krotkoff	  (Eisenbrauns,	  1997)	  pp.	  61-­‐70.	  108	  Robert	  Riggs,	  ‘Re-­‐establishing	  the	  Foundations:	  Reformism	  and	  Continuity	  in	  the	  Hawza	  of	  Najaf’,	  Shī	  ͑a	  Studies,	  Vol.	  1	  (April-­‐June	  2011),	  pp.	  9-­‐12.	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intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   (mas’ala	   al-­‐taḥsīn	   wa	  
taqbiḥ).	  However	  the	  theological	  aspects	  of	  the	  discussion	  are	  often	  treated	  in	  a	  peripheral	  manner	  within	  a	  discussion	  of	  independent	  rationality	  which	  itself	  is	  often	  subsumed	  within	  some	  other	  debate109.	  Muẓaffar	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  treats	  
al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya,	   not	   only	   as	   an	   independent	   debate,	   but	   he	   also	  explicitly	  engages	  with	  the	  theological	  presuppositions	  of	  the	  issue,	  allowing	  him	  to	  approach	  the	  topic	  ‘from	  all	  its	  aspects,	  in	  detail’110	  for	  the	  stated	  reason	  that	  such	  a	  detailed	  and	  systematic	  exposition	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  any	  other	  texts	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  of	  equivalent	  level111.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   study	   commences	   in	   chapter	   two	   with	   an	   analytical	   survey	   of	   the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  reason	  as	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Shīʿī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Survey	  of	  the	  deep	  historical	  ambiguity	  surrounding	  the	   concept	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   will	   show	   that	   resolution	   of	   this	   ambiguity	   only	  occurred	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  modern	  era	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  through	  the	  sharp	  distinction	   of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	   into	   non-­‐independent	   and	   independent	   categories.	  Conceptual	  analysis	  of	  both	  types	  of	  rational	  indicator	  will	  suggest	  that	  the	  first	  category,	  although	  deeply	  sophisticated,	  are	  more	  akin	  to	  rational	  hermeneutical	  principles	  aiding	  the	  interpretation	  of	  texts	  rather	  than	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  in	  their	  own	   right.	   The	   independent	   category	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   which	   is	   exclusively	   a	  corollary	  of	  the	  theological	  acceptance	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy,	   will	   thus	   be	   identified	   as	   the	   subject	   of	  subsequent	  analysis	  which	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  lack	  of	  impact	  of	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  ʿAdliyya	  heritage	   in	   providing	   reason	   a	   role	   as	   a	   source	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna.	  	  It	  is	  the	  theological	  adoption	  of	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	  moral	  rationalism	  entailed	  in	  the	  principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  For	  example	  within	  the	  detailed	  and	  extensive	  commentaries	  found	  on	  the	  Kifayat	  al-­‐uṣūl	  of	  Muḥammad	  Kaḍim	  Khurasāni	  the	  issues	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  qubḥ	  al-­‐ʿaqliyain	  and	  the	  correspondence	  between	  judgements	  of	  reason	  and	  judgements	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  are	  treated	  within	  the	  discussion	  of	  certainty	  (qaṭʿ)	  under	  debates	  pertaining	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  tajjarī	  (Apparent	  Insolence)	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  independent	  topic.	  See	  al-­‐Shāhruwardī,	  Buḥūth	  fi	  ʿilm	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  4	  pp.	  40-­‐49	  and	  Muḥammad	  Ḥusayn	  al-­‐Isfahānī,	  Nihāyat	  al-­‐Dirāya	  fi	  sharḥ	  al-­‐Kifāya	  (Beirut,	  Muʾassasat	  Ahl	  al-­‐Bayt	  li	  Iḥyāʾ	  al-­‐Turāth,	  2009)	  Vol.	  3	  pp.	  28-­‐32.	  	  110	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  184.	  111	  Ibid.	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makes	  space	  for	  independent	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	   In	  order	  to	  set	   the	   ground	   for	   analysis	   of	   the	   influence	   of	   this	   principle	   on	   independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  chapter	  three	  steps	  outside	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  first	  examine	  the	  development	  of	  arguments	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  moral	   rationalism	   itself	  as	   found	   in	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought.	  Outlining	  the	   fundamental	   and	   progressively	   sophisticated	   treatment	   of	   this	   theological	  principle	   sets	   the	   ground	   for	   assessing	   the	   central	   questions	   of	   this	   study,	  offering	   a	   prism	   to	   asses	   the	   Uṣūlī’s	   contributions	   to	   the	   theological	   questions	  and	   providing	   a	   base	   from	   which	   to	   asses	   the	   reasons	   for	   an	   apparent	  redundancy	  of	  independent	  rationality	  in	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  Chapter	   four	   examines	   how	   modern	   Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   have	  conceptualised	   the	  nature	   of	  moral	   values	   and	   rationality,	   in	   turn	   affecting	   the	  mechanics	   of	   how	   independent	   rationality	   may	   actually	   come	   to	   impact	   the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  fiqh.	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  within	   their	  works	  of	  uṣūl	   rather	   than	  kalām	  (rational	   theology),	  seem	   to	   have	   significantly	   advanced	   the	   debates	   around	   the	   conception	   of	   the	  theological	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy	   as	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   the	   theorisation	   of	   their	   jurisprudential	  concern	  for	  the	  role	  of	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  These	  debates	  have	  shown	   the	   emergence	   of	   two	   sharply	   different	   views	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	  morality	   and	   rationality	   amongst	  modern	   scholars	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   	   -­‐	   all	   of	  whom	   still	   affirm	   the	   rational	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy	  but	  who	   seem	   to	  hold	   radically	  different	   conceptions	  of	  how	  and	  when	   this	   is	   the	   case-­‐	  directly	   impacting	  on	   their	   ideas	  about	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
ʿaqliyya	   and	   the	   claimed	   correspondence	   (mulāzama)	   between	   judgments	   of	  human	  reason	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator.	  	  Chapter	  five	  examines	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  potential	  sources	   of	   Sharī	  a͑	   knowledge	   in	   general,	   and	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   in	  particular.	   Despite	   alternative	   trends	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   thought	   that	  validated	   less	   than	   certain	   knowledge	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   it	   is	   shown	   that	   in	   the	  modern	  framework	  a	  source	  is	  only	  considered	  as	  authoritative	  if	   it	  relies	  upon	  certainty.	   Either	   a	   source	  must	   produce	   certain	   knowledge	   regarding	   a	   Sharī	  ͑a	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precept	   or	   it	   must	   rely	   upon	   certainty	   in	   the	   Divine	   Legislator’s	   consent	   to	   it	  being	  considered	  a	  valid	  source.	  It	   is	  these	  purely	  epistemic	  considerations	  that	  act	  as	  the	  major	  theoretical	  obstacles	  to	  either	  conception	  of	  morality	  surveyed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  from	  playing	  a	  substantive	  role	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  in	  the	  actual	  fiqhi	  process	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference,	  rendering	  independent	  rationality	  effectively	  redundant	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  The	  authoritativeness	  of	  al-­‐
dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	   is	   seen	  as	  a	   function	  of	   it	  being	  certainty	  bearing,	  yet	   the	  epistemic	  conditions	   for	   determining	   a	   certain	   judgment	   of	   rational	  morality	   are	   so	   high	  that	   effectively	   any	   potentially	   relevant	   judgment	   of	   reason	   is	   considered	   less	  than	  certain	  and	  hence	  non-­‐authoritative.	  	  	  Within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   ‘emic’	   approach	   adopted	   in	   this	   study,	   chapter	   six	  concludes	  by	  outlining	  the	  scope	  internal	  to	  the	  Uṣūlī	  tradition	  itself	  to	  reassess	  the	  epistemic	  obstacles	  preventing	  the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  moral	  rationalism	  from	  allowing	  independent	   rationality	   a	   substantive	   role	   in	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	  The	  purely	  epistemic	  obstacles	   identified	   in	  Muẓaffar’s	   theory	  are	  re-­‐examined,	  with	  particular	   attention	   given	   to	   the	   requirement	   of	   certainty	   as	   the	  basis	   for	  the	   authoritativeness	   of	   independent	   rationality	   arising	   out	   of	   inferences	   from	  basic	   rational	   moral	   principles.	   Demonstration	   of	   the	   scope	   for	   an	   	   ͑Adliyya	  reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   emerges	   by	   drawing	   on,	   amongst	   other	   things,	   the	   key	  elements	  of	  ‘the	  theory	  of	  insidād’	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  justification	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  
ẓann	  (less	   than	   certain	  knowledge),	   irrespective	  of	   its	   source.	   	   In	   this	  way	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  inferences	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  can	  not	  ignore	  judgements	  of	  rational	  morality	   such	   as	   ‘an	   equal	   right	   to	   divorce	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   justice’	   or	   that	  	  ‘restricting	  autonomy	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  religion,	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  death,	  is	  an	  instance	   of	   oppression’	   in	   the	   face	   of	   apparently	   conflicting	   textual	   evidences	  which	   are	   themselves	   also	   not	   certain.	   	   Instead,	   sound	   inferences	   of	   Sharī	  ͑ā	  precepts	  ought	  to	  result	  from	  a	  consideration	  of	  rational	  morality	  as	  a	  necessary	  qualification	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  other	  evidences,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  precepts	  considered	  rationally	  immoral	  are	  not	  attributed	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  Moral	  God.	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2.	  Reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh:	  
	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  
	  
2.1	  Introduction	  This	   study	   is	   concerned	   with	   examining	   the	   role	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   as	   an	   independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   (al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqlī)	  as	   listed	  alongside	   the	  Qur’ān,	   the	  Sunna	  and	  
al-­‐Ijmā’	  (specific	  juristic	  consensus).	  To	  identify	  exactly	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  al-­‐dalīl	  
al-­‐ʿaqlī,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   reason	   as	   one	   of	   the	   four	   sources	   or	   indicators	   to	   the	  
Sharī	  ͑a,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   first	   note	   that	   reason	   and	   rationality	   have	   a	   remit	  within	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  which	  goes	  beyond	  its	  theoretical	  inclusion	  as	  an	  independent	  source	   to	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   Uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   itself	   may	   be	   considered	   an	   ʿaqlī	   or	  rational	   discipline.	   It	   is	   a	   system	   developed	   through	   a	   form	   of	   philosophical	  analysis	   applied	   to	   socio-­‐linguistic	   principles	   (uṣūl	   al-­‐lafḍiyya)	   and	   rational	  norms	  (banā	  al-­‐‘uqalā)	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  general	  rules	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  what	  may	  largely	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  apparent	  meaning	  of	  texts	  (ẓahūr	  al-­‐alfāḍ)	  and	  rational	  correlations	  (mulāzamāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya).	  	  Not	  only	   is	   the	  method	  of	  analysis	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  based	  on	  rational/non-­‐textual	  argumentation	   and	   analysis,	   the	   method	   that	   it	   accords	   for	   the	   inference	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām,	   theoretically	   at	   least,	   is	   firmly	   entrenched	   within	   a	   framework	  shaped	   by	   a	   continued	   adherence	   to	   the	   Muslim	   interpretation	   of	   Aristotelian	  logic.	  The	  theory	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  both	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  is	  developed	  and	  applied,	   has	   come	   to	   operate	   within	   a	   methodological	   framework	   which	  privileges	   syllogistic	   forms	   of	   reasoning	   that	   aim	   to	   ensure	   certainty	   in	   ones	  reasoning	   process.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   is	   actually	   achieved	   is	   open	   to	  question,	  a	  question	  whose	  further	  examination	  would	  be	  tangential	  to	  the	  main	  concern	  here-­‐	  for	  this	  study	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  not	  as	  a	  method	  or	  source	  of	  analysis,	  but	  as	  an	  indicator	  to,	  or	  a	  source	  of,	   the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  themselves.	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In	  arguably	  the	  most	  extensive	  treatment	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  found	  in	  any	  of	  the	  textbooks	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  currently	  taught	  in	  the	  Shī‘ī	  seminaries,	  Muḥammad	  Riḍa	  Muẓaffar	  defines	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐	   ͑aqlī	  when	  considered	   ‘in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Book	  and	  the	  Sunna’	  as;	   [E]very	   judgement	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   that	   necessitates	   certainty	   in	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  In	  a	  second	  formulation,	  it	  is	  every	  rational	  proposition	  through	  which	  certain	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  are	  attained112.	  This	  chapter	  will	  offer	  a	  preliminary	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  the	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   defined	   in	   this	   way.	   The	   analysis	   will	   outline	   the	   difference	   and	   the	  commonality	   between	   two	   categories	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   the	   non-­‐independent	  rational	   indicator	   (ghayr	  mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya)	   and	   the	   independent	   rational	  indicator	   (al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya).	   An	   overview	   of	   each	   of	   the	   major	  discussions	   treated	   within	   the	   category	   of	   non-­‐independent	   rational	   indicator	  will	  demonstrate	   that	   this	   is	  not	   the	   form	  of	   rational	   indicator	  whose	   influence	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  trace.	  It	  is	  a	  category	  that	  does	  have	  significant	  impact	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  but	  its	  non-­‐	  independent	  nature	  raises	  questions	  as	  to	  whether	   the	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   acquired	   through	   it	   is	   a	   result	   of	  reason	  as	  a	  source,	  or	  reason	  as	  an	  interpretive	  tool.	  It	  shall	  be	  shown	  how	  it	  is	  actually	  only	  the	  second	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐
ʿaql,	   the	   independent	   rational	   indicator	   (al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya),	   that	   is	   the	  central	   remit	   of	   this	   study	   and	   how	   this	   theoretical	   source	   is	   conceived	   of	   as	  being	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   doctrine	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy,	   thus	  setting	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  of	  this	  doctrine	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  in	  Shī‘ī	  thought.	  To	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  has	  come	  to	  be	   understood	   and	   classified	   into	   the	   dual	   categories	   of	   non-­‐independent	   and	  independent	  rational	  indicators	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  response	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  how	  the	  notion	  has	  been	  portrayed	  historically	  by	  Shī‘a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Thus	  before	  engaging	  with	  how	  the	  modern	  Shīʿī	  scholars	  understand	  and	  explain	  the	  notion	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  it	  is	  to	  this	  historical	  understanding	  that	  we	  first	  turn.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Muẓaffar	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  105	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2.2	  Al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Shīʿī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Although	   Muẓaffar	   claims	   that	   the	   early	   Shīʿa	   scholars	   (al-­‐mutaqadimūn)	  restricted	   the	   four	   sources	   of	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   or	   al-­‐adilla	   al-­‐arba	  a͑,	   to	   the	   Qur’ān,	  Sunna,	  al-­‐Ijmā’	  and	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  his	  own	  brief	  historical	  survey	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  al-­‐
dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  casts	  serious	  doubt	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  early	  theorist	  saw	  al-­‐
dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  in	  the	  sense	  defined	  above.	  As	  Muẓaffar	  himself	  notes	  ‘many	  of	  them	  did	  not	  mention	  it	  as	  one	  of	  the	  sources	  (adilla),	  or	  did	  not	  explain	  it,	  or	  explained	  it	  in	  a	  manner	  inappropriate	  for	  it	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  source	  (dalīl)	  in	  contrast	  to	  The	  Book	  and	  The	  Sunna’113.	  	  	  	  The	   earliest	   of	   Shīʿī	   writings	   in	   the	   field	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   to	   reach	   us	   is	   a	   short	  treatise	  (risāla)	  attributed	  to	  the	  Shaykh	  al-­‐Mufīd	  (d.	  413/1022)	  as	  transmitted	  by	   his	   student	   al-­‐Karājakī	   (d.	   449/1057)	   in	   the	   collection	   Kanz	   al-­‐Fawād114.	  Although	   al-­‐Mufīd	   mentions	   the	   role	   of	   al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   he	   does	   not	   describe	   it	   as	   an	  independent	   source	   to	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	   for	   he	   sees	   the	   sources	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  as	  being	  only	  three	  and	  not	  four;	   ‘Know	  that	  the	  sources	  (uṣūl)	  for	  the	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  are	  three	  things;	  The	  Book	  of	  Allah,	  glorified	  is	  He,	  the	  practice	  of	   His	   Prophet	   and	   the	   statements	   of	   the	   Pure	   Imams	  who	   came	   after	   him’115.	  Implicitly,	  Mufīd	  here	  reaffirms	  a	  theological	  stance	  of	  his	  that	  asserts	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  has	   no	   independent	   ability	   to	   determine	   religious	   responsibility116.	   	   Al-­‐Mufīd	  however	  was	  no	  naive	  traditionist,	  he	  recognised	  that	  the	  authority	  of	  revelatory	  texts	  needed	  to	  be	  established	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  text	  and	  that	  proper	  access	  to	  the	  knowledge	  within	  these	  texts	  required	  some	  level	  of	  rational	  interpretation.	  Accordingly	  he	  follows	  his	  list	  of	  the	  three	  sources	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘the	  means	  of	  reaching	  knowledge	  of	  that	  which	  is	  legislated	  in	  these	  uṣūl	  are	  [also]	  three.	  One	  of	   these	   is	   al-­‐ʿaql	   which	   is	   the	   means	   to	   recognition	   (mʿarifa)	   of	   the	  authoritativeness	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  indication	  of	  the	  Akhbār	  (Prophetic	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  102.	  114	  See	  Muḥammad	  bin	  Ali	  bin	  Uthmān	  al-­‐Karājakī,	  Kanz	  al-­‐fawā’id	  (Beirut,	  Dār	  al-­‐aḍwā’,	  1985)	  2	  vols.	  115	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  102,	  Kanz	  al-­‐fawā’id,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  15-­‐30.	  116	  See	  ‘Awā’il	  al-­‐maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐mukhtārāt’	  in	  Abbāskuli	  Vā‘iz	  Charandābi	  (ed.)	  Awā’il	  al-­‐
maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐mukhtārāt	  wa	  Sharḥ	  	   ͑aqā’id	  al-­‐Ṣadūq	  aw	  Taṣḥiīḥ	  al-­‐’ittiqād,	  (Tabriz,	  n.d.),	  pp.11-­‐12.	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Imamate	   reports)’117.	   Thus	  al-­‐ʿaql	   was	   considered	   a	   necessary	   pre	   requisite	   to	  establishing	   the	  provenance	  of	   religious	   texts	   and	   a	   tool	   for	   interpreting	   them,	  but	   was	   not	   explicitly	   listed	   as	   a	   source	   or	   dalīl	   to	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	  themselves.	  	  	  	  	  	  Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  (d.	  436/1044),	  in	  al-­‐Dharī’ā	  ilā	  uṣūl	  al-­‐	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  and	  his	  student	  Shaykh	   al-­‐Ṭūsi	   (d.	   460/1067),	   in	   al-­‐	   ͑Udda	   fi	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   authored	   the	   earliest	  Shīʿī	   works	   dedicated	   to	   the	   exposition	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   Imāmī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐
fiqh.	   	   ͑Abd	  al-­‐Hādī	  al-­‐Faḍlī	   considers	   the	   first	  of	   the	  early	  Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   to	  have	  categorised	  the	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  into	  four	  types	  (aqdama	  man	  rubba‘a	  al-­‐adilla)	  to	   be	   al-­‐Murtaḍā118 .	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   based	   on	   al-­‐Murtaḍā’s	   ideas	   as	  expressed	  in	  the	  only	  one	  of	  his	  dedicated	  works	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  have	  reached	  us119.	   One	   cannot	   find	   in	  Al-­‐Dharī’a,	   nor	   in	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda	   of	   Shaykh	   al-­‐Ṭūsī	   for	   that	  matter,	  any	  explicit	   inclusion	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Sunna.	  Al-­‐Faḍlī	  bases	  his	  reading	  of	  Murtaḍā’s	  inclusion	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  
al-­‐ʿaql	  amongst	  the	  four	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  upon	  a	  passage	  found	  in	  another	  of	  his	  works	  as	  included	  and	  published	  within	  the	  Rasā’il	  al-­‐Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā.	  	  Amongst	  the	  most	  notable	  positions	  held	  by	  Sharif	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  was	  his	   denial	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   isolated	   reports	   (al-­‐akhbār	   al-­‐aḥād),	   those	  traditions	   that	   have	   been	   reported	   by	   an	   insufficient	   number	   of	   independent	  chains	  of	  transmission	  to	  yield	  certainty	  in	  the	  soundness	  of	  their	  transmission.	  His	   rejection	   of	   the	   isolated	   report	   was	   associated	   with	   his	   insistence	   on	   ͑ilm	  (sure	  knowledge)	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  action	  in	  religious	  matters,	  a	  level	  of	  knowledge	  that	   he	   believed	  was	   not	   supplied	   by	   the	   isolated	   report.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   his	  rejection	  of	  the	  isolated	  report	  and	  his	  restriction	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  to	  the	  certain	   evidences	   of	   the	   Qur’ān	   and	   the	   Sunna,	   where	   the	   latter	   include	   the	  opinions	  of	   the	  Prophet	   and	   the	   impeccable	   Imams	  of	   the	  Twelver	   tradition	   as	  discovered	  through	  a	  consensus	  of	  Imāmi	  scholarly	  opinion,	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  posses	  a	  hypothetical	  question-­‐	  the	  response	  to	  which	  relates	  to	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  102.	  118	   ͑Abd	  al-­‐Ḥādi	  al-­‐Faḍlī	  Durūs	  al-­‐Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  al-­‐Imāmiyya	  (Beirut,	  Markaz	  al-­‐Ghadīr,	  2007)	  Vol.	  1	  p.243.	  	  119	  Two	  other	  works	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  are	  attributed	  to	  Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  although	  there	  are	  no	  known	  manuscripts	  of	  either.	  See	  Subḥānī	  ‘foreward’	  in	  	  Al-­‐Sharīf	  	   ͑Ali	  bin	  al-­‐Ḥusayn	  al-­‐Musawī	  Al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  al-­‐Dharī	  ͑a	  ilā	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐Sharī	  ͑a	  (Qum,	  Muassasat	  al-­‐Imām	  al-­‐Ṣādiq,	  2008)	  p.	  	  21.	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of	  al-­‐	͑  aql.	  Owing	  to	  the	  technical	  nature	  of	  the	  discussion,	  the	  passage	  in	  question	  is	  relayed	  here	  in	  full;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  it	  is	  said:	  What	  do	  you	  say	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  question	  over	  which	  the	   Imāmiyya	   are	   in	   disagreement,	   and	   there	   is	   no	   indicator	   from	   The	  Book,	  nor	  certain	  Sunna	  which	  pertains	  to	  it,	  what	  is	  the	  means	  to	  truth	  in	  such	  an	  issue?	  We	   say:	   This	   issue	   which	   you	   suppose,	   its	   occurrence	   has	   been	  safeguarded.	  For	  we	  know	  that	  Allah,	  exalted,	  has	  not	  left	  the	  one	  vested	  with	   responsibility	   (Mukallaf)	  without	   an	   evidence	   to	   rely	   upon	   (ḥujja),	  nor	  without	  a	  means	  to	   	   ͑ilm	  (sure	  knowledge)	  in	  that	  which	  he	  has	  been	  made	  responsible	  for.	  	  	  	  This	   issue	  (al-­‐ḥāditha)	  which	  you	  have	  mentioned,	   if	  Allah,	  exalted	  has	  a	  religious	  precept	  (ḥukm	  shar	  ͑ī)	  regarding	  it	  and	  the	  Imāmiyya	  of	  our	  time	  are	  in	  disagreement	  over	  it-­‐	  and	  such	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  rely	  upon	  their	  consensus	  as	  one	  which	  we	  are	  certain	  contains	  a	  reliable	  evidence	  (ḥujja)	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Imam	  amongst	  them-­‐	  then	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  there	  be	   in	  regards	   to	   this	  question	  a	  certain	   indicator	   from	  the	  Book	  of	  Allah	   or	   from	   the	   Sunna	   in	   which	   we	   are	   certain	   of.	   Such	   that	   the	   one	  vested	  in	  responsibility	  is	  not	  devoid	  of	  a	  means	  to	   ͑ilm	  through	  which	  he	  may	  reach	  his	  responsibility.	  Of	   course,	   unless	   it	   is	   said;	   indeed	  we	   assume	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   issue	  (ḥāditha)	  regarding	  which	  the	  Imāmiyya	  have	  no	  opinion,	  either	  by	  way	  of	  agreement	  or	  disagreement.	  It	  would	  be	  possible	  according	  to	  us	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  if	  it	  is	  agreed	  that	  Allah	  exalted	  has	  no	  religious	  precept	  in	  that	  issue	  
(an	   lā	   yakūnu	   lillāhi	   t	  ͑ālā	   fihā	   ḥukm	   shar	  ͑ī),	   should	   we	   not	   find	   in	   the	  evidences	  which	  necessitate	  sure	  knowledge	  a	  means	  to	  knowledge	  in	  the	  precept	   for	   this	   issue,	   then	   with	   regards	   to	   it,	   we	   would	   be	   upon	   that	  which	  al-­‐ʿaql	  necessitates,	  and	  [be]	  upon	  its	  judgement.120	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Despite	   the	   hypothetical	   nature	   of	   this	   final	   paragraph,	   Al-­‐Faḍlī	   feels	   that	   it	  represents	  the	  first	  reference	  by	  a	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholar	  to	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  the	  fourth	  source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a121.	   However	   whether	   the	   text	   itself	   supports	   this	   interpretation	   is	   not	  entirely	  clear.	  In	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  passage	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  repeats	  his	  well	  known	  thesis	   that	   the	  aḥkām	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	   or	   as	   he	   puts	   it	   ‘that	  which	  Allah	   has	   a	  ḥukm	  
shar	  ͑ī	  in’,	  can	  only	  be	  known	  through	  sure	  knowledge	  attained	  from	  the	  Book	  of	  Allah	  and	  the	  Sunna	  whose	  transmission	  be	  deemed	  certain,	  a	  means	  to	  which	  is	  an	  absolute	  consensus	  of	  the	  Imāmiyya.	  His	  introduction	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  a	  source	  of	  normativity	   is	   explicitly	   only	   in	   the	   case	  where	   it	   be	   agreed	   ‘that	  Allah	   exalted	  does	   not	   have	   a	   ḥukm	   shar	  ͑ī	   regarding	   it’ 122 .	   Thus	   it	   seems	   that	   in	   the	  hypothetical	  situation	  that	  the	  Imāmiyya	  have	  no	  opinion	  regarding	  an	  issue,	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  would	  rely	  upon	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  an	  action-­‐guiding	  source	  of	  normativity	  but	  
without	   according	   its	   judgement	   the	   status	   of	   being	   amongst	   God’s	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	   If	   this	  reading	   is	  sound	   it	  would	  suggest,	   in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  his	   teacher	   al-­‐Mufīd	   and	   his	   own	   writings	   in	   al-­‐Dharī‘a,	   that	   Murtaḍā	   did	   not	  accord	   al-­‐ʿaql	   a	   role	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept.	   Instead,	   in	   a	   fashion	   that	  would	   seriously	   challenge	   the	   maximalist	   scope	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   envisaged	   by	   most	  modern	   jurists,	   it	   appears	   that	   he	   admits	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	  limited	   and	   that	   issues	   falling	   outside	   this	   scope	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   a	   specific	  
ḥukm	  of	  Allah.	  Where	  no	  ḥukm	  Shar	  ͑ī	  is	  identified	  through	  the	  revelatory	  sources	  of	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna,	  reason	  or	  rationality	  would	  be	  left	  to	  judge	  the	  appropriate	  course	  of	  action.	  However	  for	  Murtaḍā,	  although	  this	  gives	  al-­‐ʿaql	  an	  independent	  role	  as	  an	  action	  guiding	  source	  of	  normativity,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  its	  judgements	  are	  not	  considered	  Shar	  ͑ī	  and	  hence	  are	  not	  attributable	  to	  God.	  Contrary	  then	  to	  Faḍlī’s	  assertion	  that	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  was	  the	  first	  amongst	  the	  Shī	  ͑a	  to	  categorise	  the	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  as	  four,	  it	  seems	  that	  instead	  it	  is	  the	  position	  which	  holds	  that	  the	   first	  explicit	   reference	   to	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   actually	  came	  later	  which	  is	  the	  more	  tenable123.	  	  	  Although	   Shaykh	   al-­‐Ṭūsī	   differed	   from	   his	   teacher	   al-­‐Murtaḍā	   on	   numerous	  issues	   pertaining	   to	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   not	   least	   with	   regards	   the	   authority	   of	   the	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isolated	   report,	   he	   too	   did	   not	   explicitly	   list	   dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	  as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  alongside	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  however	  that	  al-­‐Ṭūsī	  does	   not	  make	   any	   reference	   at	   all	   to	  al-­‐ʿaql	  within	   his	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	   In	   fact	   the	  final	   section	   of	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda	   is	   dedicated	   to	   distinguishing	   that	  which	   is	   known	   by	   reason	   (al-­‐	   ͑aql)	   from	   that	   which	   is	   known	   by	   al-­‐sam	   ͑	  124,	  where	   al-­‐sam	  ͑	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   transmitted	   revelatory	   sources	   of	  knowledge.	  In	  distinguishing	  between	  that	  which	  is	  known	  by	  revelation	  and	  that	  which	   is	   known	   by	   reason,	   he	   reminds	   his	   reader	   of	   the	   basic	   epistemological	  division	  between	  axiomatic	  and	  non-­‐axiomatic	  knowledge.	  Axiomatic	  knowledge,	  which	   by	   definition	   excludes	   any	   reliance	   on	   revelatory	   input,	   includes	  knowledge	  of	  basic	  logical	  propositions,	  such	  as	  ‘a	  single	  body	  cannot	  be	  in	  two	  places	  whilst	  in	  a	  single	  state’125	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  such	  as;	  The	   knowledge	   of	   the	   obligation	   to	   return	   a	   deposit,	   to	   thank	   the	  benefactor	  and	  [toward]	   justice,	  and	  the	  blameworthiness	  of	  oppression,	  lying	  and	  purposelessness	  and	  whatsoever	  occurs	  in	  its	  fashion	  from	  that	  which	  is	  necessitated	  by	  the	  completion/perfection	  of	  rationality126	  	  It	   is	   based	   on	   the	   legal	   implications	   of	   these	   axioms	   of	   practical	   rationality,	  acknowledged	  by	  Ṭūsī,	  which	  later	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  would	  start	  to	  describe	  as	   the	   form	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐	   ͑aqlī	   that	   is	   an	   independent	   source,	   or	   indicator,	   to	  precepts	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	   It	   is	   this	   form	   of	   rational	   indicator	   that	   stems	   from	  the	  	  	   ͑Adliyya	  moral	  rationalism	  fundamental	  to	  Shī	  ī͑	  theology	  and	  it	  is	  this	  form	  of	  independent	  rationality	  that	  this	  study	  is	  ultimately	  concerned	  with.	  As	   an	   example	   of	   non-­‐axiomatic	   knowledge,	   Ṭūsī	   holds	   that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  unaided	   by	  revelation	  is	  responsible	  for	  establishing	  those	  theological	  precepts	  that	  form	  the	  prerequisite	   for	  establishing	   the	  veracity	  of	   revelatory	  knowledge.	  The	   rational	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  establishing	  the	  veracity	  of	  revelation	  that	  he	  mentions	  pertain	  to	   the	   existence	   of	   God	   and	   His	   nature,	   a	   nature	   which	   is	   conceived	   of	   in	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distinctly	   ͑Adliyya	  terms	  and	  which	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  which	   focuses	  on	   the	  Shī	  ͑ī	   treatment	  of	   the	   theological	   aspects	  of	   their	  moral	   rationalism.	   If	   isolated	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   discussion,	   these	   comments	  regarding	  al-­‐ʿaql	  may	  well	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  been	  more	  appropriately	  placed	  in	  a	   work	   of	   ͑ilm	   al-­‐kalām,	   however	   there	   is	   no	   denying	   the	   fiqhi	   import	   of	   his	  comments	  when	  read	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  whole	  section.	  For	  in	  highlighting	  the	  theological	   responsibilities	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   he	   creates	   space	   for	   emphasizing	   those	  known	   entities	   pertaining	   to	   fiqh	   and	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   which	   can	   only	   be	   known	  through	   al-­‐sam	   ͑,	   setting	   the	   grounds	   for	   a	   textualist	   theory	   of	   law	   within	   a	  rationalist	  theological	  framework.	  	  Despite	   his	   resounding	   emphasis	   on	   sam	   ͑	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   aḥkām,	   Ṭūsī	   does	  however	  mention	  that	  the	  blameworthiness	  (and	  thus	  the	  prohibitory	  nature	  or	  
ḥurma)	   of	   killing	   and	   oppression	   are	   established	   by	   al-­‐ʿaql	   and	   that	   the	  sources/indicators	  necessitating	  of	  knowledge	  are	  known	   through	  al-­‐	   ͑aql127.	  As	  already	  stated	  it	  is	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  first	  type	  of	  rational	  judgements	  that	  are	  the	   central	   concern	  of	   this	   study,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   second	   type	   that	  may	  have	  been	  more	  pivotal	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  al-­‐Ṭūsī.	  This	  latter	  statement	  seems	  to	  follow	  al-­‐Mufīd’s	   designation	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   as	   the	   means	   to	   establishing	   what	   constitutes	   a	  valid	   source	   of	   the	   Sharī	͑  a	   aḥkām.	   However	   al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	   position	   reflects	   a	  developing	  sophistication	  in	  that	  despite	  stating	  this,	  he	  also	  states	  that	  in	  some	  cases	   it	   is	   only	   through	   revelatory	   sources	   that	   one	   can	   come	   to	   know	   of	   the	  indicators/sources	   to	   the	  aḥkām128.	   In	   these	  apparently	  conflicting	  comments	  a	  turn	  in	  Shī	͑  ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  towards	  incorporating	  speculative	  knowledge	  (ẓann)	  as	  a	  reliable	  means	   to	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   can	   be	   detected129.	   Ṭūsī	   maintains	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  is	  the	  means	  to	  understanding	  those	  sources,	  which	  necessitate	  sure	  knowledge,	   but	   in	   other	   cases	   where	   the	   adilla	   are	   not	   bearing	   of	   sure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  al-­‐Ṭūṣī,	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  pp.	  761-­‐762.	  128	  Ibid.	  p.	  761.	  129	  For	  further	  detail	  on	  the	  shift	  towards	  a	  reliance	  on	  ẓann	  and	  for	  details	  of	  the	  development	  of	  a	  fully	  blown	  theory	  of	  ijtihād	  in	  Imāmī	  thought	  see	  Norman	  Calder,	  ‘Doubt	  and	  Prerogative:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  an	  Imāmī	  Shī'ī	  Theory	  of	  Ijtihād’	  Studia	  Islamica,	  No.	  70	  (1989),	  pp.	  57-­‐78.	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knowledge-­‐	  such	  as	  in	  the	  isolated	  report-­‐	  we	  may	  know	  of	  their	  validity	  through	  
al-­‐sam	   ͑	  130.	  	  Calder	  argues	  that	  al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	  defence	  of	  the	  isolated	  report	  was	  part	  of	  an	  agenda	  to	   account	   for	   difference	   of	   opinion	   (ikhtilāf)	   amongst	   Shī	  ͑ī	   scholarship	   and	   to	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  clerical	  authority131.	  Al-­‐Ṭūsī’s	  circumscription	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
al-­‐ʿaql	  at	  the	  level	  of	  aḥkām	   lends	  support	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  maximalist	   scope	   of	   a	   textualist	   interpretation	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   envisaged	   by	   Ṭūsī,	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  picture	  offered	  by	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  his	  position	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  status	  of	  an	  act	  through	  which	  benefit	  is	  sought,	  whilst	  it	  not	  be	  known	   whether	   that	   act	   is	   considered	   ḥasan	   (good)	   or	   qabīḥ	   (bad).	   This	   is	   a	  dilemma	  that	  intersects	  with	  the	  question	  of	  the	  status	  of	  acts	  before	  revelation	  (qabla	  warūd	  al-­‐shar	   ͑)	  examined	  by	  Reinhart132.	  In	  both	  situations	  scholars	  took	  one	   of	   three	   positions.	   	   Some	   held	   that	   such	   acts	   were	   considered	   proscribed	  (maḥzūr)	  due	  to	  the	  known	  possibility	  of	  a	  detriment	  within	  them.	  Others	  argued	  that	  such	  acts	  were	   to	  be	  considered	   to	  be	  permissible	  (	  ͑alal-­‐ibāḥā)	  based	  on	  a	  variety	   of	   predominantly	   rational	   evidences.	   The	   third	   group	   adopted	   the	  position	  of	  waqf	  or	  no-­‐assessment,	  i.e.	  that	  one	  cannot	  judge	  whether	  these	  acts	  are	   permissible	   or	   prohibited	   until	   we	   are	   informed	   of	   their	   status	   through	  revelatory	   means.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   before	   revelation,	   waqf	   is	   the	   position	  associated	  with	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  ethical	  voluntarists133	  and	  asserts	  an	  almost	  absolute	  reliance	  on	  revelation	  as	  the	  provider	  of	  information	  about	  the	  status	  of	  acts.	  In	  contrast	  to	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  who	  took	  the	  position	  of	  ibāḥā,	  Ṭūsī’s	  adoption	  of	  waqf	  in	  the	  question	  of	  the	  status	  of	  acts	  through	  which	  benefit	  is	  sought	  whilst	  it	  is	  not	  known	  if	  they	  are	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	  demonstrates	  his	  restriction	  of	  the	  role	  of	  unmediated	  reason	  and	  his	  broadening	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  authority	  of	   revelatory	  knowledge-­‐	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  which	  only	  the	   fuqahā	  are	  considered	  capable	  of	  properly	  interpreting.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  al-­‐Ṭūṣī,	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  p.	  761.	  131	  See	  Calder,	  ‘Doubt	  and	  Perogative’.	  132	  See	  Kevin	  A.	  Reinhart,	  Before	  Revelation;	  The	  Boundaries	  of	  Muslim	  Moral	  Thought	  (New	  York,	  SUNY	  Press,	  1995).	  133	  Ibid,	  p.	  62.	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The	  first	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholar	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  to	  unambiguously	  mention	  al-­‐	  ʿaql	  as	  one	  of	  four	   sources	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   was	   Ibn	   Idrīs	   al-­‐Ḥillī	   (d.	   598	   A.H.)	   In	   the	  introduction	  to	  his	  work	  of	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh,	  Ibn	  Idrīs	  has	  a	  brief	  discussion	  regarding	  both	   the	   sources	   upon	   which	   he	   relies	   and	   the	   method	   he	   employs	   in	   their	  interpretation.	  Surely	   the	   truth	   is	  not	   absent	   from	   four	  paths:	  Either	   the	  Book	  of	  Allah,	  glorified	  is	  He,	  or	  the	  Sunna	  of	  His	  Prophet	  which	  is	  agreed	  upon	  and	  al-­‐
mutawātir134 ,	   or	   al-­‐Ijmā	  ,͑	   or	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐	   ͑aql.	   	   If	   the	   [first]	   three	   are	  exhausted	   then	   that	  which	   is	   relied	   upon	   in	   religious	   issues	   (masā’il	   al-­‐
shar	  i͑yya)	  amongst	  the	  researching	  experts	  (al-­‐	  Muḥaqqiqīn	  al-­‐bāḥithīn)	  of	  the	   makadh	   al-­‐Sharī	  ͑a,	   is	   by	   way	   of	   reference	   to	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   with	  regards	  to	  it135.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ibn	  Idrīs	  was	  extremely	  critical	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Imāmiyya	  had	  come	  to	  almost	  exclusively	  rely	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  al-­‐Ṭūsī.	  Accordingly	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  introduction	  reads	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  certain	  methodological	  positions	  of	  Ṭūsī,	  not	  least	  his	  acceptance	  of	  the	  isolated	  report,	  and	  features	  extensive	  reference	  to	  al-­‐Murtaḍā.	   In	   the	   brief	   quote	   above	   relating	   to	   al-­‐ʿaql	   there	   are	   two	   important	  points	  to	  note.	  Firstly	  unlike	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  he	  explicitly	  states	  that	  the	  judgements	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  do	  have	  shar	  ͑ī	  status.	  However	  this	  is	  not	  as	  a	  source	  alongside	  Qur’ān,	  Sunna	  and	   Ijmā’,	   but	  as	  a	   source	   that	   is	   relied	  upon	  only	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   any	  certain	   evidences	   from	   these	   three	   primary	   sources.	   Despite	   the	   explicit	  inclusion	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  a	  source,	  for	  an	  indication	  of	  what	  may	  have	  actually	  been	  intended	  by	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  requires	  one	  to	  look	  beyond	  Ibn	  Idrīs.	  	  The	  most	  prominent	  of	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  Imāmī	  scholars,	  Muḥaqqiq	  al-­‐	  Ḥillī	  (d.676	  A.H.),	  stated	  that	  the	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  is	  of	  two	  types.	  The	  first	  of	  which	  amount	  to	   basic	   linguistic	   principles	   based	   upon	  which	   the	  Khitāb,	   religious	   addresses	  from	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna,	  are	  understood136.	  Although	  referred	  to	  as	  dalīl	  these	  linguistic	  principles	  do	  not	  amount	   to	  a	  source	  or	   indicator	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Mutawātir	  ḥadīth	  are	  reports	  that	  have	  been	  transmitted	  by	  numerous	  independent	  chains,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  number	  of	  independent	  chains	  yields	  certainty	  in	  the	  soundness	  of	  the	  reports	  transmission.	  135	  Kitāb	  al-­‐sarā’ir,	  (Qum,	  Mu’assasat	  al-­‐Nashr	  al-­‐Islāmī,	  2007)	  Vol	  1.	  38-­‐39.	  136	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  102-­‐103.	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Muḥaqqiq’s	   second	   type	   of	   dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   however,	   is	   the	   more	   relevant	   to	   our	  investigation,	   for	   as	   he	   states	   ‘it	   is	   that	   which	   al-­‐ʿaql	   independently	   indicates	  upon,	   and	  which	   is	   restricted	   to	  being	   in	   respect	   to	  al-­‐ḥusn	   (praiseworthiness)	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   (blameworthiness)’137,	   thus	   the	   independent	  axiomatic	   judgements	  of	   moral	   status	   referred	   to	   by	   al-­‐Ṭūsī,	   started	   to	   be	   explicitly	   described	   as	   an	  instance	  of	  al-­‐	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql.	  What	  was	  already	  an	  ambiguous	  term,	  clearly	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  disparate	  concepts	  until	  that	  point,	  was	  not	  simplified	  by	  Shahīd	  al-­‐Awwal’s	  (d.	  786	  A.H.)	  elaboration	  on	  Muḥaqqiq’s	  dual	  classification	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐	   ͑aql.	  He	  added	  to	  both	  categories	  other	  more	  sophisticated	  examples	  of	  rational	   interpretation	  including	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   obligatory	   nature	   of	   a	   prerequisite	   to	   obligation	  (muqaddamāt	   al-­‐wājib)	   into	   the	   first	   category,	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   presumed	  continuity	  of	  state	  (al-­‐istiṣḥāb)	  into	  the	  second-­‐	  thus	  blurring	  somewhat	  further	  Muḥaqqiq’s	  previous	  categorisation138.	  	  The	   inclusion	   of	   linguistic	   principles,	   rational	   interpretive	   judgements	   and	  independent	   judgements	  of	   ʿaql	  all	  within	   the	   tem	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	   lends	   support	   to	  Muẓaffar’s	  claim	  that	  until	  this	  point	  what	  was	  intended	  by	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  
al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   had	   not	   yet	   been	   made	   absolutely	   clear.	   Even	   the	   much	   later	  authoritative	   figure	   of	   Mīrzā	   Qummī	   (d.	   1231	   A.H),	   who	   offered	   a	   succinct	  definition	   of	   that	   dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	  which	  may	   be	   considered	   a	   source	   alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	   and	   Sunna	   as	   being	   ‘that	   rational	   precept	   through	   which	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  is	  reached	  and	  by	  which	  one	  is	  transferred	  from	  knowledge	  of	  a	  rational	  precept	   to	   knowledge	   of	   a	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precept’139,	  managed	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   implicit	  indications	  of	  textual	  evidences	  (mafāhīm)	  as	  also	  being	  the	  result	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐
	   ͑aql140.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  somewhat	  uncharacteristically	  loose	  usage	  of	  the	  terminology	  pertaining	  to	  
al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  amongst	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  made	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  a	  somewhat	  easy	  target	  for	  the	  polemical	  attacks	  of	  the	  more	  textually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  Ibid,	  p.	  103.	  138	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  103.	  	  139	  al-­‐Qawānīn	  al-­‐muḥkama	  fil-­‐uṣūl	  il-­‐matqana,	  al-­‐juz’	  al-­‐thālith	  (Qum,	  Mu’assasat	  Iḥyā	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐Islāmī,	  2009)	  p.	  7.	  	  140	  Ibid.	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inclined	   Shī	  ͑a	   of	   the	   Akhbārī	   school141 .	   Although	   the	   Akhbārī	   were	   largely	  defeated,	   there	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   the	   intense	  debates	  between	   the	   two	  camps	  of	  Akhbārī	   and	  Uṣūlī	  have	   left	   an	   indelible	  mark	  upon	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh142.	   Seeking	   to	  understand	   to	  what	   extent	   these	  debates	   impacted	  upon	   the	  Uṣūlī	  conception	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  would	  be	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  study,	  however	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  only	  subsequent	  to	  the	  period	  of	  intense	  rivalry	  between	  the	  two	  schools	   that	   the	  ambiguity	  entailed	   in	   the	  employment	  of	   the	  term	  dalīl	  al-­‐
aql	  has	  been	  clarified.	  This	  clarification	  has	  entailed	  classifying	   the	  dalīl	  al-­‐	   ͑aql,	  explicitly	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   and	   not	   the	   linguistic	  principles	   used	   to	   understand	   the	   apparent	   meaning	   of	   textual	   evidences,	   as	  being	   either	   non-­‐independent	   rational	   judgements	   or	   independent	   rational	  judgments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.3	  Two	  forms	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐	   ͑aql	  Modern	  Shī	͑  a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  classify	  dalīl	  al-­‐	͑  aql,	  understood	  as	  a	  rational	  judgment	   that	   leads	   to	   certain	   knowledge	  of	   a	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precept,	   into	   one	  of	   two	  categories.	  Either	  it	  is	  that	  which	  is	  attained	  through	  an	  independent	  judgement	  of	   al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   and	   hence	   referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   (independent	  rational	   indicator	   or	   independent	   rationality)	   or	   it	   is	   not	   attained	   through	   the	  independent	  exercise	  of	  rationality	  and	  hence	  referred	  to	  as	  ghayr	  mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
	   ͑aqliyya	  (non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator	  or	  non-­‐independent	  rationality).	  As	  shall	   be	   shown,	   this	   division	   tidies	   up	  much	   of	   the	   ambiguity	   surrounding	   the	  historical	   usage	   of	   the	   term;	   however	   the	   technical	   nature	   of	   the	   division	  warrants	  a	  degree	  of	  explanation.	  	  	  	  	  	  According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	   being	   contingent	  (mumkin),	   cannot	   arise	  without	   a	   cause	   (	   ͑illa)143.	   Reflecting	   the	   deep	   influence	  Aristotelian	   logic	   still	   holds	   over	   the	   epistemological	   ideas	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought,	   he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  For	  example,	  see	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Baḥrānī,	  al-­‐Ḥadā’iq	  al-­‐nāḍira	  (Qum,	  Mu’asasa	  Al-­‐Islāmī,	  1957)	  Vol.	  1	  p.40-­‐59.	  	  142	  For	  an	  introductory	  survey	  on	  the	  Uṣūlī-­‐	  Akhbārī	  dispute	  see	  Hossein	  Modarressi,	  ‘Rationalism	  and	  Traditionalism	  in	  Shî'î	  Jurisprudence:	  A	  Preliminary	  Survey’,	  Studia	  Islamica,	  Vol.	  59	  (1984),	  pp.	  141-­‐158.	  	  	  143	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol	  1.	  p.	  181.	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goes	   on	   to	   state	   that	   the	   cause	   for	   accentual	   knowledge	   (	   ͑ilm	   al-­‐tasdīqī)	   is	  necessarily	   born	   out	   of	   one	   of	   three	   types	   of	   reasoning;	   deductive	   syllogism	  (qiyās),	  induction	  (istiqrā’)	  or	  analogy	  (tamthīl).	  Neither	  the	  inductive	  istiqrā’	  nor	  analogical	  reasoning-­‐	  referred	  to	  as	  tamthīl	  in	  logic	  and	  qiyās	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  -­‐	  lead	  to	   conclusions	   which	   can	   be	   deemed	   certain,	   and	   thus	   both	   are	   rejected	   as	  potentially	   valid	   methods	   of	   reasoning	   which	   may	   be	   employed	   in	   pursuit	   of	  valid	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  The	  ‘cause	  for	  knowledge	  of	  Shar	  ͑ī	  	  precepts’	  is	   hence	   theoretically	   restricted	   to	   being	   exclusively	   through	   deductive	   logical	  syllogisms	  (al-­‐qiyās	  al-­‐manṭiqī)	  144.	  If	  both	  minor	  and	  major	  premise	  in	  the	  syllogism	  are	  of	  textual	  origin	  and	  hence	  non-­‐rational,	  the	  evidence	  or	  argument	  (dalīl)	  attained	  by	  way	  of	  the	  syllogism	  is	  considered	   shar	  ͑ī	   as	   apposed	   to	   being	   aqlī.	   Such	   syllogisms	   of	   entirely	   non-­‐rational	   content	   are	   considered	  dalīl	   shar	  ͑ī.	   On	   the	   other	   hand	   if	   either	   one,	   or	  both,	  of	  the	  premises	  are	  rationally	  attained,	  the	  knowledge	  acquired	  through	  the	  syllogism	   is	   considered	   as	   a	  dalīl	   	   ͑aqlī.	   In	   the	   case	  where	   both	   premises	   of	   the	  
dalīl	   al-­‐	   ʿaqlī	   are	   rational,	   it	   is	   of	   the	   category	   referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐
	   ͑aqliyya	  (independent	  rationality).	  Consider	  the	  following	  example;	  Minor	  premise;	  Justice	  is	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  al-­‐	   ͑aql	  Major	   premise:	   Everything	   that	   is	   praiseworthy	   according	   to	   al-­‐ʿaql	   is	  rationally	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  al-­‐shar	   ͑	  	  Conclusion:	  Justice	  is	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐shar	   ͑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Needless	   to	   say	   there	   is	   much	   debate	   over	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   content	   of	   the	  mentioned	   premises	   and	   over	  whether	   theses	   premises	   are	   indeed	   rational	   or	  not-­‐	  contentions	   that	  will	  both	  be	  analysed	   in	  depth	   in	  subsequent	  discussions.	  However	   if	   taken	   at	   face	   value,	   it	   is	   clear	   how	   the	   resultant	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	  regarding	   the	  praiseworthiness	  of	   justice	   can	  be	   said	   to	  have	  come	  about	   from	  independent	   rationality	   or	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya,	   for	   both	  minor	   and	  major	  premises	  are	  claimed	  to	  be	  purely	  rational.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol	  1	  p.	  181.	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On	   the	   other	   hand	   if	   only	   one	   of	   the	   two	   premises	   is	   rational,	   the	   other	   being	  non-­‐rational,	   the	   overall	   dalīl	   al-­‐	   ͑aqlī	   is	   classified	   as	   a	   judgment	   of	   non-­‐independent	   rationality	   or	   ghayr	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya.	   Consider	   the	  following	  example;	  Minor	   premise:	   Ḥajj	   is	   obligatory	   upon	   the	   one	   who	   has	   attained	   the	  capability	  (al-­‐mustaṭī)	  Major	  premise:	  The	  necessary	  prerequisites	  (muqadamāt	  al-­‐wājib)	  for	  any	  
shar	  ͑ī	  obligation	  are	  rationally	  also	  a	  shar	  ͑ī	  obligation	  	  	  Conclusion:	   The	   necessary	   prerequisites	   for	   Ḥajj	   are	   a	   shar	͑  	   ī	  obligation	  upon	  the	  mustaṭī	  	  The	   minor	   premise-­‐	   that	   it	   is	   obligatory	   for	   every	   Muslim	   who	   attains	   the	  capability,	   and	   thus	   becomes	   in	   legal	   terms	   al-­‐mustaṭī,	   to	   perform	   the	   Greater	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca-­‐	   is	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  established	  through	  textual	  revelatory	  evidences.	  However	  the	  major	  premise	  in	  the	  syllogism	  is	  a	  rational	  precept	  not	  dictated	   by	   revelatory	  means.	   As	   discussed	   further	   below,	   some	   scholars	   hold	  that	   this	   rational	   precept	   states	   that	   it	   is	   rationally	   obligatory	   to	   fulfil	   the	  necessary	   prerequisites	   to	   every	   shar	  ͑ī	   obligation.	   Thus	   the	   necessary	  prerequisites	   to	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   Ḥajj,	   e.g.	   securing	   a	   visa	   and	   reaching	  Mecca	  on	  time	  for	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  pilgrimage	  season,	  are	  considered	  a	  
shar	  ͑ī	   obligation	   upon	   the	   Mustaṭī.	   This	   dalīl	   al-­‐	   ͑aqlī	   is	   classified	   as	   a	   non-­‐independent	  judgement	  of	  rationality,	  a	  result	  of	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya,	  for	  the	  conclusion	  is	  not	  attained	  through	  the	  exercise	  of	  reason	  only,	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  judgement	  which	  requires	  a	  precept	  established	  through	  revelatory	  knowledge	  as	  one	  of	  its	  two	  premises.	  	  
2.4	  Al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  rational	  correlations	  The	   discussions	   of	   both	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   and	   ghayr	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐
	   ͑aqliyya	   are	  often	   subsumed	  by	  Shī	  ͑ī	   scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   under	   a	   single	   title	  referred	  to	  as	  al-­‐mulāzamāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	  or	  the	  rational	  correlations.	  This	  is	  due	  to	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the	   validity	   of	   the	   syllogism	   in	   both	   above	   cases	   being	   dependent	   upon	   the	  assumed	   existence	   of	   a	   mulāzama	   (necessary	   correlation)	   between	   the	  judgement	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐shar	  .͑	  In	  the	  first	  case	  this	  correlation	  reads	   as;	   everything	   that	   is	   praiseworthy	   according	   to	   al-­‐ʿaql	   is	   praiseworthy	  according	   to	   al-­‐shar	͑  ,	   and	   in	   the	   second	   case	   it	   reads	   as;	   the	   necessary	  prerequisites	  for	  any	  Shar	  ͑ī	  obligation	  (muqadamāt	  al-­‐wājib)	  are	  rationally	  also	  a	  
Shar	  ͑ī	   obligation.	   Both	   cases	   affirm	   the	   occurrence	   of	   a	   rational	   correlation	  between	   an	   initial	   precept,	   established	   by	   either	   al-­‐ʿaql	   or	   by	   al-­‐shar	͑  ,	   and	   a	  second	  Shar	  ͑ī	  precept	  reached	  by	  way	  of	  that	  rational	  correlation.	  This	  is	  seen	  in	  the	   claimed	   rational	   correlation	   between	   the	   rational	   precept	   that	   justice	   is	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  corresponding	  Shar	  ͑ī	  precept	  stating	  the	  same,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  rational	  correlation	  between	  the	  Shar	  ͑ī	  obligation	  to	  perform	  the	  Hajj	  and	  a	  corresponding	  Shar	  ͑ī	  obligation	  to	  fulfil	  its	  necessary	  pre-­‐requisites.	  	  ͑Abd	   al-­‐Hādī	   al-­‐Faḍlī	   states	   that	   the	   judgement	   of	   ‘al-­‐ʿaql	  which	   is	   considered	   a	  source	  of	  legislation	  and	  a	  fiqhi	   indicator	  is	  this	  very	  rational	  correlation’145	  and	  it	   is	   this	   correlation	   which	   is	   the	   fundamental	   content	   to	   the	   major	   premise	  within	   the	   reasoning	   of	   both	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   and	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  
al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya.	  The	  correlation	  is	  often	  rephrased	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  general	  principle	  referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐qā’idatu	   al-­‐mulāzama	   (the	   principle	   of	   correlation),	   and	  formulated	  as	  follows;	  everything	  that	  is	  judged	  by	  al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   is	  judged	  by	  al-­‐Shar	   ͑.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  correlation,	  what	  is	  exactly	  intended	  by	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  precepts	  attained	  through	  recourse	  to	  this	  correlation	  is	  actually	  authoritative,	   are	  questions	   taken	  seriously	  by	  Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  a-­‐
fiqh	   and	   they	   are	   discussed	   extensively	   within	   their	   treatment	   of	   the	   ḥujjiyya	  (authoritativeness)	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐	   ͑aql.	  Exactly	  how	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  a-­‐fiqh	  deal	  with	  these	  questions	  is	  imperative	  to	   this	   study	   and	   thus	   they	   will	   be	   tackled	   at	   length	   in	   subsequent	   chapters.	  However	   in	   line	  with	   the	   treatment	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  found	   in	   the	  work	  of	  Mohammad	  Riḍā	   al-­‐Muẓaffar,	   some	   further	   identification	   of	   the	   instances	   of	   the	   minor	  premises	  within	  these	  syllogisms	  is	   in	  place.	  Examining	  the	  particular	  instances	  of	   the	   minor	   premises	   (tashkhīs	   al-­‐sugriyāt)	   to	   which	   these	   correlations	   may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  (Qum,	  Matbu	  ͑āt	  dīnī,	  1962)	  p.	  90.	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apply	  will	   further	   demonstrate	   the	   difference	   between	   ghayr	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐
	   ͑aqliyya	  and	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	  and	  the	  fundamental	  relation	  between	  the	  category	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   and	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   theological	   premises	  regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   morality.	   A	   central	   concern	   of	   this	   study	   is	   to	  demonstrate	   how	   and	  why	   this	   independent	   category	   of	   dalīl	   al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   which	   is	  intimately	   related	   to	   the	   theological	   ethical	   rationalism	  of	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya,	   actually	  plays	  little	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  practical	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  within	  the	  mainstream	   framework	   of	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	  alternative	  category	  of	  the	  non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator,	  a	  brief	  survey	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  within	  its	  remit	  will	  bring	  into	  question	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  can	  actually	  be	  considered	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  As	   shall	   be	   seen,	   they	   may	   be	   more	   appropriately	   regarded	   simply	   as	   issues	  pertaining	   to	   the	   rational	   interpretations	  of	   textual	   evidences	   as	   attested	   to	  by	  those	  scholars	  who	  discuss	  them	  not	  as	  rational	  correlations	  but	  instead	  within	  and	   amongst	   the	   section	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   which	   treats	   the	   linguistic	   discussions	  (mabāḥith	  al-­‐lafḍiyya)	  regarding	  the	  interpretation	  of	  texts.	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.5	  The	  non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator;	  Ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
	   ͑aqliyya	  The	  category	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  referred	  to	  as	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	  are	  those	   in	   which	   al-­‐ʿaql	  does	   not	   independently	   reach	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	   Rather	   its	   conclusion	   is	   attained	   by	   way	   of	   recourse	   to	   an	   already	  established	   judgement	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	   a	  minor	  premise	  within	  a	  syllogistic	  model	  of	  reasoning	   whose	   major	   premise	   claims	   that	   there	   is	   a	   rational	   correlation	  between	   the	   initial	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   and	   a	   second	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	  discovered	  by	  way	  of	  this	  correlation.	  There	  are	  number	  of	  possible	  occurrences	  of	  this	  rational	  correlation	   which	   are	   debated	   by	   modern	   Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   the	  following	  section	  will	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  instances	  and	   give	   a	   sense	   of	   the,	   often	   rather	   technical,	   debates	   conducted	   under	   the	  hubris	  of	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya.	  The	  question	  will	   then	  be	  raised	  as	  to	  how	  appropriate	  it	  actually	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	  as	  a	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source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   alongside	   Qur’ān	   and	   Sunna,	   or	   whether	   they	   are	  instead	   more	   appropriately	   considered	   to	   be	   questions	   which	   pertain	   to	   the	  rational	  interpretation,	  or	  even	  linguistic	  signification,	  of	  textual	  evidences.	  	  2.5.1	  The	  sufficiency	  of	  acts	  performed	  according	  to	  secondary	  precepts;	  al-­‐Ijzā’	  A	   proper	   appreciation	   of	   the	   question	   of	   al-­‐Ijzā’	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   requires	   some	  preliminary	  notes	  about	  how	  the	  nature	  of	  aḥkām	  are	  envisaged	  of	  by	  scholars	  of	  
uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh.	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   are	   the	   orthopraxic	   precepts	   broadly	   defined	   as	  ‘regulating	  instructions	  from	  Allah	  whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  order	  the	  lives	  of	  human	  beings’146.	  These	  aḥkām	  include	  the	  imposition	  of	  duties	  (takālīf)	  upon	  those	  who	  are	  deemed	  vested	  with	  responsibility	  (mukallafīn)147.	  In	  any	  particular	  case	  of	  a	  duty	   resulting	   from	   a	   divine	   imperative	   (amr),	   the	   duty	   that	   is	   sought	   is	   the	  performance	   of	   al-­‐amr	   al-­‐ikhtiyārī	   al-­‐wāqi	  ͑ī	   (the	   unconstrained	   actual	  imperative)	   that	   is	   the	   imperative	   issued	   for	   an	   unconstrained	   situation	   as	  consistent	   with	   the	   actual	   imperative	   in	   the	   knowledge	   of	   God.	   The	  corresponding	   ḥukm	   to	   this	   command	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   primary	   actual	  precept	   (al-­‐ḥukm	  al-­‐awwali	   al-­‐wāqi	  ͑ī).	   Performance	   of	   an	   action	   in	   accordance	  with	   this	   primary	   actual	   precept	   would	   relieve	   the	   duty	   incumbent	   upon	   the	  
mukallaf.	   However,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   fulfil	   the	   unconstrained	   actual	  imperative,	  due	  to	  either	  a	  suitably	  qualified	  obstacle	  or	  because	  of	  ignorance	  of	  that	  actual	   law,	  the	  required	  duty	  upon	  the	  mukallaf	   is	  considered	  to	  change	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  a	  secondary	  precept	  (al-­‐ḥukm	  al-­‐thānawī).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  constraint	  or	  obstacle	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  primary	  actual	  precept,	  such	  as	  if	  one	  cannot	  find	  water	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  minor	  ritual	  ablution	  required	  prior	  to	  canonical	  prayer,	  the	  duty	  upon	  the	  mukallaf	  changes	  to	  a	  required	   fulfilment	  of	   the	  command	   for	  constrained	  circumstances	   (al-­‐amr	  
al-­‐iḍṭirārī),	  and	  in	  our	  example	  the	  alternative	  procedure	  of	  Tayyammum-­‐	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabadi	  al-­‐Uṣūl	  p.7.	  147	  There	  are	  numerous	  general	  conditions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  met	  by	  an	  individual	  before	  he	  or	  she	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  Mukallaf	  and	  hence	  vested	  with	  Sharī	  ͑a	  responsibility.	  As	  with	  most	  things	  in	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  fiqh,	  there	  is	  debate	  both	  across	  the	  schools	  and	  within	  them	  as	  to	  the	  what	  these	  conditions	  actually	  are,	  amongst	  those	  commonly	  listed	  by	  Shī	  ͑a	  are;	  capacity	  (qudra),	  legal	  maturity	  (balūgh)	  and	  sanity	  (	   ͑aql)	  .	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does	  not	  require	  water-­‐	  should	  be	  performed	  instead	  of	  the	  normal	  ablution	  with	  water.	  In	  cases	  where	  one	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  primary	  actual	  precept,	  the	  mukallaf	  is	   required	   to	   fulfil	   the	   apparent	   imperative	   (al-­‐amr	   al-­‐ẓāhirī)	   and	   act	   in	  accordance	   to	   an	   apparent	  precept	   (ḥukm	  al-­‐ẓāhirī)	   legislated	   to	   allow	   the	  one	  vested	   with	   responsibility	   with	   a	   practical	   means	   of	   resolving	   doubtful	   or	  unknown	   situations	   of	   duty.	   For	   example,	   based	   on	   the	   juristic	   principle	   that	  ‘everything	  is	  ritually	  pure	  (ṭāhir)	  for	  you,	  until	  you	  know	  that	  it	  is	  not’148,	  if	  one	  were	   to	   find	  a	   container	  of	  water	   the	  purity	  of	  which	  was	  uncertain,	   it	  may	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  pure	  and	  hence	  suitable	  for	  use	  in	  ritual	  purification.	  Should	  this	  water	  have	  actually	  been	   impure,	   then	  according	   to	   the	  actual	  primary	  precept	  ablution	  performed	  with	  this	  water	  would	  not	  have	  fulfilled	  the	  required	  actual	  duty.	  However	  due	  to	  the	  ignorance	  of	  its	  true	  status,	  using	  the	  impure	  water	  is	  in	   accordance	  with	   requirements	   of	  al-­‐amr	  al-­‐ẓāhirī	   (the	   apparent	   imperative)	  and	   thus	   the	   performance	   with	   the	   impure	   water	   suffices	   for	   the	   mukallaf’s	  obligation	  as	  established	  in	  the	  apparent	  precept	  (al-­‐ḥukm	  al-­‐zāhirī).	  With	   this	   prelude	   it	   is	   now	   possible	   to	   outline	   the	   question	   which	   is	   debated	  under	  the	  title	  of	  al-­‐Ijzā’,	  and	  how	  it	   is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  discussion	  of	  ghayr	  al-­‐
mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	͑  aqliyya,	  the	  non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator.	  A	  debate	  arises	  as	  to	   the	   status	   of	   an	   act	   performed	   in	   accordance	  with	   a	   secondary	   imperative-­‐	  issued	   either	   due	   to	   constrained	   circumstances	   preventing	   fulfilment	   of	   the	  primary	  actual	  imperative	  or	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ignorance	  of	  the	  actual	  imperative-­‐	  when	   the	   obstacle	   to	   the	   actual	   precept	   is	   subsequently	   removed	   or,	   in	   the	  second	   case,	   when	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   actual	   situation	   becomes	   realised.	  Putting	  these	  situations	  into	  the	  context	  of	  our	  examples;	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  al-­‐
amr	  al-­‐iḍṭirārī,	  what	  is	  the	  status	  of	  the	  prayer	  performed	  with	  Tayammum,	  due	  to	   an	   initial	   absence	   of	  water	   for	   ablution,	  when	  water	   subsequently	   becomes	  available?	   And	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   al-­‐amr	   al-­‐zāhirī;	   what	   is	   the	   status	   of	   that	  prayer	  performed	  with	  ablution	  made	  with	  water	  which	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  pure,	  but	  whose	  actual	  impurity	  subsequently	  becomes	  known?	  Does	  the	  performance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  For	  debate	  and	  details	  regarding	  the	  juristic	  principle	  of	  purity	  (qā	  ͑idut	  al-­‐ṭahāra),	  including	  discussion	  of	  its	  content,	  basis,	  scope,	  conditions	  and	  examples	  of	  its	  application	  see	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Irwānī	  Durūs	  tamhīdiyya	  fi	  al-­‐qawā	  ͑id	  al-­‐fiqhiyya	  (Qum,	  Mu’asasat	  al-­‐Fiqh	  lil-­‐Ṭibā	  ͑a	  wa	  al-­‐Nashr,	  N.D.)	  	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  43-­‐56.	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of	   the	  secondary	  precept	  suffice	   for	   the	  primary	   imperative	  when	  the	  cause	   for	  the	   activation	   of	   the	   secondary	   precept,	   which	   was	   the	   constraint	   or	   the	  ignorance,	  is	  no	  longer	  present?	  Muẓaffar	   rephrases	   this	   dilemma	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   question	   regarding	   the	  existence,	  or	  non-­‐existence,	  of	  a	  rational	  correlation;	  	  The	   reality	   of	   it	   is	   a	   discussion	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  correlation-­‐	  rationally-­‐	  between	  the	  performance	  of	  an	  act	  commanded	  by	  way	  of	   a	   constrained	  or	   apparent	   imperative,	   and	   the	   sufficiency	  of	   this	  act	   to	   discharge	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   primary	   unconstrained	   actual	  imperative	  [should	  the	  constrain	  or	  ignorance	  have	  passed]149.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Modern	  Shī	  a͑	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  are	  largely	  in	  agreement	  that	  performance	  of	  the	  al-­‐amr	  al-­‐iḍṭirārī,	   that	   is	   the	   imperative	   issued	   for	  a	   situation	  of	   constraint,	  rationally	  suffices	   for	   the	  performance	  of	  al-­‐amr	  al-­‐awwalī	  al-­‐wāqi	  ͑ī,	   even	   if	   the	  means	   for	   its	   full	   performance	   subsequently	   becomes	   possible.	   The	   central	  justification	  for	  this	  position	  is	  that	  the	  aḥkām	  al-­‐iḍṭirārī	  have	  been	  legislated	  for	  the	   very	  purpose	   of	   giving	   ease,	   relieving	  duty	   and	   establishing	   leeway	   for	   the	  one	  vested	  with	  responsibility	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  duty	  (maṣāliḥ	  al-­‐takālīf)	  when	  they	  find	  themselves	  in	  constrained	  situations150.	  This	   giving	   of	   ease	   and	   leeway	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	   tone	   of	  Qur’ān	   2:185	  which,	  whilst	   discussing	   alleviations	   for	   those	   who	   have	   obstacles	   to	   performing	   the	  prescribed	   fasting	  of	   the	  month	  of	  Ramaḍān,	  states;	   ‘Allah	  desires	   for	  you	  ease,	  and	   He	   does	   not	   desire	   for	   you	   hardship’.	   It	   could	   hardly	   be	   considered	   a	  requirement	   of	   ease	   if	   the	  mukallaf	   was	   giving	   the	   responsibility	   of	   having	   to	  perform	   a	   second	   duty	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   primary	   precept	   after	   having	  already	   completed	   one	   act	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   precept	   for	   constrained	  circumstance.	   Accordingly,	   the	   act	  which	  was	   performed	   to	   discharge	   the	   duty	  imposed	  by	  the	  precept	  of	  constrained	  circumstance	  is	  considered	  sufficient,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol	  2,	  pp.	  213.	  150	  Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  p.	  96.	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hence	   in	   our	   cited	   example	   a	   prayer	   performed	  with	  Tayyammum	   is	   sufficient	  even	  if	  water	  subsequently	  becomes	  available151.	  As	   for	   the	   question	   of	   the	   sufficiency	   of	   the	   act	   performed	   according	   to	   the	  apparent	  precept	  (al-­‐ḥukm	  al-­‐ẓāhirī)	  when	  knowledge	  of	  the	  actual	  precept	  (al-­‐
ḥukm	  al-­‐wāqi	  ͑ī)	   subsequently	   becomes	   realized;	   the	  most	   popular	   opinion	   (al-­‐
mashhūr)	  is	  that	  this	  performance	  is	  not	  rationally	  sufficient	  for	  the	  discharge	  of	  duty152.	  This	  is	  as	  result	  of	  it	  becoming	  clear	  to	  the	  mukallaf	  that	  he	  was	  certainly	  false	  in	  his	  prior	  assumption.	  On	  the	  certain	  disclosure	  of	  his	  mistake	  there	  is	  no	  longer	   scope	   for	   him	   to	   rely	   upon	   the	   apparent	   precept.	   In	   this	   situation	   of	  knowledge	   the	   actual	   precept	   becomes	   an	   active	   duty	   upon	   him	   regardless	   of	  whether	  he	  brought	  about	  any	  other	  act	  in	  its	  place.	  Thus,	  if	  one	  had	  performed	  a	  prayer	  whose	  ablution	  was	  conducted	  with	  water	  assumed	  to	  be	  pure,	  but	  then	  it	  becomes	  subsequently	  known	  that	  this	  water	  was	  defiantly	  impure-­‐	  the	  duty	  to	  perform	  prayer	  with	  proper	  ritual	  ablution	  still	  rests	  upon	  the	  Mukallaf	  and	  he	  or	  she	  would	  need	  to	  repeat	  the	  acts	  for	  discharge	  of	  this	  duty153.	  	  	  	  	  	  2.5.2	  The	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	  an	  obligation;	  Muqadamāt	  al	  –wājib	  The	  pre-­‐requisites	   to	  an	  obligation	  are	   those	   ‘acts	  without	  which	  an	  obligatory	  act	   cannot	  be	  properly	   fulfilled’154.	   If	   a	  particularly	  act	   is	   considered	  obligatory	  and	  the	  performance	  of	  that	  act	  requires	  certain	  preliminaries	  or	  pre-­‐requisites,	  it	  is	  held	  that	  all	  rational	  beings	  would	  deem	  it	  rationally	  necessary	  to	  fulfil	  these	  preliminaries	  or	  prerequisites155.	  What	  is	  at	  dispute	  and	  taken	  up	  for	  a	  point	  of	  debate	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	   whether	   this	   rational	   necessity	   calling	   for	   the	  performance	   of	   the	   pre-­‐requisites	   to	   an	   obligation	   reveals	   a	   corresponding	  religiously	   ordained,	   or	   shar	  ͑ī,	   necessity	   for	   the	   performance	   of	   these	   pre-­‐requisites.	  The	  point	  of	  dispute	  again,	  according	  to	  Muẓaffar	  at	  least,	  amounts	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  account	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  debate	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol	  1.	  pp.	  212-­‐215.	  	  152	  Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl	  p.	  97	  153	  Again	  for	  a	  more	  extensive	  account	  of	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  debate,	  and	  differences	  of	  opinion	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol	  1.	  pp.	  212-­‐215.	  154	  Al-­‐Faḍlī	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl	  p.	  97.	  155	  See	  Al-­‐Faḍlī	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl	  p.97,	  Ja	  ͑far	  Subhāni	  al-­‐Mūjiz	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  (Qum,	  Mu’asat	  al-­‐Imām	  al-­‐Ṣādiq,	  2008)	  p.	  45,	  and	  Muẓaffar	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  225.	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a	  question	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  the	  judgement	  of	  al-­‐shar	   ͑.	  Formulating	  it	  as	  a	  question	  pertaining	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  rational	  correlation	  we	  may	  ask,	  does	  the	  rational	  necessity	  to	  perform	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	   a	   shar	  ͑ī	   obligation	   rationally	   correspond	   to,	   and	   reveal,	   a	   concurrent	   shar	  ͑ī	  duty	  obliging	  the	  performance	  of	  these	  pre-­‐requisites?	  	  On	   the	   face	   of	   it	   at	   least,	   this	  may	   seem	   like	   a	   rather	   pointless	   discussion.	   For	  either	  way,	  whether	  one	  affirms	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  rational	  correlation	  or	  not-­‐	  one	  has	  to	  complete	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	  an	  obligation	  in	  order	  to	  discharge	  the	  duty	  of	  that	  obligation.	  The	  only	  difference	  being	  that	  based	  on	  an	  affirmation	  of	  this	   correlation	   the	   pre-­‐requisites	  would	   be	   deemed	   ordained	   by	   both	  al-­‐shar	  ͑	  and	   al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   rather	   than	   being	   deemed	   necessary	   only	   by	   al-­‐ʿaql	   in	   the	   case	   of	  those	  who	  deny	  the	  correlation.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  apparent	  redundancy	  of	  the	  issue	  and	   particularly	   since	   the	   discussion	   is	   ‘amongst	   the	   most	   famous	   of	   the	  discipline	   [of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh],	   and	   its	   most	   delicate	   and	   most	   extensively	  discussed’156,	  Muẓaffar	  feels	  the	  need	  to	  justify	  its	  relevance.	  This	  relevance	  lies	  in	   the	   fact	   ‘that	   the	   issue	  has	  many	  theoretical	  benefits	  even	   if	   it	  does	  not	  have	  practical	  benefits’,	  what’s	  more	   these	   theoretical	  benefits	   are	  associated	  with	  a	  number	  of	  issues,	  the	  essence	  of	  which	  are	  indeed	  practical	  when	  considered	  at	  the	   level	   of	   furū	  	͑   al-­‐fiqh 157 .	   These	   involve	   discussing	   the	   nature	   of	   and	  distinguishing	   between	   numerous	   different	   categories	   of	   pre-­‐requisites	   and	  conditions	   to	   obligations,	   such	   as	   devotional	   and	   non-­‐devotional	   types	   or	  expiring	   and	   non-­‐	   expiring	   types.	   Amongst	   other	   categories,	   these	   discussions	  even	   include	   the	   question	   of	   the	   philosophical	   possibility	   of	   a	   category	   of	  conditions	  that	  are	  performed	  after	  the	  obligatory	  act	  instead	  of	  before	  it!158	  It	   is	   almost	   to	   be	   expected	   with	   the	   reputation	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   for	   producing	  oblique	  and	  hair	  splitting	  debates,	  that	  even	  in	  an	  issue	  with	  only	  limited	  direct	  practical	   benefits	   to	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   that	   we	   can	   find	   a	   vast	   range	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  156	  Muẓaffar	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  227.	  157	  Ibid.	  pp.	  227-­‐228.	  158	  A	  situation	  where	  the	  condition	  for	  the	  proper	  completion	  of	  an	  obligation	  is	  brought	  about	  after	  the	  act	  itself	  includes	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  major	  ablution	  performed	  in	  the	  night	  after	  a	  fast	  has	  been	  completed	  by	  a	  women	  experiencing	  non-­‐menstrual	  bleeding	  as	  a	  requirement	  for	  that	  fast	  to	  be	  considered	  valid.	  	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  post-­‐validation	  of	  a	  contract	  of	  sale	  by	  a	  rightful	  owner,	  in	  a	  case	  where	  an	  unlicensed	  representative	  without	  the	  owner’s	  knowledge	  has	  already	  conducted	  the	  sale	  on	  his	  behalf.	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scholarly	  opinions	  on	  the	  matter.	  This	  range	  of	  opinions	  reveal	  between	  ten	  and	  twelve	  different	  distinct	  positions	  regarding	  the	  core	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  or	  otherwise	   of	   the	   debated	   correlation	   between	   the	   rational	   requirement	   to	  perform	  pre-­‐requisites	   to	  obligation	   and	   the	  obligation	   to	  perform	   them	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  the	  shar	͑  	  159.	  	  Muẓaffar’s	   own	   position	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	   correlation,	   in	   any	   circumstance,	  between	  the	  rational	  necessity	  to	  perform	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  an	  obligation	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  obligation	  to	  fulfil	  these	  prerequisites	  from	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  obligation.	  Following	  a	  line	  of	  recent	  luminaries,	   including	  Muḥsin	  al-­‐Ḥakīm	  (d.	   190/1970)	   and	   Abū	   al-­‐Qāsim	   al-­‐Khoei	   (d.	   1413/1992),	   Muẓaffar	   cites	   an	  argument	   for	   this	   position	   attributed	   to	   Abūl	   Ḥasan	   al-­‐Isfahānī	   (d.	  1365/1946)160.	  The	  judgement	  of	  reason	  which	  calls	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  pre-­‐requisites	   to	   an	   established	   obligation	   is	   a	   judgement	   which	   is	   sufficiently	  motivating	  for	  the	  mukallaf	  to	  require	  him	  to	  perform	  the	  desired	  acts,	  such	  that	  there	   is	  no	  need	   for	  a	   further	  devotional	   command	   (amr	  al-­‐mawlawī)	   from	   the	  legislator	  to	  bring	  about	  these	  pre-­‐requisites.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  apparent	  where	  it	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	   one	   to	   whom	   the	   devotion	   is	   owed	   (al-­‐Mawlā),	   being	  omniscient,	   is	   fully	  aware	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   this	  motivation.	   ‘As	  the	  devotional	  imperative-­‐	   be	   it	   for	   [an	   act]	   itself	   or	   for	   [the	   purpose	   of]	   another	   [act]-­‐	   is	  stipulated	   by	   al-­‐Mawlā	   for	   no	   other	   reason	   than	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   eliciting	   a	  movement	  of	  the	  mukallaf	  towards	  acting	  out	  that	  which	  has	  been	  commanded’	  it	  would	   be	   redundant	   with	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   rational	   motivation	   towards	   the	  performance	  of	   the	  object	  of	  command.	   	  There	   is	  no	  need	  for	  such	  a	  devotional	  command	   when	   the	   required	   motivation	   already	   occurs	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  judgement	  of	  reason.	  In	  fact	  the	  issuance	  of	  such	  a	  shar	  ͑ī	  command	  is	  considered	  impossible	  as	  it	  would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  taḥsīl	  al-­‐ḥāsil,	  the	  bringing	  about	  of	  something	  which	   already	   exists	   and	   hence	   an	   action	   without	   purpose,	   something-­‐	   which	  according	   to	   the	   ͑Adliyya	  at	   least-­‐,	   cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	  Wise	   and	  Knowing	  God.	   	   In	   summary	   then,	   according	   to	  Muẓaffar,	   there	   is	  no	   correlation	  between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  Faḍlī	  mentions	  ten	  distinct	  opinions	  and	  Muẓaffar	  twelve.	  These	  different	  opinions	  emerge	  from	  the	  distinctions	  made	  between	  different	  types	  of	  obligations	  and	  the	  different	  type	  of	  pre-­‐requites	  which	  they	  may	  entail.	  See	  Mabādī	  al-­‐Uṣūl,	  p.	  100	  and	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  pp.	  254-­‐257.	  160	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  255.	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the	  rational	  necessity	  to	  perform	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	  an	  obligation	  and	  a	  shar	  ͑ī	  necessity	  to	  perform	  these	  very	  acts.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  judgement	  of	  reason	  is	  sufficiently	   motivating	   to	   impel	   one	   towards	   their	   performance	   and	   any	  corresponding	   shar	  ͑ī	   command	  would	  be	   rendered	   redundant	  without	  purpose	  and	  hence	  unattributable	  to	  a	  Wise	  God.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.5.3	  The	  indication	  of	  a	  prohibition	  to	  corruption:	  Dalāla	  al-­‐nahī	  	  	  ͑ala	  al-­‐fasād	  	  	  	  The	   discussion	   of	   dalāla	  al-­‐nahī	   	  ͑ala	   al-­‐fasād,	   is	   another	   undertaken	   under	   the	  title	  of	  ghayr	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   and	  again	   is	   considered	   to	  be	  one	  of	   the	  more	  important	  discussions	  found	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  having	  extensive-­‐	  and	  this	  time	  more	   obvious-­‐	   implications	   for	   a	   range	   of	   positions	   reached	   in	   furū	  	͑   al-­‐fiqh161.	  The	   wide-­‐ranging	   discussions	   undertaken	   centre	   around	   responding	   to	   the	  following	   question;	   does	   a	   prohibition	   directed	   toward	   an	   action	   indicate,	   or	  necessitate,	   its	   corruption	   and	   invalidity	   if	   performed	   by	   a	   mukallaf?	  Reformulating	   the	   issue	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   question	   with	   regards	   to	   a	   rational	  correlation	  the	  question	  posed	  asks;	   is	   there	  a	  rational	  correlation	  between	  the	  prohibition	  of	  a	  thing	  and	  its	   invalidity?	   	  Accordingly	  the	  debate	  was	  re-­‐termed	  by	  Muḥammad	  Kāḍim	  al-­‐Khurasānī,	  in	  his	  famous	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  as	  a	  question	  of	  the	   iqtiḍā	  or	   rational	  necessitation	  of	   the	  prohibition	   to	  corruption,	   rather	   than	  the	   question	   of	   its	   Dalāla,	   a	   term	   which	   usually	   implies	   only	   linguistic	  signification162.	  The	  question	  is	  tackled	  with	  respects	  to	  two	  different	  categories	  of	  act,	  acts	  that	  are	  devotional	  (al-­‐	   ͑ibāda)	  and	  acts	  that	  are	  non-­‐devotional	  (al-­‐mu	  ͑āmalāt).	  Here	  devotional	  acts	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  those	  acts	  whose	  validity	  requires	  that	  their	  performance	  be	  undertaken	  with	  a	  specific	   intention	  of	  seeking	  proximity	  to	   Allah	   (bi	   qaṣd	   al-­‐qurba).	   Of	   course	   a	   central	   notion	   in	   Islam	   is	   that	   all	  wholesome	   actions,	   however	   mundane	   they	   may	   seem,	   should	   be	   performed	  with	   the	   intention	  of	   seeking	  proximity	   to	  Allah,	   and	  any	  act	  performed	   in	   this	  manner	  deserves	  the	  title	  of	  al-­‐	   ͑ibāda.	  However	  this	   is	   	   ͑ibāda	   in	  a	  more	  general	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Subḥāni,	  Al-­‐Mūjiz,	  p.	  70.	  162	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  249	  and	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol	  1.	  p.	  306.	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sense	  that	  that	  which	  requires	  an	  appropriate	  intention	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  its	  validity,	  such	  as	  in	  case	  of	  the	  canonical	  prayers	  (al-­‐Ṣalāt)	  or	  canonical	  fast	  (al-­‐Ṣawm).	  	  The	   prohibition	   to	   fast	   on	   the	   two	   days	   of	   Eid163,	   the	   prohibition	   to	   perform	  canonical	   prayer	   in	   misappropriated	   clothes	   (al-­‐libās	   al-­‐maghṣūb)	   and	   the	  prohibition	   preventing	   a	  women	   from	   performing	   canonical	   prayer	   during	   her	  menstrual	  cycle	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  a	  prohibition	  occurring	  upon	  devotional	  acts.	  The	  prohibition	  may	  be	  directed	  towards	  either	  the	  devotional	  act	  itself,	  a	  part	  of	  an	   act,	   a	   condition	   for	   an	   act	   or	   upon	   an	   attribute	   of	   an	   act164.	   The	   position	  adopted	  in	  all	  such	  cases	  is	  that	  the	  prohibition	  does	  necessitate	  the	  invalidity	  of	  the	  devotional	  act.	  Should	  a	  mukallaf	  bring	  about	  a	  prohibited	  devotional	  act,	  that	  act	   would	   be	   deemed	   invalid.	   Hence,	   fasting	   on	   either	   of	   the	   days	   of	   Eid,	   the	  canonical	  prayer	  performed	  in	  misappropriated	  clothes	  and	  the	  canonical	  prayer	  of	  a	  woman	  during	  her	  menstrual	  cycle165,	  are	  all	  considered	  void	  and	  invalid.	  	  Amongst	  the	  justifications	  offered	  for	  this	  position	  is	  that;	  [T]here	   is	   an	  obvious	  mutual	   conflict	  between	  a	  devotional	   act-­‐	   through	  which	  proximity	   to	  Allah	   is	  sought,	  and	  [through	  which]	  His	  pleasure	  [is	  sought]-­‐	  and	  the	  prohibition,	  the	  contravention	  of	  which	  moves	  one	  away	  from	  Allah,	  exalted,	  and	  is	  a	  cause	  for	  His	  displeasure.	  It	   is	   impossible	  to	  seek	   proximity	   through	   something	   that	   moves	   one	   away,	   and	   [to	   seek]	  pleasure	  by	  that	  which	  displeases166.	  The	   prohibition	   upon	   an	   act	   is	   considered	   to	   reveal	   God’s	   dislike	   of	   that	   act,	  demonstrating	   that	   its	   performance	  would	   actually	  moves	   one	   away	   from	  Him	  and	   elicit	   His	   displeasure.	   As	   the	   devotional	   act	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   means	   of	  approach	   and	   a	   means	   of	   acquiring	   Gods	   pleasure,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  The	  two	  Eids	  are	  the	  festival	  days	  of	  celebration,	  one	  of	  which	  marks	  the	  day	  of	  sacrifice	  during	  the	  Ḥajj	  season	  whilst	  the	  other	  marks	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  month	  Ramaḍān.	  164	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  307-­‐308.	  165	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  prohibition	  preventing	  women	  from	  performing	  the	  canonical	  prayer	  during	  their	  menstrual	  cycle	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  dispensation,	  and	  does	  not	  in	  any	  way	  belittle	  their	  potential	  relationship	  with	  God-­‐	  a	  relationship	  which	  may	  be	  just	  as	  intimate	  with	  a	  God,	  described	  by	  the	  Qur’ān	  as	  being	  closer	  to	  human	  beings	  than	  their	  jugular	  veins,	  whether	  one	  is	  in	  a	  menstrual	  cycle	  or	  not.	  166	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  308.	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cannot	  seek	  this	  approach	  through	  an	  act,	  which	  due	  to	  its	  prohibition,	  is	  disliked	  by	  God	  and	  actually	   takes	  one	  away	   from	  Him.	  Thus	   the	  existence	  of	  a	   rational	  correlation	   between	   prohibitions	   directed	   towards	   devotional	   acts	   and	   the	  corruption	  or	  invalidity	  of	  these	  acts	  is	  affirmed.	  	  In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  prohibition	  upon	  non-­‐devotional	  acts,	   two	  distinct	  situations	  are	  discussed.	  Either	  the	  prohibition	  may	  be	  upon	  an	  initiatory	  contract	  (al-­‐‘aqd	  
al-­‐inshā	  ī͑)	  or	  upon	  a	  non-­‐devotional	  act	  itself	  (nafs	  al-­‐mu	  ā͑mala).	  An	  example	  of	  a	  prohibition	  upon	  an	  initiatory	  contract	  is	  the	  prohibition	  to	  selling	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  call	  to	  the	  Friday	  prayer,	  as	  inferred	  from	  Qur’ān	  62:9	  which	  states;	  ‘when	  the	  call	  to	  Friday	  prayer	  is	  proclaimed,	  hasten	  to	  the	  remembrance	  of	  Allah	  and	  leave	  sale’.	   According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   the	   opinion	   deemed	   most	   appropriate	   by	   the	  scholars	   (al-­‐ma	   ͑rūf)	   in	   this	   situation	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	   rational	   correlation	  between	  prohibition	  and	  invalidity167.	  	  Because	   there	   is	   no	   contradiction,	   not	   rationally	   nor	   conventionally	  (lā	   	   ͑aqlan	  wa	   lā	   	  u͑rfan),	   between	   a	   contract	   and	   the	   causation	   through	   it	  being	  disliked	  and	  between	  its	  validation	  by	  The	  Legislator	  when	  the	  said	  contract	   is	   otherwise	   fulfilling	   all	   the	   stipulated	   conditions	   –	   in	   fact	   the	  opposite	  is	  established,	  e.g.	   in	  the	  prohibition	  of	  Ẓihār168,	  which	  does	  not	  negate	  the	  resultant	  effects	  of	  it	  with	  respect	  to	  separation.169	  	  	  	  	  Just	   because	   the	   initiation	   of	   a	   contract	   is	   disliked	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   it	   is	  necessarily	   invalid.	   The	   difference	   between	   this	   situation	   and	   the	   prohibition	  upon	  the	  devotional	  act	  is	  that	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  a	  devotional	  act	  is	  to	  seek	  the	  pleasure	  of	  God,	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  attained	  through	  something	  disliked.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  disliked	  contract,	  which	  fulfils	  all	  necessary	  conditions	  of	   validity,	   the	   contract	   is	   still	   effective	   in	   initiating	   its	   consequence	   and	  hence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  311	  168	  Zihār	  refers	  to	  an	  act	  prevalent	  in	  the	  pre-­‐	  Islamic	  society,	  in	  which	  A	  husband	  would	  renounce	  conjugal	  relations	  with	  his	  wife	  by	  stating	  that	  His	  wife	  was	  to	  	  to	  him	  like	  the	  back	  (ẓihār)	  of	  his	  mother.	  The	  Qur’ān	  explcictly	  prohibits	  this	  practice,	  but	  it	  does	  maintain	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  impermissible	  declaration	  to	  stand	  until	  the	  husband	  has	  offered	  expiation,	  see.	  Qur’ān	  58:3.	  Reference	  to	  this	  example	  here	  as	  part	  of	  a	  justification	  for	  a	  position	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  a	  case	  where	  the	  positions	  in	  furu‘	  al-­‐fiqh	  drove	  the	  positions	  in	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  complex	  and	  variable	  relation	  between	  furū	  ͑	  
and	  uṣūl	  see	  above	  pp.	  25-­‐37.	  	  	  169	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  311.	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the	  prohibited	  initiatory	  contract	  is	  deemed	  to	  maintain	  its	  validity.	  Although	  the	  prohibition	  reveals	   that	   to	   trade	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  call	   to	  prayer	  on	  a	  Friday	   is	  disliked,	   and	   hence	   a	   sin,	   any	   sales	   which	   are	   conducted	   at	   this	   time	   are	  considered	  valid	  and	  maintain	  their	  legal	  effect.	  	  As	   for	   the	   prohibition	   upon	   a	   non-­‐devotional	   act	   when	   the	   object	   of	   the	  prohibition	   is	   not	   an	   initiatory	   contract,	   but	   the	   act	   itself	   (nafs	  al-­‐mu	  ͑āmala)	   –	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  difference	  of	  opinion	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  prohibition	  is	  deemed	  to	   invalidate	   the	  act	  or	  not170.	  However	  both	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  and	  Muẓaffar	  are	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	   if	   the	  prohibition	   is	  directed	  towards	   the	  very	  existence	  of	   the	  non-­‐devotional	  act,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  prohibition	  attached	  to	  selling	  copies	  of	   the	  Qur’ān,	   it	  would	   invalidate	   the	  action171.	  For	  both	  scholars	  such	  a	  prohibition	   reflects	   what	   ultimately	   refers	   to	   some	   unfulfilled	   condition,	   or	  obstacle	   (māni	  ͑īyya)	   to	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   contract	   itself.	   Authority	   (sulṭāniyya)	  and	   a	   right	   to	   utility	   (ḥaq	  al-­‐taṣarruf)	   are	   basic	   conditions	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   a	  non-­‐devotional	   act	   or	   transaction.	   According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   the	   prohibition	   from	  God	   is	   a	   devotional	   obstacle	   to	   the	   Mukallaf’s	   action	   that	   undermines	   his	  authority	  and	  right	  of	  utility	  over	  that	  act/transaction,	  thus	  violating	  a	  necessary	  condition	   of	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   non-­‐devotional	   act	   and	   resulting	   in	   its	  invalidity172.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.5.4	  The	  status	  of	  the	  opposite	  to	  that	  which	  has	  been	  commanded;	  al-­‐ḍid	  Within	  the	  debates	  discussed	  under	  the	  category	  of	  gayr	  mustaqillāt	  	  al-­‐	͑  aqliyya	  is	  the	  issue	  referred	  to	  by	  scholars	  of	  Shī	  ͑a	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  simply	  as	  mas’ala	  al-­‐ḍid.	  The	  discussion	   centres	   around	   the	   question	   as	   to	  whether	   or	   not	   an	   imperative	   or	  command	  toward	  a	  thing	  rationally	  necessitates	  a	  prohibition	  upon	  its	  opposite	  (hal	   yaqtaḍī	   al-­‐amr	   al-­‐nahī	   	  ͑alā	   ḍiddihi	   am	   lā).	   Here	   the	   term	   ḍid	   refers	   to	   an	  absolute	   opposition	   or	   negation.	   The	   usage	   then	   is	   more	   general	   than	   the	  employment	   of	   the	   same	   term	   in	   logic	   where	   it	   refers	   only	   to	   an	   existential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	  Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  p.	  111.	  171	  Durūs	  fi	  	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐Uṣūl,	  Vol.	  1	  p.353,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  311.	  	  172	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  1	  p.	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opposition	  e.g.	  black	  and	  white173.	  The	  question	  here	  relates	  to	  both	  this	  case	  of	  opposites	   and	   the	   case	   of	   opposition	   referred	   to	   as	   naqīḍ,	   a	   non-­‐existential	  opposition,	  e.g.	  black	  and	  non-­‐black.	  Accordingly	  the	  discussion	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   is	  at	  two	  levels,	   first	  it	   is	  asked	  if	  a	  command	  to	  a	  thing	  necessitates	  a	  prohibition	  against	  the	  non-­‐existential	  opposition	  of	  the	  commanded	  thing,	  referred	  to	  as	  al-­‐
ḍid	   al-­‐	   ͑ām.	   	   Put	   more	   simply,	   does	   the	   command	   toward	   an	   action	   also	  necessitate	  a	  devotional	  prohibition	  against	  leaving	  or	  avoiding	  that	  action?	  The	  second	   level	  of	  question	  asked	   is	  whether	  or	  not	   a	   command	   toward	  an	  action	  necessitates	   a	   prohibition	   against	   any	   actual	   existential	   act	   brought	   about,	  referred	  to	  as	  al-­‐ḍid	  al-­‐khāṣ,	  which	  is	  contrary	  to	  the	  act	  commanded.	  	  With	  respect	   to	  al-­‐ḍid	  al-­‐	   ͑ām,	   that	   is	   the	  necessitation	  of	  a	  command	  towards	  a	  prohibition	  upon	  avoidance	  of	  the	  commanded	  act,	  the	  most	  prevalent	  position	  is	  that	  it	  does	  occur174.	  Thus	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  command	  to	  perform	  an	  action	  also	  necessitates	   that	   there	   is	   a	   concurrent	   devotional	   prohibition	   against	   avoiding	  that	   action.	   Muẓaffar	   disagrees	   with	   this	   position	   claiming	   that	   there	   is	   no	  rational	  correlation	  between	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  command	  towards	  a	  thing	  and	  a	  
shar	  ͑ī	  prohibition	  of	  avoiding	  it;	  	  	  	  	  Because	   the	   very	   commanding	   of	   a	   thing	   itself,	   when	   at	   the	   level	   of	  obligation,	  is	  sufficient	  [impetus]	  to	  restrain	  from	  abstention	  [of	  that	  act].	  Thus	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   the	   stipulation	   from	   the	   Legislator	   of	   a	  prohibition	   against	   leaving	   that	   act	   above	   and	   beyond	   the	   command	   to	  that	  action.175	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	  Muẓaffar’s	  disagreement	  with	  the	  mainstream,	  as	  Al-­‐Faḍlī	  points	  out,	  the	  conclusion	  in	  both	  cases	  is	  the	  same-­‐	  one	  is	  prohibited	  from	  performing	  the	  ḍid	  
al-­‐	   	   ͑ām.	   For	   those	  who	  affirm	   the	   correlation,	   this	   is	  by	  way	  of	   an	   independent	  devotional	  prohibition	  from	  the	  Legislator.	  For	  those	  who	  deny	  this	  correlation,	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   initial	   command	   itself	   is	   strong	   enough	   to	   prevent	   us	   from	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  For	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  opposition	  (aqsām	  al-­‐taqābul)	  and	  their	  definitions	  see	  Muḥammad	  Riḍā	  al-­‐Muẓaffar,	  al-­‐Mantiq,	  (Qum,	  Initishārāt	  Sayyid	  al-­‐Shuhadā,	  1959)	  pp.	  44-­‐45.	  	  174	  Al-­‐Faḍlī,	  Mabādī	  al-­‐Uṣūl	  p.	  103,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  Durūs.	  Vol.	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  p.	  349.	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  Vol.	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avoiding	   the	   action	   and	   there	   is	   no	   need	   for	   the	   issuance	   of	   an	   independent	  prohibition176.	  	  	  The	  status	  of	  ḍid	  al-­‐khāṣ,	  an	  existential	  opposite	  to	  a	  commanded	  thing,	   follows	  and	   is	   based	   on	   the	   position	   adopted	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   necessitation	   of	   a	  command	  to	  a	  prohibition	  upon	  its	  ḍid	  al-­‐	  	   ͑ām.	  For	  those	  like	  Muẓaffar	  who	  claim	  there	   is	   no	   necessary	   correlation	   between	   a	   command	   towards	   a	   thing	   and	  another	  devotional	  prohibition	  against	  avoiding	  it,	  then	  by	  priority	  there	  cannot	  be	   a	   corresponding	   devotional	   prohibition	   against	   bringing	   about	   any	   action	  contrary	  to	  that	  which	  has	  been	  commanded177.	  However	  those	  who	  affirm	  that	  a	  command	  to	  an	  action	  does	  necessitate	  a	  devotional	  prohibition	  to	  abstain	  from	  an	  act,	  can	  argue	  that	  this	  prohibition	  extends	  to	  the	  bringing	  about	  of	  an	  action	  contrary	   to	   that	  which	  was	   commanded.	   This	   is	   justified	   by	   either	   one	   of	   two	  theories.	  The	  first	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  further	  correlation	  between	  the	  ḍid	  
al-­‐khāṣ	   and	   the	   ḍid	   al-­‐	   ͑ām,	   making	   both	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   precept	   i.e.	  prohibition.	  The	  second	  conceives	  of	   the	  avoidance	  of	   the	  ḍid	  al-­‐khāṣ,	   as	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	   to	  the	  performance	  of	   the	  commanded	  act.	  As	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	  an	  obligation	   are	   considered	   also	   a	   devotional	   obligation	   according	   to	   some178,	  avoidance	  of	  the	  ḍid	  al-­‐khāṣ	  becomes	  obligatory	  and	  its	  performance	  prohibited.	  	  In	   this	   brief	   description	   it	   is	   plain	   to	   see	   that	   this	   is	   another	   hair	   splittingly	  sophisticated	   theoretical	   discussion.	   However	   again,	   it	   is	   not	   without	   practical	  relevance.	   An	   affirmation	   of	   a	   prohibition	   to	   the	   ḍid	   al-­‐khāṣ	   has	   extensive	  implications	   to	   the	   positions	   attained	   in	   furū	  	͑   al-­‐fiqh.	   For	   scholars	   of	   this	  theoretical	   opinion,	   as	   the	   prohibition	   is	   deemed	   to	   necessitate	   invalidity,	   acts	  performed	   which	   are	   contrary	   to	   an	   active	   obligation	   are	   rendered	   invalid.	  Accordingly	   the	   performance	   of	   any	   supererogatory	   acts	   instead	   of	   active	  obligatory	  acts,	  or	  the	  performance	  of	  obligatory	  acts	  which	  are	  not	  immediate	  in	  their	   requirement	   of	   discharge	   in	   favour	   of	   those	   which	   are	   immediate	   in	  requirement-­‐	   are	   all	   deemed	   invalid.	   For	   example,	   based	   on	   the	   immediate	  obligation	  to	  remove	  impurities	  (najāsa)	   from	  within	  the	  Mosque,	   if	  one	  was	  to	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  Mabādī	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  p.	  103.	  177	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  261.	  178	  See	  the	  discussion	  above	  on	  an	  the	  alternative	  view	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  preliminaries	  for	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  (muqaddamāt	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ignore	  this	  obligation	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  canonical	  prayer	  (al-­‐ḍid	  
al-­‐khāṣ),	   this	   prayer	   would	   be	   deemed	   null	   and	   void.	   If	   one	   has	   sufficient	  capability	   to	   perform	   the	   obligatory	  major	   pilgrimage	   (al-­‐Ḥajj),	   but	   chooses	   to	  perform	   the	   recommended	   minor	   pilgrimage	   (al-­‐	   ͑umra)	   or	   a	   visitation	   to	   the	  shrines	   of	   the	   Imāms	   (al-­‐ziyāra)	   instead-­‐	   the	   minor	   pilgrimage	   or	   visitation	  would	  be	  deemed	  invalid	  and	  void.	  
	  2.5.5	  The	  simultaneity	  of	  an	   imperative	  and	  a	  prohibition:	   Ijtimā	  ͑	  al-­‐amr	  wa	  al-­‐
nahī	  The	  question	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  simultaneity	  (Ijtimā	  ͑)	  of	  a	  command	  and	  a	  prohibition	   pertaining	   to	   a	   single	   thing	   has	   been	   a	   point	   of	   discussion	   in	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholarship	  even	  before	   the	   formal	  systematisation	  of	   their	   ideas	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  began179.	   	   It	   is	   a	   discussion	   that	   amounts	   to	   what	   may	   be	   described	   as	   a	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  the	  possibility	  and	  nature	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  conflicting	  duty.	  The	  discussion	  gives	   support	   to	   the	   theses	   that	   the	  product	  of	   the	   jurists	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  deontological	  system,	  but	  is	  instead	  rather	  more	  akin	  to	  a	  system	  of	  prima	  facie	  ethics	  as	  associated	  with	  W.D.	  Ross180.	  The	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  (or	  simultaneity)	  under	  discussion	  here	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	   philosophically,	   or	   rationally,	   possible	   that	   a	   single	   act	   be	   at	   the	   same	   time	  commanded	  from	  one	  perspective	  and	  yet	  prohibited	  from	  another.	  	  To	   clarify	   the	   point	   of	   dispute,	   scholars	   of	   Shī	  ͑a	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   first	   distinguish	  between	  at	  least	  two	  types	  of	  simultaneity181,	  a	  real	  simultaneity	  (Ijtimā	  ͑	  ḥaqiqī)	  and	   a	   circumstantial	   simultaneity	   (Ijtimā	  ͑	   mawradī) 182 .	   The	   ḥaqiqī	   or	   real	  simultaneity,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  al-­‐Ijtimā	  ͑	  al-­‐ma’mūrī,	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  there	   is	   a	   single	   source	   of	   command	   and	   prohibition	   (in	   this	   case	   Allah,	   the	  
Mukallif)	  directed	  to	  the	  same	  responsible	  individual	  (mukallaf),	  at	  a	  single	  time	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  Subhani	  cites	  the	  relevant	  opinions	  of	  both	  Faḍl	  bin	  Shādhan	  (d.	  260/873)	  and	  al-­‐Kulayni	  (d.	  328/941)	  along	  with	  a	  list	  of	  prominent	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  from	  throughout	  the	  subsequent	  generations,	  see	  Al-­‐Mūjiz	  pp.	  67-­‐68.	  180	  George	  Hourani	  notes	  this	  resemblance	  in	  his	  study	  of	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  Ethics	  see	  Islamic	  Rationalism,	  (Oxford,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1971).	  	  181	  Subḥāni	  mentions	  three	  types,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  the	  two	  outlined	  here	  which	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  debate	  at	  hand.	  See	  al-­‐Mūjiz,	  p.	  67.	  	  182	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  275.	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with	  different	  referents.	  For	  example	  if	  there	  was	  a	  legal	  address	  to	  a	  responsible	  individual	  which	  stated	   ‘Pray!	  And	  do	  not	  misappropriate!	  (Ṣallī	  wa	  lā	  taghṣib)’,	  we	  have	  a	   single	   individual	  with	   two	  responsibilities;	  one	  being	   to	  perform	  his	  prayer	  and	  the	  other	  being	  to	  ensure	  that	  he	  does	  not	  misappropriate.	  There	   is	  no	  philosophical	  problem	  with	  the	  issuance	  of	  such	  a	  command	  along	  with	  such	  a	  prohibition,	  however	  the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  the	  status	  of	  the	  duties	  if	  at	  a	  point	  in	   time	   the	   responsible	   individual	  brings	  about	   the	  object	  of	  both	  duties	   (or	  as	  the	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  put	  it,	  both	  titles,	   ͑anwānain)	  in	  a	  single	  act-­‐	  i.e.	  what	  is	  the	   status	  of	  performing	  ones	  prayer	   in	   a	  misappropriated	  place?	  Are	  both	   the	  command	  and	   the	  prohibition	  still	  active	  and	  hence	  simultaneous?	  Or	   is	   such	  a	  simultaneity	  impossible,	  leaving	  one	  of	  the	  two	  duties	  suspended	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  other?	   It	   is	   these	   questions	   that	   are	   the	   central	   issues	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	  ‘simultaneity	  of	  a	  command	  and	  a	  prohibition’.	  In	  order	  to	  further	  appreciate	  the	  issue	   of	   ‘a	   real	   simultaneity’	   and	   how	   some	   resolve	   it,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   also	  explain	  the	  circumstantial	  simultaneity.	  The	   circumstantial	   concurrence	   is	   when	   the	   object,	   or	   titles	   (	  ͑anwān),	   of	   both	  duties	  concur	  at	  a	  single	  instance	  but	  not	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  single	  action.	  Rather	  it	  is	  a	  case	  where	  there	  are	  two	  actions	  at	  a	  single	  time,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  the	  object	  of	  a	  commanded	   duty	   and	   another	   is	   the	   object	   of	   a	   prohibited	   duty.	   The	   classic	  example	  offered	  to	  highlight	  this	  category	  of	  concurrence	  is	  if	  one	  were	  to	  gaze	  at	  an	  unrelated	  woman	  (ajnabiyya)	  whilst	  performing	  his	  canonical	  prayer.	  In	  this	  example	   the	   gaze	   towards	   the	   women,	   which	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   lustful,	   is	  considered	   a	   prohibited	   act	   whilst	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   canonical	   prayer	   is	  deemed	  obligatory-­‐	   thus	  there	   is	  an	  apparent	  simultaneity	  between	  prohibition	  and	  command.	  However,	  gazing	  and	  praying	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  single	  act,	  rather	  they	  are	  viewed	  as	  two	  independent	  actions-­‐	  one	  of	  which	  is	   prohibited	   and	   the	   other	   obligatory.	   It	   just	   so	   happens	   that	   the	   responsible	  individual	  brings	  about	  both	  acts	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  command	  and	  prohibition	  is	  thus	  deemed	  circumstantial	  and	  yield’s	  no	  ‘real	  simultaneity’.	  Unlike	   in	   the	   above	   example	   where	   the	   very	   act	   of	   praying	   is	   also	   an	   act	   of	  misappropriation,	   here	   there	   are	   two	   discrete	   acts	   and	   hence	   the	  mukallaf	   is	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deemed	  to	  be	  sinning	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  lustful	  gaze	  and	  obedient	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  prayer.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   possibility	   of	   a	   real	   or	   ḥaqiqī	   simultaneity	   between	   a	   command	   and	  prohibition	   are	   extensively	   discussed	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   discussions	   which	   both	  Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   and	  Muẓaffar	   subsume	  within	   the	   discussion	   of	   non-­‐independent	  rationality183.	  It	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  has	  produced	  an	  array	  of	  opinions,	  some	  arguing	  for	   and	   some	   arguing	   against	   the	   possibility	   in	   accordance	   with	   various	  permutations	  of	  how	  the	  simultaneity	  arises.	  For	  further	  analytical	  exposition	  of	  the	  question,	   the	  real	   simultaneity	   is	  also	  considered	   to	  be	  of	   two	   types;	  either	  the	   situation	   of	   simultaneity	   is	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   mukallaf	   despite	   an	  alternative	  means	  of	  discharge	  (ma	͑  a	  mandūḥa),	  or	  the	  situation	  of	  concurrence	  comes	   about	   due	   to	   a	   constraint	   beyond	   the	   control	   of	   the	   mukallaf	   (ma	͑  a	  
iḍṭirār).	  An	  example	  of	  the	  case	  where	  the	  mukallaf	  has	  an	  alternative	  means	  of	  discharge	  is	   a	   prayer	   performed	   on	  misappropriated	   land,	   despite	   there	   being	   sufficient	  time	   for	  him	   to	  be	  able	   to	  perform	   the	  prayer	   in	  a	  permissible	  place	  before	   its	  designated	   time	   elapses.	   For	   those	   who	   deem	   that	   the	   simultaneity	   between	  command	  and	  prohibition	  is	  possible-­‐	  ultimately	  reducing	  all	  real	  simultaneity	  to	  circumstantial	   simultaneity	   -­‐	   the	  mukallaf	  will	   be	   obedient	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  performance	  of	  the	  prayer	  and	  disobedient	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  misappropriation	  of	   the	   land184.	  Further	   implications	  of	   this	  discussion	  raise	   their	  head	   for	   those	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  simultaneity	  is	  not	  possible,	  if	  and	  when	  the	  commanded	  act	  is	   a	   devotional	   one.	   As	   outlined	   above	   devotional	   acts	   are	   rendered	   void	   by	   a	  prohibition,	   thus	   in	   the	   situation	  of	   simultaneity	  described,	  not	  only	  would	   the	  individual	   have	   sinned	   by	   way	   of	   using	   misappropriated	   land,	   but	   his	   prayer	  would	  also	  be	  deemed	  invalid.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  simultaneity	  is	  due	  to	  a	  constraint	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  
mukallaf,	  the	  constraint	  may	  have	  either	  come	  about	  through	  one’s	  own	  volition,	  or	   due	   to	   no	   prior	   fault.	   Examples	   of	   the	   latter	   include	   the	   case	   of	   the	  performance	   of	   an	   obligatory	   prayer	   by	   one	   who	   has	   been	   wrongfully	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  For	  details	  of	  how	  this	  position	  is	  justified	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  275	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imprisoned	  in	  a	  cell	  built	  on	  misappropriated	  land,	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  prohibition	  against	  leaving	  ones	  prayer	  at	  the	  last	  possible	  point	  of	  discharge	  coinciding	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  one	  drowning	  in	  a	  nearby	  stream.	  In	  such	  cases	  of	   conflict,	   for	   those	   who	   believe	   that	   both	   prohibition	   and	   command	   cannot	  occur	  simultaneously,	   the	  active	  obligation	   is	   the	  one	  that	   is	  based	  on	  the	  most	  important	   criteria	   (milāk).	   The	   duty	   considered	   rationally	   most	   important	  (aham)	  is	  deemed	  active,	  and	  so	  fulfilling	  the	  obligation	  to	  saving	  the	  life	  rather	  than	   respecting	   the	   prohibition	   against	   leaving	   ones	   prayer	  would	   become	   the	  required	  duty	  from	  the	  Mukallaf.	  	  2.5.6	  Non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator:	  source	  or	  interpretation?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  foregoing	  section	  has	  outlined	  the	  major	  topics	  discussed	  under	  the	  category	  of	  source	  described	  as	  non-­‐independent	  rational	  indicator.	  The	  sufficiency	  of	  acts	  according	   to	   secondary	   precepts,	   the	   pre-­‐requisites	   of	   an	   obligation,	   the	  indication	  of	  a	  prohibition	  to	  corruption,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  opposite	  to	  that	  which	  has	  been	  commanded	  and	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  an	  imperative	  and	  a	  prohibition	  are	  all	   debates	   which	   in	   some	   form	   or	   another	   ask	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   rational	  correlation	  between	  an	  established	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  and	  a	  second	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  discovered	   by	   way	   of	   this	   correlation.	   This	   outline	   was	   not	   intended	   to	   be	   a	  conclusive	  discussion	  of	  each	  issue,	  rather	  it	  aimed	  only	  at	  giving	  an	  overview	  of	  the	   potential	   instances,	   or	   minor	   premises,	   of	   the	   category	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	  classed	   as	   non-­‐independent	   rationality.	   Even	   in	   this	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	  debates,	   it	   can	  be	  seen	   that	  each	  of	   the	   five	  discussions	  relies	  on	  sophisticated,	  and	   often	   hair	   splitting,	   analysis.	   The	   sample	   of	   the	   debates,	   taken	   here	   from	  amongst	   the	   works	   of	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   scholars,	   reflects	   the	   development	   of	   the	  intellectual	  efforts	  of	  over	  a	  thousand	  years	  of	  Muslim	  scholarship.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   undisputed	   complexity	   in	   the	   discussions,	   it	   is	   quite	   reasonable	   to	  ask	  whether	  these	  issues	  can	  actually	  be	  considered	  instances	  of	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	   of	   precept	   or	   whether	   they	   are	   rather	   simply	   rational	   interpretations,	  either	   of	   linguistic	   evidences	   for	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   or	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	  themselves.	  From	  the	  earliest	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  through	  to	  modern	  authorities,	  we	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find	  many	  of	  these	  discussions	  treated	  within	  the	  section	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  referred	  to	   as	   mabaḥith	   al-­‐alfāḍ,	   the	   linguistic	   discussions185.	   Such	   scholars	   treat	   the	  discussion	   either	   within	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   linguistic	   signification	   of	   the	  imperative	   or	   of	   the	   prohibition.	   Muẓaffar	   argues	   that	   even	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  single	  opinion	   in	  each	  case	  which	  claims	   that	   it	   is	  a	   rational	   correlation,	   rather	  than	   a	   linguistic	   implication,	  which	   is	   the	   link	  between	   the	   textual	   evidence	  or	  established	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  and	  the	  newly	  discovered	  precept,	  is	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	   treatment	   of	   the	   issues	   within	   a	   discussion	   of	   rational	   correlations	   rather	  than	  linguistic	  significations186.	  	  Despite	  raising	  this	  question,	  it	  is	  however	  clear	  that	  each	  of	  the	  cases	  discussed	  does	  potentially	  fall	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  offered	  by	  Mīrzā	  Qummī	  and	   developed	   by	   Muẓaffar	   into	   the	   form	   which	   considers	   ‘every	   rational	  proposition	   through	   which	   certain	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   is	  attained187’	  to	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐	͑  aql.	  They	  key	  term	  here	  is	  that	  dalīl	  al-­‐
ʿaql	   is	   defined	   as	   anything	   ‘through	   which	   (yatawaṣṣul	   bihā)’	   one	   leads	   to	  knowledge	   of	   a	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept.	   Thus	   rational	   interpretations	   of	   textual	  evidences-­‐	   such	   as	   the	   case	   of	   the	   pre-­‐requisite	   to	   obligation-­‐	   or	   the	   rational	  interpretation	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   existing	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts-­‐	   such	   as	   in	   the	  status	  of	  the	  opposite	  to	  that	  which	  is	  commanded-­‐	  can	  all	  be	  subsumed	  into	  dalīl	  
al-­‐	   ͑aql,	   albeit	   into	   the	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  which	   is	   explicitly	   categorised	   as	   being	   non-­‐independent.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  has	  been	  shown	  through	  the	  survey	  of	  issues,	  this	  category	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  does	  have	   direct	   implications	   and	   significant	   impact	   upon	   the	   actual	   inference	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh.	  In	  fact	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  Uṣūlī	   school	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   theory	   upholds	   an	   extensive	   role	   for	   al-­‐ʿaql	   as	   an	  interpretive	   tool	   or	   hermeneutical	   device	   in	   their	   reading	   of	   the	   Qur’ān	   and	  Sunna-­‐	   the	   discussions	   and	   the	   opinions	   adopted	   within	   the	   non-­‐independent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  Review	  of	  the	  contents	  of,	  for	  example,	  the	  early	  work	  of	  Murtaḍā,	  Al-­‐Dharī	  ͑a,	  and	  the	  contemporary	  al-­‐Mūjiz	  of	  Subhāni’s	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  each	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  non-­‐independent	  rationality	  have	  been	  treated	  by	  many	  within	  discussions	  of	  the	  linguistic	  signification	  of	  textual	  evidences	  rather	  than	  as	  instances	  of	  the	  non-­‐independent	  category	  of	  
dalīl	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rationality	   are	   all	   prime	   examples	   of	   this	   rationalistic	   approach	   to	   the	  interpretation	   of	   texts.	   Of	   course	   the	   stated	   focus	   of	   this	   study	   is	   not	   to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  an	  interpretive	  tool,	  but	  rather	  to	  investigate	  its	  role	  as	  a	  truly	  independent	  source.	  By	  highlighting	  that	  the	  non-­‐rational	  indicator	  is	   far	   from	   being	   such	   a	   source	   it	   is	   hoped	   that	   we	   can	   come	   to	   a	   better	  conception	   of	   what	   is	   understood	   by	   the	   Shī	  ͑ī	   scholars	   to	   be	   an	   independent	  rational	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  and	  thus	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  independent	  rational	  indicator	  or	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya.	  	  
2.6	  The	  independent	  rational	  indicator	  (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐aqliyya)	  Reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  precept,	  or	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐	͑  aql,	  has	  come	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  ‘every	   rational	   proposition	   through	   which	   certain	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  is	  attained188.	   	  When	  both	  minor	  premise	  and	  major	  premise	  within	  the	  syllogistic	   reasoning	   which	   brings	   forth	   this	   knowledge	   are	   both	   non-­‐textual	  precepts	  the	  judgement	  is	  classified	  as	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya,	  an	  independent	  rational	   indicator.	   Unlike	   the	   category	   of	   non-­‐independent	   rationality,	   such	  judgements	   are	   clearly	   sources	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   that	   may	   be	   classed	   as	   evidences	  alongside	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna,	  instead	  of	  being	  merely	  a	  means	  of	  interpreting	  either	   these	   sources	   or	   the	  precepts	   established	   therein.	   The	  major	  premise	   in	  the	  mustaqillāt	  	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	  pertains	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgement	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  the	  judgement	  of	  al-­‐shar	   ͑.	  Whether	  this	  correlation	  (also	  assumed	   within	   the	   major	   premise	   of	   non-­‐independent	   rationality)	   actually	  occurs,	   what	   its	   nature	   is	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   it	   is	   an	   authoritative	   means	   of	  discovering	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   are	   all	   issues	   yet	   to	   be	   discussed.	   After	  having	   outlined	   above	   the	   instances	   of	   the	   minor	   premise	   in	   the	   non-­‐independent	  rationality,	  this	  final	  section	  of	  the	  current	  chapter	  will	  identify	  the	  scope	   of	   instances	   of	   the	  minor	   premise	   in	   independent	   rationality	   setting	   the	  scheme	   for	   the	   subsequent	   engagement	  with	  why	   this	   theoretical	   source	   does	  not	  seem	  to	  impact	  on	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	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The	   exclusive	   instance	   of	   minor	   premises	   for	   independent	   judgements	   of	  rationality,	   from	  which	   knowledge	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	   attained,	   according	   to	  Muẓaffar,	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  single	  type	  of	  rational	  judgement.	  These	  are	  judgements	  of	   the	  praiseworthiness	  or	  blameworthiness	  of	   voluntary	  actions,	   based	  on	   the	  theological	   premise	   that	   the	   praiseworthy	   (al-­‐ḥusn)	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   (al-­‐
qubḥ)	   are	   indeed	   intelligible	   independent	   of	   revelation.	   Discussion	   of	   this	  theological	  premise	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  mas’alat	  	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbīḥ	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyain,	  the	   issue	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy.	  Summarising	   a	   previously	   cited	   example;	   assuming	   that	   rationality	   can	  independently	  affirms	   that	   ‘justice	   is	  praiseworthy’,	   and	   that	   there	   is	  a	   rational	  correlation	  between	  this	  judgement	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  judgement	  of	  shar	   ͑,	   it	  can	  be	  known	  through	  reason	  -­‐independently	  of	  transmitted	  revelatory	  sources-­‐	  that	  according	  to	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  justice	  is	  considered	  praiseworthy.	  Muẓaffar	   identifies	   four	   lexically	   ordered	   questions	   that	   need	   solving	   posed	   in	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  the	  space	  for	  such	  independent	  rational	  indicators	  to	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  Muẓaffar’s	  treatment	  of	  each	  will	  be	  examined	  more	  closely	  in	  subsequent	   chapters,	   being	   employed	   as	   a	   platform	   to	   address	   the	   primary	  concerns	  of	  the	  study	  in	  explaining	  the	  apparent	  redundancy	  of	  rational	  morality	  and	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  Briefly	  noting	  the	  four	  levels	  of	  discussion	  here	  will	  however	  set	  the	  scene	  and	  identify	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  instances	  of	  independent	  rationality	  within	  the	  dual	  category	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql.	  	  The	  first	  level	  of	  discussion	  is	  regarding	  an	  ontological	  question	  regarding	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  acts.	   ‘Do	  voluntary	  actions,	  irrespective	  of	  any	  precept	  from	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  and	  attachment	  of	  any	  legal	  address	  to	  them,	  have	  a	  rational	  status	  as	  either	   praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy?’189.	   This	   is	   the	   classical	   question	   which	  forms	   a	   dividing	   line	   between	   the	   meta-­‐ethical	   theories	   of	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	  and	   	   ͑Adliyya	   theologians,	   and	   upon	   which	   their	   respective	   conceptions	   of	   the	  nature	   of	   God’s	   justice	   depends.	   Indeed	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   call	   themselves	   ͑Adliyya	   –	  literally	  the	  people	  of	  Justice-­‐	  by	  way	  of	  the	  substantive	  conception	  of	  justice	  that	  they	   subscribe	   to	   God,	   a	   notion	   premised	   on	   their	   affirmation	   that	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  are	  intelligible	  independent	  of	  revelation.	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The	  second	  lexical	  question	  raised	  by	  Muẓaffar,	  and	  described	  as	  a	  dividing	  line	  between	  scholars	  of	  the	  Akhbārī	  and	  Uṣūlī	  schools,	  is	  that	  ‘after	  having	  assumed	  that	  actions	  in	  themselves	  are	  either	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy,	  is	  it	  actually	  possible	  for	  al-­‐ʿaql	  to	  perceive	  the	  aspects	  (wajūḥ)	  of	  their	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	   independently	   of	   any	   instruction	   or	   explanation	   from	   the	  Divine	  Legislator?’190.	  	  Although	  this	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  discrete	  question	  of	  moral	  epistemology	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  question	  which	  focuses	  on	  moral	  ontology,	  it	  shall	  be	  demonstrated	   in	  what	   follwos	   that	   the	   ͑Adliyya	  affirmation	  of	  voluntary	  actions	  having	  moral	  status	  irrespective	  of	  any	  Divine	  Legislation	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  their	  position	  with	  regards	  moral	  epistemology.	  	  Resolution	   of	   these	   theological	   questions	   regarding	  moral	   ontology	   and	  moral	  epistemology	   allows	   for	   the	   occurrence	   of	   the	   minor	   premises	   within	   the	  
mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya,	   such	   as	   justice	   and	   kindness	   are	   praiseworthy	   or	  oppression	   and	   lying	   are	   blameworthy.	   Having	   established	   that	   such	  propositions	  are	  rational,	  according	   to	  Muẓaffar,	  one	  can	   then	  move	   to	   the	   two	  remaining	   questions.	   Both	   of	   the	   subsequent	   questions	   may	   properly	   be	  considered	   to	   fall	   within	   the	   remit	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   instead	   of	   the	   theological	  discipline	  of	   	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐kalām,	   the	  primary	  forum	  for	  debate	  of	  the	  initial	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  moral	  ontology	  and	  epistemology.	  The	  first	  of	  the	  two	  questions	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  takes	  on	  the	  major	  premise	  in	  the	  mustaqillāt	  	  al-­‐	͑  aqliyya,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  claimed	  rational	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgement	  of	  	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  the	   judgement	   of	   al-­‐shar	͑  .	   As	   Muẓaffar	   puts	   it,	   ‘when	   al-­‐ʿaql	   judges	   of	   the	  praiseworthiness	   or	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   a	   thing,	   is	   it	   also	   rationally	  necessary	  according	  to	  it	  [al-­‐	͑  aql]	  that	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  is	  in	  accordance	   with	   its	   judgement	   [of	   praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness]?’191.	  Assuming	   that	   such	  a	   rational	   correlation	   can	  be	   substantiated,	   a	   final	   point	   of	  dispute	  arises	  regarding	  whether	  or	  not	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  attained	  through	   this	  means	   are	   authoritative	   or	   not?	   Can	   one	   rely	   upon	   this	  means	   to	  knowledge	   as	   conferring	   accountability	   (munajjaziyya)	   or	   excusabillity	  (mu	  ͑adhariyya)	  with	  regards	  to	  responsibilities	  before	  God?	  The	  question	  of	  the	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authority	  of	  the	  knowledge	  acquired	  by	  means	  of	  this	  rational	  correlation	  is	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  question	  of	  ḥujjiyya.	  As	  already	  stated,	  one	  of	  the	  central	  reasons	  for	  basing	  the	  narrative	  of	  this	  study	  around	  Muẓaffar’s	  treatment	  of	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	͑  aqliyya,	  is	  that	  in	  his	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  he	  offers	  an	  extensive	  exposition	  of	  the	  theological	  assumptions	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  his	  engagement	  with	  the	  questions	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  proper.	   	   In	  fact	  he	  claims	  that	  much	  of	   the	   confusion	   and	  debate	  pertaining	   to	   the	  questions	   surrounding	   the	  role	   of	   independent	   rationality	   as	   a	   source	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   stems	   from	  misconceptions	   in	   the	   theological	   premises192 .	   It	   shall	   be	   shown	   that	   his	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  rationality	  are	  instrumental	   in	   determining	   how	   and	   when	   the	   judgement	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   can	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgement	  of	  shar	͑  and	  that	  the	  epistemic	  conditions	  of	  validity	  to	  ensure	  that	  such	  judgements	  are	  authoritative	  are	  so	  high,	  that	  ultimately	  al-­‐
ʿaql	  is	  left	  redundant	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  precept	  in	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  furū	  	͑  
al-­‐fiqh.	  Muẓaffar’s	   treatment	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  morality	  and	   rationality	  and	   their	  impact	  on	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  precepts	  reflects	  not	  only	  a	  culmination	   of	   the	   relevant	   theological	   and	   philosophical	   ideas	   developed	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought,	  but	  also	  marks	  a	  development	  in	  these	  ideas.	  	  The	  exposition	  of	  these	  ideas	  in	  the	  discipline	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  criticisms	  that	  they	  received	  by	  other	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl,	  demonstrate	  the	  centrality	  of	  this	  discipline	  within	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	   thought.	  However,	  before	  a	  detailed	  analysis	   of	   these	   ideas	   of	   Muẓaffar	   and	   their	   criticisms	   is	   embarked	   upon,	   a	  thorough	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  has	  been	  conceived	  of	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought	  will	  ground	   the	   fundamentality	  of	   the	  principle	  within	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought,	  and	  allow	  the	  contributions	  and	  developments	  brought	  to	  the	  issue	  by	  modern	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   to	  be	  seen	  in	  greater	  relief.	  What’s	  more	  it	   is	  this	   very	   principle	  whose	   influence	   this	   study	  wishes	   to	   trace	   in	   its	   search	   for	  an	  	   ͑Adliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  Both	  the	  centrality	  of	  this	  principle	  in	  Shī	  ī͑	  theology	  and	  the	  potential	  that	  it	  holds	  for	  a	  moral	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  call	  us	  to	  temporarily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Muẓaffar	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1.	  p.	  185.	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move	   away	   from	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	   into	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	   issue	   in	   one	   of	   the	  central	  arenas	  for	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  and	  philosophical	  thought;	  	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐kalām.	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3.	  The	  intelligibility	  of	  moral	  values	  	  
in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought	  
	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
Qā	  ͑idat	   al-­‐taḥsīn	   wa	   taqbīḥ	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyain,	   may	   be	   literally	   understood	   as	   the	  principle	  of	  the	  rational	   intelligibility	  of	   ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  subsequent	  analysis,	  what	  is	  intended	  here	  by	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’,	  or	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  is	   quite	   specifically	   targeting	   the	   usage	   of	   the	   terms	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   moral	  status	  of	  voluntary	  actions.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  principle	  asserts	  that	  the	  moral	  value	   or	   status	   of	   some	   actions,	   that	   is	   their	   praiseworthiness	   or	  blameworthiness,	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  humans	  independent	  to	  revelation.	  It	  is	  this	  principle	  which	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  underpinning	  to	  the	  distinctive	  Shī	  ͑ī	  and	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	   doctrine	   of	   Divine	   justice,	   by	   which	   they	   call	   themselves	   ͑Adliyya	  (The	  people	  of	  Justice)	  and	  it	  is	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  principle	  that	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  claim	  that	  reason	  has	  a	  theoretical	  role	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  leading	  to	  the	  category	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  as	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya.	  	  Of	  course	  all	  Muslim	  theologians	  ascribed	  justice	  to	  Allah,	  for	  al-­‐	   ͑Adl	  is	  included	  amongst	  His	  Asmā	  al-­‐Ḥusnā,	  His	  Most	  Beautiful	  Names.	  What	  was	  of	  contention	  between	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  and	   their	   interlocutors,	   in	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   disputes	   of	  Muslim	  theology,	  revolved	  around	  what	  the	  ascription	  of	   justice	  to	  God	  actually	  meant.	  The	  belief	  of	  the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  is	  that	  Allah	  is	  Just	   in	  a	  substantive	  sense,	  that	  He,	   His	   actions	   and	   His	   commands	   are	   Just	   and	   that	   it	   is	   not	   permissible	   (la	  
yajūz),	   or	   not	   philosophically	   possible,	   for	  Allah	   to	   act	   unjustly	  where	   just	   and	  unjust	  are	  understood	  in	  a	  specific	  sense.	  What	   is	  crucial	  here	   is	  that	  the	  terms	  just	   and	   unjust	   are	   used	   as	   notions	   that	   are	   independently	   understandable	   by	  human	   beings	   and	   not	   simply	   defined	   by	   revelation	   and	   divine	   command.	   To	  claim	  that	  God’s	  actions	  must	  be	   just	   in	   this	  sense	  required	   from	  the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  a	  prior	  affirmation	  that	  justice/injustice,	  or	  moral	  values	  per	  se,	  have	  some	  reality	  or	   truth	   independent	   to	   God’s	   command.	   And	   thus	   it	   was	   the	   discussions	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regarding	  the	  normative	  assessment	  of	  God’s	  actions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	  theory	  summed	  up	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy.	  	  This	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy	   has	  come	  to	  be	  described	  by	  contemporary	  Shī	  a͑	  scholars	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ‘cornerstones’	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought193.	  It	  is	  a	  principle	  the	  influence	  of	  which	  is	  felt	  across	  a	  number	  of	   disciplines	   having	   particular	   significance	   in	   theology,	   ethics	   and	   fiqh	  194 .	  Although	   the	   central	   concern	  of	   this	   study	  may	  be	   seen	   to	  be	   investigating	   the	  influence	  of	  this	  principle	  in	  the	  last	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  disciplines	  through	  the	   medium	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   the	   interdisciplinary	   nature	   of	   the	   principle	   itself	  means	  that	  the	  study	  cannot	  be	  solely	  jurisprudential.	  	  In	   fact	   the	   study	   as	   a	   whole,	   described	   as	   a	   search	   for	   an	   	   ͑Adliyya	   reading	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a,	   could	   be	   conceived	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   assess	   the	   implications	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  and	  ethical	  assumptions	  upon	  jurisprudence	  and	  thus	  cannot	  observe	  the	   sometimes	   sharp	  demarcations	  drawn	  between	  each	  discipline.	   In	   fact	   it	   is	  explaining	  the	  apparent	  detachment	  of	  fiqh	  from	  theology	  and	  ethics	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  study,	  a	  separation	  which	  renders	  Shī	  ͑ī	  moral	  rationalism	  redundant	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  fiqh	  and	  which	  the	  present	  study	  seeks	  to	  challenge	  through	  a	  close	  study	  of	  the	  role	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  In	   order	   to	   properly	   set	   the	   grounds	   for	   assessing	   the	   theological	   and	   ethical	  implications	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   in	   contemporary	   Imāmī	   Shī	  ͑ī	  thought,	  we	  are	  thus	  called	  to	  offer	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  how	  this	  foundational	  principle	  has	  been	  conceived	  of	  in	  Imāmī	  	  thought.	  This	   chapter	   will	   seek	   to	   uncover	   the	   development	   and	   increasing	   depth	   of	  sophistication	  with	  which	  this	  principle	  has	  been	  dealt	  with	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Imāmī	  	  thought.	  As	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  survey	  is	  only	  to	  provide	  a	  conceptual	  prelude	  to	  the	  relevant	  debates	  in	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  it	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  be,	  nor	  need	   to	   be,	   a	   comprehensive	   survey.	   Accordingly	   it	   is	   only	   a	   sample	   of	   key	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  Ja	  ͑far	  Subḥānī,	  Risala	  fi	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbīḥ,	  
http://www.imamsadeq.org/ar.php/page,531BookAr68P1.html#3,	  p.	  5.	  194	  Ibid,	  p	  3.	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thinkers	   from	   what	   may	   be	   considered	   as	   three	   distinct	   periods	   in	   the	  intellectual	  history	  of	  the	  Imāmī	  Shī	  ͑a,	  all	  of	  which	  represent	  streams	  of	  thought	  with	  significant	  impact	  and	  influence	  upon	  the	  shape	  of	  debate	  in	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh.	  Although	  theological	  thought	  amongst	  the	  Shī	  ͑a	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  earliest	  companions	  of	  the	  Imāms,	  there	  is	   little	  doubt	  that	  it	  was	  the	  occultation	  of	  the	  Twelfth	  Imām	  that	  gave	  Imāmī	  thinkers	  an	  unprecedented	  impetus	  towards	  the	  development	   of	   systematic	   and	   comprehensive	   approaches	   to	   their	   scholarly	  endeavours195.	  It	  thus	  seems	  appropriate	  to	  begin	  our	  analysis	  of	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  moral	  rationalism	  with	   a	   sample	  of	   how	   it	  was	   conceived	  of	   in	   this	   formative	  period.	  The	  second	  period	  of	  focus	  is	  what	  may	  be	  described	  as	   ‘the	  classical	  period’	  of	  Imāmī	   theological	   thought,	   epitomised	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   ‘A͑llama	   Al-­‐Ḥillī	   (d.	  726/1325)	  and	  his	  teacher	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Din	  Ṭūsī	  (d.	  672/1274).	  This	  classical	  period	  has	   been	  described	   ‘as	   the	   last	   school	   of	   original	   thought	   in	   Imamite	   kalām’196	  representing	  a	  culmination	  of	  Imāmī	  theology	  which	  had	  by	  then	  become	  infused	  with	   a	   distinctively	   philosophical	   approach.	   The	   continued	   centrality	   of	   the	  output	   from	  this	  period	  within	   the	  curricula	  of	  contemporary	   Imāmī	  schools	  of	  learning	  is	  testament	  to	  its	  on-­‐going	  influence,	  supporting	  well	  the	  assertion	  that	  Imāmī	  theology	  has	  experienced	  little	  substantive	  development	  since197.	  However	   there	  was	  a	   further	   important	   shift	   in	   the	  disposition	  of	  many	   Imāmī	  thinkers	  subsequent	  to	  this	  classical	  period.	  Although	  it	  is	  with	  	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī	  that	  theology	   and	   philosophy	   became	   firmly	   fused	   together	   in	   Imāmī	   thought,	   and	  despite	   few	   significant	   changes	   in	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   Imāmī	   theological	  positions	  since,	  the	  dramatic	  developments	  in	  falsafa	  epitomised	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Ṣadr	  al-­‐Din	  al-­‐Shirāz	  (d.	  1050/1640)	  has	  had	  a	  large	  influence	  on	  how	  some	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  For	  an	  insight	  into	  early	  theological	  dispositions	  amongst	  third	  century	  Shī	  ͑a	  with	  specifc	  reference	  to	  debates	  regarding	  the	  nature	  and	  succession	  to	  the	  Imāms	  see	  Hossein	  Modarressi,	  
Crisis	  and	  Consolidation	  in	  the	  Formative	  Period	  of	  Shi'ite	  Islam:	  Abū	  Ja'far	  Ibn	  Qiba	  Al-­‐Razi	  and	  His	  
Contribution	  to	  Imamite	  Shi'ite	  Thought	  (Princeton,	  Darwin	  Press,	  1993),	  Part	  1	  pp.	  1-­‐105.	  Also	  for	  a	  brief	  general	  survey	  of	  early	  theological	  tendencies	  during	  and	  subsequent	  to	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Imāms	  see	  Murtaza	  Muṭahharī,	  Understanding	  Islamic	  sciences:	  philosophy,	  theology,	  
mysticism,	  morality,	  jurisprudence	  (London,	  Saqi,	  2002),	  pp.	  75-­‐79.	  196	  Wilferd	  Madelung	  ‘Imāmism	  and	  Mu’tazilite	  Theology’,	  Le	  Shī	  ͑īsme	  Imāmite,	  (Paris,	  Presses	  Universitaires	  de	  France,	  1970),	  p.	  27	  found	  in	  Wilfred	  Madelung	  Religious	  Schools	  and	  Sects	  in	  
Medieval	  Islam	  (London,	  Variorum	  Reprints,	  1985).	  197	  Madelung,	  ‘Imāmism	  and	  Mu’tazilite	  Theology’	  p.	  27.	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approached	   the	   doctrinal	   positions	   established	   in	   that	   classical	   period.	  Accordingly,	  the	  third	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  analysis	  of	  Qā	  ͑idatu	  
taḥsīn	   wa	   taqbīḥ	   provided	   by	   Ḥāj	   Mullā	   Hādī	   al-­‐Sabzawārī	   (d.	   1290/1873),	   a	  scholar	   who	   combined	   his	   deep	   understanding	   of	   Ṣadrian	   thought	   with	   an	  arguably	  stronger	  mystical	   influence	  than	  Ṣadra	  himself,	  often	  applying	  his	  vast	  scholarly	  tools	  in	  service	  of	  a	  vigorous	  defence	  of	  Imāmī	  doctrines,	  including	  the	  
Qā	  ͑idat	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbīḥ.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.2	  The	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  in	  the	  
formative	  years	  of	  Imāmī	  theology	  Amongst	   the	   earliest	   intellectual	   figureheads	   of	   the	   Imāmī	   community	   to	   be	  associated	  with	  the	  reconciliation	  between	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  thought	  and	  Imāmī	  doctrine	  was	   al-­‐Mufīd.	   The	   fundamental	   point	   of	   concurrence	   between	   the	   two	   schools	  that	  was	  endorsed	  by	  al-­‐Mufīd	  was	  with	  regards	  Divine	  Justice,	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	  principle	  in	  question.	  Of	  course	  this	  did	  not	  imply	  that	  al-­‐Mufīd	  was	  in	  complete	  concurrence	  with	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  on	  every	  issue	  related	  to	  God’s	   Justice,	   but	   he	   was	   certainly	   happy	   to	   consider	   the	   Imāmiyya	   and	   the	  Mu	   ͑tazila	   collectively	   under	   the	   title	   of	   ‘Adliyya198.	   Although	   McDermott	   gives	  huge	   insight	   into	   the	  place	   of	   al-­‐Mufīd’s	   theology	  with	   regards	   the	  diverse	   and	  competing	   intellectual	   tendencies	   occurring	   within	   Imāmī	   thought	   in	   the	   late	  third	  and	  early	   fourth	  centuries,	  his	  not	  unjustified	  characterisation	  of	  al-­‐Mufīd	  as	  holding	  a	  position	   ‘between	  the	   Imamite	   traditionists	  and	  the	   full	  Mu‘tazilite	  stance	  adopted	  by	  Al-­‐Murtaḍā’199	  	  has	   its	   limits.	   	  This	   can	  be	  quite	   clearly	   seen	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   al-­‐Mufīd’s	   position	   on	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   as	  compared	  with	  his	  traditionist	  predecessor	  Muḥammad	  bin	  	  ͑Ali	  bin	  Bābawayh	  (d.	  381/991-­‐2),	   commonly	   known	   as	   al-­‐Ṣadūq.	   Al-­‐Mufīd	   affirmed	   the	   picture	   of	  Divine	   Justice	   one	   may	   expect	   to	   see	   from	   a	   self	   professed	   member	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	  The	  raison	  d’être	  of	  one	  of	  his	  most	  important	  creedal	  works,	  Awā’il	  al-­‐maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐
mukhtārāt,	  is	  partly	  to	  distinguish	  exactly	  where	  the	  Imāmī	  differ	  from	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  despite	  their	  common	  categorisation	  as	  ‘Adliyya.	  199	  Martin	  J.	  McDermott,	  The	  Theology	  of	  Al-­‐Shaikh	  Al-­‐Mufid	  	  (Beirut,	  Dar	  al-­‐Mashreq,	  1978)	  p.	  395.	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‘Adliyya200,	  however	  his	  position	  on	  what	  is	  now	  considered	  by	  Imāmī	  thinkers	  to	  be	  a	  philosophical	  pre-­‐requisite	  to	  that	  picture	  of	  Divine	  justice,	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  does	  not	  follow	  suit.	  Although	  not	  directly	  addressing	   the	   question	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   moral	   values	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	  epistemic	  access	  to	  such	  values,	  Al-­‐Mufīd	  flatly	  denied	  any	  independent	  role	  for	  rationality	  in	  discovering	  duty201.	  Of	  course	  the	  general	  disposition	  of	  Al-­‐Mufīd,	   ‘theologian	  and	  traditionist’,	  is	  far	  more	   inclined	   to	   the	   use	   of	   rationality	   than	   Ibn	   Bābawayh	   ‘the	   traditionist’.	  However	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  reason	  determining	  the	  basis	  of	  value,	  we	  find	  the	  positions	  reversed.	  Despite	  his	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Baghdādi	  school	  of	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  kalām202	  and	  his	  strong	  advocacy	  for	  the	  use	  of	  rationality	  as	  a	  method	  in	   establishing	   and	   defending	   doctrine203,	   al-­‐Mufīd	   is	   very	   careful	   to	   mention	  explicitly	  his	  denial	  of	  any	  possibility	  for	  al-­‐ʿaql	  to	  act	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  normativity.	  In	  a	  passage	  entitled	  ‘Regarding	  the	  statement	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  cannot	  be	   separated	   from	   sam	   ͑	   (revelatory	   knowledge)	   and	   that	   al-­‐taklīf	   (religious	  responsibility)	   is	  not	  appropriate/correct	  except	   through	  al-­‐rusul	   (apostleship)’	  he	  states;	  The	  Imāmiyya	  all	  concur	  that	  al-­‐	   ͑aql,	  in	  its	  knowledge	  and	  its	  conclusions,	  requires	   al-­‐sam	  ͑	   and	   that	   it	   cannot	   be	   independent	   from	   sam‘.	   The	  inattentive	  is	  reminded	  by	  it	  (al-­‐sam	͑  )	  as	  to	  the	  manner	  of	  deduction	  and	  it	  is	  necessary	  in	  the	  initiation	  of	  responsibility,	  whilst	  its	  origination	  in	  the	  world	  is	  through	  a	  prophet204.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	  See	  ‘Awā’il	  al-­‐maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐mukhtārāt’	  in	  Abbāskuli	  Vā‘iz	  Charandābi	  (ed.)	  Awā’il	  al-­‐
maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐mukhtārāt	  wa	  Sharḥ	  	   ͑aqā’id	  al-­‐Ṣadūq	  aw	  Taṣḥīḥ	  al-­‐’ittiqādāt,	  (Tabriz,	  n.d.)	  p.24.	  201	  Awā’il.	  pp.	  11-­‐12.	  202	  Madelung	  describes	  a	  ‘marked	  preference’	  for	  the	  Baghdadi	  Mu	   ͑tazila	  over	  the	  Basrans	  in	  Al-­‐Mufīd’s	  thought,	  	  Imāmism	  and	  Mutazlite	  theology,	  p.24.	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  examination	  of	  his	  points	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  Baghdadi	  school	  see	  McDermott,	  The	  Theology	  of	  al-­‐Shaikh	  al-­‐Mufid	  (1978).	  	  203	  Al-­‐Mufīd	  argued	  against	  Ibn	  Babawayh’s	  prohibition	  from	  rational	  debate	  regarding	  Allah,	  claiming	  that	  in	  its	  correct	  form	  rational	  debate	  in	  defence	  of	  doctrine	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  Qur’ān,	  practiced	  by	  the	  Prophets	  and	  praised	  by	  the	  Imāms.	  See‘Sharḥ	  ‘aqā’id	  al-­‐Ṣadūq	  aw	  Taṣḥīḥ	  
al-­‐’ittiqād’	  in	  Abbāskuli	  Vā‘iz	  Charandābi	  (ed.)	  Awā’il	  al-­‐maqālāt	  fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐mukhtārāt	  wa	  
Sharḥ	  	   ͑aqā’id	  al-­‐Ṣadūq	  aw	  Taṣḥīḥ	  al-­‐’ittiqādāt,	  (Tabriz,	  n.d.).	  pp.	  26-­‐27.	  	  	  204	  Awā’il.	  	  pp.	  11-­‐12.	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The	  explicit	  rejection	  of	  any	  independent	  normative	  role	  for	  al-­‐	   ͑aql,	  and	  the	  firm	  denial	  of	  any	  responsibility	  prior	  to	  prophecy,	  although	  not	  found	  in	  the	  context	  of	   discussions	   on	   Divine	   justice,	   are	   more	   consistent	   with	   a	   voluntarist	  framework	  and	  sit	  in	  tension	  with	  al-­‐Mufīd’s	  adoption	  of	  an	  	   ͑Adliyya	  mantle.205	  	  With	  somewhat	  surprising	  contrast	  to	  the	  above	  position	  of	  Al-­‐Mufīd,	  and	  when	  speaking	   specifically	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Divine	   Justice,	   Ibn	  Bābawayh	   states	   that	  justice	  and	  injustice	  ‘are	  based	  upon	  that	  which	  rationality	  considers	  is	  good	  and	  that	  which	   is	  bad’206.	  However	   indicative	   these	   comments	  may	  be	   to	  either	   the	  internal	   resources	   of	   Imāmī	   tradition	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   rationalist	   moral	  framework,	   or	   to	   the	   influence	  Mu	   ͑tazilī	   thought	  may	   have	   had	   even	   upon	   the	  traditionist	   Imāmī	  camp	  during	   these	   formative	  years,	   they	  do	  not	  amount	   to	  a	  detailed	  affirmation	  of	  Qā	  ͑idat	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbīḥ	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyain	  formulated	  as	  a	  necessary	  premise	  to	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  theological	  position	  regarding	  Divine	  Justice.	  	  With	  the	  known	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  disposition	  of	  Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  the	  immediate	  heir	  of	  Mufīd’s	   authority	   in	   the	   Imāmī	   community,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   to	   find	   that	   his	  major	   theological	   work	   employs	   reasoning	   that	   repeatedly	   presumes	   that	   the	  moral	   values	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   are	   intelligible	   independent	   of	   revelation207.	   His	  treatise	  ‘mas’ala	  fi	  al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  al-­‐qubḥ	  al-­‐	  ʿaqlī’,	  published	  in	  a	  collected	  volume	  of	  some	  of	  his	  works,	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  earliest	  dedicated	  Imāmī	  treatment	  of	  the	  issue208.	   In	  a	  style	   typical	  of	   the	  polemical	   form	  of	  Kalām,	  Murtaḍā	  responds	   to	  objections	  against	  the	  doctrine	  that	  arise	  from	  a	  Qur’ānic	  narrative	  of	  Moses	  and	  his	  mystical	  guide	  (presumed	  by	  most	   to	  be	   the	  Prophet	  Khizr),	  where	  Moses’s	  guide	   performs	   a	   number	   of	   acts	   which	   at	   face	   value	   appear	   blameworthy	   to	  Moses209.	   However	   this	   brief	   treatise	   offers	   no	   systematic	   justification	   or	   even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Al-­‐Mufīd	  explicitly	  affirmed	  that	  his	  position	  denying	  any	  independent	  normative	  efficacy	  to	  
al-­‐ʿaql	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Asḥāb	  al-­‐Ḥādith,	  Awā’il,	  p.	  12.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  close	  association	  between	  the	  Asḥāb	  al-­‐Ḥādith	  and	  a	  voluntrist	  ethical	  framework	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  claim	  that	  al-­‐Mufīd	  may	  not	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  implication	  of	  his	  statement	  in	  this	  regard.	  206	  Abī	  Ja	  ͑far	  bin	  	  ͑Ali	  bin	  al-­‐Ḥusayn	  Bābawayh,	  Al-­‐Tawḥīd	  (Qum,	  Jāmi	  ͑at	  al-­‐Mudarrasīn,	  1995)	  p.	  395	  and	  McDermot,	  The	  Theology	  of	  Al-­‐Shaikh	  Al-­‐Mufid,	  p.	  350.	  	  207	  For	  example	  see	  the	  discussion	  on	  ‘the	  invalidity	  of	  religious	  responsibility	  beyond	  capability’	  in	  al-­‐Dhakhīrā	  fi	  	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐kalām	  (Qum,	  Mu’assasat	  al-­‐Nashr	  al-­‐Islāmī,	  1990)	  pp.	  100-­‐103.	  	  208	  Rasā’il	  al-­‐Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā;	  Majmu	  ͑a	  al-­‐thālitha	  (N.P.,	  Dār	  al-­‐Qur’ān	  al-­‐Karīm,	  1984)	  pp.	  175-­‐180.	  209	  See	  Qur’ān	  18:65-­‐82.	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conceptual	   analysis	   of	   a	   doctrine	   that	   would	   later	   be	   recognised	   as	   being	  fundamental	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought.	  	  The	   traditionist	   and	   rationalist	   tendencies	   in	   early	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   became	  increasingly	  synthesised	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Muḥammad	  bin	  Ḥasan	  al-­‐Ṭūsī.	  As	  seen	  in	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   and	   despite	   his	   efforts	   to	   expand	   the	   authority	   of	  tradition,	  al-­‐Ṭūsī	  maintained	  that	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  were	  understandable	  by	  the	  intellect	  independently	  of	  revelation210.	  However	  it	  was	  not	  until	  what	  we	  are	  here	  describing	  as	  the	  classical	  period	  of	  Imāmī	  theological	  thought	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  was	  given	  a	   systematic	   and	   comprehensive	   treatment	   as	   a	   principle	   philosophically	  fundamental	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  conception	  of	  God.	  	  	  
3.3	  The	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  in	  Classical	  
Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  Imāmī	  expositions	  of	  the	  Qā	  i͑datu	  taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbīḥ	  al-­‐	͑  aqliyain,	  conceived	  as	  a	  necessary	  premise	  to	  the	   ͑Adliyya	  position	  on	  Divine	  Justice,	  can	  be	  found	   in	   the	   concise	  work	   entitled	  al-­‐Yāqūt	   fi	   	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐kalām.	   The	   importance	   of	  this	   text	   as	   an	   early	   Imāmī	   representation	   of	   a	   systematic	   and	   philosophically	  inclined	   approach	   to	   Kalām,	   has	   been	   well	   noted211.	   It	   represents	   a	   style	   of	  philosophical	   theology	   that	   would	   become	   the	   central	   approach	   to	   doctrinal	  works	   in	  Imāmī	  thought	  thenceforth	  and	  is	  a	  pre-­‐cursor	  to	  the	  style	  adopted	  in	  the	   classical	   Imāmī	  works	   of	   theology	  penned	  by	  Naṣīr	   al-­‐Dīn	  Ṭūsī	   and	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī212.	   However	   this	   importance	   has	   been	   somewhat	   offset	   by	   confusion	   over	  both	  its	  author	  and	  its	  time	  of	  writing.	  The	  work	  is	  most	  commonly	  ascribed	  to	  one	  Abū	  Isḥāq	  Ibrāhīm	  bin	  Nawbakht,	  in	  line	   with	   the	   opinion	   of	   	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī	   found	   in	   the	   preface	   to	   his	   commentary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda.	  p.	  759.	  	  211	  In	  the	  foreword	  to	  the	  most	  recent	  edition	  al-­‐Sayyid	  Maḥmūd	  Al-­‐Mar‘ashī	  describes	  it	  as	  ‘possibly	  the	  first	  of	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  works	  of	  Kalām’,	  see	  Ziyāfī	  (e.d.)	  Al-­‐Yaqūt	  fi	  	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐kalām	  li	  Abi	  Isḥāq	  
Ibrāhīm	  bin	  Nawbakht	  (Qum,	  Maktaba	  Ayatulla	  al-­‐Mar‘ashi	  Najafi,	  2007).	  	  	  	  212	  Henry	  Corbin	  believed	  that	  al-­‐Yāqūt	  represented	  the	  first	  systematisation	  of	  Islamic	  Philosphy	  in	  an	  approach	  that	  would	  be	  followed	  and	  completed	  by	  Nasir	  al-­‐Din	  Ṭūṣī,	  ‘Imāmologie	  Et	  Philosophie’	  in	  Tawfiq	  Fahd	  (ed.)	  Le	  Shi	  ͑isme	  imamate	  (Paris,	  Presses	  Universitaires,	  1970)	  p.146.	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upon	   the	   Yāqūt	   entitled	   Anwār	   al-­‐Malakūt	   fi	   Sharḥ	   al-­‐Yāqūt213.	   However	   some	  doubt	  has	  been	  cast	  over	  this	  due	  to	  later	  references	  to	  the	  author	  simply	  taking	  the	   form	   of	   Ibn	   Nawbakht214,	   an	   Ibn	   Nawbakht	   interpreted	   by	   some	   as	   being	  other	  than	  the	  Abū	  Isḥāq	  Ibrahim	  mentioned	  by	  	   ͑Allama215.	  In	  his	  comprehensive	  survey	   of	   the	   Banū	   Nawbakht,	   Muḥammad	   Iqbāl	   Al-­‐Ishtiyānī	   rejects	   the	  divergent	  opinions	  of	  the	  likes	  of	  Mīrzā	  ‘Abdullah	  Affendi	  al-­‐Isbahāni,	  ‘and	  those	  who	   followed	   him’,	   as	   having	   no	   basis216.	   His	   preference	   for	   	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī’s	  opinion	   is	   justified	   by	   way	   of	   three	   separate	   references	   to	   the	   full	   name	   Abū	  Isḥāq	  Ibrāhīm	  bin	  Nawbakht	  found	  in	  the	  writings	  of	   ͑Allāma	  and	  due	  to	  	   ͑Allama’s	  closer	  proximity	  in	  time	  to	  the	  original	  source	  than	  the	  later	  opinions217.	  	  Just	  how	  close	  in	  time	  	   ͑Allama’s	  writing	  actually	  was	  to	  the	  penning	  of	  the	  Yāqūt	  has	  also	  been	  a	  point	  of	  serious	  dispute.	  Ziyāfī	  discusses	  numerous	  opinions	  as	  to	  when	  the	  Yāqūt	  was	  actually	  written218.	  These	  opinions	  range	  quite	  dramatically	  with	   competing	   claims	   locating	   the	   book	   to	   have	   been	   a	   product	   of	   anywhere	  between	  the	  third	  century	  Hijri	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  late	  sixth	  century	  Hijri	  on	  the	   other.	   His	   review	   of	   the	   various	   prominent	   opinions	   concludes	   with	   him	  reaching	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  Yāqūt	  was	  written	  at	   some	  point	  between	  550-­‐650	  A.H.219	  	  In	  his	   initial	   justification	  for	  this	  Ziyāfī	  cites	  and	  follows	  the	  position	  of	  Wilferd	  Madelung,	   who	   argued	   that	   the	   Yāqūt	   must	   have	   been	   written	   later	   than	   the	  period	  of	   al-­‐Mufīd	   (335-­‐436A.H.).	  His	   reasoning	  was	  based	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  opinions	   of	   the	   Banū	   Nawbakht	   were	   treated	   extensively	   in	   Al-­‐Mufīd’s	  comparative	   study	   of	   	   ͑Adliyya	  doctrine	   in	   his	  Awā’il	  al-­‐maqālāt	   fi	  madhāhib	  al-­‐
mukhtārāt,	  however	  those	  opinions	  bear	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  
Ṣāḥib	   al-­‐Yāqūt,	   whose	   substance	   and	   style	   thus	   must	   reflect	   a	   later	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  213	  Anwār	  al-­‐Malakūt	  fi	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Yāqūt	  (N.P.	  Initishārāt	  Raḍī	  Initishārāt	  Bidār,	  1984/85)	  p.	  2.	  214	  Ziyāfī,	  Ali	  Akbar,	  ‘muqaddama’	  in	  Ziyāfi	  (e.d.)	  Al-­‐Yaqūt	  fi	  	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐Kalām	  li	  Abi	  Isḥāq	  Ibrāhīm	  bin	  
Nawbakht	  (Qum,	  Maktaba	  Ayatullah	  al-­‐Mar	  ͑ashī	  Najafī,	  2007),	  p.	  13.	  	  215	  ‘A͑bdullah	  Affendi	  al-­‐Isbahānī	  attributes	  the	  Yāqut	  to	  Al-­‐Shaykh	  Ismā	  	   ͑īl	  Bin	  Isḥāq	  Bin	  abi	  Saḥl	  Bin	  Nawbakht	  Al-­‐Fāḍil,	  Riyāḍ	  al-­‐	   ͑	  ulama	  wa	  ḥiyāḍ	  al-­‐fuḍalā’	  (Qum,	  Ṭib	  	  ͑at	  al-­‐khiyām,	  1980)	  Vol.	  6	  p.	  38.	  	  216	  Kandāni	  Nawbakhtī,	  (Tehran,	  Maktaba	  Ṭahwarī,	  1966)	  pp.94-­‐95.	  	  217	  Ibid.	  218	  Ziyāfī	  ‘Muqqadama’	  pp.	  15-­‐18.	  219	  Ibid.	  p.17.	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provenance220.	   Ziyāfī	   furthers	   Madelung’s	   justification	   for	   this	   later	   dating	   by	  making	   reference	   to	   the	   Ṣāḥib	   al-­‐Yāqūt’s	   position	   regarding	   the	   criteria	   for	  contingency	  (al-­‐imkān)	  as	  matching	  that	  which	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Dīn	  Ṭūsī	  categorised	  as	  the	   opinion	   held	   by	   the	   	   ‘philosophers	   and	   later	   theologians’221.	   However	   both	  Madelung	   and	   Ziyāfī	   do	   recognise	   that	   the	   Yaqūt	   could	   not	   have	   been	  written	  after	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   seventh	   Muslim	   century,	   highlighting	   the	   known	  existence	  of	  a	  commentary	  on	  the	  work	  written	  by	  Ibn	  Abi	  al-­‐Ḥadīd	  Al-­‐Mu	   ͑tazilī,	  who	  died	  in	  656	  A.H.222	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Having	   said	   all	   of	   this,	   the	   debate	   surrounding	   the	   exact	   date	   of	   the	   texts	  provenance	   does	   not	   significantly	   impact	   its	   relevance	   here.	   Whether	   it	   was	  written	  a	  few	  centuries,	  or	  only	  a	  few	  decades,	  before	  the	  works	  of	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Din	  Ṭūsī	  and	   	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī	  makes	  no	  difference	   to	   its	  presentation	  of	  mas’ala	  taḥsīn	  
wa	  taqbīḥ	   in	  a	  manner	  not	  observed	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  earlier	  Imāmī	  scholars,	  a	  presentation	   that	   would	   be	   adopted	   and	   developed	   further	   by	   the	   scholars	  epitomising	   the	   Classical	   era	   of	   Imāmī	   theological	   writings	   and	   by	   Imāmī	  scholars	  of	  subsequent	  generations.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  discussion	  in	  question	  is	  treated	  within	  a	  section	  entitled	  ‘The	  position	  with	  regards	  justice	  (al-­‐Qawl	  fi	  al-­‐	͑  adl)’223.	  That	  the	  justice	  in	  question	  is	  indeed	  Divine	  justice	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   overall	   position	   of	   the	   section	   within	   the	   work.	   The	  section	  immediately	  follows	  sections	  dealing	  with	  the	  proofs	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God,	  His	  Unity,	  His	  attributes	  and	  the	  necessity	  (wajūb)	  of	  these	  attributes224.	  As	  we	   have	   seen	   the	   opinions	   of	   Ibn	   Bābawayh	   and	   al-­‐Mufīd	   regarding	   the	  intelligibility	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   were	   not	   stated	   as	   a	   philosophical	   premise	  necessary	  in	  establishing	  their	  doctrine	  of	  Divine	  justice.	  However,	  Ibn	  Nawbakht	  explicitly	   precedes	   his	   discussion	   on	   Divine	   justice	   by	   first	   affirming	   the	  independent	   epistemic	   ability	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   to	   determine	   ḥasan	   and	   qabīḥ,	   stating	  that	   ‘al-­‐ʿaql	   can	   independently	   ascertain	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   some	   actions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  Madelung	  ‘Imāmism	  and	  Mutazlite	  theology’,	  p.	  15.	  221	  Emphasis	  added.	  Ziyāfī	  ‘Muqaddama’	  p.17,	  and,	  al-­‐Khawāja	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Dīn,	  Talkhīṣ	  al-­‐Muḥaṣṣil;	  
al-­‐Ma‘ruf	  bi	  naqḍ	  al-­‐muḥaṣṣal	  (Beirut,	  Dār	  al-­‐aḍwā’a,	  1985)	  p.	  120.	  222	  Madelung	  ‘Imāmism	  and	  Mutazlite	  theology’,	  	  p.	  15and	  Ziafi,	  ‘Muqaddama’,	  p.	  17.	  223	  Abi	  Isḥāq	  Ibrāhīm	  bin	  Nawbakht	  al-­‐Yāqūt	  fi	  ͑ilmal-­‐kalām,	  (Qum,	  Maktaba	  Ayatulla	  al-­‐Mar‘ashi	  Najafi,	  2007)	  p.45.	  224Ibid,	  pp.	  38-­‐44.	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and	   not	   others,	   and	   the	   praiseworthiness	   [of	   some],	   such	   as	   oppression	   and	  equity	  and	  lying	  and	  truthfulness’225.	  Dealing	   with	   the	   epistemological	   question	   only,	   and	   not	   the	   question	   of	   the	  grounds	  for	  such	  judgements,	  Ibn	  Nawbakht	  thus	  affirms	  the	  partial	  affirmation	  (ī’jāb	  juzī)	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  to	  understand	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  some	  actions,	  structured	  as	   the	  premise	  upon	  which	  he	   can	   later	  build	  his	  doctrine	  of	  Divine	  Justice.	  His	  somewhat	  densely	  stated	  justifications	  for	  this	  moral	  rationalism	  are	  described	  as	  follows;	  	  1)	   Because	   it	   [the	   blameworthiness	   of	   oppression]	   is	   known,	   without	  having	   to	   rely	   on	   revelatory	   knowledge	   [as	   demonstrated]	   due	   to	   the	  blaming	  of	  jāhiliyya	  (the	  pre-­‐Islamic	  community	  of	  Arabia)	  for	  it226.	  Thus	  it	  [i.e.	  the	  judgement	  of	  blameworthiness]	  must	  be	  from	  al-­‐	   ͑aql.	  	  	  2)	  And	  because	  we	  judge	  its	  blameworthiness	  [solely	  based]	  on	  its	  being	  oppression,	   the	   causative	   factor	   [of	   this	   judgement]	   must	   be	   its	   very	  oppressiveness.	  	  3)	  Amongst	  us	  are	   those	  who	  claim	  the	  self-­‐evidence	   (al-­‐ḍarūra)	  of	   this,	  and	   that	   is	   the	   truth,	   due	   to	  which	   if	  we	  had	  doubted	  prophet	  hood	   the	  blameworthiness	   of	   adultery	   would	   be	   lifted	   but	   not	   [the	  blameworthiness	  of]	  oppression.	  4)	  If	  praiseworthiness	  was	  due	  to	  the	  command,	  the	  actions	  of	  The	  Maker	  (al-­‐Ṣāni	   ͑)	  would	  not	  be	  praiseworthy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  225	  Ibn	  Nawbakht	  al-­‐Yāqūt,	  p.	  45.	  226	  This	  reading	  of	  the	  text	  takes	  Jāhillīyya	  as	  the	  subject.	  An	  alternative	  reading	  is	  also	  plausible,	  where	  Jāhillīyya	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  direct	  object,	  rendering	  the	  sentence	  ‘due	  to	  the	  blaming	  of	  
Jāhillīyya	  for	  it’.	  This	  is	  still	  consistent	  with	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  for	  if	  moral	  values	  were	  not	  intelligible	  prior	  to	  revelation	  then	  Jahillīyya	  would	  be	  beyond	  reproach	  in	  their	  actions	  and	  not	  subject	  to	  blame,	  since	  they	  are	  subject	  to	  moral	  reproach	  they	  must	  have	  had	  access	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  moral	  values.	  The	  credit	  for	  bringing	  this	  reading	  to	  my	  attention	  belongs	  to	  Dr	  Ali	  Fanaei.	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5)	  And	  [praiseworthiness	  due	  to]	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  prohibition	  correlates	  to	  blameworthiness	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   the	  command-­‐	  which	  would	  make	  necessary	  that	  His	  actions	  are	  blameworthy.	  227	  This	   concise	   treatment	   contains	   many	   of	   the	   key	   arguments	   adopted	   and	  developed	   by	   subsequent	   Imāmī	   thinkers	   in	   defence	   of	   their	   adoption	   of	   the	  moral	   rationalism	   entailed	   in	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy,	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ,	  are	  understandable	  by	  reason	  independent	  of	  revelation.	  However,	   in	   line	  with	   the	   style	   of	   the	  work	   at	   large,	   the	   ideas	   have	  been	   presented	   in	   an	   extremely	   condensed	   fashion.	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī,	   arguably	   the	  paradigmatic	  figure	  of	  the	  classical	  period	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought,	  notes	  that	  the	  Yāqūt	  stands	  out	  amongst	  other	  early	  comparable	  works	  of	  theology	  in	  that	  it	  contains	  all	  of	  the	  most	  important	  issues	  of	  the	  discipline,	  and	  furthermore	  these	  are	  presented	   in	  the	  most	  beautiful	  of	  ways228.	  However	  this	  value	   is	   tempered	  by	  it	  being	  a	  text	  which	  is	  considerably	  short	  in	  length,	  and	  despite	  bearing	  ‘vast	  knowledge,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  understand,	   [being	  written]	   at	   the	  height	  of	  brevity	  and	  concision	  (gāyatu	  al-­‐ījāz	  wa	  al-­‐ikhtisār),	  such	  that	  most	  onlookers	  would	  be	  prevented	  from	  understanding	  it’229.	  Accordingly	  	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī	  penned	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  commentary	  on	  the	  text,	  al-­‐Anwār	  al-­‐malakūt	  fi	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Yāqūt.	  It	  is	  to	  this	   commentary	   that	   we	   now	   turn,	   supplemented	   by	   other	  works	   of	   	   ͑Allama,	  with	   the	   aim	   of	   getting	   a	   fuller	   appreciation	   of	   the	   ideas	   encapsulated	   in	   the	  
Yāqūt	  and	  how	  they	  were	  understood	  and	  developed	  by	  thinkers	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  classical	  era	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theology.	  ͑Allama	   Ḥillī’s	   presentation	   of	   the	   question	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  in	  al-­‐Anwār	  provides	  a	  remarkably	  clear	  and	  well	   structured	   analysis	   of	   the	   relevant	   debates,	   even	   when	   compared	   to	   his	  other	  more	   famous	  works	  Al-­‐Bāb	  al-­‐Ḥādī	  ‘ashar	   and	  Kashf	  al-­‐murād	  fi	  Tajrīd	  al-­‐
ittiqād	   or	   the	   more	   extensive	   work	   al-­‐Manāhij	   al-­‐yaqīn	   fi	   uṣūl	   al-­‐dīn.	   He	  commences	  by	  defining	  exactly	  what	   is	   intended	  by	  al-­‐‘adl	  (Divine	   Justice),	  and	  why	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  Ibn	  Nawbakht	  al-­‐Yāqūt,	  p.45.	  The	  numbering	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  original	  text.	  228	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār,	  p.	  2.	  229	  Ibid.	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required	   before	   the	   questions	   pertaining	   to	   God’s	   justice	   can	   be	   properly	  engaged	   with.	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī	   explains	   that	   discussion	   of	   al-­‐‘adl	   refers	   to	   ‘those	  things	   associated	   with	   the	   normative	   assessment	   of	   His	   actions	   (al-­‐lati	   lahā	  
ta	  a͑luq	   bi-­‐aḥkām	   af	  ͑āllihi)’ 230 	  dealing	   with	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   God’s	  praiseworthy	  actions	  (ḥusn	  al-­‐ḥusn	  minhā),	  the	  necessity	  of	  His	  necessary	  actions	  (wajūb	  al-­‐wājib)	  and	  the	  denial	  of	  His	  performing	  any	  blameworthy	  actions	  (nafā	  
al-­‐qabīḥ	  minhā)231.	  The	  necessary	  link	  between	  discussion	  of	  God’s	  justice	  in	  this	  sense	  and	  the	  philosophical	  requisite	  of	  a	  prior	  acceptance	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  moral	  values	  is	  then	  drawn	  in	  what	  follows;	  The	   fundamental	   principle	   upon	   which	   the	   issues	   of	   God’s	   justice	   rest	  upon	   is	   the	   knowledge	   that	   He,	   exalted,	   is	  wise	   (m	͑  arifat	   kawnihi	   ta	  ͑āla	  
hakīman)	   and	   that	   he	   does	   not	   perform	   that	   which	   is	   blameworthy	   (al-­‐
qabīḥ)	  nor	  does	  He	  fail	  to	  do	  that	  which	  is	  necessary	  (al-­‐wājib)232.	  	  Once	   this	   conception	   of	   Gods	   Wisdom	   or	   Ḥikma	   is	   established,	   the	   issues	  pertaining	   to	   God’s	   Justice	   which	   are	   traditionally	   discussed	   by	   Imāmī	  theologians,	   such	   as	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   religious	   responsibility	   (ḥusn	   al-­‐
taklīf)	   or	   the	   necessity	   of	   grace	   (wajūb	  al-­‐luṭf)	  may	   be	   discussed	   and	   justified.	  However	   ͑Allāma	   explains	   that	   this	   fundamental	   conception	   of	   God’s	   Wisdom	  itself	   assumes,	   or	   even	   relies	   upon,	   a	   prior	   knowledge	   of	   that	   which	   is	  praiseworthy	   (al-­‐ḥusn)	  or	  blameworthy	   (al-­‐qubḥ)	  and	  an	  acceptance	   that	   these	  values	  are	  rationally	  intelligible	  (	͑  aqliyān)	  independent	  of	  revelation.	  Accordingly	  any	   discussion	   of	   al-­‐‘adl,	   should	   be	   preceded	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  (al-­‐ḥusn)	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  (al-­‐qubḥ).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  With	   this	   prelude	   	   ͑Allāma	   moves	   on	   to	   define	   voluntary	   actions	   (af	  ͑āl	   al-­‐
ikhtiyārī),	   categorising	   them	   as	   being	   either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ;	   ‘The	  ḥasan	   is	   that	  [voluntary	   action]	   whose	   performance	   has	   no	   potential	   role	   (madkhal)	   in	   the	  desert	  of	  blame,	  and	  the	  qabīḥ	  is	  that	  [voluntary	  action]	  whose	  performance	  has	  a	   potential	   role	   (madkhal)	   in	   the	   desert	   of	   blame’233.	   Thus	   the	   ḥasan	   is	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  230	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār	  p.	  105.	  231	  Ibid.	  232	  Ibid.	  233	  Ibid.	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actually	   restricted	   to	   that	  which	   is	  praiseworthy,	  but	   includes	   those	  acts	  which	  do	   not	   deserve	   blame	   and	   whose	   status	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   simply	  mubaḥ	  (permissible).	   The	   qualification	   of	   ‘madkhaliyya’,	   which	   defines	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	  based	  on	  an	  act	  either	  having	  or	  not	  having	  a	  possible	  role	  in	  the	  desert	  of	  blame,	  is	   intended	   to	   dispel	   the	   theological	   difficulties	   posed	   by	   those	  minor	   sins	   (al-­‐
sagā’ir)	  which	  ultimately	  might	  not	  lead	  to	  actual	  blame	  with	  all	  its	  eschatological	  consequence,	  but	   that	  do	  have	  a	  possible	  role	   in	  the	  desert	  of	  blame	  and	  hence	  can	  still	  be	  categorised	  as	  qabīḥ234.	  Before	  explaining	  and	  elaborating	  on	  the	  justifications	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  al-­‐
ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  cited	  in	  the	  Yāqūt,	  	   ͑Allāma	  briefly	  points	  towards	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  ontological	  grounds	  for	  this	  moral	  rationalism;	  	  ‘The	   Imāmiyya	   and	   the	   Mu	  ͑tazila	   hold	   that	   amongst	   actions	   are	   those	  which	   are	   deemed	  praiseworthy	   due	   to	   aspects	   (wajūḥ)	   occurring	   upon	  them...	  and	  amongst	  them	  are	  those	  deemed	  blameworthy	  due	  to	  aspects	  occurring	  upon	  them’235.	  	  The	  reference	  here	  to	  wajūḥ,	  demonstrates	  that	   	   ͑Allāma	  is	  referring	  specifically	  to	   the	   moral	   theory	   associated	   with	   the	   Basran	   school	   of	   the	   Mu	   ͑tazila.	   The	  Basran	  theory	  of	  wajūḥ	  was	  developed	  to	  counteract	  what	  they	  felt	  was	  the	  too	  rigid	  essentialist	  moral	  ontology	  of	  the	  Baghdādi	  Mu	  ͑tazila236.	  Despite	  describing	  the	  Wajḥ	  as	  ‘an	  elusive,	  and	  perhaps	  vague,	  concept’237	  Reinhart	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  in	  explaining	  its	  implications	  to	  the	  moral	  theory	  of	  the	  Basran	  School238.	  For	  our	  purposes	   here	   it	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	   the	   wajūḥ	   of	   an	   act	   are	   attributes	   that	  manifest	   themselves	   only	   on	   the	   occurrence	   of	   an	   act,	   allowing	   the	   moral	  appraisal	   of	   the	   act	   and	   introducing	   a	   contextual	   element	   to	   what	   is	   still	  maintained	  as	  a	  realist	  moral	  ontology.	  As	  	   ͑Allāma	  explains,	  it	  is	  through	  coming	  to	  know	  the	  wujūḥ	  of	  an	  act	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  can	  judge	  if	  an	  act	  is	  subject	  to	  blame	  or	  praise239.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  234	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār	  p.	  105.	  235	  Ibid.	  236	  Reinhart,	  Before	  Revelation,	  p.146.	  237	  Ibid	  p.	  148.	  238	  See	  Before	  Revelation,	  pp.	  146-­‐160.	  239	  See	  Manāhij	  al-­‐yaqīn	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐dīn	  (Qum,	  Yārān,	  1995)	  pp.	  	  229-­‐230.	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͑Allama	  notes	   that	   amongst	   the	  proponents	   of	   this	  moral	   rationalism	  are	   those,	  such	   as	   the	   author	   of	   the	   Yāqūt,	   who	   believe	   that	   this	   position	   is	   self-­‐evident	  (ḍarūrī),	   whereas	   others	   declare	   that	   it	   is	   not	   self	   evident	   and	   is	   in	   need	   of	  justification	  (istidlālī).240	   ͑Allāma	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  outline	   five	   justifications,	  all	  of	  which	   are	   alluded	   to	   in	   the	   concise	   passage	   of	   the	   Yāqūt	   reproduced	   above.	  Interestingly	  	   ͑Allāma	  ascribes	  theses	  justifications	  to	  the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  and	  not	  to	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Yāqūt.	  For	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Yāqūt	  claims	  that	  the	  described	  moral	  rationalism	   is	   self	   evident,	   and	   thus	   he	   actually	   has	   no	   need	   of	   these	  justifications-­‐	   thus	   in	   	   ͑Allama’s	  somewhat	  sympathetic	  eyes,	   the	   listing	  of	   these	  arguments	  was	  not	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  Yāqūt	  but	  simply	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  others	  had	  chosen	  to	  support	  this	  idea.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  first	  justification	  relies	  on	  an	  argument	  pointing	  to	  a	  claimed	  universality	  of	  basic	  moral	   judgements	   such	   as	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   lying	   and	   oppression,	  and	  the	  praiseworthiness	  of	  truthfulness	  and	  justice.	  The	  possible	  sources	  of	  this	  knowledge	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  either	  rational	  (al-­‐	   ͑aql)	  or	  revelatory	  (al-­‐shar	   ͑).	  	  Now	  since	  people	  that	  do	  not	  recognise	  Prophetic	  or	  revelatory	  knowledge,	  such	  as	   the	   pre-­‐Islamic	   community	   of	   Arabia	   (al-­‐Jāhillīyya),	   or	   those	   that	   deny	   the	  phenomenon	   of	   Prophecy	   itself	   still	   affirm	   that	   lying	   and	   oppression	   are	  blameworthy	  and	  that	  truthfulness	  and	  justice	  are	  praiseworthy-­‐	  the	  knowledge	  of	   these	  moral	   values	   has	   to	   be	   accessible	   without	   recourse	   to	   revelation	   and	  thus	  must	  be	  the	  result	  of	  al-­‐	   ͑aql.	  This	  argument	  by	  universality	  is	  one	  of	  the	  two	  central	  arguments	  that	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  by	  Imāmī	  scholars	  throughout	  the	  subsequent	  generations	  and	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  	  	  	  The	  second	  justification	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Yaqut,	  is	  described	  by	  	   ͑Allāma	  as	  a	  type	  of	   intuitive	   argument	   (haddasiyāt).	   The	   argument	   states	   that	   whenever	   we	  recognise	  an	  act	  as	  oppressive	  we	   judge	  that	   it	   is	  blameworthy	  and	  should	  this	  aspect	   of	   oppression	   no	   longer	   be	   present,	   and	   thus	   the	   aspect	   of	  blameworthiness	   not	   be	   there,	   we	   would	   no	   longer	   judge	   the	   act	   to	   be	  blameworthy.	  The	  relationship	  between	  oppression	  and	  blameworthiness	  is	  thus	  described	  by	   	   ͑Allāma	  as	  being	  like	  the	  relationship	  between	  fire	  and	  burning241.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  240	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār,	  p.	  105-­‐106.	  241	  Ibid,	  p.	  106.	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Although	   it	   is	   not	   explicitly	   stated,	   presumably	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   natural	  relationship	   between	   the	   aspect	   of	   oppression	   and	   the	   moral	   value	   of	  blameworthiness	   undermines	   the	   possibility	   that	   blameworthiness	   be	  determined	  by	  divine	  command	  and	  revelation	   (shar	   ͑),	   and	  hence	  supports	   the	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  rational	  categories.	  	  	  	  The	   third	   argument	   points	   to	   a	   perceived	   difference	   between	   the	  blameworthiness	  of	  those	  actions	  considered	  blameworthy	  due	  to	  revelation	  and	  those	   actions	   deemed	   blameworthy	   due	   to	   reason.	   The	   argument	   states	   that	   if	  blameworthiness	   was	   solely	   dependent	   on	   revelation	   there	   would	   be	   no	  difference	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   that	   which	   was	   deemed	  blameworthy	   by	   al-­‐shar	͑  	   and	   that	   which	   is	   deemed	   blameworthy	   by	   al-­‐	   ͑aql.	  However	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	   there	   is	   an	   obvious	   or	   even	   ‘self	   evident’	   difference	  between	  these	  two	  categories;	  ‘for	  if	  we	  should	  have	  doubt	  regarding	  revelatory	  knowledge	   (al-­‐shar’)	   we	   may	   doubt	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   adultery	   and	   of	  consuming	  wine,	   but	   we	  would	   still	   have	   no	   doubt	   in	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	  oppression	  and	  lying’242.	  	  The	   fourth	   argument	   employed	   in	   the	   justification	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  is	  a	  form	  of	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum;	  ‘If	   the	   praiseworthy	   was	   determined	   by	   revelation	   then	   the	   actions	   of	  Allah,	   exalted,	   would	   not	   be	   praiseworthy.	   The	   conclusion	   [of	   this	  conditional	   statement]	   is	   invalid	   by	   consensus,	   and	   thus	   the	   premise	   is	  likewise	  [invalid]’243.	  	  	   ͑Allāma	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  why	  this	  absurdity	  is	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  the	  anti-­‐thesis	   of	   his	   moral	   rationalism,	   ‘praiseworthy	   according	   to	   them	   [i.e.	   non-­‐	  
‘Adliyya]	   is	   that	   which	   is	   commanded,	   and	   Allah	   exalted,	   is	   not	   subject	   to	   any	  command,	   thus	   His	   actions	   would	   not	   be	   deemed	   praiseworthy’ 244 .	   The	  consensus	   of	   Muslim	   theologians	   is	   of	   course	   that	   Allah’s	   actions	   are	   indeed	  praiseworthy	   and	   hence	   the	   grounds	   of	   moral	   value	   cannot	   be	   solely	   due	   to	  divine	  command	  and	  revelation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār,	  p.	  106.	  243	  Ibid.	  244	  Ibid.	  
	  	   98	  
The	   fifth	  argument	   is	   a	   justification	   that,	   albeit	   in	   slightly	  varied	  presentations,	  joins	  the	  first	  argument	  above	  in	  being	  central	  to	  almost	  all	   	   ͑Adliyya	  defences	  of	  their	  moral	  rationalism;	  If	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  were	  not	  rationally	  intelligible,	  nothing	  from	  Allah,	   exalted,	   could	  be	  considered	  blameworthy.	  Thus	   it	  would	  be	  praiseworthy	  for	  him	  to	  send	  liars	  (irsāl	  al-­‐kadhāb)	  and	  to	  contradict	  his	  own	   word.	   This	   would	   necessitate	   the	   lifting	   of	   the	   Promise	   and	   the	  Threat	   (al-­‐w	  ͑ad	  wa	  al-­‐wa	  ͑īd)	  and	  [lead	   to]	   the	   invalidity	  of	  responsibility	  (takālīf)...245	  	  	  	  	  	  	  At	   its	   core	   this	   argument	   is	   aimed	   at	   highlighting	   that	   if	   basic	   moral	   values	  cannot	  be	  ascertained	  independent	  of	  revelation	  then	  God	  would	  be	  free	  from	  all	  moral	  considerations,	  ultimately	  undermining	  our	  trust	  in	  revelation	  itself.	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Din	  Ṭūsī	  famously	  formulated	  a	  variation	  of	  this	  argument	  in	  a	  typically	  eloquent	  and	  concise	  statement; ‘li	  intifā’ihimā	  muṭlaqan	  law	  thabatā	  shar	   ͑an’246.	  Although	  a	  literal	  translation	  is	  difficult	  the	  sentence,	  at	  least	  loosely,	  reads	  that	  
ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   must	   be	   intelligible	   through	   reason	   ‘[D]ue	   to	   their	   nullification	  absolutely	   [through	   reason	   or	   revelation],	   if	   they	   [goodness	   and	   badness]	   are	  established	   by	   revelation	   [alone]’.	   The	   consequence	   of	   believing	   that	   moral	  values	  can	  only	  be	  established	  by	  revelation	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  type	  of	  moral	  scepticism,	  where	  neither	  reason	  nor	  revelation	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  in	  determining	  the	  value	  of	  acts.	  What	  completes	  his	  argument,	  and	  is	  only	  implicit	  here,	  is	  that	  no	  Muslim	  accepts	  such	  a	  moral	  scepticism	  and	  thus	  the	  premise	  that	  moral	  values	  are	  only	  established	   through	   revelation,	   must	   also	   be	   rejected.	   As	   for	   why	   moral	  scepticism	  results	  from	  holding	  that	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  known	  only	  through	  shar	  ͑,	  we	  can	  again	  turn	  to	  a	  commentary	  of	  	   ͑Allāma;	  If	   we	   did	   not	   know	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   some	   things	  and	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   others-­‐	   through	   reason,	   we	  would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   make	   the	   judgement	   of	   the	  blameworthiness	   of	   lying,	   and	   thus	   would	   allow	   for	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār,	  p.	  107.	  246	  See	  al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Kashf	  al-­‐murād	  fi	  tajrīd	  al-­‐‘ittiqād	  	  (Beirut,	  Dār	  al-­‐amira,	  2006)	  p.	  59.	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possibility	  of	   its	   [lying]	  occurrence	   from	  Allah,	   exalted	  be	  He	  from	  this,	  The	  High	  and	  The	  Great.	  And	  thus	  if	  we	  were	  informed	   [by	   revelation]	   that	   a	   thing	  be	  blameworthy	  we	  could	  not	  be	  certain	  of	  its	  blameworthiness,	  and	  if	  we	  were	  informed	   that	   a	   thing	   be	   praiseworthy	   we	   could	   not	   be	  certain	   of	   its	   praiseworthiness,	   due	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  deception	  and	  because	  of	  our	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  commanded	  toward	  the	  blameworthy	  and	  prevented	  from	  the	  praiseworthy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  denying	  the	  wisdom	  (ḥikma)	  of	  The	  Most	  Exalted	  in	  this	  regard247.	  In	  this	  argument	  we	  see	  that	  not	  only	  is	  reason	  given	  a	  role	  alongside	  revelation	  in	   determining	   moral	   values,	   but	   the	   moral	   instructions	   of	   revelation	   are	  considered	   useless	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   rational	   morality,	   due	   to	   our	   trust	   in	  revelation	   being	   itself	   reliant	   on	   our	   independent	   ability	   to	   discern	   the	  praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   of	   acts.	   This	   fifth	   argument	   taken	  alongside	   the	   claimed	   universality	   of	   basic	   moral	   principles	   found	   in	   the	   first	  argument,	  form	  the	  two	  central	  and	  recurring	  justifications	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   found	   throughout	   the	  subsequent	  history	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought.	  	  What	  has	  been	  termed	  here	  as	   the	  classical	  period	  of	   Imāmī	  thought	  witnessed	  the	  development	  of	   a	   sophisticated	   conception,	   and	  defence,	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   as	   a	   necessary	  philosophical	   premise	   to	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   conception	   of	   the	   Justice	   of	   God.	   The	  distinctive	   approach	   to	   Kalām	   developed	   in	   this	   period,	   which	   culminated	  in	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī	   through	   the	   hands	   of	   Naṣīr	   al-­‐Din	   Ṭūsī,	   infused	   a	   rigorous	  philosophical	   method	   to	   a	   traditionally	   polemical	   discipline.	   Although	   this	  approach	   to	   doctrine	   remains	   strong	   in	   contemporary	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought,	   with	   the	  works	  of	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī	   and	  Naṣīr	   al-­‐Din	  Ṭūsī	   still	   central	   in	   the	   curricula	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  higher	   learning,	   a	   further	   shift	   in	   the	   manner	   of	   defending	   the	   doctrines	  established	  in	  the	  Classical	  period	  was	  still	  to	  occur.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  contributions	  of	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  al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Kashf	  al-­‐Murād	  p.	  59.	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this	   later	  Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   in	   developing	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.4	  Intelligibility	  of	  Praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  in	  post-­‐Ṣadrian	  Shī	  ͑ī	  
thought:	  Sabzawārī	  on	  ḥusn	  wa	  qubḥ	  Ḥāj	  Mullā	  Hādī	   Sabzawārī,	   a	   Nineteenth	   Century	  Shī	  ͑a	   Philosopher-­‐Mystic,	  was	  deeply	  ingrained	  with	  the	  now	  paradigmatic	  approach	  to	  falsafa	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  epitomised	  by	   the	  work	  of	   Ṣadr	   al-­‐Din	   al-­‐Shirāzī,	  more	  widely	   known	  as	  Mullā	  Ṣadra	   (d.	   1049/1640).	   The	   School	   of	   Mullā	   Ṣadra	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   an	  attempted	  synthesis	  between	  the	  three	  elements	  of	  Qur’ān,	   ͑Irfān	  and	  Burhān,	  i.e.	  Muslim	   scripture,	   mysticism	   and	   deductive	   reasoning 248 .	   It	   is	   a	   Muslim	  philosophical	  school	   that	  sees	  the	  culmination	  of	  knowledge	  only	  coming	  about	  by	   a	   combination	   of	   mystical	   intuition	   and	   philosophical	   rational	   analysis.	  Philosophical	   analysis	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   spiritual	  or	  metaphysical	   experience	   is	  considered	   ultimately	   redundant	   and	   mystical	   experience	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  rational	  and	  analytical	  appraisal	  more	  often	  than	  not	  simply	  illusory.	  The	  success	  of	  Mullā	  Ṣadra	  in	  offering	  a	  systematic	  philosophical	  system	  which	  could	  account	  for	  his	  own	  metaphysical	  experience	  and	  be	  consistent	  with	  Muslim	  scripture	  is	  testified	   to	   by	   the	   continued	   dominance	   of	   a	   school	  whose	   influence	   has	   been	  compared	  to	  the	  mark	  left	  by	  Aristotle	  upon	  the	  Greeks	  and	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  upon	  early	  Muslim	   philosophy.	   Sabzawārī	   is	   not	   only	   an	   important	   nineteenth	   century	  proponent	   of	   Ṣadrian	   philosophy,	   but	   in	   the	   words	   of	   Toshiku	   Izutso	   he	  represents	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  school	  and	  ‘precisely	  the	  highest	  peak	  reached	  by	  this	  philosophical	  tradition’	  up	  until	  that	  era249.	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  For	  more	  on	  Mullā	  Ṣadrā	  in	  general,	  and	  this	  synthesis	  in	  particular,	  see	  Seyyed	  Hossein	  Nasr,	  ‘Mullā	  Ṣadrā:	  his	  teachings’	  in	  Seyyed	  Hossein	  Nasr	  and	  Oliver	  Leamen	  (eds.)	  History	  of	  Islamic	  
Philosophy	  (Qum,	  Anṣārīyan	  Publications,	  2001),	  Part	  2,	  pp.	  643-­‐662.	  249	  See	  Toshiku	  Izutsu,	  ‘The	  Significance	  of	  Sabzawārīan	  Metaphysics	  in	  The	  Concept	  and	  Reality	  of	  
Existence	  (Kuala	  Lumpur,	  Islamic	  Book	  Trust,	  2007),	  pp.	  91-­‐97.	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Within	  his	  commentary	  on	  the	  invocation	  Jawshan	  al-­‐Kabīr250,	  Sabzawārī	  offers	  a	  short	   but	   incisive	   discussion	   on	   the	   theological	   disputes	   surrounding	   the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  of	  actions.	  The	  treatise	  gives	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  different	  positions	  found	  amongst	  Muslim	  theologians	  and	  directly	  tackles	  some	   of	   the	   most	   challenging	   disputes	   which	   have	   arisen	   both	   from	   across	  the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  and	  Ash	  ͑arī	   divide	   and	   from	   amongst	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	   themselves.	   	   He	  commences	  with	  a	  familiar	  classification	  of	  Muslims	  into	  two	  groups;	  stating	  that	  the	  philosophers,	  the	  Imāmiyya	  and	  the	  Mu	  t͑azila	  have	  considered	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  to	   be	   	   ͑aqliyān	   (rationally	   intelligible)	   and	   that	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	   held	   that	   they	   are	  
shar	   	͑  īyān	   (stipulated	   by	   revelation).	  He	   then	  mentions	   four	   different	   positions	  attributed	   to	   the	   Mu	  ͑tazila	   themselves.	   All	   of	   these	   accept	   the	   basic	  epistemological	  claim	  that	  moral	  values	  are	  rationally	  intelligible,	  yet	  each	  has	  a	  different	   notion	   of	   the	   ontology	   that	   forms	   the	   grounds	   from	   which	   these	  judgements	   arise.	   The	   earliest	   of	   the	  Mu	  ͑tazila	   (al-­‐aqdimūn	  minhum)	   held	   that	  actions	  are	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	  due	  to	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  action	  and	  not	  due	  to	  any	  specific	  attribute	  in	  them.	  Some	  others	  amongst	  the	  early	  Mu	  ͑tazila	  held	  that	  there	  are	  existential	  attributes	  within	  actions	   that	  necessitate	   the	   judgement	  of	  both	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ.	   The	   third	   opinion	   cited	   accepts	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  existential	  attribute	  but	  only	  in	  the	  qabīḥ	  and	  not	  in	  the	  ḥasan,	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  ṣifāt	  ul	  muqabbaḥa	  (an	  attribute	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  judgement	  of	  qabīḥ)	  is	  sufficient	   in	   establishing	   that	   something	   is	   ḥasan.	   Whereas	   the	   fourth	   opinion	  holds	   that	   the	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   of	   actions	  was	  not	   determined	  by	   any	   existential	  attribute	  of	  the	  action	  but	  ‘was	  due	  to	  considered	  aspects	  (wajūḥ	  i‘tibāriyya)	  and	  associated	   attributes	   (ṣifāt	   iḍāfiyya)	   which	   differ	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  considerations	  (i‘tibariyāt)’251.	  	  	  3.4.1	  Conceptual	  analysis	  of	  the	  debate	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  For	  more	  on	  Shī	  ͑ī	  invocations	  in	  general,	  and	  Jawshan	  al-­‐Kabir	  in	  particular,	  see	  Colin	  Turner	  ‘Aspects	  of	  devotional	  life	  in	  Twelver	  Shi'ism:	  the	  practice	  of	  du‘ā’	  in	  Paul	  Luft	  and	  Colin	  Turner	  (eds.)	  Shī	  ͑īsm:	  Critical	  Concepts	  in	  Islamic	  Studies	  (London,	  Routledge,	  2008)	  Vol.	  3,	  pp.	  375-­‐408.	  251	  al-­‐Sabzawārī,	  Ḥāj	  Mullā	  Hādī,	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’	  aw	  Sharḥ	  du‘ā	  al-­‐Jawshan	  al-­‐kabīr	  	  (Tehran,	  Initishārāt	  Dānishghāh	  Tehran,	  2006)	  pp.	  	  318-­‐319.	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Moving	   beyond	   these	   ontological	   differences	   Sabzawārī	   goes	   on	   to	   explain	   his	  conception	   of	   the	   core	   epistemological	   theory	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   doctrine,	  offering	  a	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  what	  he	  feels	  is	  intended	  when	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  
al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  are	  	   ͑aqliyān.	  For	  Sabzawārī	  then	  claiming	  that	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  intelligible	  means	  that;	  	  	  	  It	   is	   possible	   for	   al-­‐ʿaql	   to	   understand	   that	   a	   specific	   action	   (al-­‐f‘il	   al-­‐
fulāni)	   is	  praised	  in	  a	  factual	  sense	  (fi	  nafs	  al-­‐amr)	  and	  that	  another	  may	  be	   blamed,	   even	   if	   the	  most	   illuminating	   revelation	   has	   not	   yet	   brought	  knowledge	  of	  this	   .	  Or	  that	  it	   is	  possible	  for	  it	  [al-­‐	   ͑aql]	  to	  understand	  the	  aspect	   (al-­‐jiha)	   through	   which	   it	   deems	   the	   action	   good,	   thus	   being	  commanded	  to	  it,	  or	  bad,	  and	  thus	  being	  prohibited	  from	  it,	  even	  if	  this	  be	  after	   the	   occurrence	   of	   revelation.	   Its	   [	   ͑aql’s]	   non-­‐comprehension	   of	   the	  aspects	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   in	   some	   actions	   does	   not	   reject	   their	  intelligibility,	  because	  it	   is	  known	  in	  general	  (ijmālan)	  that	  had	  they	  been	  free	   from	   utility	   (maṣlaḥa)	   or	   detriment	   (mafṣada)	   it	   would	   have	   been	  blameworthy	   (qabīḥ)	   for	   The	   Most	   Wise	   (al-­‐Ḥakīm)	   to	   have	   sought	   its	  performance	  or	  avoidance252.	  	  	  	  	  Thus	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   means	   that	   al-­‐ʿaql	   has	   the	   potential	  ability	  to	  recognise	  whether	  an	  act	  be	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy	  ‘in	  the	  realm	  of	   fact	   (fi	   nafs	   al-­‐amr)’	  253,	   that	   is	   in	   a	   factual	   sense,	   prior	   to	   the	   receipt	   of	  revelatory	   knowledge.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   al-­‐ʿaql	   has	   the	   potential	   ability	   of	  understanding	  why,	  through	  recognition	  of	  the	  relevant	  jiha	  (aspect),	  a	  particular	  act	  is	  considered	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy	  even	  after	  revelation	  has	  already	  identified	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  that	  particular	  act.	  	  The	   final	   part	   of	   the	   quoted	   passage	   goes	   on	   to	   accept	   that	   the	   ʿaql	  does	   not	  always	   recognise	   these	   relevant	   aspects	   (jihāt) 254 ,	   but	   that	   this	   does	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’,	  p.	  319.	  253	  ‘The	  realm	  of	  fact’	  is	  the	  translation	  offered	  for	  the	  term	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  by	  M.	  Mohaghegh	  &	  T.	  Izutsu	  in	  the	  glossary	  to	  their	  critical	  edition	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  component	  of	  Sabzawārī’s	  Sharḥ	  
al-­‐manzūma	  see	  Sharḥ-­‐i	  Ghurar	  al-­‐farā’id	  or	  Sharḥ-­‐i	  manzumah-­‐i	  H.M.H.	  Sabzawārī	  Part	  One	  
Metaphysics	  (Tehran,	  Initishārāt	  Dānishghāh	  Tehran,	  1991).	  A	  detailed	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  what	  is	  intendd	  by	  ‘the	  realm	  of	  fact’	  follows	  below.	  254	  This	  reaffirms	  that	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  position	  was	  an	  ījāb	  juz’ī,	  a	  partial	  affirmation	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  salb	  al-­‐kulli,	  universal	  or	  absolute	  negation.	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undermine	   the	  position	   that	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   are	   	   ͑aqliyān.	  Allah	  as	  al-­‐Ḥakīm,	   the	  Most	  Wise,	   is	  assumed	  to	  always	  do	   that	  which	   is	   in	   line	  with	  maṣlaḥa	   (utility)	  and	  against	  mafṣada	  (detriment).	  Thus	  even	   if	   the	  specific	  aspects	  which	   led	   to	  an	  act	  being	  commanded	  or	  prohibited	  are	  not	  identifiable,	  it	  is	  known	  that	  there	  must	  be	  an	  underlying	  benefit	  or	  detriment	  within	   these	  acts,	  without	  which	   it	  would	   have	   been	   unbefitting	   for	   The	   Most	   Wise	   to	   call	   us	   towards	   their	  performance	  or	  avoidance255.	  	  In	   this	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ,	   Sabzawārī	  utilizes	   the	   notion	   of	   nafs	   al-­‐amr	   stating	   that	   al-­‐ʿaql	   can	   understand	   whether	  something	  is	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	   in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr,	   the	  realm	  of	  fact.	  The	  notion	  of	  nafs	  
al-­‐amr	   is	   a	   concept	   not	   employed	   by	   the	   early	   or	   classical	   theologians	   in	   their	  discussion	  of	  mas’ala	  taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbiḥ	  analysed	  thus	  far.	  However	  for	  Sabzawārī	  it	   is	  a	  concept	  central	   to	  his	   treatment	  of	   the	   issue	  and	   thus,	  despite	  appearing	  slightly	  tangential,	  the	  concept	  of	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  warrants	  further	  clarification.	  	  3.4.2	  Nafs	  al-­‐amr,	  the	  realm	  of	  fact	  
Nafs	  al-­‐amr,	   translated	   here	   as	   ‘the	   realm	   of	   fact’	   in	   line	  with	   its	   philosophical	  usage,	  is	  a	  term	  that	  is	  found	  in	  both	  Muslim	  philosophical	  and	  mystical	  writings.	  Explanation	  of	  how	  Sabzawārī,	  who	  himself	  was	  both	  a	  philosopher	  and	  a	  mystic,	  uses	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  is	  not	  helped	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  both	   philosophy	   and	   mysticism	   have	   employed	   the	   term	   to	   denote	   different	  things.	   Thankfully	   in	   the	   Sharḥ	   al-­‐Manzūma,	   a	   poetic	   exposition	   of	   the	   core	  questions	  of	  Muslim	  philosophy	  with	   the	  author’s	  own	  commentary,	  Sabzawārī	  himself	  explains	  the	  concept	  of	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  in	  more	  than	  sufficient	  depth	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  understand	  its	  relevance	  and	  usage	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  theological	  debates	  regarding	  moral	  ontology	  and	  epistemology	  at	  hand.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	  al-­‐Sabzawārī,	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’,	  p.	  319.	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Discussion	  of	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  in	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐manzūma	  occurs	  in	  the	  poem	  regarding	  the	  ‘explanation	   of	   the	   criterion	   for	   truth	   in	   the	   proposition’256.	   The	   commentary	  pertaining	  to	  this	  passage	  makes	  explicit	  what	  Sabzawārī	  believes	  that	  criterion	  for	   truth	   is;	   ‘the	   truthful	   [proposition],	   is	   the	   information/predicate	   that	  corresponds	  to	  reality	  (wāqi	  ͑ī)’257.	  The	  discussion	  summarised	  in	  the	  poem,	  and	  expanded	   on	   in	   the	   commentary,	   explains	   Sabzawārī’s	   conception	   of	   a	  correspondence	   theory	   of	   truth,	   a	   theory	   of	   knowledge	   which	   was	   not	   only	  central	  to	  the	  epistemology	  of	  Muslim	  philosophers	  but	  has	  an	  implicit	  influence	  across	  almost	  the	  entire	  edifice	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  thought.	  Outlining	  his	  general	  theory	  of	  truth	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  better	  understand	  when	  and	  how	  he	  feels	  reason	  can	   independently	   ascertain	   the	   truth	  of	  propositions	   regarding	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  and	  help	  explain	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  ontological	  grounds	  for	  such	  propositions.	  	  	  	  	  	  According	  to	  Sabzawārī	  propositions	  are	  of	   three	  types;	  al-­‐khārijī,	  al-­‐ḥaqīqī	  and	  
al-­‐dhinī,	  what	  we	  may	  term	  external,	  real	  and	  mental	  respectively.	  A	  proposition	  is	  khārijī	  when	  the	  instances	  of	  its	  subject	  are	  existent	  in	  the	  extra-­‐mental	  realm	  in	   actuality	   (al-­‐mawjūda	   fi	  al-­‐khārij	  muḥaqqiqatan),	   such	   as	  when	   it	   is	   said	   that	  ‘whoever	   is	   in	   the	   house	   has	   been	   killed’.	   The	   proposition	   is	   termed	   al-­‐ḥaqīqī	  when	   the	   instances	   of	   its	   subject	   are	   again	   existent	   in	   the	   extra-­‐mental	   realm,	  however	  this	  time	  their	  existence	  may	  be	  actual	  or	  hypothetical	  (muḥaqqiqtan	  aw	  
muqaddiratan).	   Consider	   an	   example	   mentioned	   by	   Sabzawārī	   himself,	   ‘every	  body	  has	  a	   limit	   (kullu	  jism	  mutanāhi)’258	  i.e.	   each	  and	  every	  body	   in	   the	  extra-­‐mental	  realm,	  be	  it	  one	  that	  actually	  exists	  or	  one	  that	  hypothetically	  exists,	  is	  of	  limited	  dimensions.	  This	  differs	   from	  the	   initially	  described	  khārijī	  proposition,	  whose	   judgement	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   hypothetical	   instances-­‐	  with	   reference	   to	  the	  example	  given	  for	  such	  a	  proposition	  above;	  it	  is	  only	  those	  who	  are	  actually	  in	   the	  house	  who	  are	  dead,	  with	   the	   judgement	  not	  extending	   to	  anybody	  who	  may	  be	  assumed	   to	  be	  in	  the	  house,	  unlike	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ḥaqīqī	  proposition.	  The	  third	  type	  of	  proposition	  is	  where	  the	  instances	  of	   its	  subject	  occur	  only	   in	  the	  mind,	   e.g.	   ‘Universals	   are	   either	   essential	   or	   accidental’	   or	   ‘the	   essential	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  256‘Sharḥ	  gharar	  al-­‐farā’id	  yā	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐manzūma’,	  in	  M.	  Mohaghegh	  &	  T.	  Izutsu	  (eds.)	  Sharḥ-­‐i	  
Ghurar	  al-­‐farā’id	  or	  Sahrh-­‐i	  manzūmah	  H.M.H.	  Sabzawārī	  Part	  One	  Metaphysics	  (Tehran,	  Initishārāt	  Dānishghāh	  Tehran,	  1991)	  p.	  9.	  257Ibid	  p.82.	  258	  Sabzawārī,	  ‘Sharḥ	  gharar	  al-­‐farā’id	  yā	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐manzūma’,	  p.	  82.	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either	  a	  genus	  or	  a	  differentia’259.	  The	  instances	  of	  the	  subject	  in	  both	  examples	  are	   purely	   mental	   considerations;	   with	   no	   extra-­‐mental	   occurrence	   (actual	   or	  hypothetical),	  hence	  such	  propositions	  are	  termed	  Dhinī.	  With	  this	  classification	  in	  mind,	  and	  based	  on	  his	  correspondence	  theory	  of	  truth,	  Sabzawārī	  goes	  on	  to	  formulate	  the	  necessary	  truth-­‐conditions	  for	  each	  of	  these	  types	  of	  proposition;	  	  Truth	   in	   the	  khārijiyya	   [propositions]	   is	   determined	  by	   consideration	   of	  the	  relationship	  of	  its	  correspondence	  to	  that	  which	  is	  in	  the	  extra-­‐mental	  realm.	   This	   is	   also	   the	   case	   for	   the	   ḥaqiqiyya	   [proposition],	   for	   it	   also	  contains	   a	   judgement	   about	   existents	   in	   the	   extra-­‐mental	   realm,	   albeit	  actualised	  or	  hypothetical	  [existents]260	  Thus	   the	  Khārijiyya	   and	   the	  Ḥaqīqiyya	   propositions	   are	   true	   if	   and	  when	   their	  content	  corresponds	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  extra-­‐mental	  realm.	  Maintaining	  that	  correspondence	   with	   reality	   is	   the	   criterion	   for	   truth	   in	   such	   cases	   poses	   no	  difficulty	  in	  a	  pre-­‐modern	  framework	  that	  does	  not	  take	  seriously	  the	  fallibility	  of	  knowledge.	   However	   the	   situation	   for	   the	  Dhinī	   proposition	   is,	   at	   least	   at	   first	  sight,	  not	  so	  straightforward.	  	  As	  stated	  above,	  the	  subject	  matter	  for	  the	  Dhinī	  propositions	  are	  purely	  mental	  considerations,	   thus	   they	   have	   no	   extra-­‐mental	   occurrence	   with	   which	   their	  correspondence	   (or	   non-­‐correspondence)	   can	   be	   assessed.	   It	   is	   here	   that	   the	  notion	  of	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  comes	  into	  play,	  for	  the	  Dhinī	  proposition	  is	  considered	  true	  if	   and	  when	   it	   corresponds,	  not	   to	   that	  which	   is	   in	   the	  extra-­‐mental	   realm,	  but	  rather	  to	  that	  which	  is	  in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  or	  the	  realm	  of	  fact.	  	  Sabzawārī	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  give	  a	  complete	  logical	  definition	  for	  nafs	  al-­‐amr,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  genus	  and	  differentia,	  instead	  he	  somewhat	  obliquely	  states	  that	  the	   nafs	   al-­‐amr	   of	   a	   thing	   is	   defined	   and	   understood	   ‘by	   the	   definition	   of	   that	  which	   makes	   a	   thing	   that	   thing	   (bi	   ḥad	   dhāt	   al-­‐shay)’261.	   Thankfully	   he	   does	  elaborate;	  ‘What	  is	  intended	  here	  by	  ḥad	  al-­‐dhāt	  is	  that	  which	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  Sabzawārī,	  ‘Sharḥ	  gharar	  al-­‐farā’id	  yā	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐manzūma’,	  p.	  82.	  260	  Ibid.	  261	  Ibid.	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suppositions	  of	  one	  supposing	  (farḍ	  al-­‐fāriḍ)’262,	  i.e.	  the	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  is	  the	  purely	  objective,	  completely	  detached	  from	  any	  influence	  of	  the	  subject;	  ‘It	   [nafs	  al-­‐amr]	  encompasses	  the	  realm	  of	  māhiyya	   (quiddity),	   the	  extra-­‐mental	  and	  the	  mental	  existences.	  Thus	  [the	  statements	  that]	  Human	  is	  an	  animal	   at	   one	   level,	   existent	   in	   the	   extra-­‐mental	   realm,	   or	   a	   universal,	  existent	   in	   the	   mental	   realm,	   are	   all	   factual	   things	   [min	   al-­‐umūr	   al-­‐
nafsiyya],	   for	   they	   are	   not	   simply	   due	   to	   the	   suppositions	   of	   the	   one	  supposing	   them,	   such	  as	   is	   the	   case	   in	   [the	   statement]	  Human	   is	   a	   solid	  entity’263	  Predications	   that	   are	   dependent	   on	   the	   subject	   perceiving	   them	   are	   ruled	   out	  from	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  and	  are	  not	  considered	  factual.	  The	  ‘solidity’	  of	  human	  beings	  is	  a	  notion	  relative	  to	  the	  observer	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  factual,	  it	  is	  not	  of	  those	  things	  which	  are	  true	   in	  themselves,	  or	  as	  Sabzawārī	   initially	  put	   it	  bi	  ḥad	  
al-­‐dhāt,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  not	  true	  through	  the	  definition	  of	  that	  thing	  itself.	  The	  definition	  of	  ‘human	  as	  rational	  animal’	  does	  not	  confer	  any	  necessary	  judgement	  regarding	  the	  solidity	  of	  humans.	  Offering	  further	  clarification	  he	  states;	  ‘What	  is	  intended	  by	  al-­‐amr,	  is	  the	  thing	  itself.	  Thus	  if	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  number	  four	  fi	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  is	  so	  and	  so,	  what	  is	  meant	  is	  that	  the	  number	  four	  through	  the	  definition	  of	  itself	  is	  such	   and	   such’264.	   According	   to	   Sabzawārī	   then	   the	   nafs	   al-­‐amr	   is	   the	   factual	  reality	  of	  things,	  things	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves.	  	  Sabzawārī	   now	   proceeds	   to	   explain	   the	   relationship	   between	   nafs	   al-­‐amr,	   this	  realm	  of	  fact,	  and	  the	  realms	  of	  extra-­‐mental	  existence	  and	  mental	  existence.	  The	  realm	   of	   fact	   is	   considered	   absolutely	   more	   general	   (a	  ͑am	  muṭlaqan)	   than	   the	  realm	  of	   extra-­‐mental	   existence,	   because	  everything	   that	   is	   in	   the	   extra-­‐mental	  realm	  is	  also	  in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr,	  i.e.	  it	  also	  has	  factual	  reality.	  More	  simply	  put,	  every	  externally	  occurring	  existent	  is	  a	  fact,	  but	  every	  fact	  is	  not	  an	  externally	  occurring	  existent.	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  Realm	  of	  fact	  Extra-­‐mental	  realm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Fig.	  1	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  realm	  of	  fact	  and	  the	  extra-­‐mental	  realm.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  mental	  existence	  however	  does	  not	   follow	  suite,	   for	   the	  realm	  of	   fact	  can	  only	  be	  said	   to	  be	  more	  general	  than	  mental	  existence	  from	  a	  certain	  perspective	  (a	͑  am	  min	  wajh);	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   truthful	   [mental]	   propositions,	   such	   as	  when	  we	   say	   that	  four	   is	   even,	   both	   [realms]	   concur...whilst	   in	   false	   [mental]	   propositions	  and	   with	   respect	   to	   Truth	   Absolute,	   esteemed	   be	   His	   Name,	   the	   two	  [realms]	  differ.	   In	   the	   false	  proposition	   (for	   example	   the	  number	   four	   is	  odd),	  the	  mental	  is	  actualised	  but	  not	  the	  factual.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  The	  Truth,	  Exalted,	   the	   factual	   is	   realized	   but	   not	   the	   mental,	   due	   to	   His	   being	  unqualified	   externality	   (kharijiyyan	  mutlaqan),	   neither	   is	  He	   encompassed	  by	  rationality	  nor	  by	  supposition	  (la	  yaḥītu	  bihi	  	   ͑aql	  wa	  la	  wahm)265.	  	  	  	  	  	  Accordingly,	  that	  which	  occurs	  in	  the	  mental	  realm	  may	  be	  factual	  (true	  in	  itself),	  e.g.	   the	  number	   four	   is	   even.	  On	   the	  other	  hand	   that	  which	  occurs	   to	   the	  mind	  may	  be	  non-­‐factual,	  e.g.	  the	  number	  four	  is	  odd,	  such	  a	  mental	  proposition	  would	  only	  occur	  in	  the	  mental	  realm	  with	  no	  corresponding	  occurrence	  in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr.	  Displaying	   his	   theological	   and	   even	  mystical	   inclinations	   Sabzawārī	   goes	   on	   to	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identify	  a	  third	  category	  in	  this	  relationship,	  that	  which	  occurs	  in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  but	  does	   not	   occur	   in	   the	   mental	   realm.	   Allah,	   what	   Sabzawārī	   refers	   to	   as	   The	  Absolute	  Truth,	   is	  a	   fact.	  However	  the	  transcendence	  of	   this	   fact	  means	  that	  He	  cannot	  be	  realized	  in	  the	  mental	  realm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  realm	  of	  fact	  Mental	  realm	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   Fig.	  2	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  realm	  of	  fact	  and	  the	  mental	  realm	  	  	  Returning	  to	  Sabzawārī’s	  conception	  of	  what	   is	   intended	  by	  the	   intelligibility	  of	  
ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  employing	  the	  notion	  of	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  allowed	  him	  to	  develop	  a	  more	   sophisticated	   conception	  of	   the	   issue	   than	   that	   found	   in	   the	  early	  and	  classical	  formulations	  of	  the	  doctrine.	  When	  he	  states	  that	  ‘It	  is	  possible	  for	  al-­‐ʿaql	  to	  understand	   that	  a	   specific	   action	   (al-­‐f	  ͑il	  al-­‐fulāni)	   is	  praised	   in	   the	  realm	  of	  fact	  (fi	  nafs	  al-­‐amr)	  and	  that	  another	  may	  be	  blamed’266	  he	  is	  asserting	  not	  only	  that	  moral	  values	  are	  discoverable	  by	   independent	  rationality	  but	  that	  they	  are	   ‘factual’.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  here	  his	  conception	  of	   fact,	  or	  nafs	  al-­‐amr,	   is	  more	   general	   than	   existence	   (both	   mental	   and	   extra-­‐mental)	   and	   thus	   for	  rationality	  to	  identify	  that	  an	  action	  is	  either	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy	  does	  not	   require	   any	   existential	   attribute,	   essential	   or	   accidental,	   in	   the	   action	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  266	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’,	  p.	  319.	  
	  	   109	  
gives	   rise	   to	   the	   moral	   judgement.	   The	   implications	   of	   this	   developed	  sophistication	  in	  the	  theory	  can	  be	  seen	  further	  not	  only	  in	  his	  own	  response	  to	  Ash	  ͑arī	   criticisms,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   sets	   a	   precedent	   for	   a	   trend	   observed	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  mas’ala	  taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbīḥ	   employed	  by	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	  and	  impacts	  the	  disputes	  surrounding	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  principle	  to	  	  
fiqh.	  	  3.4.3	  The	  role	  of	  revelation	  Having	  established	  himself	  firmly	  in	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  camp,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Mu	   ͑tazlia	  and	  his	  predecessors	  from	  amongst	  the	  Imāmiyya,	  by	  affirming	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  Sabzawārī	  goes	  on	  to	  briefly	  discuss	  the	  common	  concern	  with	  the	   implications	   this	   position	   holds	   regarding	   the	   role	   of	   revelation.	   For	   those	  that	  claim	  that	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  rationally	  intelligible	  do	  not	  think	  that	  al-­‐shar	͑  	  or	   revelation,	   is	   superfluous	   or	   redundant	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   our	   knowledge	   of	  moral	  values.	  Accordingly	  Sabzawārī	  outlines	  exactly	  what	  the	  role	  of	  revelation	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  for	  those	  who	  accept	  this	  position;	  Revelation	  is	  a	  discloser	  (kāshif)	  and	  a	  clarifier	  (mubayyin)	  of	  the	  ḥusn	  and	  
qubḥ	   established	   for	   it	   in	   the	   realm	  of	   fact	   and	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   that	   an	  action	   which	   has	   been	   commanded	   be	   prohibited	   in	   that	   time	   in	   itself,	  likewise	   neither	   can	   that	   which	   has	   been	   prohibited	   be	   commanded,	  although	  it	  is	  possible	  if	  the	  time	  has	  changed	  as	  is	  the	  case	  of	  abrogation	  (naskh	  al-­‐aḥkām)267	  Moving	  into	  what	  may	  be	  deemed	  a	  more	  polemical	  tone,	  and	  setting	  it	  up	  for	  a	  rebuttal,	  he	  contrasts	  this	  with	  the	  Ash	  a͑rī	  position,	  where;	  	  Revelation	   is	   the	  establisher	   (al-­‐muthbit)	   for	   it	   and	  not	   the	  discloser.	  al-­‐
ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  any	  real	   issue	   in	  the	  action	  prior	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  revelation.	  And	  the	  aforementioned	  reversal	  is	  possible,	  as	  there	   is	   no	   necessary	   relation	   (	   ͑alāqa	   lazūmiyya)	   between	   prayer	   and	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entering	   paradise	   nor	   between	   consumption	   of	   the	   property	   of	   orphans	  and	  the	  consumption	  of	  fire	  in	  the	  belly268.	  	  Moving	  to	  the	  refutation	  of	  this	  position	  Sabzawārī	  tries	  to	  demonstrate	  what	  he	  considers	  are	  the	  unacceptable	  implications	  of	  this;	  Thus	   if	   Allah	   were	   to	   cause	   the	   devout	   ascetic	   believing	   worshipper	   to	  enter	  the	  fire	  and	  the	  polytheist	  unbeliever	  to	  enter	  paradise,	  it	  would	  be	  considered	  appropriate	  by	  the	  proponents	  of	  this	  school	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
madhhab	  al-­‐taḥqīq269.	  	  Despite	   his	   deep	   inclinations	   towards	   discursive	   philosophy,	   here	   Sabzawārī	  gives	   us	   a	   paradigmatic	   example	   of	   the	   use	   of	   polemics	   in	   Muslim	   theological	  writing.	   His	   refutation	   of	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	   position,	   does	   not	   employ	   the	   deductive	  reasoning	   championed	   by	   the	   philosophers,	   but	   rather	   attempts	   to	   undermine	  the	   Ash	  ͑arī	   position	   using	   propositions	   which	   they	   would	   apparently	   accept,	  disregarding	  whether	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  can	  establish	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  his	   own	   position	   or	   not.	   Sabzawārī’s	   argument	   against	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	   appraisal	   of	  revelation	   being	   the	   establisher	   (muthbit),	   rather	   than	   a	   discloser	   (kāshif),	   of	  
ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   and	   their	  denial	  of	   any	  necessary	   correlation	   (	   ͑alāqa	  lazūmiyya)	  between	   actions	   and	   their	   other-­‐worldly	   effects,	   relies	   on	   reference	   to	   the	  authority	  of	  revelation	  and	  prophetic	  narration.	  Of	  course	  his	  own	  argument	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  claims	  that	  one	  cannot	  rely	  on	  scripture	  in	  the	  initial	  premises	  of	  one’s	  moral	  reasoning.	  He	   argues	   that	   the	   Qur’ān	   repeatedly	   asserts	   and	   establishes	   a	   correlation	  ‘between	   good	   actions	   and	   blissful	   forms’	   on	   one	   hand,	   and	   also	   ‘between	   bad	  actions	  and	  blameworthy	  forms’	  on	  the	  other270.	  Although	  the	  textual	  evidences	  he	   cites	   do	   suggest	   such	   a	   correlation,271	  they	   fail	   to	   make	   clear	   whether	   this	  correlation	  is	  a	  necessary	  or	  natural	  one,	  and	  thus	  at	  least	  on	  this	  point	  he	  does	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  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’,	  p.319.	  269	  Ibid	  p.	  320.	  	  	  	  270	  Ibid.	  271	  Of	  the	  ‘many	  verses’	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  indicating	  this	  correlation,	  Sabzawārī	  explicitly	  mentions	  only	  the	  following	  as	  examples;	  32:	  17,	  9:	  95,	  and	  4:	  95,	  along	  with	  the	  following	  statement	  attributed	  to	  the	  Prophet	  Muḥammad	  ‘They	  are	  nothing	  other	  than	  your	  actions	  being	  returned	  unto	  you’.	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not	   seem	   to	   significantly	   dent	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	   position.	   The	  Ash	  ͑arī	   do	   not	   deny	   a	  correlation	   established	   by	   revelation-­‐	   they	   only	   deny	   the	   necessity	   of	   this	  correlation.	  For	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī,	  one	   is	  rewarded	   in	  accordance	  with	  what	  one	  does	  simply	   because	   Allah	   wills	   this	   to	   be	   the	   case,	   and	   not	   due	   to	   any	   intrinsic	  relationship	  between	  actions	  and	  their	  effects.	  	  3.4.4	  Justifying	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  After	   this	   initial	   criticism	   of	   a	   somewhat	   stereotypical	   and	   simplified	   Ash	  ͑arī	  position,	  Sabzawārī	  mentions	  his	   justification	   for	  adopting	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  position	  of	   affirming	   that	  al-­‐ḥusn	   and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   are	   rationally	   intelligible.	   The	   arguments	  mentioned	  differ	  only	  in	  formulation	  to	  those	  cited	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  doctrine	  offered	   by	   the	   likes	   of	   Naṣīr	   al-­‐dīn	   Ṭūsī	   and	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī	   examined	   above.	  Sabzawārī	   follows	   the	   classical	   triple	   justification	   of	   firstly	   claiming	   the	   self-­‐evident	   nature	   of	   basic	  moral	   values,	   secondly	   claiming	   a	   universality	   of	   basic	  moral	   judgements,	   and	   thirdly	   by	   arguing	   that	   any	   trust	   in	   the	   veracity	   of	  scriptural	  morality	  must	  be	  initially	  dependent	  on	  an	  independent	  non-­‐scriptural	  morality.	  The	   first	   two	   arguments	   are	   relayed	   in	   a	   fairly	   straightforward	   manner,	  resembling	  very	  closely	  the	  formulations	  of	  his	  predecessors;	  The	  truth	  is	  that	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  are	  rationally	  intelligible,	  due	  to	  the	  self-­‐evident	  knowledge	  of	  the	  desert	  of	  praise	  upon	  justice	  and	  goodness,	  and	  [the	  desert]	  of	  blame	  upon	  oppression	  and	  enmity.	  This	  knowledge	  is	  acquired	  by	  every	  rational	  person,	  even	  if	  he	  does	  not	  live	  in	  accordance	  to	  a	  religion,	  and	  due	  to	  this	  also	  being	  the	  judgement	  of	  those	  who	  deny	  the	  revealed	  religions	  (munkar	  al-­‐sharā’i	  ͑),	  such	  as	  the	  Barāhima272.	  The	  third	  argument,	  which	  was	  always	  the	  least	  straightforward	  but	  probably	  the	  most	   convincing	   of	   the	   three,	   is	   formulated	   slightly	   differently	   to	   the	   versions	  expounded	   by	   Naṣīr	   al-­‐Din	   Ṭūsī	   and	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī.	   Eloquently,	   although	   again	  rather	  polemically,	  Sabzawārī	  uses	  the	  famous	  formulation	  for	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theory	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of	   meta-­‐ethics	   within	   his	   justification	   for	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	   stance	   stating	   that	  ‘knowledge	   of	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   that	   which	   the	   legislator	   has	   made	  praiseworthy	  or	   the	  blameworthiness	  of	   that	  which	  he	  has	  made	  blameworthy'	  depends	  upon	  the	  a	  priori	  acceptance	  of	  the	  following	  propositions;	  	  
i) ‘Lying	  is	  blameworthy	  (qabīḥ)	  and	  does	  not	  occur	  from	  Him’	  273	  	  	  
ii) ‘commanding	   the	   blameworthy	   and	   prohibiting	   the	   praiseworthy	   are	   a	  foolishness	  and	  futility	  which	  can	  not	  be	  associated	  with	  Him’274	  	  	  	  Knowledge	  of	  these	  propositions	  is	  assumed	  to	  only	  be	  able	  to	  arise	  from	  one	  of	  two	   ways;	   either	   through	   al-­‐ʿaql	   or	   al-­‐shar	͑  .	   If	   it	   is	   known	   through	   al-­‐shar	͑  	  (revelation)	  we	  are	  returned	  to	  our	  original	  question,	  i.e.	  we	  again	  do	  not	  know	  how	  we	  can	  trust	  this	  revelatory	  knowledge	  without	  the	  two	  prior	  assumptions.	  Therefore	  knowledge	  of	  these	  propositions	  must	  come	  through	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  hence	  
al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  must	  be	  rationally	  intelligible	  independent	  of	  revelation.	  	  	  3.4.5	  Objections	  to	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  	  Sabzawārī	  discusses	  two	  important	  and	  recurring	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objections	  against	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ,	  and	  it	  is	  in	  his	  attempted	  resolution	  of	  these	  objections	   that	   make	   apparent	   his	   novel	   contribution	   to	   the	   debate.	   His	  discussion	  of	  the	  two	  objections	  will	  take	  on	  greater	  relevance	  when	  we	  see	  their	  influence	   upon	   the	   heated	   debates	   regarding	   the	   conception	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	   al-­‐
qubḥ	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyān,	   and	   its	   subsequent	   influence	   upon	   al-­‐ʿaql	   as	   an	   independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts,	  found	  within	  the	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  literature.	  	  The	  first	  of	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objections	  relayed	  by	  Sabzawārī	  is	  based	  on	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  meanings	  or	  usage	  of	  the	  terms	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ.	  In	  defence	  of	  their	   ethical	  or	   theological	   voulntarism,	  Ash	  ͑arī	   scholars	  distinguished	  between	  three	   different	   meanings	   of	   the	   two	   oppositional	   terms.	   	  The	   first	   of	   which	   is	  when	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   is	  used	  to	  describe	  an	  attribute	  of	  perfection	  (ṣifāt	  al-­‐
kamāl)	  or	  an	  attribute	  of	  imperfection	  (ṣifāt	  ul-­‐naqṣ).	  The	  second	  meaning	  of	  al-­‐	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ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   is	   when	   something	   is	   either	   consistent	   with	   an	   objective	   or	  contrary	  to	  it,	  thus	  when	  something	  is	  deemed	  to	  have	  utility	  (maṣlaḥa)	  it	  can	  be	  termed	  ḥasan	  and	  when	   it	   is	  deemed	  a	  detriment	   (mafṣada)	   in	  may	  be	   termed	  
qabīḥ.	   According	   to	   Sabzawārī,	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	   accept	   that	   these	   first	   two	   types	   of	  
ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  perceived	  by	  the	  	   ͑aql275.	  	  The	   third	   meaning	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   is	   ‘the	   deserving	   of	   reward	   and	  punishment	  from	  Allah	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  regulative	  system	  (aḥkāmihi)’276.	  Thus,	   if	  ones	  actions	  deserve	  divine	  reward	  they	  are	  ḥasan,	  and	   if	   they	  deserve	  divine	  punishment	  they	  are	  qabīḥ.	  It	  is	  only	  this	  third	  meaning	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐
qubḥ	  which	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   controversy	   (maḥal	  al-­‐nizā	  ͑)	   and	   it	   is	   instances	   of	  this	  third	  meaning	  alone	  which	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  believe	  cannot	  be	   	   ͑aqlī	  i.e.	  they	  claim	  that	  knowledge	  of	  whether	  an	  act	   is	  deserving	  of	  divine	  punishment	  or	  reward	  cannot	  be	  intelligible	  without	  recourse	  to	  revelation.	  	  With	   reference	   to	   the	   first	   justification	   for	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ,	  which	   relied	   on	   a	   claimed	   self-­‐evidence	   and	   universality	   of	   basic	   moral	  propositions,	  Sabzawārī	  cites	  the	  following	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objection;	  The	   conviction	  of	   rational	   people	   as	   to	   the	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	   of	   those	   things	  mentioned	  e.g.	   justice,	  kindness	  and	  their	  opposites,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  their	  being	   either	   consistent	  with	   objectives	   or	   in	   opposition	   to	   them	   or	   that	  they	   be	   attributes	   of	   perfection	   or	   imperfection	   is	   accepted	   (musallam),	  but	  there	  is	  no	  dispute	  with	  reference	  to	  these	  two	  meanings	  [of	  ḥusn	  and	  
qubḥ]	  and	  as	  for	  the	  disputed	  meaning	  it	  [the	  conviction	  of	  rational	  people	  independent	  of	  revelatory	  knowledge]	  is	  impossible.277	  Although	  Sabzawārī	  acknowledges	  that	  this	  Ash	  ͑arī	  analysis	  has	  caused	  problems	  for	  some	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	   to	  say	  that	  he	  himself	  is	  dismissive	  of	  this	  objection	  does	  not	  quite	  capture	  the	  contempt	  with	  which	   he	   regards	   the	   argument.	   Before	   even	   beginning	   any	   refutation	   of	   the	  objection,	  Sabzawārī	  addresses	  his	  readers	  directly	  with	  ‘And	  you	  are	  well	  aware	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of	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  it	  is	  refuted’278	  almost	  implying	  that	  the	  flaw	  in	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  position	  is	  so	  obvious	  that	  it	  is	  hardly	  worth	  mentioning.	  	  Sabzawārī’s	  dismissal	  of	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objection	  revolves	  around	  an	  initial	  premise	  that	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   their	   first	   two	   meanings,	   which	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	   except	   are	  rational,	   	   ‘when	   in	   voluntary	   actions,	   [ultimately]	   refer	   to	   [the	   qualities	   of]	  praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness	   (raja	  ͑at	   ͑ilā	   al-­‐mamdūḥiyya	   wa	   al-­‐
madhmūmiyya)’.	  For	  example,	  accepting	  that	  kindness	  is	  rationally	  ḥasan,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  an	  attribute	  of	  perfection	  (ṣifāt	  al-­‐kamāl),	  	  implies	  the	  acceptance	  of	  its	  praiseworthiness	  as	  a	  voluntary	  action	  (the	  act	  of	  iḥsān)	  also	  being	  rational.	  	  Having	   already	   described	   praise	   and	   blame	   as	   factual	   things	   (min	   al-­‐umūr	   al-­‐
nafsiyya)	  he	  continues	  with	  ‘Praise	  and	  blame	  are	  more	  general	  than	  being	  either	  from	   rational	   people	   or	   from	   Allah,	   exalted’	   meaning	   that	   if	   something	   is	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy	   it	   is	   so,	   be	   it	   from	   the	  perspective	  of	  humans	  or	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Allah.	  Now	  moving	  from	  the	  factual	  to	  the	  normative	  (in	  a	  sense	   connecting	   the	   ‘is’	   to	   the	   ‘ought’)	   Sabzawārī	   can	   conclude;	   ‘And	   to	   be	  deserving	   of	   His	   praise	   and	   blame	   is	   to	   be	   deserving	   of	   His	   reward	   and	  punishment’279.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  see	  that	  for	  Sabzawārī,	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  acceptance	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  their	  first	  two	  meanings	  implies	  that	  they	  must	  also	  accept	  its	  intelligibility	   in	   the	   third	   meaning.	   Despite	   his	   initial	   claims	   regarding	   the	  simplicity	  of	  this	  argument,	  he	  does	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  rephrase	  and	  elaborate	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  drive	  home	  his	  point	  absolutely	  clearly;	  Thus	  if	  you	  accept	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  goodness	  of	  kindness	  (	   ͑aqliyatu	  
ḥusn	   al-­‐iḥsān)	   and	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   its	   performer,	   through	  rationality,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  an	  attribute	  of	  perfection	  or	  consistency	  with	  objectives,	   it	   is	   necessary	   for	   you	   to	   recognise	   its	   intelligibility	   in	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   praiseworthiness	   of	   its	   performer	   in	   the	   view	   of	   Allah,	  exalted280.	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The	   reason	   offered	   for	   this	   necessary	   correlation	   is	   based	   on	   an	   Aristotelian	  foundationalist	   epistemological	   assumption,	   that	   pure	   reason	   must	   have	  epistemic	  access	  to	  facts;	  	  Because	  everything	  which	  is	  praised	  or	  blamed	  by	  pure	  reason	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐
ṣarīḥ),	  [i.e.]	  by	  way	  of	  self	  evidence	  or	  through	  sound	  deductive	  reasoning,	  is	  praised	  or	  blamed	  fi	  nafs	  al-­‐amr.	  If	  not,	  it	  would	  then	  imply	  the	  paralysis	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  toward	  sophistry281.	  If	  pure	  reason,	  self-­‐evidently	  or	  through	  sound	  deductive	  reasoning,	  determines	  the	   factual	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  act,	  as	  being	  either	  blameworthy	  or	  praiseworthy	  than	  this	  judgement	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgement	  of	  Allah,	  ‘otherwise	  it	  would	  necessitate	  His	  ignorance	  of	  that	  which	  is	  factual	  (fi	  nafs	  al-­‐
amr),	  exalted	  a	  great	  distance	  be	  He	  from	  this’282.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	  this	  response	  to	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objection	  to	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  third	  meaning,	  we	  can	  gain	  greater	  insight	  into	  Sabzawārī’s	  own	  conception	  of	   the	   issue.	   As	   previously	   noted,	   he	   refers	   to	  moral	   values	   as	   factual	   realities,	  
min	   umūr	   al-­‐nafsiyya,	   adopting	   the	   position	   that	   they	   are	   intelligible	   by	  rationality,	  unaided	  by	   revelation.	  However	  here	  he	  makes	   it	   clear	   that	  we	   can	  only	  ascertain	  for	  sure	  that	  a	  value	  is	  factual,	  independently	  of	  revelation,	  if	  it	  is	  the	   result	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐ṣarīḥ	   or	  pure	   rationality.	  Accordingly	   if	  moral	   values	   are	  known	   self-­‐evidently	   or	   through	   sound	   deductive	   reasoning,	   they	   can	   be	  considered	  as	  factual	  values,	  both	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  humans	  and	  from	  the	  point	   of	   view	   of	   Allah.	   As	   shall	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   subsequent	   analysis,	   it	   is	   this	  epistemological	   criteria	   for	   the	   valid	   correspondence	   between	   judgements	   of	  reason	  and	  judgements	  of	  God	  which	  is	  the	  major	  obstacle	  for	  preventing	  the	  role	  of	   independent	   rationality	   (al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya)	   from	   playing	   any	  substantive	   role	   in	   the	   actual	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   rendering	   any	   relevant	  judgements	  of	   rational	  morality	  superfluous	   to	  considerations	  of	   the	  validity	  of	  precepts	  derived	  in	  fiqh.	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Sabzawārī	   also	   discusses,	   and	   responds	   to,	   a	   second	   objection	   to	   the	   	   ͑Adliyya	  theory	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   moral	   values.	   Like	   the	   first	   objection,	   it	   is	   a	  challenge	  that	  has	  gone	  a	  long	  way	  in	  shaping	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  have	  outlined	   their	   conception	  of	   the	   intelligibility	  of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	   the	  blameworthy.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapters,	  it	  is	  a	  challenge	  which	  has	   led	   to	  much	  debate	  around	   the	  conception	  of	   rational	  moral	   judgements	   in	  
uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   the	   result	   of	   which	   also	   seems	   to	   have	   played	   a	   role	   in	   the	  curtailment	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   judgements	   actually	   impact	   the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  fiqh.	  Not	  only	  does	  Sabzawārī’s	  incisive	  analysis	  of	  the	  issue	  allow	  an	  excellent	  backdrop	  for	  assessing	  these	  disputes	  in	  modern	  
uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   but	   they	   also	   offer	   a	   genuinely	   tenable	   route	   for	   resolution	   of	   the	  conflict.	  The	   objection	   raised,	   and	   attributed	   to	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī,	   is	   against	   the	   claimed	   self-­‐evidence	   (ḍarūra)	   of	   basic	   moral	   propositions,	   a	   claim	   that	   we	   have	   seen	   is	  central	  to	  the	  justifications	  offered	  by	  the	   ͑Adliyya	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy.	   The	   objection	   relies	   upon	   a	   particular	  classification	   of	   propositions	   employed	   by	   Muslim	   philosophers	   and	   logicians,	  and	   which	   aims	   to	   point	   toward	   a	   category	   mistake	   in	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   analysis.	  According	   to	   logicians,	   syllogisms	   may	   be	   used	   for	   a	   number	   of	   different	  purposes	   depending	   upon	   the	   content	   of	   the	   propositions	   that	   make	   up	   that	  particular	  syllogism.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  content	  (mādat	  al-­‐qiyās),	  a	  syllogism	   may	   be	   employed	   for	   either	   deduction	   (burhān),	   polemics	   (jadal),	  oratory	  (khitāba),	  poetry	  (sh	͑  ar)	  or	  fallacies	  (mughālaṭa)283.	  Sabzawārī’s	  account	  of	  the	  objection	  against	  the	  self	  evidence	  of	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  notes	  that	  the	   early	   Muslim	   philosophers	   (ḥukamā)	   have	   described	   statements	   such	   as	  ‘justices	   is	   praiseworthy’	   and	   ‘oppression	   is	   blameworthy’,	   as	   being	   from	  amongst	  those	  propositions	  classified	  as	  maqbūlāt	  al-­‐	   ͑āmma	  -­‐	  generally	  accepted	  propositions	   whose	   validity	   is	   dependent	   upon	   a	   broad	   acceptance	   of	   the	  proposition-­‐	   a	   form	  of	  proposition	  which	  provides	   the	   content	   to	  polemics	   (al-­‐
jadal)	  rather	  than	  to	  deduction	  (al-­‐burhān)284.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  describing	  these	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propositions	   as	   being	   self-­‐evident,	   a	   particular	   property	   of	   propositions	  which	  form	  the	  content	  to	  burhān	  and	  not	  a	  property	  associated	  with	  the	  maqbūlāt	  al-­‐
	   ͑āmma	  becomes	  ‘nonsensical’	  (gayr	  masmū	  )͑	  and	  hence	  unjustified285.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  earliest	  to	  raise	  this	  objection,	  albeit	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  form,	  seems	  to	   be	   the	   paradigmatic	  Ash	  ͑arī	   theologian	   and	   jurist	   of	   his	   era,	   Abū	  Ḥāmid	   Al-­‐Ghazzāli.	   In	   his	  Muṣtasfā	   fi	   	   ͑ilm	  al-­‐uṣūl	  he	   argues	   against	   the	   self	   eveidence	   of	  such	  propositions	  describing	   them	   instead	  as	  propositions	  which	  are	  popularly	  considered	  praiseworthy	  (maḥmūda	  mashhūra)	  286,	  apparently	  making	  reference	  to	  a	  position	  attributed	   to	   Ibn	  Sīnā	   that	  has	   clearly	   raised	  challenges	   that	  have	  impacted	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions	  adopted	  by	  modern	  Shī	͑  a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  In	  his	  Ishārāt	  wa	  tanbīhāt	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  classifies	  basic	   moral	   propositions,	   like	   ‘lying	   is	   blameworthy’,	   as	   being	   examples	   of	   a	  ‘popularly	   agreed	   upon’	   proposition	   referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐mashūrāt.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  these	  moral	   judgements,	   these	   forms	   of	  maqbulāt	  al-­‐	   ͑āmma	   are	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘praiseworthy	   opinions’	   (al-­‐ārā	   al-­‐mussammāt	   bil	  maḥmūda).	   According	   to	   Ibn	  Sīnā	   these	  propositions	  are	  designated	  as	  mashūrāt	   for	   the	  reason	  that	   there	   is	  no	  ontological	  basis	  to	  them	  except	  for	  the	  popular	  consensus	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  them	  (la	  	  ͑umda	  lahā	  illa	  shūra)287.	  They	  are	  thus	  portrayed	  as	  being	  purely	  inter-­‐subjective,	   with	   an	   explicit	   recognition	   that	   should	   an	   individual	   human	   being	  have	   been	   brought	   up	   alone	   in	   isolation	   of	   society,	   despite	   possessing	   his	  faculties	   of	   reason,	   speculation	   and	   sense	   experience,	   ‘he	  would	  not	   have	  been	  trained	   to	   accept	   or	   recognise	   such	   propositions’288.	   This	   conception	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions	  undermines	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  self	  evident	  to	  unaided	  reason,	  a	  central	  justification	  of	  the	  	   ͑Adliyya	  defence	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sabzawārī’s	   response	   to	   this	   objection	  maintains	   that	   basic	  moral	   propositions	  are	   indeed	   self-­‐evident	   propositions	   in	   the	   sense	   ‘that	   they	   do	   not	   entertain	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  Ḥāmid	  al-­‐Ghazzālī,	  Al-­‐Mustaṣfā	  min	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  al-­‐uṣūl	  (Beirut,	  Mu’assasat	  al-­‐Risāla,	  1997)	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  ͑mān,	  1992)	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doubt’289.	   This	   recognition	   does	   not	   need	   to	   rely	   on	   speculative	   reasoning	   or	  intellectual	   deliberation,	   ‘judgement	   of	   the	   axiomatic	   nature	   of	   these	  propositions	   is	   also	   axiomatic’	   (al-­‐ḥukm	   bi	   bidāhatihā	   ayḍan	   badīhīyun)290.	   His	  resolution	  of	   the	  apparent	  conflict	  between	  this	  position	  and	  the	  categorisation	  of	  such	  propositions	  as	  being	  from	  amongst	  the	  mashūrāt	  or	  maqbūlāt	  rests	  upon	  the	   nature	   of	   the	   rational	   judgement	   that	   recognises	   these	  moral	   propositions.	  Sabzawārī	   claims	   that	   these	   judgements	   are	   not	   purely	   the	   result	   of	   practical	  rationality	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐	͑  amalī),	  that	  function	  of	  reason	  which	  perceives	  those	  issues	  whose	   performance	   is	   either	   befitting	   or	   non-­‐befitting,	   but	   that	   they	   are	  judgements	  which	  also	  fall	  under	  the	  domain	  of	  theoretical	  rationality	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐
naẓarī),	  the	  function	  of	  reason	  which	  perceives	  those	  things	  worthy	  of	  knowing.	  This	   is	  due	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  basic	  propositions	  being	  of	  relevance	  to	  issues	   of	   general	   or	   social	   utility	   and	   detriment	   (maṣāliḥ	   al-­‐	   	   ͑āmma	   wa	  
mafāṣidihā).	   It	   is	   because	   of	   this	   social	   aspect,	   which	   falls	   under	   the	   remit	   of	  theoretical	   rationality,	   that	  philosophers	  have	   considered	   these	  propositions	   to	  be	  amongst	  the	  maqbūlāt	  al-­‐	  	   ͑āmma;	  ‘the	  purpose	  of	  which	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  to	  draw	  out	  (al-­‐tamthīl)	  the	  aspect	  of	  social	  utility	  or	  detriment	  whose	  criteria	  is	  an	   acceptance	   of	   the	   mass	   generality	   of	   human	   kind	   and	   not	   any	   particular	  group’291.	  However	   for	   Sabzawārī,	   that	   the	   social	   utility	   or	   detriment	   of	   a	   proposition	  (which	  is	  recognised	  by	  theoretical	  rationality)	  can	  only	  be	  established	  through	  a	  social	   consensus	   does	   not	   rule	   out	   that	   the	   proposition	   in	   itself	   may	   be	   self	  evident	  in	  its	  validity	  at	  an	  individual	  level.	  As	  he	  himself	  states;	  	  [T]his	   does	   not	   contradict	   their	   [i.e.	   basic	   moral	   propositions]	   being	  axiomatic	   (gayr	  munāf	  li-­‐badāhatihā),	  because	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  a	   single	  proposition	  be	  classified	  as	  being	  of	  the	  certain	  propositions	  (al-­‐yaqīnīyāt)	  and	   of	   the	   widely	   accepted	   propositions	   (al-­‐maqbūlāt)	   from	   different	  respects,	   and	   hence	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   consider	   them	   in	   deduction	   (al-­‐
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burhān)	   and	   in	   polemics	   (al-­‐jadal)	   through	   these	   different	  considerations.292	  As	  shall	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  subsequent	  analysis,	  not	  all	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh	  have	  accepted	  that	  a	  single	  proposition	  can	  be	  from	  amongst	  the	  yaqīnīyāt,	  and	  hence	  self	  evidently	   intelligible,	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  be	   from	  amongst	   the	  
maqbūlāt	   al-­‐	   ͑āmma	   or	   al-­‐mashhūrāt	   the	   knowledge	   of	   which	   requires	   a	   social	  context.	   This	   debate	   has	   led	   to	   much	   contention	   regarding	   exactly	   how	  rationality	   comes	   to	   judge	   the	   praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   of	   basic	  moral	   propositions,	   reflecting	   a	   considerable	   diversity	   in	   the	   conception	   of	   the	  nature	  of	  morality	  and	  rationality	  amongst	  modern	  scholars	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Sabzawārī’s	  position	  sets	  an	  excellent	  backdrop	   for	  engaging	   in	   these	  elaborate	  discussions	  of	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh-­‐	  debates	  to	  which	  we	  shall	  turn	  to	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
3.5	  Summary	  A	   substantive	   notion	   of	   God’s	   Justice	   has	   been	   a	   prominent	   feature	   of	   Imāmī	  theological	  thought	  since	  the	  formative	  period	  of	  the	  school.	  Even	  the	  traditionist	  Shaykh	  al-­‐Ṣadūq,	  employed	  a	  conception	  of	  God’s	  justice	  premised	  on	  the	  ability	  of	   human	   reason	   to	   understand	   moral	   values	   in	   his	   explanation	   and	  interpretation	  of	  Imāmī	  traditions.	  This	  early	  post-­‐occultation	  period	  saw	  a	  range	  of	  different	  tendencies	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.	  Yet,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  doctrinal	  works	  of	  Al-­‐Mufīd,	   the	   concept	   that	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   for	  God	   to	   commit	  blameworthy	  acts	  and	  that	  God	  always	  acts	  with	  purpose	  became	  a	  characteristic	  doctrine	  of	  the	   school	   and	   led	   to	   their	   self	   affirmation	   as	   ‘Adliyya.	   In	   the	  works	   of	  Mufīd’s	  students,	  Shaykh	  al-­‐Ṭūsī	  and	  Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  we	  find	  the	  acceptance	  that	   the	  knowledge	   of	   basic	   moral	   propositions	   is	   axiomatic	   and	   that	   the	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  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asmā’,	  p.	  322.	  Also	  see,	  Ḥāj	  Mullā	  Hādī	  al-­‐Sabzawārī,	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Manzūma	  (Qum,	  Initishārāt	  Luqmān,	  N.D)	  pp.	  99-­‐100,	  where	  Sabzawārī	  quotes	  the	  above	  mentioned	  passage	  form	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  and	  explicitly	  rejects	  his	  analysis	  of	  mashūrāt	  and	  yaqīnīyāt	  as	  being	  mutually	  exclusive	  categories	  of	  propositions.	  Here	  Sabzawārī	  affirms	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  moral	  propositions,	  in	  themselves,	  may	  be	  self	  evident	  (and	  hence	  from	  the	  yaqīnīyāt)	  and	  that	  judgements	  regarding	  their	  social	  utility	  or	  detriment	  require	  a	  social	  consensus	  (and	  hence	  form	  this	  respect	  they	  are	  from	  the	  mashhūrāt).	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praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   of	   actions	   is	   indeed	   	   ͑aqlī	   i.e.	   rationally	  intelligible	  independent	  of	  revelation.	  	  	  	  By	  the	  classical	  period	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought	  scholars	  such	  as	  Ibn	  Nawbakht,	  Naṣīr	  al-­‐Din	  Ṭūsī	  and	  	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī	  had	  developed	  a	  sophisticated	  and	  systematic	  defence	  of	  Imāmī	  doctrine.	  This	  included	  an	  explicit	  recognition	  that	  an	   	   ͑Adliyya	  conception	   of	   God’s	   justice	   philosophically	   required	   a	   prior	   acceptance	   of	   a	  notion	  of	  God’s	  wisdom	  (Ḥikma)	  that	  in	  turn	  depended	  on	  the	  affirmation	  of	  the	  intellects	   ability	   to	   understand	   basic	   moral	   values	   independent	   of	   revelation.	  This	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	  (Qā	  ͑idatu	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbīḥ	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyain)	  was	   justified	  by	  a	  range	  of	  arguments	  that	  continue	  to	  be	  prominent	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theologians.	  These	   justifications	   claim	   that	   the	   validity	   of	   basic	   moral	   propositions	   are	  axiomatic	  or	  self-­‐evident,	  that	  knowledge	  of	  such	  propositions	  are	  universal	  and	  that	  in	  fact	  the	  very	  trust	  in	  the	  veracity	  of	  revelatory	  knowledge	  itself	  is	  reliant	  upon	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   moral	   values	   independent	   to	  revelation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Although	  Imāmī	  thinkers	  of	  subsequent	  generations	  have	  not	  significantly	  shifted	  their	   doctrinal	   positions,	   they	   did	   employ	   more	   sophisticated	   philosophical	  concepts	   in	   the	   defence	   of	   these	   doctrines.	   Sabzawārī	   describes	   moral	  propositions	  as	  factual	  (min	  umur	  al-­‐nafisiyya),	  where	  the	  realm	  of	  fact	  is	  larger	  than	   the	   realm	  of	   existence.	   If	  moral	   propositions	   are	   factual	   in	   this	   sense	   and	  one	  comes	  to	  know,	  by	  way	  of	  pure	  or	  deductive	  reasoning,	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  an	  act,	  this	  knowledge	  is	  deemed	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgement	  of	  God.	  For	  an	  all-­‐knowing	  God	  is	  also	  aware	  of	  that	  which	  is	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  in	  the	  realm	   of	   fact.	   Since	   God’s	   judgement	   of	   praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy	   relate	  directly	   to	   that	  which	   is	   deemed	  worthy	   of	   reward	   and	   punishment,	   it	   in	   turn	  becomes	  possible	   to	  have	  knowledge	  of	   that	  which	   is	  deemed	  by	  God	  to	  be	   the	  subject	   of	   Divine	   praise	   and	   reward	   or	   Divine	   blame	   and	   retribution,	  independent	  of	  revelation-­‐	   if	  our	  judgements	  of	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  are	  the	  result	  of	  pure	  rationality.	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Sabzawārī	   also	   distances	   himself	   from	   Ibn	   Sīnā’s	   description	   of	   moral	  propositions	   as	   having	   no	   purely	   rational	   basis	   beyond	   the	   social	   consensus	  which	   gives	   rise	   to	   them,	   a	   position	   highlighted	   by	   Ash	  ͑arī	   scholars	   as	  undermining	   the	   possibility	   of	   moral	   propositions	   being	   self-­‐evident.	   For	  Sabzawārī	  the	  truth	  of	  moral	  propositions	  can	  be	  known	  axiomatically	  and	  only	  require	   a	   social	   consensus	   for	   determining	   the	   broader	   social	   utility	   or	   social	  detriment	   of	   a	   particular	   voluntary	   action.	   Thus	   justice	   can	   be	   known	   to	   be	  praiseworthy	   axiomatically	   in	   itself,	  with	   only	   the	   recognition	   that	   justice	   is	   of	  social	  utility	  requiring	  a	  social	  context.	  	  	  Such	  conceptual	  developments	  and	   the	  objections	   from	  which	   they	  have	  arisen	  have	  gone	  a	  long	  a	  way	  in	  shaping	  the	  debates	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  morality,	  rationality	  and	  the	  role	  of	  independent	  moral	  judgements	  in	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  All	  of	  which	  bear	  directly	  upon	  the	  impact	  of	  reason	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   Despite	   the	   fundamental	   position	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  has	  come	  to	  hold	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  thought,	  the	  concomitant	  notion	  of	  reason	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   has	   little	   or	   no	   impact	   in	   the	   actual	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  fiqh.	  After	  having	  outlined	   the	  conception	  of	   the	  principle	  of	   the	   intelligibility	  of	   the	  praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought	   the	   subsequent	  chapters	  can	  now	  directly	  engage	  in	  how	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  has	  received,	  and	  developed,	  this	  heritage.	  This	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  ask	  why	  this	  notion	  has	  led	  to	  the	  acceptance	  of	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐	   ͑aqliyya	   (reason	  as	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts),	  the	  major	  jurisprudential	  implication	  of	  the	  principle,	  only	  as	  a	  theoretical	  source	  having	  little	  actual	  or	  practical	  influence	  upon	  the	  inference	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  fiqh.	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4.	  The	  nature	  of	  morality,	  rationality	  and	  independent	  
judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  in	  modern	  Shīʿī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	  
	  
4.1	  Introduction	  We	  have	  seen	   in	  chapter	   two	   that	  Shīʿa	   scholars	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	   the	  role	   for	   reason	   in	   their	   method	   of	   interpretation	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   ever	   since	   the	  systematization	   of	   their	   thoughts	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   first	   began.	   The	   increasing	  sophistication	  with	  which	   this	   concern	  developed	   led	   to	   the	  drawing	  of	   a	   clear	  distinction	  between	  two	  categories	  of	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept;	  non-­‐independent	   rationality	   (gayr	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	   and	   independent	  rationality	   (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya).	  The	   inclusion	  of	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  as	   a	   valid	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	   a	   direct	   implication	   of	   the	   Shī	  ͑ī	   meta-­‐ethical	  rationalism	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  theological	  principle	  referred	  to	  as	  qāʾidat	  
al-­‐taḥsīn	   wa	   al-­‐taqbiḥ	   al-­‐ʿaqliyain,	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy.	   This	   principle	   is	   foundational	   to	   the	  theological	   conception	   of	   God	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   by	   which	   the	   Shī	  ͑a	   describe	  themselves	   as	   ʿAdliyya	   and	   through	  which	   they	   ascribe	   a	   rationally	   intelligible	  conception	  of	  justice	  to	  God,	  in	  terms	  of	  His	  essence,	  His	  actions	  and	  His	  laws.	  The	  centrality	  of	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	  principle	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  ʿAdliyya	  doctrine	  led	  to	  its	   progressively	   sophisticated	   and	   philosophically	   nuanced	   defense	   and	  conception.	  As	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  this	  conception	  was	  shaped	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  the	  polemical	  nature	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	   ʿilm	  al-­‐kalām	   in	  which	  it	  was	  formulated	   and	   by	   the	   debates	   that	   ensued	   therein.	   These	   theological	   debates	  have	   left	   a	   great	   mark	   on	   how	   modern	   Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   have	  conceptualized	   the	  nature	   of	  moral	   values	   and	   rationality,	   in	   turn	   affecting	   the	  impact	  of	  how	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  may	  actually	  come	  to	  play	  a	  role	   in	   the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  fiqh.	  In	  fact	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  within	  their	  works	  of	  uṣūl	  rather	  than	  kalām,	  seem	  to	  have	  significantly	  advanced	  the	   debates	   around	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   theological	   principle	   of	   the	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intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  theorisation	  of	  their	  jurisprudential	  concern	  for	  the	  role	  of	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   These	   debates	   have	   shown	   the	   emergence	   of	   two	   sharply	  different	   views	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	  morality	   and	   rationality	   amongst	   Shī	  ͑a	  
Uṣūliyūn	   themselves-­‐	   all	   of	   whom	   still	   affirm	   the	   rational	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   but	   who	   seem	   to	   hold	   radically	   different	  conceptions	   of	   how	   and	   when	   this	   is	   the	   case-­‐	   directly	   impacting	   their	   ideas	  about	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   and	   the	   claimed	   correspondence	   (mulāzama)	  between	  judgments	  of	  human	  reason	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator.	  The	   following	   chapter	   will	   outline	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   morality,	  rationality	   and	   independent	   rationality	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   (al-­‐
mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	   in	   the	   thought	   of	   Muḥammad	   Riḍā	   al-­‐Muẓaffar.	   This	  treatment	   shall	   be	   followed	   by	   what	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   direct	   criticism	   of	  Muẓaffar’s	   conception	   in	   the	   ideas	   of	   Muḥammad	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr,	   who	   on	   this	  particular	   issue	   represents	   the	   culmination	   of	   a	   markedly	   different	   strand	   of	  thinking	   to	   Muẓaffar.	   Explaining	   why	   the	   theological	   resources	   in	   the	   ʿAdliyya	  tradition	   have	   not	   allowed	   the	   notion	   of	   reason	   as	   an	   independent	   source	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   to	   significantly	   impact	   the	   reading	  of	   fiqh	   in	  Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   is	  of	  course	   the	   driving	   question	   to	   this	   research,	   and	   thus	   references	   to	   these	  obstacles	   will	   be	   made	   throughout	   the	   forthcoming	   discussions.	   However,	  despite	   the	   radically	   different	   conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   morality	   and	  rationality	  amongst	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Uṣūliyūn,	  the	  fundamental	  obstacle	  to	  either	  conception	  playing	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   fiqh	   is	   a	   common	   epistemological	   criterion	   which	  demands	  qaṭʿ	   (certainty)	   as	   the	  ultimate	  basis	   for	   the	   validity	   (ḥujjiyya)	   of	   any	  source	   of	   Sharīʿa	   knowledge.	   The	   concept	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   generally	   and	   more	  specifically	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  judgments	  of	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  thus	  demand	  a	  dedicated	  treatment.	  	  Prior	  to	  dealing	  with	  this	  pivotal	  question	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  the	   judgments	  of	   independent	   rationality	  we	   first	  need	  a	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  and	  principally	  Muẓaffar,	  described	  the	  nature	  of	  exactly	  what	  these	  judgments	  are,	  and	  how	  and	  when	  they	  are	  believed	  to	  arise.	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4.2.	  Four	  levels	  of	  discussion	  As	   stated	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   sources	   relied	   upon	   for	   this	   study,	   Muẓaffar’s	  treatment	  of	  independent	  rationality	  stands	  out	  amongst	  others,	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  continued	  importance	  of	  his	  text	  in	  training	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  scholars,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  the	  depth	  and	  breadth	  of	  approach	  he	  brings	  to	  the	  question.	  Prior	  to	  commencing	  his	  detailed	  exposition	  Muẓaffar	  first	  outlines	  the	  earlier	  mentioned	  four	  questions	  or	  points	  of	  debate	  that	  pertain	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  As	  we	  return	  to	  a	  close	  examination	  of	  the	   question	   of	   independent	   rationality	   in	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   it	   is	   of	   value	   to	  examine	  this	  schematic	  of	  the	  four	  questions	  more	  closely.	  The	  question	  posed	  in	  the	  first	  debate,	  which	  may	  be	  described	  as	  an	  ontological	  question,	  asks	  whether	  actions	   have	   a	   rational	   status	   in	   terms	   of	   being	   praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy	  irrespective	   of	   any	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	   Legislator.	   Rephrased	   the	   question	  asks;	   Are	   actions	   praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy	   due	   to	   their	   own	   essence	  having	  an	  intrinsic	  value	  in	  the	  view	  of	  rationality	  (fi	  naẓr	  al-­‐ʿaql)	  prior	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  any	  judgment	  of	  The	  Divine	  Legislator	  upon	  them,	  or	  is	  this	   not	   the	   case	   and	   instead	   the	   praiseworthy	   is	   only	   that	   which	   The	  Divine	   Legislator	   has	   made	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   is	   only	  that	  which	  He	  has	  made	  blameworthy?293	  .	  This	   of	   course	   refers	   to	   the	   classical	   meta-­‐ethical	   debate	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  morality	  and	  Gods	  justice	  examined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  a	  survey	   of	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   in	   Imāmī	   theological	   thought.	   Although	  Muẓaffar	   recognises	   that	   this	   is	   a	   question	  of	   ʿilm	  al-­‐kalām	   he	   still	   proposes	   to	  tackle	  it	  within	  his	  work	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  due	  to	  it	  being	  from	  amongst	  the	  grounds	  or	  presuppositions	  (min	  al-­‐mabādi)	  of	  the	  Uṣūlī	  questions,	  the	  proper	  resolution	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of	  which	  requires	  a	  proper	  conceptualisation	  of	  its	  theological	  premises294,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  analysis	  which	  will	  occupy	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  forthcoming	  chapter.	  After	  having	  assumed	  or	  accepted	  that	  actions	  are	   indeed,	  with	  respect	   to	  their	  own	   selves,	   either	   praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy	   the	   second	   question	   may	   be	  asked	  as	  to;	  	  [W]hether	  it	  is	  actually	  possible	  for	  rationality	  to	  perceive	  the	  aspects	  of	  praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   independently	   of	   the	   Divine	  Legislators	   instruction	  and	  explanation	  or	  not?	  And	   if	   it	   is	  possible,	   is	   it	  appropriate	  for	  the	  one	  vested	  with	  responsibility	  (mukallaf)	  to	  refer	  to	  it	  without	   The	   Divine	   Legislators	   clarification	   or	   instruction,	   or	   is	   it	   not	  appropriate	  for	  him	  to	  do	  so	  either	  absolutely	  or	  in	  some	  situations’295.	  This	   epistemological	   question	   is	   cited	   by	   Muẓaffar	   as	   marking	   a	   major	   and	  famous	   point	   of	   departure	   between	   the	   Uṣūlī	   and	   Akhbārī	   schools	   of	   thought,	  with	  the	  latter	  denying	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  has	  the	  actual	  capability	  of	  understanding	  the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy,	   or	   that	   even	   if	   it	   could	   make	   such	   a	  judgment,	  one	  cannot	  rely	  on	  knowledge	  accessed	   in	   this	  way	  either	  absolutely	  or	  in	  certain	  situations.	  Again	  Muẓaffar	  sees	  this	  as	  a	  question	  for	   ʿilm	  al-­‐kalām,	  however	   it’s	   treatment	   here	   is	   necessary-­‐	   for	   if	   rationality	   is	   incapable	   of	  perceiving	  the	  aspects	  of	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  instances	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya,	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   which	   is	   the	   primary	  concern	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   the	   origin	   of	   this	   second	   debate	   is	   the	   occurrence	   of	   a	  fallacy	   in	   the	   minds	   of	   some	   scholars	   regarding	   the	   proper	   conception	   of	   the	  intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   established	   in	   the	  aforementioned	   ontological	   question296.	   As	   shall	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   subsequent	  analysis,	  Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  of	   the	   intelligibility	  of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	   reduces	   the	   ontology	   of	   moral	   values	   to	   their	   epistemology,	  claiming	   that	   there	   is	  no	   reality	   to	   judgments	  of	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy	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beyond	   the	   concurrence	   of	   the	   rational	   community	   -­‐	   the	   affirmation	   of	   which	  leaves	  no	  scope	  for	  the	  second	  epistemological	  question.	  Thirdly,	   after	   having	   affirmed	   that	   actions	   may	   be	   either	   praiseworthy	   or	  blameworthy	   and	   that	   rationality	   can	   perceive	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  ask	  the	  jurisprudential	  or	  Uṣūlī	  question	  pertaining	  to	   the	   correspondence	   (al-­‐mulāzama)	   between	   judgments	   of	   reason	   and	  judgments	  of	  The	  Divine	  Legislator.	  In	  Muẓaffar’s	  words	  the	  question	  is;	  ‘when	  al-­‐
ʿaql	   judges	   the	   praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness	   of	   a	   thing	   is	   it	   also	  necessary	   in	   its	   view,	   rationally	   (ʿaqlan),	   that	   The	   Divine	   Legislator	   has	   a	  judgment	  in	  accordance	  with	  it?’297.	  The	  question	  of	  the	  mulāzama	  is	  the	  central	  question	  pertaining	  to	  independent	  rationality	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  again	  marks	  an	  apparent	  dividing	   line	  between	   the	  Uṣūlī	  and	  Akhbārī	   schools,	  with	  only	  a	   rare	  exception	   from	   the	   former	   not	   affirming	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   correspondence	  between	  the	  judgments	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator298.	  	  	  	  The	   fourth	  question	  deals	  with	   the	   religious	  validity	   (ḥujjiyya)	  of	   this	  means	  of	  knowledge;	  	  After	  having	  established	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  correlation	  (mulāzama)	  and	  acquiring	  certainty	  (qaṭʿ)	  that	  The	  Divine	  Legislator	  necessarily	  judges	  in	  accordance	  with	  that	  which	  is	   judged	  by	  al-­‐ʿaql,	   [one	  can	  still	  ask]	  is	  this	  certainty	  religiously	  valid	  (ḥujjatan	  sharʿan)?299.	  	  In	   other	   words,	   can	   one	   rely	   upon	   this	   certainty	   in	   the	   court	   of	   God	  where	   it	  would	   confer	   accountability	   (munajjazīyya)	   and/or	   excusabillity	  (muʿadhdharīyya)	   upon	   the	   one	   vested	   with	   responsibility	   (mukallaf)?300	  This	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  In	  an	  otherwise	  incisive	  analysis,	  Rob	  Gleave	  seems	  to	  misinterpret	  this	  fourth	  question	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  Muẓaffar’s	  schematic	  of	  the	  issue	  to	  frame	  his	  comparative	  study	  of	  ‘rationalist	  morality’	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  two	  eighteenth	  century	  scholars,	  Yūsuf	  al-­‐Baḥrānī	  and	  Waḥīd	  al-­‐Biḥbahānī.	  Gleave	  interprets	  the	  question	  as	  relating	  to	  whether	  ‘the	  findings	  of	  ʿaql	  are	  logically	  related	  to	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  acts	  in	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a…	  Does	  the	  fact	  that	  ʿaql	  finds	  that	  lying	  is	  evil	  mean	  that	  lying	  is	  haram	  (forbidden)?	  This,	  I	  presume,	  is	  what	  Riḍā	  means	  when	  he	  asks	  if	  the	  moral	  classification	  of	  the	  ʿaql	  is	  shar’i	  in	  nature’.	  	  Inevitable	  doubt,	  p.	  187.	  Although	  the	  interpretation	  may	  be	  only	  tentative	  (as	  seen	  in	  usage	  of	  such	  language	  as	  ‘presume’),	  Gleave	  falls	  short	  in	  recognising	  that	  the	  fourth	  question	  is	  not	  about	  whether	  ʿaql	  reveals	  knowledge	  which	  is	  shar	  ͑ī	  (an	  issue	  rightly	  falling	  under	  question	  three,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  mulāzama),	  but	  rather	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question	  arises	  due	   to	  various	  opinions	  attributed	   to	  a	  group	   from	  the	  Akhbārī	  School,	  who	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  seem	  to	  have	  denied	  the	  validity	  of	  relying	  on	   the	   judgments	   of	   reason	   despite	   their	   theoretical	   correspondence	   with	   the	  judgment	  of	  God301.	  The	  debates	  here	  hinge	  on	  the	  theory	  of	   the	  nature	  of,	  and	  the	   criteria	   for,	   the	   validity	   or	   authoritativeness	   of	   religious	   sources.	   For	   the	  scholars	   of	   the	   Uṣūlī	   school	   qaṭʿ	   (certainty),	   viewed	   as	   the	   ultimate	   basis	   for	  validity,	  is	  deemed	  authoritative	  by	  its	  very	  essence	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  nonsensical	  to	  ask	   whether	   the	   certainty	   acquired	   regarding	   a	   correspondence	   between	   a	  judgment	  of	  reason	  and	  a	  judgment	  of	  The	  Divine	  Legislator	  is	  valid	  or	  not.	  	  Muẓaffar	   treats	   this	   fourth	   issue,	   which	   deals	   with	   the	   authoritativeness	   or	  
ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql,	   independently	  from	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  morality,	  rationality	   and	   how	   and	   when	   independent	   rationality	   corresponds	   to	   the	  judgment	   of	   the	   Legislator.	   Our	   analysis	   here	  will	   follow	   this	   pattern,	   not	   only	  because	   it	   is	   the	   choice	   of	   presentation	   adopted	   by	  Muẓaffar,	   but	   because	   the	  epistemological	   criteria	   for	   authority	   adopted	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   are	  pivotal	   to	   explaining	   the	   redundancy	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   in	   both	  competing	   conceptions	  of	   the	   source	  amongst	  Uṣūliyūn	   and	   thus	   it	  deserves	  an	  independent	   treatment.	   The	   immediate	   concern	   here	   is	   to	   elucidate	  Muẓaffar’s	  detailed	   response	   to	   the	   first	   three	   questions,	   revealing	   his	   conception	   of	   the	  nature	   of	   morality,	   rationality	   and	   how	   independent	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	  actually	  arise.	  	  	  
4.3.	  Muẓaffar	  on	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  In	  his	  response	  to	  the	  first	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  discussions	  Muẓaffar	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  theological	  question	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  values	  dealt	  with	  in	  mas’ala	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbiḥ.	  He	  commences	  by	  settings	  out	  the	   two	   main	   positions	   taken	   on	   the	   issue.	   Initially	   he	   describes	   the	   claim	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  that	  the	  question	  is	  actually	  asking	  whether	  or	  not	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  accessed	  in	  this	  way	  can	  be	  relied	  upon,	  and	  hence	  whether	  it	  is	  deemed	  religiously	  valid	  or	  not,	  i.e.	  is	  it	  ḥujja?	  The	  question	  of	  the	  validity	  or	  authoritativeness	  of	  relying	  upon	  potential	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  is	  the	  question	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  question	  of	  ḥujjiyya.	  	  301	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  186.	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Ash	  ͑arī	   theologians	   who	   hold	   that	   moral	   value	   follows	   the	   command	   of	   God.	  Accordingly	  they	  hold	  that	  the	  praiseworthy	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  that	  which	  He	  makes	   praiseworthy,	   the	   blameworthy	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	   that	   which	   He	  makes	   blameworthy	   and	   that	   should	   He	   decide	   to	   make	   that	   which	   is	  blameworthy	  praiseworthy,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case302.	  	  This	   is	   contrasted	  with	   the	  position	   adopted	  by	   the	   ʿAdliyya,	  whose	  doctrine	   is	  formulated	  by	  Muẓaffar	  as	  follows;	  Actions	   have	   an	   intrinsic	   value	   in	   the	   sight	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   regardless	   of	   any	  judgment	  from	  the	  Divine	  Legislator,	   thus	  amongst	  them	  is	  that	  which	  is	  praiseworthy	  in	  itself	  and	  amongst	  them	  is	  that	  which	  is	  blameworthy	  in	  itself,	  and	  amongst	  them	  is	  that	  which	  has	  neither	  of	  these	  two	  attributes.	  And	   The	   Divine	   Legislator	   does	   not	   command	   except	   to	   that	   which	   is	  praiseworthy	   and	   does	   not	   prohibit	   except	   from	   that	   which	   is	  blameworthy.	  Thus	  telling	  the	  truth	  is,	  in	  itself,	  praiseworthy	  and	  due	  its	  praiseworthiness	  Allah,	  exalted,	  has	  commanded	  it.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Allah,	   exalted,	   has	   commanded	   it	   and	   then	   it	   became	  praiseworthy.	  And	  lying,	  in	  itself,	  is	  blameworthy	  and	  it	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Allah,	  exalted,	  has	  prohibited	  it,	  not	  that	  Allah,	  exalted,	  prohibited	  it	  and	  then	  it	  became	  blameworthy303.	  	  	  	  	  Muẓaffar	  recognizes	  that	  this	  brief	  outline	  is	  of	  course	  insufficient	  to	  allow	  one	  to	  judge	  in	  accordance	  with	  either	  camp,	  and	  thus	  sets	  out	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  morality	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  reason	  can	  come	  to	  understand	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  stance.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  ‘a	  necessary	  preliminary’	   to	   the	   jurisprudential	   questions	   pertaining	   to	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐
ʿaqliyya,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  debate	  which	  he	  feels	  has	  not	  been	  given	  its	  proper	  due	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  texts	  written	  in	  either	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  or	  ʿilm	  al-­‐kalām304.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  302	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  188-­‐189.	  303	  Ibid	  p.	  188.	  304	  Ibid.	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  4.3.1	  The	  three	  meanings	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  Muẓaffar	   commences	   his	   analysis	   with	   a	   discussion	   which	   we	   encountered	  briefly	  in	  Sabzawārī’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  mas’alat	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbiḥ	  and	  which	  distinguishes	   between	   different	   meanings	   of	   the	   key	   terms	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐
qubḥ.	   This	   preliminary	   conceptual	   analysis,	   which	   originated	   in	   response	   to	  Ash	  ͑arī	  criticism305,	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  what	  type	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  is	  being	  referred	   to	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   current	   debate	   and	   seeks	   to	   identify	   exactly	  which	  of	  the	  meanings	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  dispute	  between	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  and	  Ash	  ͑arī	  camps.	  Muẓaffar’s	   analysis	   differs	   from	   the	   one	   seen	   in	   Sabzawārī's	   treatment.	  Not	  only	  does	  he	  by	  provide	  a	  more	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  different	  meanings	  but	   he	   also	   offers	   a	   distinct	   and	   somewhat	   unique	   conception	   of	   the	   third	   and	  most	   relevant	   usage	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ.	   This	   stems	   from	   his	   particular	  understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   moral	   propositions	   which,	   unlike	   Sabzawārī,	  closely	   follows	   the	   ideas	  of	   Ibn	  Sīnā.	   It	   is	  an	  analysis	   that	   is	  crucial	   in	  outlining	  the	  basis	  for	  Muẓaffar’s	  distinctive	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  morality	  and	  the	  resultant	  mechanics	   of	   exactly	   how	   he	   believes	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	  arise,	  and	  how	  they	  may	  correspond	  with	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  	  The	   first	   usage	   of	  al-­‐ḥusn	   and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   described	   by	  Muẓaffar	   is	  when	   they	   are	  employed	  to	  refer	  to	  perfection	  (kamāl)	  or	  imperfection	  (naqṣ).	  He	  notes	  that	  this	  usage	   occurs	   to	   describe	   attributes	   for	   voluntary	   actions,	   such	   as	   when	   it	   is	  stated	  that	  'learning	  is	  ḥasan'	  or	  'negligence	  of	  learning	  is	  qabīḥ',	  and	  to	  describe	  attributes	  for	  the	  objects	  of	  verbs	  (muta	͑  allaqāt	  al-­‐afʿāl),	  such	  as	  when	  it	   is	  said	  	  'knowledge	   is	   ḥasan'	   or	   'ignorance	   is	   qabīḥ'.	   Muẓaffar	   goes	   on	   to	   explain	   that	  many	  of	  the	  human	  moral	  dispositions	  (al-­‐akhlāq	  al-­‐insāniyya)	  are	  described	  as	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	  in	  this	  sense,	  for	  example;	  [B]ravery,	   nobility,	   wisdom,	   moderation,	   justice	   and	   their	   like	   are	  described	  as	  ḥasan	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  being	  perfections	  for	  the	  soul	  and	  the	   strength	  of	   its	   existence.	   Likewise	   their	  opposites	   are	   [described]	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  305	  For	  the	  distinctions	  drawn	  between	  different	  types	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  or	  ‘Voluntarist	  critique’	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  position	  see	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories,	  pp.	  101-­‐110.	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qabīḥ	  because	  they	  are	   imperfections	   in	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  soul	  and	   its	  strength.306	  	  Muẓaffar	  makes	  two	  important	  comments	  before	  moving	  to	  the	  second	  category	  of	  usage.	  Firstly,	  if	  something	  is	  described	  as	  being	  ḥasan	  in	  this	  sense	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  qabīḥ	   in	  one	  of	  the	  subsequent	  usages	  of	  the	  term.	  As	   shall	  be	   seen	   in	   the	  examples	   that	   follow,	   the	  different	  usages	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  Secondly,	  he	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  no	  apparent	  dispute	  with	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theologians	  regarding	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  this	   sense,	   and	   that	   in	   fact	   some	   ‘recognize	   that	   they	   are	   rationally	   intelligible	  
(ʿaqliyān),	  because	  they	  are	  from	  amongst	  the	  certain	  propositions	  (al-­‐qaḍāyā	  al-­‐
yaqiniyāt)	  behind	  which	  there	  is	  an	  external	  reality	  to	  which	  they	  correspond…’	  307.	  As	   seen	   in	   the	   treatment	  of	   the	   issue	  by	  Sabzawārī,	   and	  as	   shall	   be	   further	  demonstrated	  here,	   this	  statement	  reflects	   that	   the	  conception	  of	  how	  different	  judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  arise	  is	  intimately	  linked	  with	  the	  categorization	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  propositions	  determined	  in	  the	  traditional	  Muslim	  reading	  of	  Aristotelian	  logic	  found	  in	  ʿilm	  al-­‐manṭiq	  under	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  mabādi	  al-­‐
aqīsa	  (the	  preliminaries/components	  of	  the	  syllogisms)308.	  	  	  	  Moving	  to	  the	  second	  usage,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  two	  terms	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  may	  be	   employed	   with	   an	   intended	   meaning	   which	   refers	   to	   a	   compatibility	   or	  conduciveness	  to	  the	  soul	  (mulāimatan	  lil-­‐nafs)	  on	  one	  hand,	  or	  a	  repugnance	  to	  the	  soul	  (munāfiratan	  lahā)	  on	  the	  other.	   In	  this	  second	  usage	  they	  can	  again	  be	  applied	   to	   both	   voluntary	   actions	   themselves	   or	   to	   the	   object	   of	   verbs	  (mutaʿallaqāt	  al-­‐afʿāl).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter	  one	  may	  say	  that	  a	  beautiful	  view	  is	  ḥasan,	  or	  that	  a	  sweet	  taste	  is	  ḥasan.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  an	  action	  itself	  one	  may	  say	  that	   drinking	   after	   thirst	   is	   ḥasan,	   or	   eating	   when	   hungry	   is	   ḥasan.	   Muẓaffar	  outlines	  that	  the	  root	  of	  such	  judgments	  (aḥkām)	  is	  ‘that	  the	  soul	  is	  delighted	  by	  these	   things	   and	   enjoys	   their	   taste	   due	   to	   their	   conduciveness	   to	   it’309.	   The	  opposite	  of	  such	  examples,	  like	  when	  it	  is	  said	  that	  a	  view	  is	  qabīḥ,	  or	  eating	  on	  a	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  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  189.	  307	  Ibid.	  308	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  Muẓaffar’s	  categoristaion	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  propositions	  see	  his	  widely	  taught	  text,	  al-­‐Manṭiq	  pp.	  294-­‐321.	  	  	  309	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	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full	  stomach	  is	  qabīḥ	  arise	  ‘because	  the	  soul	  is	  irritated	  and	  disgusted	  by	  them’310.	  Accordingly	  Muẓaffar	   explains	   that	   this	   second	   usage	   of	   ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  conduciveness	  or	  non-­‐conduciveness	   to	   the	  soul	   (mulāʾimat	  al-­‐nafs	  wa	  
ʿadamihā),	  ultimately	  refers	  to	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  (al-­‐lidha	  wa	  al-­‐	   ͑alam)311.	  In	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	   three	  meanings	  of	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   offered	  by	  Sabzawārī,	  we	  saw	  that	  the	  second	  usage	  was	  not	  portrayed	  in	  this	  manner;	  rather	  it	  was	  described	  as	  being	  used	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  utility	   (maṣlaḥa)	  or	  detriment	   (mafṣada)	  of	   a	  thing312.	  Despite	  Muẓaffar	  describing	  the	  second	  usage	  as	  ultimately	  referring	  to	  pleasure	  and	  pain,	  through	  a	  conduciveness	  or	  non	  conduciveness	  to	  the	  soul,	  he	  too	  goes	  on	  to	  identify	  this	  usage	  with	  a	  notion	  of	  utility	  and	  detriment.	  	  For	  Muẓaffar	   judgments	  of	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ,	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  pleasure	  or	  pain,	  are	  extended	   to	   also	   include	   those	   things	   whose	   indirect	   effects	   or	   subsequent	  implications	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  pleasure	  or	  pain.	  In	  fact	  sometimes	  there	  are	  things	  that	   in	   themselves	   are	   repugnant	   to	   the	   soul	   but	   whose	   pleasurable	  consequences	   and	   ultimate	   conduciveness	   to	   the	   soul	   is	   deemed	   of	   more	  significance	   than	   the	   initial	   displeasure-­‐	   and	   hence	   they	   are	   considered	  ḥasan.	  Muẓaffar	  here	  cites	  the	  example	  of	  a	  bitter	  medicine;	  its	  consequences	  of	  leading	  to	  the	  pleasurable	  states	  of	  well	  being	  and	  restfulness	  are	  seen	  as	  rationally	  more	  important	   than	   the	   immediate	   discomfort	   caused	   by	   the	   bitterness	   of	   the	  medicine-­‐	  and	  hence	  a	  bitter	  medicine	  is	  included	  in	  that	  which	  is	  deemed	  ḥasan.	  Or	   in	   the	   opposite	   case,	   a	   delicious	   morsel	   that	   is	   known	   to	   be	   of	   serious	  detriment	   to	  one’s	  health	   is	   considered	  qabīḥ	  due	   to	   the	  greater	  significance	  of	  the	   ill	  health	  than	  the	   immediate	  pleasure	  of	   its	   taste.	  From	  this	  basis	  Muẓaffar	  moves	  to	  make	  the	  link	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  to	  its	  usage	  in	  reference	  to	  utility	  and	  detriment,	  for;	  Man,	   through	   his	   extensive	   experience	   and	   discriminatory	   rational	  faculties	   is	   capable	   of	   categorizing	   things	   and	   actions	   into	   three	  categories;	  that	  which	  is	  deemed	  ḥasan,	  that	  which	  is	  deemed	  qabīḥ,	  and	  that	   which	   has	   neither	   of	   these	   two	   distinctions.	   And	   he	   makes	   this	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division	  in	  accordance	  with	  that	  which	  is	  conducive	  to	  him	  or	  repugnant	  to	   him,	   whether	   this	   be	   by	   considering	   the	   immediate	   results	   or	   the	  distant	  [results]313	  	  	  	  Thus	  using	   the	   terms	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   to	  describe	  actions	  or	   things	  based	  on	   the	  accruement	   of	   pleasure	   and	   pain,	   immediate	   or	   otherwise,	   is	   for	   Muẓaffar	  nothing	   other	   than	   their	   use	   for	   the	   description	   of	   utility	   and	   detriment,	   for	  ‘deeming	  utility	  (maṣlaḥa)	  as	  ḥasan	  is	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  its	  conduciveness	  to	  the	  soul	  and	  deeming	  detriment	  (mafṣada)	  as	  qabīḥ	  is	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  than	  its	  repugnance	  from	  the	  soul’314.	  Like	  Sabzawārī315,	  Muẓaffar	  notes	  that	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  have	  no	  dispute	  with	  regards	  this	   second	   usage	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   (conceived	   of	   in	   terms	   of	   pleasure/pain,	  conduciveness/non-­‐conduciveness	  or	  utility/detriment),	  rather	  they	  too	  believe	  that	  in	  ‘in	  this	  meaning’	  they	  are	  ‘rationally	  intelligible’,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  ‘they	  are	  among	  those	  things	  which	  can	  be	  perceived	  by	  rationality	  without	  relying	  upon	  a	  religious	  precept’316.	  The	  Ash	  ͑arī	  concern	   is	  explicitly	  pertaining	  to	  the	  usage	  of	  
ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  with	  regards	  the	  desert	  of	  Divine	  reward	  and	  punishment,	  and	  not	  with	   reference	   to	  a	   thing	  being	  deemed	  pleasurable	  or	  non-­‐pleasurable	  or	  of	   it	  being	   of	   utility	   or	   detriment.	   Accordingly	   we	   find	   that	   Bāqillānī,	   Juwaynī	   and	  Ghazzālī,	   although	   in	   slightly	   different	   ways,	   all	   affirmed	   the	   independent	  intelligibility	  of	  this	  type	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ317.	  The	   third	   and	  most	   relevant	  usage	  of	   the	   terms	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   is	   described	  by	  Muẓaffar	  as	  being	  that	  which	  is	  employed	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  praise	  (al-­‐madḥ)	  and	  blame	  (al-­‐dhamm).	  For	  Muẓaffar	  it	  is	  only	  this	  type	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  moral	  value	  of	  acts	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  deserts,	  for	  it	  is	  this	  type	  of	  ḥusn	  and	   qubḥ	   which	   is	   connected	   with	   reward	   and	   punishment	   and	   hence	  eschatological	   moral	   goodness	   and	   badness,	   accordingly	   it	   is	   only	   the	  intelligibility	  of	  this	  type	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  which	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  Ash	  ͑arī	  and	  ʿAdliyya	  meta-­‐ethics.	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Unlike	   the	   first	   two	  meanings,	   this	   third	  meaning	   of	  ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   cannot	   be	  applied	   to	   the	   objects	   of	   a	   verb,	   and	   is	   only	   applicable	   to	   voluntary	   actions	  themselves.	  Muẓaffar	  defines	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  this	  sense	  as	  follows;	  The	  ḥasan	   is	  that	  through	  which	  the	  performer	  of	  an	  act	  deserves	  praise	  and	  reward	  in	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  collective	  of	  rational	  beings	  (	  i͑nda	  al-­‐ʿuqalāʾ	  
kāfatan),	  and	  the	  qabīḥ	  is	  that	  which	  is	  deserving	  of	  blame	  and	  punishment	  according	  to	  them	  [the	  rational	  beings]	  all	  together	  (kāfatan).	  In	   an	   alternative	   formulation,	   al-­‐ḥasan	   is	   that	   whose	   performance	   is	  considered	  befitting	  by	   the	  rational	  beings,	   i.e.	   rationality,	   in	  accordance	  with	  everybody	  (ʿinda	  al-­‐kul),	  perceives	   that	   its	  performance	   is	  befitting.	  And	  al-­‐qabīḥ	   is	   that	  whose	  avoidance	   is	  befitting	  according	   to	   them	  [the	  
ʿuqalāʾ],	   i.e.	   rationality,	   in	   accordance	  with	   everybody,	   perceives	   that	   its	  performance	  is	  not	  befitting	  or	  that	  its	  avoidance	  is	  befitting318.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Sabzawārī,	  who	  was	  at	  pains	  to	  point	  out	  that	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  this	  third	   sense	   referred	   to	  a	   factual	  notion	  of	  praise	  and	  blame	   in	  nafs	  al-­‐amr	  (the	  realm	   of	   fact),	   in	  Muẓaffar’s	   definition	  we	   see	   that	   he	   reduces	   the	   ontology	   of	  such	  judgments	  to	  their	  epistemology.	  He	  describes	  them	  as	  being	  that	  which	  is	  seen	  as	  deserving	  of	  praise	  and	  blame,	  not	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  disclosure	  of	  that	  which	   is	   factual	  by	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  but	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	   judgment	  of	  rational	  beings	   (al-­‐ʿuqalā).	   This	   apparently	  minor	   and	   subtle	   difference	   in	   terminology	  reflects	  a	  huge	  distinction	   in	  Muẓaffar’s	   conception	  of	   the	  nature	  or	  grounds	  of	  moral	   judgments,	   a	   discussion	   directly	   addressed	   and	   elaborated	   upon	   below.	  However	  initially	  he	  wishes	  only	  to	  identify	  that	  it	   is	  this	  third	  meaning	  of	  ḥusn	  and	   qubḥ	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   praise	   and	   blame,	   that	   is	   the	   point	   of	   inter-­‐school	  controversy,	   reaffirming	   that	   it	   is	   only	   the	   praiseworthiness	   and	   the	  blameworthiness	   of	   voluntary	   actions	   that	   Ash	  ͑arī	   scholars	   claimed	   cannot	   be	  understood	  without	  recourse	  to	  Divine	  revelation319.	  	  Before	  moving	   to	  discuss	   the	  grounds	   for	  each	  of	   these	   three	  different	   types	  of	  judgments	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ,	   Muẓaffar	   highlights	   an	   important	   point	   that	   has	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already	   been	   alluded	   to	   above	   and	   which	   is	   instrumental	   in	   his	   conception	   of	  how	  reason	  comes	  to	  make	  the	  judgments	  of	  morality	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  relevant	  to	  
Sharī	  ͑a.	  A	  single	  act	  may	  be	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	  in	  all	  three	  of	  the	  above	  meanings.	  For	  example,	   learning	   and	  kindness	   can	  be	   termed	  ḥasan	   in	   all	   three	   senses	   of	   the	  word-­‐	   both	   may	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   perfection	   for	   the	   soul,	   both	   may	   be	  deemed	   pleasurable	   and	   conducive	   to	   the	   soul	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   benefit	   and	  utility	  which	  they	  bring	  about	  and	  they	  both	  may	  be	   judged	  by	  the	   ʿuqalā	   to	  be	  praiseworthy	  and	  befitting	  acts	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  human	  beings.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  something	  be	  ḥasan	  in	  one	  of	  the	  three	  meanings	  yet	  not	   be	   ḥasan,	   or	   even	   be	   deemed	   qabīḥ,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   others.	   For	  example	   smoking	   or	   the	   use	   of	   certain	   drugs	   may	   be	   considered	   ḥasan	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   second	   meaning-­‐	   a	   usage	   rooted	   in	   pleasure.	   Yet	   such	   acts	   are	  neither	  ḥasan	  with	  respect	  to	  bringing	  about	  a	  state	  of	  perfection	  or	  completion,	  nor	  are	  they	  ḥasan	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  all	  rational	  people	  would	  judge	  that	  they	  are	  befitting	  and	  praiseworthy	  acts	  to	  perform320.	  With	  this	  final	  comment	  regarding	  the	   three	  different	  meanings	  of	   the	   terms	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   and	  having	   identified	  that	  the	  point	  of	  controversy	  is	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  rational	  intelligibility	  of	  the	   third	  meaning,	   i.e.	   the	   praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   of	   voluntary	  actions,	  Muẓaffar	  moves	  on	   to	  elaborate	  upon	   the	  differing	  ontological	  basis	  or	  grounds	  for	  the	  respective	  judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  order	  to	  clarify	  further	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  moral	  judgments	  whose	  rational	  status	  is	  at	  dispute.	  	  	  	  	  4.3.2	  The	  ontology	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  in	  its	  different	  meanings	  Muẓaffar	  continues	  his	  clarification	  of	   the	  conception	  of	   the	  difference	  between	  the	   three	   above	   meanings	   of	   the	   terms	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   by	   discussing	   the	  ontological	  basis,	   referred	   to	  as	   the	  wāqʿiyya,	   of	  each	  of	   the	   respective	   types	  of	  judgments.	   Through	   this	   distinction	   he	   sets	   out	   his	   distinctive	   and	   disputed	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions.	  	  For	  Muẓaffar	  it	  is	  only	  the	  judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  first	  meaning,	  in	  the	  sense	   of	   perfection	   and	   imperfection,	   which	   are	   purely	   objective	   with	   a	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grounding	   firmly	   rooted	   in	   the	   external	  world.	   It	   is	   only	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   in	   this	  sense	  that	  refers	  to	  ‘a	  real	  existential	  property…	  not	  reliant	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  one	  who	  perceives	  it	  and	  intellects	   it’321.	  This	  denial	  of	  a	  pure	  objectivity	  of	  
ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  two	  other	  usages,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  the	  usage	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	   the	   sense	   of	   moral	   value	   and	   desert,	   seems	   initially	   at	   least	   to	   be	   in	   stark	  contrast	   to	   the	   general	   picture	   of	   ʿAdliyya	   meta	   ethics.	   An	   objective	   notion	   of	  morality	  is	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  popular	  portrayal	  of	  ʿAdliyya	  meta-­‐ethics	  as	  reflected	  in	   Hourani’s	   description	   of	   ʿAbd	   al-­‐Jabbār’s	   meta-­‐ethics	   as	   ‘a	   moral	  objectivism’322.	  Muẓaffar’s	  undermining	  of	  the	  objectivity	  of	  moral	  value	  is	  at	  the	  root	   of	   much	   of	   the	   criticism	   that	   he	   has	   received	   regarding	   his	   treatment	   of	  
mas’alat	   al-­‐taḥsīn	   wa	   al-­‐taqbiḥ	   and	   his	   conception	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  from	  within	   the	   circle	   of	  Shī	  ͑a	  Uṣūliyūn	   themselves-­‐	   a	   body	   of	   criticisms	  which	  will	   be	   referred	   to	   when	   examining	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   positions	   on	   the	   matter.	  However	   before	   moving	   to	   this	   critique,	   a	   fuller	   understanding	   of	   Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  of	  how	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   can	  be	  rationally	   intelligible	   (ʿaqliyān),	  yet	  at	  the	   same	   time	   not	   be	   purely	   objective,	   deserves	   a	   fuller	   explanation-­‐	   an	  explanation	  whose	   importance	  Muẓaffar	   himself	   is	   not	   unaware	   of.	   Thus	   after	  stating	   that	   only	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   in	   its	   first	  meaning	   refers	   to	   a	   ‘real	   existential	  property’,	  he	  moves	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  grounds	  for	  the	  other	  two	  types	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ.	  	  On	  consideration	  of	  the	  second	  type	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  when	  the	  terms	  are	  used	  to	  describe	  something	  which	  is	  conducive	  or	  non-­‐conducive	  to	  the	  soul,	  Muẓaffar	  explains	  that	  the	  use	  of	  such	  language	  ‘in	  itself	  has	  no	  correspondence	  in	  external	  reality	  to	  which	  it	  [directly]	  corresponds,	  which	  it	  reflects	  or	  parallels,	  although	  its	  origin	  is	  sometimes	  an	  external	  thing,	  such	  as	  [in	  our	  description	  of	  the	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  of]	  colour,	  smell	  and	  taste…’323.	  The	  appreciation	  of	  the	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  of	  any	  such	  thing	  depends	  upon	  either	  a	  common	  (ʿām)	  or	   individual	  (khāṣ)	  taste.	  The	  appreciation	  of	  a	  painting	  or	  a	  melody	  as	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	   is	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  individual	  perceiving	  them,	  should	  they	  be	  conducive	  to	  an	   individual’s	  specific	  taste	  (dhawq	  khāṣ)	  they	  would	  be	  ḥusn	  for	  him,	  whereas	  the	  very	  same	  painting	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or	  melody	  may	  be	  non-­‐conducive	  to	  the	  taste	  of	  another	  and	  hence	  qabīḥ	  to	  that	  individual.	   In	   this	   way,	   with	   variations	   in	   the	   specific	   taste	   of	   people,	   a	   single	  thing	  may	   be	  ḥasan	   for	   some	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  qabīḥ	   for	   others.	   However	  should	   a	   group	   concur	   in	   its	   opinion	   regarding	   a	   thing	   due	   to	   a	   common	   taste	  (dhawq	  ʿām)	  that	  thing	  will	  be	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ	  to	  all	  of	  them.	  	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   those	   things	   which	   give	   rise	   to	   such	   judgments	   (like	   a	  scenery	   being	   viewed	   or	   a	   melody	   being	   heard)	   may	   have	   an	   ontological	  existence	  in	  the	  objective,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  themselves	  they	  are	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  subject;	  
al-­‐ḥusn	   in	  the	  meaning	  of	  conduciveness	  (mulāʾima)	  is	  not	  an	  ontological	  attribute	   (ṣifat	  wāqʿiyya)	   for	   things	   like	   [when	   used	   in	   the	  meaning	   of]	  perfection	  (kamāl),	   the	  ontology	  of	  such	  attributes	   is	  nothing	  other	   than	  the	  perception	  of	  man	  and	  his	  taste,	   if	   there	  was	  no	  man	  to	  taste	  and	  no	  one	  similar	   to	  man	   in	  his	   taste,	   then	  things	  would	  not	  be,	   in	   themselves,	  
ḥasan	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  conduciveness324	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Muẓaffar	   also	   points	   out	   that	   pleasure	   and	   pain,	  which	   are	   also	   referred	   to	   by	  using	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   in	   its	  second	  meaning,	  may	  well	  be	  existentially	  occurring	  but	  they	  are	  not	  attributes	  of	  things	  in	  the	  external,	  rather	  they	  are	  ‘attributes	  of	  the	  perceptive	  soul’	  and	  thus	  again	   judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  of	   this	   type	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  any	  existential	  property	  in	  the	  objective325.	  	  As	  for	  al-­‐ḥusn	  in	  its	  third	  and	  most	  relevant	  sense,	  defined	  by	  Muẓaffar	  as	  being	  used	   in	   the	   meaning	   of	   ‘that	   which	   is	   befitting	   to	   be	   performed	   according	   to	  reason	  (al-­‐ʿaql)’326,	  it	  is	  also	  considered	  to	  have	  no	  objective	  ontological	  basis	  in	  external	   reality.	  Muẓaffar’s	   position	   here	   seems	   to	   fly	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   ‘moral	  objectivism’	   associated	   with	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   and	   warrants	   some	   explanation.	   For	  Muẓaffar	   the	   wāqʿiyya,	   or	   ontological	   grounds,	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   its	   third	  meaning	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	   the	   concurrence	   of	   the	   opinion	   of	   rational	  beings327-­‐	  thus	  its	  ontology	  is	  reduced	  to	  its	  epistemology.	  Following	  Ibn	  Sīnā328,	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and	   unlike	   Sabzawārī,	   he	   categorises	   moral	   propositions	   regarding	  praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   as	   being	   only	   from	   that	   category	   of	  propositions	  described	  as	  Mashūrāt	  al-­‐Ṣirfa,	  purely	  popular	  held	  views	  that	  have	  no	  correspondence	  in	  external	  reality329.	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  and	  Muẓaffar	  explicitly	  define	  such	  propositions,	  in	  their	  works	  of	  Logic,	  as	  having	  no	  ontological	  basis	  except	  the	  concurrence	  of	  the	  rational	  people	  itself.	  The	  validity	  of	  such	  propositions	  is	  judged	  not	  in	  reference	  to	  correspondence	  with	  an	  external	  or	  factual	  reality	  but	  is	   judged	   with	   reference	   to	   its	   correspondence	   with	   the	   consensus	   of	   opinion	  held	  by	  the	  ʿuqalā	  (rational	  beings).	  As	   seen	   in	   our	   analysis	   of	   Sabzawārī’s	   treatment,	   this	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	  affirmed	  by	  Muẓaffar	   and	  quoted	   almost	  word	   for	  word	   from	   Ibn	   Sīnā,	   that	   an	  isolated	   individual	   who	   had	   no	   exposure	   to	   society	   cannot-­‐	   through	   his	  rationality	   alone-­‐	   come	   to	   the	   judgment	   that	   society	   deems	   the	   performer	   of	  justice	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   performer	   of	   oppression	   as	   blameworthy330 .	  Historically	   the	   categorisation	   of	   such	   moral	   properties	   as	   mashūrāt	   by	  philosophers	   such	   as	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   has	   been	   picked	   up	   on	   by	   Voluntarist	   Ash	  ͑arī	  thinkers,	  such	  as	  al-­‐Ghazzālī,	  in	  their	  critique	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  position331.	  Indeed	  it	  was	  with	  reference	  to	  such	  criticism	  that	  Sabzawārī	  denied	  that	  the	  categories	  of	  
mashūrāt	   (popularly	   held)	   and	   yaqīnīyāt	   (certain	   with	   objective/factual	   basis)	  need	   be	   mutually	   exclusive.	   Sabzawārī	   argued	   that	   from	   one	   perspective	   a	  proposition	  may	  be	  considered	  amongst	   the	  yaīnīyāt,	  having	  a	   factual	  reality	   to	  which	   it	   corresponds,	   and	   from	   another	   perspective	   it	   may	   be	   amongst	   the	  
mashūrāt,	   the	   basis	   of	  which	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	   the	   concurrence	   of	   rational	  peoples332.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  328	  al-­‐Ishārāt	  wa	  al-­‐tanbihāt,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  351.	  329	  Al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  309-­‐310	  .	  330	  Although	  largely	  quoting	  directly	  form	  Ibn	  Sīnā,	  and	  that	  without	  acknowledgement,	  Muẓaffar	  does	  add	  a	  sentence	  which	  may	  reflect	  that	  his	  view	  is	  slightly	  more	  nuanced	  than	  has	  been	  otherwise	  interpreted	  and	  actually	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  Sabzawārī	  than	  it	  first	  appears.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  inability	  of	  an	  isolated	  man,	  behind	  the	  ‘veil	  of	  ignorance’	  to	  independently	  come	  to	  rational	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ḥusn	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  qubḥ	  of	  oppression-­‐	  ‘does	  not	  negate	  that	  he	  himself	  may	  deem	  the	  performer	  of	  justice	  as	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  performer	  of	  oppression	  as	  blameworthy,	  yet	  this	  judgment	  is	  different	  from	  his	  judgment	  of	  a	  concurrence	  of	  opinion	  upon	  this’,	  i.e.	  one	  may	  praise	  a	  just	  act	  independent	  of	  society	  but	  one	  cannot	  recognize	  that	  society	  deems	  justice	  praiseworthy	  in	  such	  circumstances.	  See	  Al-­‐Manṭiq,	  p.	  302	  	  	  
331	  al-­‐Ghazzālī,	  al-­‐Mustaṣfā,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  116	  and	  Emon,	  Islamic	  Natural	  Law	  Theories	  106-­‐109.	  	  332	  See	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Manzuma,	  pp.	  99-­‐100	  and	  Sharḥ	  al-­‐Asma,	  pp.	  322.	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Muẓaffar	  however	  maintains	  that	  both	  types	  of	  proposition,	  the	  mashūrāt	  al-­‐ṣirfā	  and	   the	   yaqīnīyāt,	   are	   mutually	   exclusive.	   His	   depiction	   of	   moral	   propositions	  regarding	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   as	   being	  mashūrāt	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   important	   in	   his	  conception	   of	   both	   the	   theological	   question	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  and	  the	  jurisprudential	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  judgment	  of	  God	  corresponds	  to	  the	  judgments	  of	  reason.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  by	   way	   of	   this	   description	   of	   moral	   propositions	   as	   not	   having	   an	   objective	  reference	  in	  the	  external	  that	  allows	  him	  to	  build	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	  rationalism	  where	   human	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   can	   correspond	   to	   Divine	  judgments	   of	   morality.	   As	   shall	   be	   further	   drawn	   out,	   Muẓaffar’s	  conceptualization	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  as	  being	  that	  which	  is	  deemed	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  by	  all	  rational	  beings,	  allows	  him	  to	  argue	  that	  God	   ‘the	  chief	  rational	  being’,	  must	  also	  have	  the	  same	  judgment-­‐	  for	  no	  consensus	  of	  rational	  beings	  is	  possible	  without	  His	  inclusion.	  	  	  	  	  Thus	   far	  we	  have	   see	   that	  Muẓaffar	   identifies	   the	  point	  of	  dispute	  between	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  and	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  theologians	  as	  being	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  of	  actions.	  For	  Muẓaffar	  it	  is	  this	  third	  meaning	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  moral	  value	  of	   acts.	   However,	   following	   Ibn	   Sīnā	   and	   his	   own	   most	   influential	   teacher	  Muḥammad	   Ḥusayn	   Isfahāni	   (d.1365/1945)333 ,	   he	   has	   a	   somewhat	   distinct	  notion	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   such	  moral	   propositions.	   These	  moral	   propositions	   are	  classified	  as	  being	   form	  amongst	   those	  propositions	   that	  have	  no	  existential	  or	  factual	   reality	   to	  which	   they	  correspond	  except	   the	  concurrence	  of	   the	   rational	  people.	   This	   distinct,	   and	   disputed,	   conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   moral	  propositions	   shapes	   his	   understanding	   of	   both	   theological	   and	   jurisprudential	  questions	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   determining	   how	   he	   portrays	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	  to	  have	  the	  independent	  ability	  to	  reveal	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  However	  for	  Muẓaffar	   some	   questions	   still	   remain	   to	   be	   resolved	   at	   the	   theological	   level	  before	  moving	   to	   the	   jurisprudential	   questions	  of	   the	   correspondence	  between	  the	   judgment	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	   God;	   what	   types	   of	   rational	  judgments	  are	   the	   judgments	  of	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   in	   its	   third	  meaning?	  And	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  333	  Nihāyat	  al-­‐Dirāya,	  Vol.	  3	  pp.	  29-­‐31.	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are	   the	  ḥusn	  making	   properties	   or	   causes	   (asbāb)	   that	   lead	   to	   an	   action	   being	  deemed	  as	  praiseworthy?	  	  	  	  4.3.3	  Practical	  and	  theoretical	  rationality-­‐	  the	  epistemology	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  Contrary	   to	   G.E.	   Von	   Grunebaum’s	   assertion	   that	   the	   Muslim	   adoption	   of	   the	  Aristotelian	   distinction	   between	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   rationality	   had	   little	  influence	   on	   the	   ethical	   thought	   of	   Muslims334,	   Muẓaffar’s	   treatment	   of	   the	  theological	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  demonstrate	  that	   it	   is	   a	   pre-­‐modern	   distinction	  which	   continues	   to	   be	   instrumental	   in	   how	  Shī	  ͑a	   scholars	   have	   conceptualised	   the	   epistemology	   of	   rational	   judgments	  pertaining	  to	  morality	  and	  how	  these	   judgments	  may	  potentially	  correspond	  to	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  For	  before	  Muẓaffar	  moves	  from	  discussing	  the	  ontology	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	   to	  outlining	  the	  asbāb	  or	  causes	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  such	  judgments	  he	  states	  that;	  ‘what	  is	  intended	  by	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  when	  it	  is	  said	  that	  al-­‐ʿaql	  judges	  the	  ḥusn	  or	   qubḥ	   of	   a	   thing	   in	   the	   third	   meaning	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ,	   is	   al-­‐ʿaql	   al-­‐ʿamali	  (practical	  rationality)	  as	  oppose	  to	  al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐naẓari	  (theoretical	  rationality)’335.	  	  The	   particular	   interpretation	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   practical	   and	  theoretical	   elements	   of	   rationality	   offered	   by	   Muẓaffar	   is,	   like	   much	   of	   his	  conceptual	   analysis	   thus	   far,	   important	   in	   the	   mechanics	   of	   exactly	   how	  judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   arise	   and	   how	   one	   may	   come	   to	   know	   of	   a	  correspondence	   between	   these	   judgments	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	   Divine	  legislator.	   Muẓaffar	   follows	   early	   Muslim	   philosophers,	   such	   as	   al-­‐Farābī	   (d.	  338/950) 336 ,	   in	   making	   this	   distinction	   between	   practical	   and	   theoretical	  rationality	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  object	  of	  perception	  (mudrakāt)	  rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  334	  The	  Concept	  and	  Function	  of	  Reason	  in	  Islamic	  Ethics,	  Oriens,	  Vol.	  15.	  (1962),	  p.	  4.	  335	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Muẓaffar,	  Vol.1	  p.193.	  336	  Considerable	  ambiguity	  and	  debate	  emerges	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  later	  Muslim	  philosophers	  over	  whether	  the	  distinction	  also	  pertains	  to	  different	  faculties	  or	  functions	  of	  reason,	  rather	  than	  simply	  being	  a	  distinction	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  object	  of	  reasons	  perception.	  Although	  Muẓaffar’s	  definition	  follows	  Farabi	  closely	  in	  explicitly	  limiting	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  distinction	  to	  the	  object	  of	  perception,	  his	  own	  writing	  is	  riddled	  with	  signs	  of	  this	  historic	  ambiguity	  and	  repeatedly	  fails	  to	  clarify	  between	  the	  faculties	  of	  judging	  and	  perceiving.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  his	  use	  of	  the	  terms	  idrāk	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  ḥukm	  al-­‐ʿaql	  as	  synonyms	  on	  numerous	  occasions.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  differing	  ways	  in	  which	  Muslim	  philosophers	  have	  drawn	  the	  distinction	  between	  
al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐ʿamali	  and	  al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐naẓari	  see	  Subhani,	  Risāla	  fi	  taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbiḥ,	  pp.	  33-­‐37.	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based	  on	   any	  difference	   in	   rational	   function.	  Where	   the	   object	   of	   perception	   is	  pertaining	   to	   action,	   or	   more	   precisely	   in	   Muẓaffar	   words,	   when	   it	   is	   ‘from	  amongst	   those	   things	   befitting	   to	   be	   performed	   or	   not	   performed,	   such	   as	   the	  
ḥusn	   of	   justice	   or	   the	   qubḥ	   of	   oppression,	   its	   perception	   is	   termed	   practical	  rationality’.337	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  when	  the	  object	  of	  perception	  is	  ‘from	  amongst	  those	   things	   befitting	   to	   be	   known,	   such	   as	   in	   their	   statement	   “The	   whole	   is	  greater	  than	  the	  part”	  which	  has	  no	  relationship	  with	  action,	  then	  its	  perception	  is	  termed	  theoretical	  rationality’338.	  Accordingly	   Muẓaffar	   explains	   that	   he	   has	   been	   using	   the	   terms	   ḥukm	   al-­‐ʿaql	  (judgment	   of	   reason)	   and	   aḥkām	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   (rational	   judgments)	   thus	   far	   as	  being	  specifically	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  practical	  rationality.	  The	  ḥukm	  al-­‐ʿaql	   that	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  third	  meaning	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ,	  is	  for	  Muẓaffar	  ‘nothing	  other	  than	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  thing	  be	  from	  amongst	  those	  things	  which	  are	  befitting	  to	  be	  performed	  or	  befitting	  to	  be	  avoided…	  And	  thus	  what	   is	  meant	   by	  aḥkām	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   (rational	   judgments)	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	  the	  objects	  of	  perception	  of	  practical	  rationality	  and	  its	  opinions’339.	  	  With	  this	  distinction	  and	  clarification	  in	  place	  Muẓaffar	  can	  now	  go	  on	  to	  further	  discuss	   the	   mechanics	   of	   each	   of	   the	   other	   meanings	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐ʿamali	  and	  al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐naẓari.	  The	   ʿaql	  that	  is	  considered	   to	   perceive	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   its	   first	   meaning	   is	   al-­‐ʿaql	   al-­‐naẓari,	  ‘because	   perfection	   and	   imperfection	   are	   amongst	   those	   things	   befitting	   to	   be	  known	  and	  not	  from	  those	  things	  befitting	  to	  be	  performed’340.	  Of	  course	  if	  al-­‐ʿaql	  perceives	  the	  perfection	  or	  imperfection	  of	  a	  thing	  it	  may	  also	  perceive	  that	  this	  thing	   is	   worthy	   of	   being	   performed	   or	   avoided,	   in	   which	   case	   ‘practical	  rationality	   is	   aided	   by	   theoretical	   rationality,	   or	   it	   may	   be	   said	   that	   the	  acquisition	   of	   practical	   rationality	   has	   come	   about	   actually	   (fiʿlan)	   after	   the	  acquisition	  of	   theoretical	   rationality’341.	  The	  rationality	   that	  perceives	  ḥusn	   and	  
qubḥ	   in	   its	  second	  meaning	  is	  also	  theoretical	  rationality.	  The	  conduciveness	  or	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  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  193.	  338	  Ibid,	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  Ibid.	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non-­‐conduciveness	  of	  a	  thing	  to	  the	  soul	  or	  considerations	  regarding	  utility	  and	  detriment	  are	  factors	  which	  are	  befitting	  to	  be	  known,	  although	  again,	  alongside	  these	   judgments	   there	  may	  well	  be	  a	   judgment	  of	  practical	   rationality	   that	   this	  thing	  is	  worthy	  of	  being	  performed	  or	  avoided	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  theoretical	  knowledge.	  	  By	  distinguishing	  between	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  rationality	  and	  drawing	  out	  the	   differences	   between	   his	   three	   meanings	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   this	   regard	  Muẓaffar	  seems	  to	  be	  attempting	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  between	  non-­‐moral,	   morally	   relevant	   facts	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   morality	   themselves.	  Judgments	  pertaining	  to	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  first	  and	  second	  meaning342,	  which	  fall	  under	  the	  remit	  of	  theoretical	  rationality,	  are	  non-­‐moral-­‐	  they	  have	  no	  direct	  relationship	   to	   considerations	   of	   action.	   However	   these	   judgments	   are	  sometimes	   morally	   relevant	   and	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   moral	   judgments	   of	  practical	   rationality	   that	   a	   thing	   ought	   to,	   or	   ought	   not	   to,	   be	   performed.	   Of	  course	   Muẓaffar’s	   real	   concern	   is	   to	   identify	   if,	   when,	   and	   how,	   judgments	   of	  practical	  rationality	  (regarding	  the	  worthiness	  of	  action	  or	  inaction)	  can	  actually	  correspond	  to	  God’s	  judgments	  regarding	  the	  value	  of	  acts-­‐	  for	  it	  is	  this	  which	  is	  at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   dispute.	   The	   ʿAdliyya	   position,	  which	  Muẓaffar	   is	   seeking	   to	  defend,	   does	   affirm	   this	   possibility,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   claim	   that	  all	   judgments	   of	  practical	  rationality	  have	  this	  potential	  correspondence.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  identify	  exactly	  which	   judgments	  of	  practical	   rationality	   regarding	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   in	   its	  third	   meaning,	   i.e.	   praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness,	   have	   this	   potential	  correspondence	  he	  next	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  different	  causes	  (asbāb)	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  practical	  rationality’s	  judgments	  regarding	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ.	  	  4.3.4	  The	  asbāb	  (causes)	  of	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	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  Although	  judgements	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  second	  meaning	  are	  described	  above	  as	  having	  no	  objective	  basis	  in	  the	  external-­‐	  they	  may	  still	  be	  described	  loosely	  as	  facts.	  They	  are	  facts	  about	  a	  subjects	  state	  or	  preference,	  not	  facts	  about	  the	  external	  world,	  e.g.	  the	  proposition	  “I	  am	  happy”,	  although	  having	  no	  correspondence	  with	  the	  external	  world	  may	  still	  be	  considered	  factual-­‐	  if	  I	  am	  indeed	  actually	  happy.	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In	  line	  with	  the	  Aristotelian	  tradition,	  Muẓaffar	  describes	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	   as	   being	   responsible	   for	   those	   judgments	   pertaining	   to	   action	   and	  normativity-­‐	   for	   it	   is	   the	   very	   perception	   of	   whether	   something	   ‘ought	   to’	   or	  ‘ought	  not	  to’	  be	  performed	  and	  thus	  whether	  an	  action	  be	  considered	  as	  either	  
ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ,	   in	   its	   third	  meaning,	  which	   is	  described	  as	  being	  the	   judgment	  of	  practical	  rationality.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  note	  however	  is	  that	  with	  this	  analysis	  Muẓaffar	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   argue	   that	   every	   judgment	   of	   practical	   rationality	  regarding	  whether	   an	   action	   ought	   to,	   or	   ought	   not	   to,	   be	   performed	   is	  purely	  rational	  and	  hence	  can	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator.	  Muẓaffar	  wishes	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   claimed	   that	   only	   a	   specific	   type	   of	  moral	   judgment,	   those	   that	   are	   purely	   rational,	   have	   the	   quality	   of	  correspondence	   to	   the	   judgment	   of	   God.	   For	   according	   to	   Muẓaffar,	   the	   ‘real’	  point	  of	  dispute	  between	  ʿAdliyya	  and	  Ash	  ͑arī	  camps	  was	  only	  over	  this	  category	  of	   judgment	   and	   it	   is	   only	   in	   these	   purely	   rational	   judgments	   of	   morality,	   or	  purely	   rational	   judgments	   of	   ʿaql	   al-­‐ʿamali	   that	   the	   Uṣūliyūn	   argue	   for	   a	  correspondence	   between	   the	   judgment	   of	   human	   reason	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	  God.	  To	  clarify	   this	  position	  he	  outlines	   five	  different	  asbāb	   or	   causes	   that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality343,	  identifing	  exactly	  which	  types	  of	  judgments	   regarding	  morality	   he	   believes	   to	   be	   purely	   rational.	   This	   typology	  sets	   the	   stage	   for	   his	   justification	   of	   the	   central	   jurisprudential	   concern	   in	   the	  issue	  of	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   (independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept)-­‐	   which	   is	   the	   question	   of	   the	   correlation	   (mulāzama)	   between	   the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐sharʿ.	  The	  first	  of	  the	  five	  ‘causes’	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	  is	  the	  perception,	  by	  theoretical	  rationality,	  that	  a	  thing	  is	  a	  perfection	  for	  the	  soul	  or	  an	  imperfection	  for	  it.	  As	  stated	  above,	  this	  perception	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  judgment	  of	  practical	  rationality	  regarding	  the	  praiseworthiness	  or	  blameworthiness	  (ḥusn	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  Muẓaffar	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  that	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  i.e.	  it	  is	  not	  an	  exclusive	  list	  and	  the	  possibility	  remains	  that	  there	  may	  be	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aw	   qubḥ)	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   those	   things	   as	   a	   means	   of	   acquiring	   that	  perfection	  or	  warding	  off	  that	  imperfection344.	  The	  second	  mentioned	  ‘cause’	  is	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  thing	  is	  conducive	  or	  non-­‐conducive	  to	  the	  soul,	   ‘either	   in	   itself,	  or	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  general	  or	  particular	  benefit’345.	   This	   judgment	   of	   theoretical	   rationality	   is	   deemed	   a	   cause	   for	   the	  judgment	   of	   practical	   rationality	   whereby,	   ‘the	   praiseworthiness	   or	  blameworthiness	  of	  performing	  that	  action	  is	  perceived	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  acquiring	  its	  utility	  or	  repelling	  its	  detriment’346.	  As	   shall	   be	   outlined	   shortly	   it	   is	   only	  when	   these	   first	   two	   types	   of	   causes	   are	  ‘universal	   (kullī)’	   in	   their	   nature	   that	   the	   resultant	   judgment	   of	   practical	  rationality	  is	  deemed	  purely	  rational	  thus	  having	  potential	  correspondence	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  The	  other	  three	  causes	  for	  practical	  rationality	  mentioned	  by	  Muẓaffar	  are	  judgments	  that	  an	  action	  is	  worthy	  of	  performance	  or	  avoidance	  based	  on	  either;	  	  
• Human	  dispositions	  of	  character	  (al-­‐khulq	  al-­‐insānī),	  	  
• Human	  emotion	  or	  sentiment	  (al-­‐infiʿāl	  al-­‐nafsānī),	  
• Or	  due	  to	  the	  custom	  and	  conventions	  amongst	  people	  (al-­‐ʿādatu	  ʿinda	  al-­‐
nās).	  The	   judgment	   that	   an	   act	   is	   worthy	   of	   doing	   or	   not	   doing,	   that	   an	   act	   is	  blameworthy	   or	   not	   blameworthy,	  may	   come	   about	   due	   to	   any	   of	   these	   above	  causes.	   Despite	   potential	   concurrence	   amongst	   the	   rational	   beings	   upon	   the	  value	   of	   actions	   due	   to	   these	   causes,	   unless	   the	   concurrence	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	  rationality	   of	   those	   rational	   beings	   they	   are	   judgments	   pertaining	   to	   morality	  that	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  our	  debate.	   Judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	  that	  stem	  from	  a	  concurrence	  amongst	  people	  due	  to	  their	  dispositions	  of	  character,	  their	  emotions,	  or	  their	  custom	  are	  not	  purely	  rational	  and	  hence	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  necessarily	  shares	  these	  judgments.	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  The	   purely	   rational	   judgments	   of	  morality	   arise	   for	  Muẓaffar	   from	   causes	   one	  and	   two-­‐	   but	   only	   in	   certain	   circumstances.	   Judgments	   of	   practical	   rationality	  that	   arise	   due	   to	   considerations	   of	   perfection/imperfection	   and	  conduciveness/non-­‐conduciveness	  may	  again	  be	  of	  two	  types.	  Either	  they	  result	  from	   the	   perception	   of	   an	   occurrence	   that	   is	   ‘particular	   and	   specific	   (juziyya	  
khāsa)’	   or	   they	   result	   from	   the	   perception	   of	   a	   ‘universal	   issue	   (amr	   kullī)’347.	  Where	  the	  source	  is	  a	  particular	  and	  specific	  occurrence	  the	  judgment	  regarding	  its	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ,	  i.e.	  its	  worthiness	  of	  performance	  or	  avoidance,	  is	  motivated	  by	  considerations	   of	   ‘personal	   utility	   (maṣlaḥa	   shakhṣṣiyya)’.	   Such	   judgments	   are	  not	  deemed	  by	  Muẓaffar	   to	   arise	   through	   the	   faculty	  of	   rationality;	   rather	   they	  arise	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   faculties	   of	   sense	   perception	   (al-­‐ḥiṣ),	   supposition	   (al-­‐
wahm)	   and	   imagination	   (al-­‐khiyāl).	   Although	   the	   perception	   of	   such	   particular	  and	   specific	   occurrences	   may	   be	   followed	   by	   a	   judgment	   that	   the	   one	   who	  performs	  these	  actions	   is	  worthy	  of	  praise	  or	  blame,	  according	  to	  Muẓaffar	   it	   is	  not	   befitting	   to	   term	   this	   judgment	   of	   praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness	  ‘rational’.	  These	  judgments	  are	  instead	  more	  appropriately	  termed	  ‘sentimental’	  
(ʿātifī)	  and	  accordingly	   they	  are	  not	  deemed	   to	  have	  any	  potential	   relevance	   to	  discovering	  the	  judgments	  of	  God	  through	  any	  necessary	  correlation348.	  On	   the	   other	   hand	   pure	   rational	   judgments	   of	   morality,	   which	   do	   arise	   from	  rationality	  qua	  rationality	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  bi-­‐mā	  huwa	  al-­‐ʿaql)	  and	  thus	  properly	  deserve	  the	   title	   of	   rational,	   arise	   for	   Muẓaffar	   when	   the	   source	   of	   the	   judgment	   is	   a	  ‘universal	   issue’349.	   Such	   pure	   rational	   judgments	   may	   arise	   when	   either	   an	  action	   is	  deemed	   to	  universally	  be	  a	  perfection	  or	  an	   imperfection	   for	   the	  soul,	  such	   as	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of	   knowledge	   or	   the	   avoidance	   of	   learning.	  Alternatively,	   in	   the	   second	   case,	   a	   purely	   rational	   judgment	   of	   morality	   may	  arise	  when	   the	  action	   is	  deemed	  praiseworthy	  due	   to	  a	   ‘social	  utility’	   (maṣlaḥa	  
nawʿiyya),	  such	  as	   in	  the	   judgment	  regarding	   ‘the	  utility	  of	   justice	   in	  preserving	  society	   and	   ensuring	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   human	   race’350 .	   Likewise	   the	  blameworthiness	   of	   an	   action	   may	   be	   purely	   rational	   in	   this	   manner	   when	   it	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results	   from	   an	   action	   deemed	   a	   ‘social	   detriment	   (mafṣada	   nawʿiyya),	   like	  oppression’351.	  The	  claimed	  universal	  nature	  of	   these	   judgments	   leads	  Muẓaffar	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  arise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  rational	  faculties	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  rational,	   and	   accordingly	   these	   actions	  would	   receive	   praise	   or	   blame	   from	  all	  rational	  people.	  Neatly	  summarising	  Muẓaffar	  states;	  It	   is	   this	  praise	  and	  blame,	  concurred	  upon	  by	  the	  opinion	  of	  all	  rational	  people,	  due	   to	   that	  social	  utility	  or	  detriment	   (al-­‐maṣlaḥa	  aw	  al-­‐mafṣada	  
al-­‐nawʿiyyatain),	   or	  due	   to	   that	  universal	   perfection	  or	   imperfection	   (al-­‐
kamāl	   aw	   al-­‐naqaṣ	   al-­‐nawʿiyyain),	   that	   is	   considered	   the	   rational	  judgments	  (aḥkām	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	  that	  is	  the	  point	  of	  dispute352.	  Tying	  together	  this	  epistemological	  discussion	  with	  the	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  the	  ontology	   of	   these	   judgments	   Muẓaffar	   refers	   back	   to	   the	   logical	   categories	   of	  propositions	  and	  states;	  	  These	   general	   rational	   judgments	   are	   termed	   al-­‐ārāʾa	   al-­‐maḥmūda	  (praiseworthy	  opinions)	  and	  al-­‐ta’dibāt	  al-­‐ṣalāḥiyya	  (virtuous	  etiquettes).	  These	   fall	   under	   the	   category	  of	  al-­‐mashūrāt,	   the	   category	   that	   first	   and	  foremost	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   category	   of	   al-­‐ḍarūriyāt	   (necessary	  propositions)353.	  Necessary	   propositions	   are	   a	   type	   of	   al-­‐yaqīnīyāt	   (certain	   proposition),	   that	   is	  they	   are	   proposition	   that	   leads	   to	   sure	   belief	   corresponding	   to	   an	   external	   or	  objective	   reality354.	   According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   it	   is	   a	   major	   category	   mistake	   to	  suppose	   that	   the	  purely	   rational	   judgments	  of	  morality	   just	  described	  are	   from	  amongst	   the	   necessary	   propositions,	   ‘as	   many	   people,	   amongst	   whom	   are	   the	  
Ashāʾira,’	  have	  claimed355.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here,	  as	  already	  seen	  in	  Sabzawārī’s	  thought,	  that	  many	  scholars	  from	  amongst	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  also	  describe	  basic	  moral	  propositions	   as	   being	   from	   amongst	   the	   yaqīnīyāt	   -­‐a	   picture	   of	   the	   nature	   of	  morality	   much	   more	   commensurate	   with	   the	   moral	   objectivism	   traditionally	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associated	  with	  the	  ʿAdliyya.	  Yet	  Muẓaffar	  has	  been	  at	  pains	  to	  emphasize	  that	  the	  two	  categories	  of	  yaqīnīyāt	  and	  mashūrāt	  are	  indeed	  mutually	  exclusive.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	   from	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  ontology	  and	  the	  classification	  of	  moral	  propositions	  as	  mashūrāt	  that	  he	  builds	  his	  legal	  epistemology	  of	  rational	  morality.	  Seeking	  authority	  to	  support	  his	  conception,	  Muẓaffar	  reiterates	  that	  it	  is	  because	  of	  this	  nature	  of	  such	  judgments	  of	  morality	  that	  Ibn	  Sīnā	  stated;	   ‘an	  individual	   isolated	   from	   society,	   alone	   with	   his	   unadulterated	   rationality	   and	  [faculties	  of]	  supposition	  and	  sense	  perception,	  who	  was	  not	  trained	  to	  accept	  or	  recognise	   these	  propositions’	  would	  not	  be	  able	   to	  come	  to	  knowledge	  of	   them	  simply	  by	  way	  of	  his	   reason,	   speculation	  and	  sense	  perception356.	   Ibn	  Sīnā	  and	  Muẓaffar	   claim	   that	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   regarding	   universal	  perfection/imperfection	   or	   social	   utility/detriment	   are	   of	   the	   widely	   accepted	  proposition,	   whose	   grounds	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	   the	   consensus	   of	   rational	  people-­‐	  thus	  if	  one	  had	  never	  been	  part	  of	  this	  rational	  community,	  according	  to	  Muẓaffar,	  one	  would	  have	  no	  means	  of	  recognising	  that	  the	  rational	  community	  deems	  these	  things	  are	  either	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy.	  In	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality,	  Muẓaffar’s	   aim	  has	   been	   to	   further	   his	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	  what	   is	   intended	  when	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  al-­‐qubḥ	  ʿaqliyān,	  identifying	  exactly	  what	  type	  of	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	  was	  the	  point	  of	  dispute	  between	  the	   ʿAdliyya	  and	  	  Ash	  ͑arī	  theologians;	  	  For	   not	   every	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   its	   third	   meaning	   was	   the	   subject	   of	  dispute	  with	   the	  Ashāʾira,	   but	   it	  was	   specifically	   those	  whose	   cause	  was	  the	  perception	  of	  perfection	  or	  imperfection	  in	  a	  universal	  mode	  (bi	  naḥw	  
al-­‐kulli),	  and	  that	  whose	  cause	  was	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  conduciveness	  or	  non-­‐conduciveness,	   again	   in	   a	   universal	   mode,	   with	   respect	   to	   social	  utility	   (maṣlaḥa	   nawʿiyya)	   or	   social	   detriment	   (mafṣada	   nawʿiyya).	   For	  surely	   it	   is	   the	  rational	   judgments	  arising	   from	  these	  causes	  that	  are	  the	  judgments	  of	  rational	  people,	   in	  as	  far	  as	  they	  are	  rational,	  and	  it	   is	  with	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respect	   to	   these	   that	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	   the	  Divine	   Legislator	   necessarily	  follows	  them	  in	  their	  judgment357.	  	  	  	  Having	   clarified	  what	   he	   believed	   to	   be	   the	   actual	   point	   of	   theological	   dispute	  regarding	   whether	   actions	   in	   themselves	   have	   a	   value	   of	   being	   either	  praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy	   in	   the	   sight	   of	   reason,	   he	   is	   now	   finally	   in	   a	  position	  to	  offer	  his	  justifications	  for	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  stance,	  justifications	  which	  are	  shaped	   to	   a	   significant	   extent	   by	   his	   particular	   conception	   of	   the	   nature	   of	  rational	  morality	  set	  out	  thus	  far.	  	  4.3.5.	  Justifying	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   Muẓaffar’s	   introduction	   to	   his	   treatment	   of	   the	   theological	   questions	  pertaining	   to	  mas’alat	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  al-­‐taqbiḥ	   he	   stated	   that	   in	  order	   to	   judge	   in	  favour	  of	  either	  position,	  ʿAdliyya	  or	  Ash	  ͑arī,	  one	  needed	  a	  precise	  conception	  of	  the	   actual	   point	   of	   dispute.	   Having	   offered	   such	   a	   clarification	   in	   what	   has	  preceded	  he	  moves	  to	  justifying	  why	  he	  believes	  the	  position	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  is	  the	  sound	  one.	  His	  conceptual	  analysis	  thus	  far,	  and	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  the	   ʿAdliyya	  position	  in	  what	  follows,	  demonstrate	  the	  polemical	  context	  from	  which	  Muslim	  theological	  writing	  emerged,	  and	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  is	  still	   shackled	   with.	   Yet	   despite	   the	   limits	   imposed	   by	   theological	   discourse	  shaped	   by	   the	   aim	   of	   defending	   historic	   boundaries	   of	   school	   position,	   the	  dialectical	   nature	   of	   the	   debates	   has	   been	   an	   impetus	   for	   the	   progressive	  development	  and	  increasing	  sophistication	  of	  the	  ideas	  being	  contested.	  Although	  Muẓaffar	   gave	   his	   conceptual	   analysis	  before	   explicitly	   engaging	  with	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	   criticisms	   of	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   position,	   there	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   he	   has	  developed	  this	  conception	  in	  direct	  response	  to,	  or	  at	  least	  in	  dialectic	  with,	  those	  criticisms.	  In	  fact,	  as	  shall	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  critique	  of	  Muẓaffar’s	  positions	  by	  other	  
Uṣūliyūn,	   it	   seems	  that	  some	  of	  his	  peers	   from	  within	  his	  own	  school	  may	  have	  felt	  that	  he	  went	  too	  far	  in	  modifying	  his	  notion	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  morality	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  Ash	  ͑arī	  criticism	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  undermined	  the	  notion	  of	  objectivity	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central	   to	   the	   classical	   ʿAdliyya	   doctrine	   regarding	   morality.	   Nevertheless	  Muẓaffar	   feels	   that	   his	   conception	   allows	   him	   to	   dispel	   the	   strongest	   of	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  criticisms	  and	  maintain	  the	  strongest	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  justifications	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy.	  In	  a	  style	  clearly	  shaped	  by	   the	   discipline	   of	   ʿilm	   al-­‐kalām	   from	  which	   these	   debates	   rightly	   belong,	   he	  commences	  his	  justifications	  by	  citing	  two	  major	  Ash	  ͑arī	  criticisms	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  position	   and	   responds	   to	   each	   in	   turn.	   He	   then	   cites	   variations	   on	   each	   of	   the	  classical	  ʿAdliyya	  arguments	  for	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  and	  responds	  to	  some	  possible	  objections	  that	  may	  be	  raised	  against	  these.	  	  Of	   course	   establishing	   how	   scholars	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   deem	   the	   principle	   of	   the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy	  as	  justified	  is	  a	  necessary	  premise	  for	  discussion	  of	  how	  and	  when	  they	  believe	  this	  principle	  can	  influence	  the	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   through	   the	   concept	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya,	  warranting	   the	   discussion	   of	   these	   arguments	   here.	   However	   beyond	   this	  primary	   fiqhi	   significance,	   these	   debates	   and	   justifications,	   along	   with	   the	  detailed	  discussions	  which	  they	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  regarding	  moral	  ontology	  and	  moral	  epistemology,	  demonstrate	  that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  a	  crucial	  arena	  which	  houses	  much	   of	   the	   most	   advanced	   philosophical,	   theological	   and	   ethical	   thought	   of	  Muslim	   religious	   scholarship.	   Accordingly	   each	   of	   the	   arguments	   cited	   by	  Muẓaffar,	   those	   in	   denial,	   and	   those	   in	   support	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy,	  will	  be	  examined	  here	  in	  turn.	  	  	   4.3.5.1	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objection	  1	  If	  propositions	  regarding	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  amongst	  those	  judged	  by	  al-­‐
ʿaql,	   then	   there	   would	   be	   no	   difference	   between	   its	   judgment	   of	   this	  proposition	  and	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  whole	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  part.	  But	   the	   difference	   is	   present	   for	   sure,	   because	   no	   two	   people	   disagree	  about	  the	  second,	  whilst	  there	  is	  dispute	  regarding	  the	  first358.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  201.	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Muẓaffar’s	   response	   to	   this	   objection	   denies	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   conditional	  statement	   in	   the	   initial	   premise	   of	   the	   above	   argument 359 .	   As	   has	   been	  extensively	   outlined	   thus	   far	   Muẓaffar	   accepts,	   and	   in	   fact	   argues	   for,	   a	  fundamental	   difference	   between	   propositions	   regarding	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ,	   which	  are	   a	   specific	   type	   of	  al-­‐mashūrāt	   termed	  al-­‐ta’dibāt,	   and	   propositions	   such	   as	  ‘the	   whole	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   part’	   which	   are	   a	   specific	   type	   of	   al-­‐yaqiniyāt	  termed	  al-­‐awwaliyāt.	  ‘There	  is	  no	  correlation	  between	  them	  nor	  are	  they	  from	  a	  single	   category	   which	   would	   require	   that,	   should	   the	   first	   be	   understood	   by	  reason	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  two’360.	  	  For	  Muẓaffar	  the	  very	  nature	  of	   the	   two	  propositions	   in	  question	   is	  different,	   and	   this	  difference	  does	  not	  undermine	  that	  they	  may	  both	  be	  rationally	  intelligible.	  	  To	   clarify	   further	   the	   distinction	   which	   Muẓaffar	   relied	   upon	   throughout	   his	  conceptual	   analysis	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   rational	   morality	   he	   summarizes	   the	  differences	  between	   the	   rational	  moral	  principles	   termed	  al-­‐ta’dibāt,	  which	   fall	  under	   al-­‐mashūrāt,	   and	   al-­‐awwaliyāt	   which	   fall	   under	   al-­‐yaqiniyāt	   in	   the	  following	  three	  key	  points;	  1)	   ‘The	   judge’	   (al-­‐ḥākim)	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   relevant	   propositions	   of	  
ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   al-­‐ta’dibāt	   is	   practical	   rationality,	   whereas	   in	   al-­‐
awwaliyāt,	   such	  as	   ‘the	  whole	   is	  greater	   than	   the	  part’,	   it	   [the	   judge]	   is	  theoretical	  rationality361.	  2)	  The	  purely	  rational	  propositions	  relating	   to	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ,	  referred	  to	  as	  al-­‐ta’dibāt,	   ‘have	  no	   reality	  except	   for	   the	   concurrence	  of	  opinion	  amongst	  rational	  people,	  whereas	  al-­‐awwaliyāt	  have	  a	  reality	  [to	  which	  they	  correspond]	  in	  the	  objective’362.	  3)	   In	   the	   case	   of	   al-­‐ta’dibāt,	   and	   based	   on	   the	   statement	   of	   Ibn	   Sīnā,	  Muẓaffar	   claims	   that	   ‘it	   is	   not	   necessary	   that	   every	   rational	   person	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  359	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  201.	  360	  Ibid.	  p.	  202.	  361	  The	  choice	  of	  the	  term	  ḥākim	  here	  reflects	  a	  residual	  ambiguity,	  or	  even	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  way	  Muẓaffar	  is	  describing	  the	  function	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql.	  Earlier	  he	  was	  quite	  explicit	  in	  stating	  that	  the	  role	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  al-­‐ʿamalī	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  idrāk	  mā	  yanbagi	  an	  yʿamul	  aw	  yatruk,	  i.e.	  
perceiving,	  and	  not	  judging,	  that	  which	  is	  worthy	  of	  performance	  or	  avoidance.	  Never	  the	  less	  here	  his	  intention	  is	  only	  to	  highlight	  the	  different	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  in	  each	  of	  the	  propositions	  under	  consideration.	  362	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.1	  p.	  202.	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judges	  in	  accordance	  with	  them,	  should	  he	  have	  been	  isolated	  and	  alone	  and	  not	  trained	  to	  accept	  and	  recognize	  these	  propositions’363.	  This	  is	  of	  course	  contrary	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  self	  evident	  certain	  propositions	  such	  as	  the	   awwaliyāt,	   where	   the	   proper	   conception	   of	   the	   components	   is	  sufficient	   to	  give	  rise	   to	  an	  assent	  with	  regards	   their	   content,	  and	   thus	  they	  may	  be	  known	  by	  any	  rational	  person	  in	  any	  situation.	  	  	   4.3.5.2	  Ash	  ͑arī	  objection	  2	  The	   second	  objection	   tackled	  by	  Muẓaffar	   through	  which	  Ash	  ͑arī	   scholars	   deny	  the	   rational	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   is	   cited	   as	  follows;	  If	   they	   [ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ]	   had	   been	   rationally	   intelligible	   (ʿaqlī)	   then	   the	  praiseworthiness	  of	   things	  and	  their	  blameworthiness	  would	  not	  change	  in	   accordance	   with	   the	   changing	   aspects	   (al-­‐wajūḥ)	   and	   considerations	  (al-­‐iʿtibārāt).	  For	  example	  truth	  telling	  is	  on	  one	  occasion	  praised	  but	  on	  another	  blamed-­‐	  should	   there	  be	  within	   it	  a	  great	  harm.	  Likewise	   in	   the	  opposite	  way,	   the	   act	   of	   lying	   is	   blamed	   but	   is	   praised	   should	   there	   be	  great	  benefit	  within	  it364.	  This	   classical	   objection	   against	   the	   ʿAdliyya,	  which	  was	  often	   formulated	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  apparent	  praiseworthiness	  of	  lying	  to	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  Prophet365,	  arose	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  early	  Baghadādī	  Mu	   ͑tazilī	  moral	  ontology.	  The	   rigid	  nature	   of	   this	   ontology,	   which	   left	   no	   room	   for	   any	   contextualism,	   led	   to	   the	  development	   in	   the	   Basran	   school	   of	   the	   theory	   of	  wajūḥ366.	   As	   seen	   in	   earlier	  chapters	  this	  Basran	  theory	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Imāmiyya	  and	  explicitly	  referred	  to	   in	  the	  classical	  era	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	  thought	  by	  the	  likes	  of	   	   ͑Allāma	  Ḥillī367.	  With	   this	   turn,	   the	   qualities	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   were	   no	   longer	   seen	   as	   being	  essential	  (al-­‐dhātī)	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  an	  intrinsic	  and	  necessary	  attribute	  of	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  363	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.1	  p.	  202.	  364	  Ibid.	  365	  For	  example	  see	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Kashf	  al-­‐murād,	  p.	  60.	  366	  See	  Reinhart,	  Before	  Revelation,	  p.146.	  367	  See	  Al-­‐Ḥillī,	  Anwār,	  p.	  105	  and	  Manāhij	  al-­‐yaqin,	  pp.	  229-­‐230.	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actions	  regardless	  of	  the	  situation.	  Rather	  as	  Muẓaffar	  outlines,	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  more	   sophisticated	   than	  his	   intellectual	  predecessor	  Ḥillī,	   the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  of	  actions	  is	  in	  one	  of	  three	  possible	  modes;	  1)	   An	   action	   may	   be	   a	   complete	   cause	   (ʿilla)	   in	   determining	   its	  praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness.	   Such	   cases	   alone	   are	   referred	   to	   as	  ‘essential’	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  (al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  al-­‐qubḥ	  al-­‐dhātiyain),	  such	  as	   justice	  and	  oppression.	  They	  are	  referred	   to	  as	  essentially	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy,	  not	  because	  of	  an	  existential	  quality	  within	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  act,	  but	  because;	  	  Justice	   in	  so	   far	  as	   it	   is	   just,	   can	  be	  nothing	  other	   than	  always	  ḥasan,	   i.e.	  whenever	  the	  title	  of	  justice	  is	  applicable,	  then	  necessarily	  its	  performer	  is	  considered	  praiseworthy	   in	   the	  view	  of	  rational	  beings	  and	  he	  would	  be	  considered	   a	   doer	   of	   good.	   Likewise	   oppression,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	  oppression,	   can	   be	   nothing	   other	   than	   qabīḥ,	   i.e.	   whenever	   the	   title	   of	  oppression	   is	   applicable	   then	   they	   would	   consider	   its	   performer	   as	  blameworthy	  and	  he	  would	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  performer	  of	  evil368.	  2)	   Alternatively	   an	   action	   may	   be	   a	   causative	   factor	   (muqtaḍ)	   for	   the	  attributions	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy,	   and	   thus	   its	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  is	  termed	  ʿaraḍīyān	  (accidental)	  in	  contrast	  to	  essential369.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  however	  that	  both	  here	  and	  above	  the	  terms	  cause,	  causative	  factor,	   as	   well	   as	   accident	   and	   essential	   are	   not	   used	   in	   their	   technical	  philosophical	  sense.	  What	  is	  intended	  here	  by	  an	  action	  being	  either	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  ‘accidentally’	   is	   that	   the	   title	   of	   this	   category	  of	   action	   is	  not	  deemed	   sufficient	  enough,	  in	  its	  self,	  to	  always	  deserve	  consideration	  as	  being	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ.	  However	  all	  things	  being	  equal,	  the	  action	  in	  its	  own	  right-­‐	  prima	  facie	  if	  you	  like-­‐	  would	  fall	  under	  either	  the	  category	  of	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  due	  to	  a	  more	  basic	  category.	  For	   example,	   the	   act	   of	   honoring	   a	   truthful	   person,	   when	   free	   from	   any	   other	  considerations	   and	   in	   its	   self,	  would	   fall	   under	   the	   category	  of	   a	   just	   act.	   Since	  justice	   is	   deemed	   ‘essentially’	   praiseworthy-­‐	   due	   to	   its	   general	   social	   utility-­‐	  honoring	  a	   truthful	  person	  would	  thus	  be	  considered	  ḥasan.	  However	   if,	  due	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  199.	  369	  Ibid.	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particular	  circumstances,	  the	  same	  act	  of	  honoring	  a	  truthful	  person	  becomes	  the	  cause	  for	  his	  imprisonment	  or	  death,	  it	  would	  be	  deemed	  a	  qabīḥ	  act-­‐	  for	  it	  would	  now	  fall	  under	  the	  category	  of	  oppression,	  which	  is	  ‘essentially’	  and	  hence	  always	  blameworthy.	  	  3)	  The	  third	  category	  of	  action	  is	  that	  which	  is	  not	  causal	  (lā	  ʿilliyya),	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  causative	  factor	  (lā	  iqtiḍā	  fihi)	  in	  its	  own	  right	  for	  either	  the	  attribution	  of	  
ḥusn	   (praiseworthy)	  or	  qubḥ	   (blameworthy).	  This	  type	  of	  act	   is	  morally	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  itself;	  [I]t	  is	  only	  deemed	  ḥasan	  if	  and	  when	  a	  praiseworthy	  title	  can	  be	  applied	  to	   it,	   such	   as	   justice,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   deemed	   qabīḥ,	   if	   and	   when	   a	  blameworthy	   title	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   it,	   such	   as	   oppression.	   And	   when	  neither	   a	   praiseworthy	   nor	   a	   blameworthy	   title	   is	   applicable	   to	   it,	   it	   is	  neither	  ḥasan	  nor	  qabīḥ370.	  The	   example	   mentioned	   by	   Muẓaffar,	   although	   potentially	   distasteful	   to	  contemporary	   liberal	   sensibilities,	   cites	   the	  example	  of	  hitting.	  Hitting	  with	   the	  intention	   of	   training	   (lil-­‐taʾdīb)	   is	   praiseworthy,	   but	   hitting	   simply	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   relieving	  ones	  distress	  or	   anger	   (lil-­‐tashaffi)	   is	  blameworthy,	  whilst	  sometimes	  hitting	   is	  neither	  praiseworthy	  nor	  blameworthy,	   for	  example	  when	  hitting	  an	  inanimate	  object	  like	  in	  the	  tapping	  of	  a	  desk371.	  	  	  With	   this	   threefold	   categoristaion	   in	   mind	   Muẓaffar’s	   response	   to	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	  objection	   becomes	   quite	   clear;	   ‘The	   ʿAdliyya	   do	   not	   claim	   that	   all	   things	   are	  necessarily	  always	  given	  either	  the	  attribution	  of	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy,	  in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   doubt	   which	   they	   have	   mentioned’372.	   For	  Muẓaffar,	  telling	  the	  truth	  and	  lying	  both	  fall	  under	  the	  second	  category	  of	  act,	  i.e.	  their	   praiseworthiness	   and	   blameworthiness	   is	   accidental	   (ʿaradiyān)	   and	   thus	  may	   change	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   aspects	   and	   considerations	   of	   the	   act	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  200.	  371	  Ibid.	  Muẓaffar’s	  example	  here	  raises	  some	  ambiguities.	  It	  seems	  from	  his	  typology	  that	  this	  third	  category	  of	  acts	  refers	  to	  those	  actions	  that,	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  have	  no	  predisposition	  to	  being	  either	  ḥasan	  or	  qabīḥ,	  instead	  they	  are	  theoretically	  morally	  neutral.	  	  However	  when	  actualsied	  in	  a	  context	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  reasonable	  that	  they	  can	  retain	  this	  moral	  neutrality,	  for	  if	  they	  are	  valueless	  when	  brought	  about	  they	  would	  be	  futile	  and	  purposeless-­‐	  a	  category	  of	  acts	  that,	  within	  the	  	  	   ͑Adliyya	  tradition	  at	  least,	  would	  necessarily	  be	  deemed	  qabīḥ.	  	  	  372	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  203.	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performed	   in	   different	   contexts-­‐	   thus	   the	   Ash	  ͑arī	   objection	   regarding	   the	  contextual	   nature	   of	   moral	   judgments	   does	   nothing	   to	   undermine	   Muẓaffar’s	  reading	  of	   the	   ʿAdliyya	  position	  regarding	   the	  potential	   rational	   intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  blameworthiness	  of	  actions373.	  	  	   4.3.5.3	  ʿAdliyya	  Justifications	  Muẓaffar’s	  outline	  of	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  justifications	  follow	  very	  closely	  the	  arguments	  developed	  by	  classical	  Imāmī	  theologians	  examined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  He	  firstly	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  known	  bil	  ḍarūra,	  self	  evidently	  or	  necessarily,	  that	  some	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  are	  either	  praiseworthy	  or	  blameworthy.	  This	  claim	  is	  justified	  by	  arguing	  that	  knowledge	  of	  these	  propositions	  is	  universally	  accepted-­‐	  even	   those	  who	  reject	   revelation	  agree	  upon	   these	  basic	  moral	  values.	  He	   then	  cites	   the	   classical	   ʿAdliyya	   argument	   that	   claims	  moral	   skepticism	   is	   the	   logical	  result	   of	   a	   belief	   that	   the	   only	   way	   of	   establishing	  moral	   values	   is	   revelation-­‐	  since	   all	   Muslims	   reject	   moral	   skepticism,	   the	   premise	   that	   morality	   is	  determined	  by	  revelation	  must	  also	  be	  false374.	  	  Despite	   continuing	   in	   the	   trajectory	   outlined	   by	   his	   intellectual	   forefathers,	  Muẓaffar’s	  distinct	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions	  results	   in	  his	  preferred	   formulation	   of	   each	   argument	   being	   subtlety	   different	   from	   his	  predecessors.	   As	   found	   in	  most	   presentations	   of	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   justifications,	   the	  claim	  of	  self-­‐evidence	  and	  the	  argument	  by	  universality	  are	   linked	   into	  a	  single	  argument;	  	  The	   praiseworthiness	   of	   generosity	   and	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	  oppression	   are	   amongst	   those	   things	   known	   necessarily	   (ḍarūratan)	   by	  every	  rational	  person	  without	  relying	  on	  revelation,	  for	  this	   is	  known	  by	  even	  those	  who	  deny	  scripture375.	  	  	  	  Muẓaffar	   denies	   that	   basic	   moral	   propositions	   are	   from	   the	   category	   of	  propositions	   which	   have	   an	   external	   reality	   to	   which	   they	   correspond,	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  373	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  202-­‐203.	  374	  Muẓaffar,	  Al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  296-­‐297	  375	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  p.	  203.	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moral	  propositions	  cannot	  be	  understood	  merely	  by	  properly	  conceiving	  of	   the	  component	  parts	  of	  the	  proposition.	  It	  is	  the	  distinct	  category	  of	  proposition,	  the	  
awwaliyāt	   (such	   as	   ‘the	   whole	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   part’)	   that	   is	   properly	  axiomatic.	   Knowledge	   of	   al-­‐awwaliyāt	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   being	   self	   evident	   or	  necessary	   i.e.	  bil-­‐ḍarūra,	  as	  by	  definition	   they	   are	   those	  propositions	  where	  by	  simply	  a	  proper	  conception	  of	  the	  components	  of	  the	  proposition	  necessarily	  and	  
self	  evidently	   leads	  to	  knowledge	  of	  the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  that	  proposition376.	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  classical	  portrayal,	  Muẓaffar	  argues	  that	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  are	  not	  of	  this	  category377,	  but	  rather	  are	  classed	  as	  a	  type	  of	  mashūrāt,	  having	  no	  reality	   to	  which	  they	  correspond-­‐	  except	  the	  concurrence	  of	  rational	  opinion.	   If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  question	  arises	  as	  to	  how	  can	  they	  be	  known	  bil-­‐ḍarūra?	  	  Although	  Muẓaffar	  does	  not	  directly	   respond	   to	   this	   concern	  he	  does	  elaborate	  on	  what	  he	  thinks	  was	  intended	  in	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  claim	  that	  basic	  moral	  judgments	  are	  self	  evident	   in	  a	  manner	  which	   is	  consistent	  with	  his	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions;	  Those	  who	  claim	  the	  necessity	  (ḍarūra)	  of	  the	  judgment	  of	  rational	  beings	  (ḥukm	   al-­‐ʿuqalā)	   regarding	   the	   ḥusn	   of	   generosity	   and	   the	   qubḥ	   of	  oppression	   claim	   the	   necessity	   of	   their	   praise	   for	   the	   performer	   of	  generosity	  and	  the	  their	  blame	  for	  the	  performer	  of	  oppression378.	  From	  this	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  his	  interpretation	  of	  ḍarūra	  is	  not	  a	  notion	  of	  self-­‐evidence	  as	  occurs	  in	  the	  axiomatic	  awwaliyāt.	  	  Rather	  Muẓaffar’s	  understanding	  of	  ḍarūra	  here	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  literal	  connotation	  of	  the	  term	  denoting	  a	  ‘necessary’	  judgment.	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  Muẓaffar’s	  analysis	  thus	  far,	  the	   source	   of	   this	   necessary	   judgment	   cannot	   arise	   simply	   from	   a	   proper	  conception	  of	  the	  component	  parts	  of	  basic	  moral	  propositions,	   instead	  he	  cites	  the	  source	  of	  this	  ‘necessity’	  as	  being	  due	  to	  tawātur379-­‐	  that	  is	  the	  truth	  of	  these	  basic	   moral	   propositions	   is	   known	   bil-­‐ḍarūra,	   necessarily,	   because	   they	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  376	  See	  Muẓaffar,	  Al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  296-­‐297.	  377	  Muẓaffar	  explicitly	  categorises	  these	  mashhūrāt	  as	  being	  in	  contrast	  to	  propositions	  that	  he	  terms	  as	  ḍarūriyāt;‘They	  are	  from	  those	  widely	  accepted	  propositions	  (al-­‐qaḍāyā	  al-­‐mashhūrāt)	  which	  are	  a	  category	  fundamentally	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  necessary	  propositions	  (al-­‐qaḍāyā	  al-­‐
ḍaruriyāt)’.	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  196.	  378	  Ibid.	  379	  Ibid,	  p.	  203.	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examples	  of	  judgments	  which	  are	  so	  widely	  accepted	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  that	  so	  many	   people	  may	   be	  mistaken	   or	   be	   colluding	   upon	   falsehood,	   and	   hence	   it	   is	  considered	  absurd	  to	  deny	  them380.	  Despite	   the	  apparent	  difference	   in	   the	  way	  Muẓaffar	  understands	   the	  ḍarūra	  of	  basic	  moral	   propositions	   from	   the	  way	   it	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   conceived	   of	   by	  early	  and	  classical	  Imāmī	  theologians,	  he	  does	  manage	  to	  give	  an	  interpretation	  of	   the	   classical	   argument	   ‘by	   necessity’	   in	   a	   manner	   consistent	   with	   his	   own	  conceptual	   analysis.	   However	   his	   adoption	   of	   the	   classical	   claim	   that	   this	  necessity	   is	   justified	   by	   the	   universality	   of	   the	   acceptance	   of	  moral	   judgments	  does	   not	   fit	   as	   neatly	   with	   his	   own	   picture	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   rational	   morality.	  Having	   extensively	   and	   repeated	   argued	   for	   rational	   moral	   propositions	   being	  amongst	  the	  mashūrāt,	  he	  explicitly	  asserts	  that	  an	  isolated	  individual,	  who	  had	  always	  been	  alone	  and	  bereft	  of	  the	  training	  received	  through	  society,	  would	  not	  be	   able	   to	   recognize	   these	   propositions	   through	   his	   rationality	   alone381.	   His	  adoption	  of	   the	  classical	  argument	  by	  way	  of	   the	  universal	  acceptance	  of	  moral	  propositions	   thus	   needs	   a	   qualification;	   he	   can	   only	   claim	   that	   basic	   moral	  propositions	  are	  universally	  accepted	  by	   those	   rational	  beings	   living	   in	  a	  social	  
context	  and	  not	  by	  every	  rational	  person.	  	  	  The	   second	   ʿAdliyya	   justification	   cited	   by	   Muẓaffar	   argues	   that	   knowledge	   of	  moral	  values,	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ,	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  if	  the	  only	  way	  of	  establishing	  these	  values	  was	  revelation.	  Muẓaffar	  notes	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  moral	   skepticism	   results	   from	   claiming	   the	   basis	   of	  morality	   is	   revelation	  has	  been	   formulated	   in	   a	  number	  of	  ways382.	   	  His	  preferred	   formulation	  varies	  slightly	   from	   those	   examined	   from	   the	   classical	   period	   where	   the	   arguments	  often	  centered	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  being	  able	  to	  establish	  independently	  that	  it	  is	  blameworthy	   or	   qabīḥ	   for	   Allah	   to	   lie	   before	   one	   can	   have	   trust	   in	   the	   moral	  teachings	  of	  revelation.	  For	  if	  it	  is	  not	  qabīḥ	  for	  Allah	  to	  lie	  then	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  us	   to	   assume	  He	   is	   telling	   the	   truth	   in	  His	   scriptural	   instructions	   regarding	  morality.	   Instead	   Muẓaffar	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   the	   source	   of	   two	   basic	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  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	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  Ibid,	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obligations	  accepted	  by	  all	  Muslims,	   the	  obligation	   to	  obey	  God	   (wajūb	  al-­‐ṭāʿa),	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  know	  God	  (wajūb	  al-­‐mʿarifa)383.	  It	  is	  accepted	  by	  both	  ʿAdliyya	  and	  Ash	  ͑arī	  scholars	  that	  there	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  one’s	  creator	  and	  that	  Muslims	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  obey	  the	  commands	  and	  prohibitions	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  However	  Muẓaffar	  notes	  that	  the	  Ash	  ͑arī	  position	  holds	  that	  the	  source	  of	  this	  obligation	  is	  non-­‐rational	  or	  textual	  i.e.	  it	  is	  
sharʿī.	  Muẓaffar	   then	  poses	   the	  question	  that	   if	   this	   is	   the	  case,	   ‘from	  whence	   is	  this	  obligation	  established?’.	  The	  expected	  Ash	  ͑arī	  response	  is	  of	  course	  that	  this	  obligation	   stems	   from	   a	   command	   from	   the	   legislator	   for,	   apparently	   at	   least,	  their	  system	  demands	  that	  obligation	  follows	  command.	  Muẓaffar	  then	  posses	  a	  second	  question	  through	  which	  he	  moves	  to	  the	  crux	  of	  his	  argument;	  From	   where	   does	   the	   obligation	   of	   obedience	   to	   this	   command	   come	  from?	  If	  this	  obligation	  is	  rational	  then	  that	  is	  what	  has	  been	  sought,	  but	  if	  it	   is	  again	  non-­‐rational	  (sharʿī)	  then	  necessarily	  it	  must	  have	  a	  command	  which	   necessarily	   also	   requires	   obedience	   and	   then	   we	   can	   shift	   our	  question	   to	   it…and	   likewise	  we	   continue	  without	   limit.	  We	   cannot	   stop	  until	   we	   reach	   an	   obligation	   the	   obedience	   to	   which	   is	   rationally	  determined	   and	   does	   not	   depend	   upon	   the	   command	   of	   the	   Legislator.	  And	  that	  is	  what	  is	  sought384.	  Muẓaffar	  is	  demonstrating	  that	  if	  the	  authority	  of	  obligation	  can	  only	  stem	  from	  revelatory	  command,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  an	  infinite	  regress	  always	  questioning	  the	  source	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  each	  command	  in	  the	  chain.	  Ultimately	  the	  authority	  of	  any	   body	   of	   revelatory	   texts	  must	   be	   established	   from	   something	   outside	   that	  body	  of	  material.	  Summarising	  in	  typical	  ʿAdliyya	  style,	  Muẓaffar	  goes	  on	  to	  state	  that	  	   In	  fact	  the	  establishment	  of	  revelation	  in	  the	  very	  first	  place	  depends	  upon	  the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy,	   and	   had	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  383	  For	  the	  conception,	  influence	  and	  subsequent	  fate	  of	  two	  rational	  theories	  for	  the	  Obligation	  to	  obey	  God	  in	  Mu	  ͑tazilī	  thought	  see	  Aron	  Zysow	  ‘Two	  Theories	  of	  the	  Obligation	  to	  Obey	  God’s	  Commands’	  in	  Peri	  Bearman,	  Wolfart	  Heinrichs	  and	  Bernard	  Weiss	  (eds.)	  The	  Law	  Applied;	  
Contextualizing	  the	  Islamic	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  A	  Volume	  in	  Honour	  of	  Frank	  E.	  Vogel	  (London,	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2008),	  pp.	  397-­‐422.	  384	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establishment	   been	   through	   the	   revelation	   itself,	   it	   would	   have	   been	  impossible	   to	   establish	   it-­‐	   for	   we	   would	   shift	   our	   question	   to	   that	  revelatory	  means	  and	  be	  left	  with	  an	  infinite	  regress	  that	  has	  no	  limit385.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.4	  The	  theological	  premises	  to	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  Muẓaffar	  preceded	  his	  discussion	  of	   the	   jurisprudential	  questions	  pertaining	   to	  
al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya-­‐	   (reason	  as	   an	   independent	   source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precept)	  by	  identifying	  that	  a	  necessary	  premise	  to	  these	  jurisprudential	  discussions	  is	  a	  clear	  conception	  of	  the	  theological	  questions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy.	  The	  theological	  questions	  were	  identified	  as	  two;	   1)	   Do	   some	   actions,	   in	   themselves,	   have	   a	   status	   of	   being	   either	   ḥusn	  (praiseworthy)	  or	  qubḥ	  (blameworthy)	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  rationality?	  2)	   If	   this	   is	   the	   case	   is	   it	   possible	   for	   reason	   to	   actually	   perceive	   these	  values?	  In	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  Muẓaffar	  offered	  a	  thorough	  and	  detailed	  conceptual	  analysis	   of	   why	   he	   believes	   that	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   were	   correct	   in	   responding	  affirmatively	   to	   the	   first	  question,	  and	   that	   indeed	  some	  actions,	   in	   themselves,	  do	  have	  a	  moral	  status	   in	  the	  eyes	  of	  rationality	  regardless	  of	  divine	  command.	  Before	  embarking	  on	  that	  analysis	  he	  claimed	  that	  obtaining	  a	  proper	  conception	  of	   the	  ontological	  question	  regarding	  why	  and	  how	  actions	  may	  have	  a	  rational	  status	   of	   either	   ḥusn	   or	   qubḥ	   irrespective	   of	   divine	   command,	   is	   sufficient	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   there	   is	   actually	   no	   scope	   for	   the	   second	   epistemological	  question.	  	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   his	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   rational	   morality,	  Muẓaffar	  makes	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  ontology	  and	  the	  epistemology	  of	  the	  relevant	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality.	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Because	   as	   has	   preceded,	   there	   is	   no	   ontology	   to	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   in	   the	  sense	   which	   is	   under	   dispute	   with	   the	   Ashā	  ͑ira	   (which	   is	   the	   third	  meaning)	   except	   for	   the	   rational	   community	  perceiving	   this	   and	   [except	  for]	   the	   concurrence	   of	   their	   opinion	   upon	   the	   desert	   of	   praise	   for	   the	  performer	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   the	   desert	   of	   blame	   for	   the	   performer	   of	   al-­‐
qabīḥ386	  As	  Muẓaffar	  denies	  that	  the	  moral	  values	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  in	  its	  disputed	  sense	  have	   any	   factual	   or	   existential	   reality	   except	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   rational	  community,	  one	  cannot	  claim	  that	  actions	  have	  a	  rational	  status	  of	  either	  ḥusn	  or	  
qubḥ	  and	  yet	  reason	  be	  incapable	  of	  understanding	  this	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ-­‐	  ‘unless	  it	  be	  possible	  to	  separate	  a	  thing	  from	  itself’387.	  	  Although	  this	  conceptual	  analysis	  is	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  picture	  offered	  in	  classical	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   and	   developed	   by	   later	   thinkers	   such	   as	   Ḥāj	  Mullā	   Hādī	  Sabzawārī,	  it	  is	  a	  picture	  that	  allowed	  him	  to	  maintain	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  classical	  
ʿAdliyya	   justifications	   for	   the	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	  praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy.	   Moreover	   it	   is	   a	   conception	   of	   rational	  morality	   from	   which	   he	   can	   directly	   build	   his	   jurisprudential	   epistemology	  regarding	   the	   central	   Uṣūlī	   question	   in	   this	   regard;	   can	   these	   judgments	   of	  rational	  morality	  correspond	  to	   the	   judgments	  of	   the	  Divine	   legislator	  and	  thus	  become	  a	  potential	  source	  for	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts?	  	  
4.5.	  The	  rational	  correlation	  between	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  al-­‐sharʿ	  Having	  described	  his	  conception	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   rational	  morality,	  and	  why	  he	  believes	   that	   the	   relevant	   judgments	   of	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   are	   rationally	  intelligible,	  Muẓaffar	  moves	  to	  discuss	  the	  first	  of	  the	  two	  jurisprudential	  (Uṣūlī)	  questions	   necessary	   in	   affirming	   that	   independent	   judgments	   of	   reason	   have	   a	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  by	  discussing	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  mas’alat	  
al-­‐mulāzama	   i.e.	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   rational	   correlation.	   As	   outlined	   earlier,	   the	  question	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  al-­‐sharʿ	  is	  central	  to	  establishing	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both	  the	  independent	  and	  non-­‐independent	  modes	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqlī	  (reason	  as	  a	  source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept).	   The	   specific	   correlation	   whose	   existence	   is	   being	  questioned	   here,	   i.e.	   in	   the	   context	   of	   reason	   as	   an	   independent	   source,	   is	  ‘whether	   or	   not	   reason’s	   judgment	   of	   the	   ḥusn	   or	   qubḥ	   of	   a	   thing	   rationally	  necessitates	   that	   al-­‐sharʿ	   judges	   in	   accordance	   with	   it?’388	  Rephrasing	   we	   may	  ask,	   is	   there	  a	   rational	   correlation	   that	  deems	   that	   the	   judgments	  of	   the	  Divine	  legislator	   correspond	   with	   the	   judgments	   of	   human	   rationality	   regarding	   the	  
ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  of	  an	  action?	  For	  Muẓaffar	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  specific	  judgments	  of	  al-­‐
ʿaql	   under	   consideration	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator	   does	  rationally	  exist.	  The	  relevant	  judgments	  of	  the	  ḥusn	  or	  qubḥ	  of	  a	  thing	  have	  been	  carefully	  defined	  and	  outlined	  as	  being	  nothing	  other	  than;	  [T]he	  complete	  concurrence	  of	  opinion	  from	  the	  rational	  community,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  are	  being	  rational	  (bi	  mā	  hum	  ʿuqalā),	  upon	  the	  ḥusn	  of	  a	  thing	  due	  that	  which	  is	  in	  it	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  social	  order	  and	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  human	  species,	  or	  upon	  the	  qubḥ	  of	  a	  thing	  due	  to	  its	  disruption	  of	  these389.	  	  	  	  As	  these	  judgments	  are	  defined	  as	  being	  only	  those	  which	  reflect	  the	  concurring	  opinion	  of	  all	  rational	  beings	  then;	  	  [N]ecessarily	   the	   Divine	   legislator	   judges	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	  judgment,	  because	  He	  is	  from	  amongst	  them	  [i.e.	  the	  rational	  beings],	  and	  in	   fact	  He	   is	   the	   chief	   of	   them.	  He	   is	   in	   himself	   rational-­‐	   and	   in	   fact	   the	  creator	  of	  rationality	  -­‐	  thus	  like	  all	  rational	  beings,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  He	  judges	   in	  accordance	  with	   that	  which	   they	   judge.	   If	  we	  assumed	   that	  He	  was	   not	   joining	   them	   in	   their	   judgment	   then	   this	   judgment	   would	   not	  reflect	  the	  [concurring]	  opinion	  of	  all	  [rational	  beings]-­‐	  which	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  [initial]	  assumption390.	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Muẓaffar’s	   argument	   for	   the	  mulāzama	   stems	   from	   his	   conception	   of	   God	   as	   a	  rational	   being	   coupled	   with	   his	   definition	   of	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   as	   being	   the	  concurrence	   of	   all	   rational	   beings	   upon	   the	   praiseworthiness	   and	  blameworthiness	  of	  an	  action.	  When	  judgments	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  are	  universally	  concurred	  upon	  by	  all	   rational	  beings,	   then	   it	   follows	   that	  God	  must	  also	  share	  this	  judgment,	  for	  He	  is	  one	  of	  those	  rational	  beings.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  other	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  have	  attacked	  this	  position	  on	  a	  number	  of	  counts,	  but	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  central	  questions	  of	  this	  study	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  to	  note	  here	   is	   that	   in	   Muẓaffar’s	   justification	   for	   the	   theoretical	   correlation	   between	  judgments	  of	  reason	  and	  judgments	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  is	  central	  in	  limiting	  the	  actual	  role	  of	   reason	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   derivation	   of	  precepts	   in	   fiqh.	  Muẓaffar	  argues	   that	  any	  universally	  agreed	  upon	   judgment	  of	  reason	  includes,	  and	  thus	  reflects,	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator-­‐	  but	  the	  occurrence	   of	   such	   universally	   agreed	   upon	   judgments	   are	   so	   rare	   that	   the	  instances	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgment	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	  al-­‐sharʿ	  are	  so	  few	  and	  far	  between	  that	  they	  are	  seen	  to	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  derivation	  of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   This	   limit	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   requirement	   that	   these	  rational	   judgments,	   the	   universal	   concurrence	   and	   the	   correlation,	   must	   be	  deemed	   to	   be	   certain	   (qaṭʿī)	   for	   them	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   religiously	   valid	  means	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge.	  This	   fundamental	  Uṣūlī	   criteria	   for	   the	  validity,	  or	  
ḥujjiyya,	  of	  sources	  demands	  an	  independent	  analysis,	  an	  analysis	  which	  will	  be	  embarked	   upon	   after	   first	   examining	   some	   contrasting	   views	   regarding	   the	  
mulāzama	   from	   amongst	   other	   Shī	  ͑ī	   Uṣūliyūn	   and	   the	   contrasting	   picture	   of	  rational	  morality	  that	  this	  entails.	  	  	  	  	  
4.6	  Critique	  of	  Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  Muẓaffar’s	  analysis	  of	  mas’alat	  al-­‐taḥsīn	  wa	  taqbiḥ	   and	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya	  is	   undoubtedly	   one	   of	   the	   most	   systematic	   and	   extensive	   treatments	   of	   the	  subject	   amongst	   modern	   works	   of	   Shī	  ͑a	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh.	   Yet	   the	   conception	   of	  morality,	   rationality	   and	   how	   rational	   judgments	   may	   correspond	   with	   the	  judgments	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  developed	  therein	  is	  far	  from	  universally	  accepted	  amongst	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Shī	  ͑ī	   scholarship.	   Criticisms	   of	   Muẓaffar’s	   position,	   from	   Shī	  ͑a	   Uṣūliyūn	  themselves,	   have	   ranged	   from	   stating	   the	   there	   is	   some	   ‘confusion’391	  in	   his	  writings	  to	  describing	  his	  ideas	  on	  the	  topic	  as	  being	  from	  amongst	  the	  ‘strangest	  of	  discussions	  (min	  ʿajāʾib	  al-­‐kalām)392.	  By	  following	  ‘the	  basis	  popularly	  held	  by	  the	  philosophers’393	  in	  categorising	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  propositions	  as	  being	  al-­‐
mashūrāt	   al-­‐ṣirfa	   (purely	   popularly	   held	   views	   with	   no	   correspondence	   in	  objective	   reality	   beyond	   the	   concurrence	   of	   rational	   opinion)	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	  Muẓaffar’s	   analysis	   does	   not	   establish	   that	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy	  are	   rationally	   intelligible	   (al-­‐ḥusn	   wa	   al-­‐qubḥ	   ʿaqliyain),	   rather	   his	   position	  actually	   amounts	   to	   stating	   that	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy	   are	   a	  construction	  of	  the	  rational	  community	  (al-­‐ḥusn	  wa	  al-­‐qubḥ	  al-­‐ʿuqalāʾiyain).	  This	  has	  been	   cited	  as	  bearing	  an	  unacceptable	   resemblance	   to	   the	  Ash	  ͑arī	   position,	  for	   it	   simply	   amounts	   to	   a	   different	   form	  of	   positivism394.	   The	  Ash	  ͑arī	   position	  holds	   that	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   blameworthy	   are	   posited	   by	   the	   command	   of	  Allah,	   and	  –in	   the	  eyes	  of	   the	   critique-­‐	  Muẓaffar	   is	   saying	   that	   they	  are	   instead	  posited	   by	   the	   rational	   community.	   Following	   both	   Ibn	   Sīnā395,	   and	   his	   most	  influential	   teacher	   al-­‐Isfahānī396,	   Muẓaffar	   has	   classified	  moral	   propositions	   as	  
mashūrāt.	  Accordingly	  moral	   values	   have	   no	   reality	   beyond	   the	   social	   rational	  consensus	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  them397,	  and	  thus	  by	  implication	  theses	  values	  have	  no	   reality	  prior	   to	   that	   social	   rational	   consensus,	   and	   these	  values	  may	   change	  with	   a	   change	   in	   social	   rational	   consensus398.	   For	   further	   exposition	   of	   an	  alternative	   view,	   which	   although	   not	   explicitly,	   seems	   to	   directly	   respond	   to	  Muẓaffar’s	  disputed	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  morality,	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  views	  of	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  391	  Muḥammad	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī	  (Qum,	  Dār	  al-­‐Mujtabā,	  1999)	  p.	  518.	  392	  Nāṣir	  Makārim	  al-­‐Shirāzi,	  Anwār	  al-­‐uṣūl	  (Qum,	  Madrassat	  al-­‐Imām	  Amir	  al-­‐Muʾminīn,	  1994)	  Vol.2	  p.	  512.	  393	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  p.	  519.	  394	  Ibid.	  p.	  516.	  395	  al-­‐Ishārāt	  wa	  al-­‐tanbihāt,	  p.	  351.	  396	  Nihāyat	  al-­‐Dirāya,	  Vol.	  3	  pp.	  29-­‐31.	  397	  Al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  309-­‐310	  and	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  193,	  196	  and	  202.	   	  398	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  p.	  518.	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4.7	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  on	  rationality,	  morality	  and	  the	  correlation	  between	  al-­‐
ʿaql	  and	  al-­‐sharʿ Muḥammad	  Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   is	   far	   better	   known	   to	   readers	   of	  Muslim	   thought	   in	  general,	   and	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   in	   particular,	   in	   the	  West	   than	   Muḥammad	   Riḍā	   al-­‐Muẓaffar399.	  His	  political	  activism	  combined	  with	  a	  mastery	  of	  traditional	  Muslim	  studies	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  seriously	  engage	  with	  shifting	  intellectual	  paradigms	  of	  his	  day	  have	   left	  a	   formidable	   intellectual	   legacy.	  That	  his	   intellectual	  output	  was	  brutally	   cut	   short,	   at	   the	  hands	  of	   Saddam’s	  Baathist	   Iraqi	   regime,	   did	  not	  undermine	   the	   regard	   in	   which	   his	   work	   would	   be	   held	   both	   in	   traditional	  Muslim	   and	   wider	   circles,	   with	   commentators	   describing	   his	   contributions	   to	  twentieth	   century	   Muslim	   religious	   thought	   ranking	   	   ‘as	   highly	   as	   the	   great	  reformists	  of	  the	  caliber	  of	  Jamāl	  al-­‐Dīn	  al-­‐Afghānī	  and	  Muḥammad	  ‘Abduh’400.	  	  Like	  Muẓaffar’s	  text	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  three	  volume	  work	  on	  the	  same	  subject	  titled	  al-­‐Durūs	  fi	  ʿilm	  al-­‐uṣūl	  was	  also	  written	  in	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  traditional	  syllabus	  of	  his	  day	  and	  has	  subsequently	  come	  to	  have	  a	  central	  place	  in	  the	  training	  of	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars401.	  Although	  his	  treatment	  is	  extremely	   brief	   when	   compared	   to	   Muẓaffar,	   in	   the	   third	   and	   most	   advanced	  volume,	   he	   offers	   a	   concise	   critique	   of	   the	   conception	   of	   morality	   adopted	   by	  Muẓaffar,	   Isfahāni	   and	   Ibn	   Sīnā.	   This	   critique	   reveals	   his	   own	   conception	   of	  morality,	   which	   instead	   of	   following	   ‘the	   basis	   adopted	   by	   the	   majority	   of	  philosophers’	  follows	  what	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  ‘the	  basis	  adopted	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  
Uṣūliyūn’	   in	   its	   categorisation	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   moral	   propositions402 .	   This	  conception	   of	   morality	   is	   arguably	   far	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   objectivism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  399	  For	  brief	  biographical	  information	  and	  some	  general	  notes	  on	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  and	  his	  intellectual	  contributions	  see	  Parviz	  Mottahedeh,	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Muḥammad	  Bāqir	  as-­‐Ṣadr,	  
Lessons	  in	  Islamic	  Jurisprudence	  Translated	  with	  an	  introduction	  by	  Roy	  Parviz	  Mottahedeh,	  (Oxford,	  Oneworld,	  2005),	  p.1-­‐33	  and	  Mohsen	  Araki	  ‘A	  Short	  Biography	  of	  Martyr	  Ayatullah	  al-­‐Ṣadr’	  in	  Hamid	  Algar	  and	  Sa’eed	  Bahmanpour	  (eds.)	  Principles	  of	  Islamic	  Jurisprudence	  According	  
to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Law	  by	  Muḥammad	  al-­‐Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  (London,	  ICAS	  Press,	  2003),	  pp.11-­‐24.	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  treatment	  of	  his	  life	  and	  intellectual	  contributions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics,	  see	  Chibli	  Mallat,	  The	  Renewal	  of	  Islamic	  Law:	  Muḥammad	  Baqer	  as-­‐Ṣadr,	  Najaf,	  and	  
the	  Shi'I	  International,	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  400	  Mallat,	  The	  Renewal	  of	  Islamic	  Law,	  p.	  35.	  401	  For	  an	  insight	  into	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  views	  regarding	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  then	  said	  curriculum	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  the	  motivation	  for	  writing	  his	  own	  work	  on	  the	  subject	  see	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  17-­‐38.	  402	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  p.	  519.	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associated	   with	   the	   classical	   ʿAdliyya	   doctrine	   than	   that	   depicted	   by	   Muẓaffar.	  Despite	   these	   differences,	   as	   shall	   be	   seen	   in	   subsequent	   chapters,	   neither	   of	  these	   radically	   different	   views	   regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   morality	   result	   in	   al-­‐
mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   (independent	   judgments	   of	   rationality)	   playing	   a	  significant	   role	   in	   the	   actual	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   at	   the	   level	   of	   fiqh	  because	   of	   a	   common	   criteria	   of	   certainty	   (qaṭʿ)	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   validity	   (or	  
ḥujjiyya)	  for	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	  Before	  engaging	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  ʿuqalāʾīyyain	  i.e.	  constructed	  and	  postulated	  by	  the	  consensus	  of	  the	  rational	   community	   rather	   than	  being	   ʿaqliyain	   and	  hence	   rationally	   intelligible	  by	   independent	   reason,	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   first	   clarifies	   his	   understanding	   of	   the	  distinction	   between	   theoretical	   rationality	   and	   practical	   rationality.	   Like	  Muẓaffar	   he	   too	   makes	   this	   distinction	   based	   on	   the	   object	   of	   perception	   (al-­‐
mudrak),	  but	  with	  some	  important	  differences.	  For	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  the	  judgement	  of	  ‘theoretical	  rationality	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  that	  which	  is	  ontological	  (idrāk	  mā	  
yakūnu	  wāqiʿīan)’,	  while	  the	  judgement	  of	  practical	  rationality	  is	  ‘the	  perception	  of	  that	  which	  ought	  or	  ought	  not	   to	  occur	   (idrāk	  mā	  yanbagi	  aw	  mā	  lā	  yanbagi	  an	  
yaqʿa)’403.	  With	  this	  initial	  distinction	  in	  place	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  starts	  to	  reveal	  his	  conception	  of	   morality,	   for	   he	   states	   that	   in	   this	   way	   defined	   judgements	   of	   practical	  rationality	  actually	  amount	   to	   judgements	  of	   theoretical	  rationality	   for	   they	  too	  are	  the	  perception	  of	  something	  with	  ontological	  reality;	  On	   analysis	  we	   see	   that	   the	   second	   [judgements	   of	   practical	   rationality]	  ultimately	   refers	   to	   the	   first	   [judgements	   of	   theoretical	   rationality].	  Because	   it	   [practical	   rationality]	   is	   the	   perception	   of	   an	   ontological	  attribute	  in	  the	  action,	  and	  this	  is	  that	  it	  [either]	  ought	  to	  occur,	  and	  that	  is	  
al-­‐ḥusn,	  or	  that	  it	  ought	  not	  to	  occur,	  and	  that	  is	  al-­‐qubḥ.404	  Thus	  according	  to	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  the	  moral	  values	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  are	  real	  ‘ontological	  attributes	  perceived	  by	  rationality	  just	  as	  it	  [rationality]	  perceives	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  403	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  305.	  	  404	  Ibid.	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other	  ontological	  attributes	  and	   things’.	  With	   the	  object	  of	  both	   theoretical	  and	  practical	   rationality	  being	  deemed	  ontologically	  occurring	   in	   this	  way,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	   explains	   that	   the	   only	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   judgements	   is	   that	   the	  subject	  matter	  of	  practical	  rationality	  ‘due	  its	  nature,	  requires	  a	  specific	  practical	  implication’	  whereas	  the	  judgement	  of	  theoretical	  rationality	  does	  not405.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  claims	  that	  the	  conception	  which	  deems	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  to	  be	  the	   result	   from	   the	   ‘postulation	   of	   the	   rational	   community’	   based	   on	   their	  concurring	  judgements	  regarding	  social	  utility	  (al-­‐maṣlaḥa	  al-­‐nawʿiyya)	  or	  social	  detriment	  (al-­‐mafṣada	  al-­‐nawʿiyya)	  is	  flawed406.	  He	  offers	  two	  arguments	  here	  to	  demonstrate	  these	  flaws,	  one	  by	  intuition	  (wijdānan)	  and	  one	  that	  he	  describes	  as	  being	   tajrabatan,	   literally	   meaning	   through	   experience	   but	   what	   is	   actually	  intended	  here	   is	  a	  demonstration	  via	  a	   type	  of	   thought	  experiment407.	  The	   first	  argument	  seems	   to	  be	  directed	  against	   the	  notion	  of	  morality	  as	  being	  positive	  with	   the	  second	  undermining	   the	  apparent	  claim	  that	  ḥusn	   and	  qubḥ	   are	  based	  on	   purely	   utilitarian	   considerations	   of	   social	   or	   public	   maṣlaḥa	   (utility)	   and	  
mafṣada	  (detriment).	  	  	  In	  a	  style	  typical	  of	  moral	  intuitionists	  his	  initial	  argument,	  or	  claim,	  resonates	  closely	  with	  the	  classic	  ʿAdliyya	  argument	  for	  the	  self-­‐evident	  essential	   nature	   of	   basic	  moral	   knowledge;	   ‘As	   for	   intuition	   (wijdān),	   it	   judges	  that	  the	  qubḥ	  of	  oppression	  is	  established	  irrespective	  of	  the	  postulation	  of	  any	  postulator,	   like	   the	   contingency	   of	   a	   contingent	   being	   (k-­‐imkān	  al-­‐mumkin)’408.	  Nothing,	  neither	  God,	  nor	  any	  rational	  consensus,	  designated	  oppression	  qabīḥ-­‐	  oppression	  simply	  is	  qabīḥ.	  	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  then	  employs	  a	  thought	  experiment	  to	  undermine	  what	  he	  sees	  as	  the	  purely	  utilitarian	  conception	  of	  morality	  adopted	  by	  Muẓaffar.	  Al-­‐Ṣadr	  claims	  that	   on	   consideration	   of	   concrete	   cases	  we	   see	   that	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ,	   what	  ought	   or	   ought	   not	   to	   occur,	   does	   not	   exclusively	   follow	   the	   criterion	   of	   utility	  and	  detriment,	  and	  in	  fact	  ‘sometimes	  the	  utility	  in	  the	  qabīḥ	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  detriment	   in	   it,	   and	  despite	   this	   the	   rational	   beings	   agree	  upon	   its	  qubḥ’409.	   To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  405	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  305.	  406	  Ibid,	  p.	  306.	  407	  Ibid,	  pp.	  306-­‐307.	  408	  Ibid,	  p.	  306.	  409	  Ibid,	  p.	  306.	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demonstrate	   he	   asks	   us	   to	   consider	   the	   morality	   of	   killing	   a	   human	   being	   to	  extract	   a	   specific	  medicine	   from	  his	   heart,	   through	  which	   two	  people	   could	   be	  saved	  from	  certain	  death.	  If	  viewed	  solely	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  utility	  and	  detriment,	  than	  the	  utility	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  detriment,	  despite	  which	  nobody	  doubts	  that	  this	  would	  be	  [an	   instance	  of]	  oppression	  and	  rationally	  qabīḥ.	  Thus	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐
qubḥ	   (what	   ought	   and	   ought	   not	   to	   occur)	   do	   not	   follow	   utility	   and	  detriment	   in	   a	   simple	   fashion,	   rather	   they	   [al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ]	   have	   a	  reality	   which	   concurs	   with	   [considerations	   of]	   utility	   and	   detriment	   in	  many	   instances,	  but	  which	   is	  at	  odds	  with	  these	  [consideration]	   in	  some	  cases.410	  	  	  	  	  	  Assuming	  one	  accepts	  the	  epistemological	  value	  or	  claims	  of	  intuition,	  these	  two	  arguments	  certainly	  raise	  serious	  objections	  against	  the	  caricature	  of	  Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  of	  morality	  as	  painted	  by	  those	  who	  oppose	  it.	  However	  it	  is	  a	  fallacy	  to	   accept	   that	   these	   criticisms	   justify	   any	   alternative	   conception411.	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   own	  position,	  which	   receives	  no	   justification	   in	   his	  works	   of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  other	  than	  the	  aforementioned	  critique	  on	  the	  competing	  conception,	  claims	  that	  
al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  are	  ontological	  or	  factual	  properties412.	  This	  claim	  is	  coupled	  to	   a	   notion	   similar	   to	   that	   held	   by	   Sabzawārī	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   what	   he	  termed	  al-­‐nafs	  al-­‐amr	  (the	  realm	  of	  fact).	  For	  like	  Sabzawārī,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  caused	  by	  any	  claims	  that	  place	  the	  locus	  of	  these	  values	  within	   the	   existential	   act	   itself.	   Accordingly	   he	   holds	   that	   ḥusn	   and	   qubḥ	   are	  indeed	   factually	   or	   ontologically	   established	   (thābit)	   properties,	   but	   that	   the	  realm	  of	  ontology	  is	  wider	  than	  the	  realm	  of	  existence	  (lawḥ	  al-­‐wāqiʿī	  awsaʿa	  min	  
lawḥ	  al-­‐wajūd)413.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  306-­‐307.	  411	  The	  absence	  of	  any	  justifications	  for	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  own	  conception	  of	  morality	  may	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  is	  engaging	  in	  pure	  polemics	  (jadal)-­‐	  trying	  to	  justify	  his	  own	  position	  simply	  by	  undermining	  a	  contrasting	  (although	  not	  an	  opposite)	  view.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  absence	  of	  justifications	  for	  his	  position	  in	  his	  works	  of	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  may	  reflect	  that	  he	  recognises	  such	  debates	  are	  actually	  outside	  what	  he	  conceives	  to	  be	  the	  poper	  remit	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  	  412	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  305.	  413	  See	  Al-­‐Sharawurdī,	  Baḥuth	  fi	  ʿilm	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  4	  p.	  120.	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Despite	   the	   absence	   of	   justifications,	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   conception	   of	   morality	   is	  consistent	  with	   the	   classical	   ʿAdliyya	  moral	   objectivism	  adopted	  and	  developed	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought.	  Whereas	  reconciling	  Muẓaffar’s	  pure	   moral	   rationalism	   and	   the	   classical	   justifications	   for	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy,	  which	  relies	  on	  the	  self-­‐evidence	   of	   basic	  moral	   properties,	  was	   far	   less	   straightforward.	  Of	   course	   the	  proper	   place	   for	   any	   conclusive	   resolution	   of	   debates	   regarding	   whether	   the	  ontology	   of	   basic	  moral	   values	   is	   something	   natural	   and	   objective,	   or	  whether	  these	   values	   are	   purely	   constructed	   through	   the	   social	   consensus	   of	   rational	  beings	   is	   certainly	  not	  within	   the	  discipline	  of	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  These	  questions	  are	  for	  moral	   philosophy.	   Although	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   debates	   here	   do	   demonstrate	  the	   broader	   relevance	   of	   Uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   to	   understanding	   Muslim	   religious,	  theological	  and	  philosophical	   thought,	   they	  also	  point	  to	  the	  underdevelopment	  of	   any	   science	   within	   Muslim	   thought	   which	   deals	   with	   these	   fundamental	  questions	   of	  moral	   philosophy	   in	   their	   own	   right.	  What	   is	  most	   relevant	   about	  this	   debate	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	   that	   undermining	   Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  of	  morality	  and	  proposing	  that	  moral	  values	  are	  natural	  ontologically	  occurring	  facts,	  also	  undermines	  Muẓaffar’s	  argument	  for	  the	  mulāzama	  (rational	  correlation)	  between	   the	   judgement	  of	   reason	  and	   the	   judgement	  of	   the	  Divine	  legislator-­‐	  an	  issue	  which	  is	  firmly	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  is	  a	  critical	  link	  in	  understanding	  how	  judgements	  of	  reason	  regarding	  rational	  morality	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  Muẓaffar	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   a	   correlation	   (mulāzama)	   between	   rational	  judgements	  of	  al-­‐ḥusn	   and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   and	   the	   judgements	  of	   the	  Divine	   legislator,	  because	   al-­‐ḥusn	   and	   al-­‐qubḥ	   are	   nothing	   other	   than	   the	   concurrence	   of	   all	  rational	   beings	   regarding	   the	   praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness	   of	   an	   act-­‐	  and	  Allah	   is	  one	  of	   the	   rational	  beings	  upon	  whose	  opinion	   this	   concurrence	   is	  based414.	   However,	   having	   described	  al-­‐ḥusn	   and	  al-­‐qubḥ	   as	   factual	   ontological	  properties	   that	   exist	   irrespective	   of	   any	   judgement	   of	   the	   rational	   community,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  obviously	  cannot	  endorse	  such	  an	  argument	   for	  a	  mulāzama.	  The	  majority	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  scholars,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  position	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  morality,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  414	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	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do	   affirm	   the	   correlation	   between	   judgements	   of	   practical	   rationality	   and	   the	  judgements	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator415,	   yet	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   does	   not416.	   That	   this	  denial	  is	  contrary	  to	  a	  popular	  position	  of	  the	  Uṣūliyūn,	  which	  is	  intricately	  linked	  to	   fundamental	   aspects	   of	   the	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   tradition,	   says	   something	   about	  the	   honesty	   of	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   scholarship.	   It	   is	   a	   central	   premise	   of	   this	   study	  that	  in	  practice	  independent	  judgements	  of	  rational	  morality	  have	  no	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  derivation	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  and	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  in	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  mulāzama	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  accepts	  this417.	  	  As	   outlined	   above,	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   draws	   no	   substantive	   distinction	   between	  practical	  rationality	  and	  theoretical	  rationality,	  except	  that	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	   former	   ‘due	   to	   its	   self,	   requires	   a	   specific	   practical	   implication’418.	   	  He	   also	  notes	   that	   those	  who	   claim	   there	   is	   a	   correlation	   between	   practical	   rationality	  and	   judgements	   of	   the	   Divine	   Legislator	   describe	   the	   perception	   of	   utility	   and	  detriment-­‐	   judgements	   that	   fall	  under	   the	  remit	  of	   theoretical	  rationality-­‐	   to	  be	  the	   root	   of	   these	   practical	   judgements419.	   Accordingly	   to	   understand	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  denial	  of	  the	  correlation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  practical	  rationality	  requires	  us	  to	  understand	  his	  ideas	  on	  the	  correlation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  theoretical	  rationality.	  In	   line	   with	   his	   ʿAdliyya	   heritage,	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   affirms	   that	   ‘the	   precepts	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   follow	  utility	  and	  detriment’420,	   i.e.	   there	  is	  wisdom	  and	  purpose	  behind	  these	   precepts.	   Accordingly,	   and	   in	   his	   typical	   style	   of	   using	   philosophical	  terminology	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  legislation	  process,	  he	  states;	  	  [W]henever	  a	  criterion	  (milāk),	  with	  all	  its	  particularities	  and	  conditions,	  is	  complete,	  and	  it	  be	  free	  from	  any	  obstacles	  (mawāniʿ)	  from	  its	  bearing	  effect	   it	   can	   be	   considered	   at	   the	   level	   of	   a	   complete	   cause	   (al-­‐ʿillat	   al-­‐
tāmma)	  motivating	  the	  Master	  to	  stipulate	  a	  precept	  in	  accordance	  with	  it,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  415	  Al-­‐Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  307	  416	  Ibid.	  417	  Elsewhere	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  explicitly	  states	  that	  he	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  independent	  judgments	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  in	  the	  fiqhi	  inference	  of	  even	  a	  single	  precept,	  al-­‐Fatāwa	  al-­‐wāḍiha	  p.	  98.	  His	  position	  is	  also	  noted	  by	  Modarressi,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Law,	  p.	  4	  	  418	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  305.	  419	  Ibid,	  p.	  307.	  420	  Ibid,	  p.	  305.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  despite	  his	  criticism	  of	  Muẓaffar’s	  conception	  of	  ḥusn	  and	  qubḥ	  due	  to	  the	  intuitive	  concerns	  over	  a	  purely	  utilitarian	  conception	  of	  morality,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  has	  no	  problems	  in	  identifying	  the	  criteria	  behind	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  as	  being	  utility	  and	  detriment.	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in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  The	  Wisdom	  of	  The	  most	  exalted	  (wafaqan	  l-­‐
ḥikmatihi	  tʿāla)421.	  In	  simpler	  terms,	  whenever	  something	  is	  of	  benefit	  or	  detriment,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  other	  factors	  impeding	  that	  benefit	  or	  detriment,	  as	  Allah	  is	  Wise,	  He	  designates	  a	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  urging	  us,	  or	  impelling	  us,	  to	  acquire	  that	  benefit	  or	  refrain	  from	  that	   detriment.	   With	   this	   premise,	   which	   accepts	   that	   there	   is	   criteria	   and	  wisdom	  behind	  the	  legislation	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  goes	  on	  to	  accept	  that,	   ‘Thus	   it	   is	   possible,	   theoretically,	   should	   we	   suppose	   that	   theoretical	  rationality	   perceives	   this	   criteria,	   with	   all	   its	   particularities	   and	   issues,	   that	   in	  such	  a	  case	  it	  discloses	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept’.422	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  describes	  this	  ‘theoretical’	  mulāzama	  as	  being	  an	  instance	  of	  where	  the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	   discovered	   by	   ‘moving	   from	   cause	   to	   effect’,	   where	   the	  cause	   is	   knowledge	   of	   the	   criterion	   (milāk)	   and	   the	   effect	   is	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   which	   it	   discloses 423 .	   However	   despite	   conceding	   to	   the	  theoretical	  possibility	  of	   such	  an	   independent	  disclosure	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	   in	  practice	   such	   disclosure	   does	   not	   happen,	   for	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   conditions	   to	  reveal	  this	  correspondence	  are;	  [D]ifficult	   to	  actually	  occur	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  most	  situations.	  Because	  the	  scope	  of	  rationality	  is	  constrained,	  and	  humans	  recognise	  that	  their	   perspective	   is	   limited...	   more	   often	   than	   not	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   his	  perspective	  has	  missed	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  issues	  at	  hand’424.	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  affirms	  the	  wisdom	  and	  perfect	  rationality	  of	  God’s	  law,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  is	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  epistemic	  value	  of	  any	  of	  human	  reason’s	  attempts	   to	   independently	   properly	   understand	   this	   rationality	   and	   wisdom.	  Continuing	  in	  this	  tone	  he	  states;	  Sometimes	  he	  perceives	  the	  utility	  in	  an	  action,	  but	  usually	  he	  is	  not	  sure	  of	  its	  degree	  or	  the	  level	  of	  its	  importance,	  nor	  [is	  he	  sure]	  of	  the	  absence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  421	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  305	  422	  Ibid,	  p.	  306.	  423	  Ibid.	  424	  Ibid.	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of	   any	   conflicts	   to	   it.	   And	  when	   there	   is	   no	   surety	   in	   all	   of	   these	   things,	  there	  is	  no	  disclosure	  [of	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept]425.	  	  For	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  then,	  despite	  the	  precepts	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  being	  based	  on	  substantive	  objective	   criteria,	   in	   practice	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   rely	   on	   our	   independent	  judgements	  regarding	  the	  criteria	  of	  these	  precepts	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  surety	  in	  our	  judgments	   of	   reason.	   	   It	   seems	   that	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   does	   not	   actually	   deny	   the	  major	   premise	   in	   the	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   regarding	   a	  mulāzama	   between	  the	   judgements	   of	   reason	   and	   the	   judgements	   of	   the	  Divine	   Legislator-­‐	   if	  we	   a	  sure	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  judgement	  of	  reason	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  He	  just	  sees	  the	  possibility	   of	   surety	   in	   these	   judgements	   as	   being	   near	   impossible,	   and	   thus	  practically	  something	  which	  cannot	  be	  relied	  upon.	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  is	  not	  unique	  amongst	  the	  Uṣūliyūn	  in	  bringing	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	   actual	   epistemic	   reliability	   of	   reason	   in	   his	   treatment	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐
ʿaqliyya.	   In	   fact,	   as	   shall	   be	   further	   outlined,	   it	   is	   paradigmatic	   of	   the	   modern	  Uṣūlī	  school	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  any	  source	  of	  Sharī	   ͑a	  knowledge	  must	  ultimately	  rely	   on	   certainty,	   either	   a	   source	   of	   knowledge	   should	   be	   certainty	   bearing	   in	  itself	  or	  it	  should	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  certainly	  validated.	  Whether	  one	  conceives	  of	  
al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  al-­‐qubḥ	  as	  values	  resulting	  from	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  concurrence	  of	  the	  rational	  community,	  or	  whether	  they	  be	  seen	  as	  factual	  ontologically	  and	  naturally	  occurring	  values,	  it	  is	  the	  criteria	  for	  validity	  or	  ḥujjiyya	  which	  are	  the	  real	   obstacles	   preventing	   independent	   judgements	   of	   rational	   morality	   from	  playing	  a	  role	  in	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  precepts	  at	  the	  level	  of	  furūʿ	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	   effectively	   brought	   this	   criterion	   for	   validity	   into	   the	   question	   of	   the	  existence	  of	  the	  mulāzama.	  However,	  as	  mentioned	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  chapter,	  Muẓaffar	   correctly	   identified	   that	   the	   question	   of	   the	   validity	   of	   knowledge	  gained	   through	   the	   mulāzama	   is	   a	   separate	   question	   from	   the	   theoretical	  possibility	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgement	  of	  reason	  and	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  425	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  306.	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4.8.	  Summary	  	  The	   foregoing	   chapter	   has	   detailed	   a	   sample	   of	   the	   extensive	   debates	   and	  outlined	   two	   competing	   conceptions	   of	   morality	   and	   rationality	   adopted	   by	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  ʿAdliyya	  meta-­‐ethical	  tradition	  adopted	  and	  developed	  as	  a	   fundamental	   theological	  principle	   in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   radically	   different	   conceptions	   of	   morality	   amongst	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Muẓaffar	  and	  Isfahānī	  describe	  al-­‐ḥusn	  and	  
al-­‐qubḥ	   as	   having	   no	   objective	   reality	   beyond	   the	   concurrence	   of	   the	   rational	  community,	   whilst	   others	   such	   as	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   describe	   them	   as	   factual	   and	  naturally	   occurring	   ontological	   values.	   The	   conceptual	   analyses	   and	   debates	  regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   morality	   and	   rationality	   within	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   represent	  some	  of	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  contributions	  of	  Muslim	  thinkers	  to	  questions	  of	  moral	   philosophy.	  However	   resolution	   of	   debates	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  morality	  and	  rationality	  are	  clearly	  not	  questions	  within	  the	  core	  remit	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  and	  there	   is	   undoubtedly	   space	   within	   Muslim	   philosophical	   and	   theological	  scholarly	  endeavours	  for	  the	  independent	  treatment	  of	  these	  subjects.	  	  The	  discussions	  here	  are	  explicitly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  their	  implications	  for	  the	  role	  of	   independent	   judgements	   of	   reason,	   or	   rational	   morality,	   being	   a	   source	   of	  knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   Despite	   the	   upfront	   pessimism	   harboured	   by	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  with	   regards	   the	   limited	   scope	  and	  perspective	  of	  human	  reason,	  both	   he	   and	  Muẓaffar	   accept	   that	   a	   correlation	   between	   rational	   judgments	   of	  morality	   (however	   conceived)	   may,	   theoretically	   at	   least,	   reveal	   knowledge	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  However	  the	  radically	  different	  conceptions	  of	  morality	  held	  by	  both	  scholars	  necessitates	  quite	  different	  approaches	  to	  conceptualising	  how	  and	  when	  this	  correlation	  may	  occur.	  As	  has	  been	  alluded	  to	  already,	  the	  fundamental	  reason	  why	  this	  theoretical	  correlation,	  in	  both	  cases,	  does	  not	  bear	  substantive	  effect	   in	   allowing	   independent	   judgements	   of	   rational	   morality	   to	   inform	   the	  interpretation	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   is	   the	   epistemic	   criteria	   for	   the	   validity	   (ḥujjiyya)	   of	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	  The	  importance	  of	  these	  criteria	  now	  demand	  us	  to	  move	   to	   an	   independent	   treatment	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   amongst	   Shī	  ͑ī	  
Uṣūliyūn	   in	   general,	   followed	  by	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	   its	   implications	   for	  reason	  as	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	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5.	  The	  authoritativeness	  of	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge	  
and	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  This	   study	   set	   out	   in	   chapter	   two	   by	   identifying	   that	   the	   category	   of	   rational	  indicator	   (al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaqlī)	   that	   may	   properly	   be	   considered	   an	   independent	  source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	   only	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   (independent	  rationality),	   a	  direct	   function	  of	   the	   theological	  principle	  of	   the	   intelligibility	  of	  the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	   blameworthy.	   The	   meta-­‐ethical	   principle	   which	   has	  given	   rise	   to	   the	   theoretical	   space	   for	   this	   jurisprudential	   source	   has	   been	  conceived	   of	   and	   defended	   in	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   and	   nuanced	   ways	  through	   the	   history	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought.	   The	   resultant	   contributions	   to	  questions	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  morality	  and	  rationality	   found	  in	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  reflect	  a	  culmination	  of	  some	  of	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  ideas	  of	  Muslim	  thought	  on	   questions	   of	   moral	   philosophy.	   Despite	   radical	   differences	   emerging	   in	   the	  conceptions	   of	   morality	   held	   by	   different	   modern	   Uṣūliyūn	   we	   have	   seen	   a	  common	  affirmation	  of	  a	   theoretical	  correspondence	  between	  the	   judgments	  of	  reason	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   Divine	   legislation,	   albeit	   argued	   for	   in	   different	  ways.	  	  The	  study	  has	  thus	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  different	  views	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thinkers	  on	  the	  questions	   of	   moral	   ontology,	   moral	   epistemology	   and	   the	   correlation	   between	  judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	   However,	   as	  outlined	  in	  the	  fourfold	  schematic	  offered	  by	  Muẓaffar	  regarding	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya	   as	   a	   substantive	   source	   amongst	   the	   evidences	  employed	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts,	  there	  is	  still	  one	  outstanding	  and	  pivotal	  discussion	  remaining.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  deemed	  acceptable	  to	  actually	   rely	   upon	   such	   independent	   judgments	   of	   reason	   in	   the	   process	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference-­‐	  the	  question	  of	  ḥujjiyya-­‐	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  As	   shall	   be	   seen	   it	   is	   the	   epistemic	   considerations	   of	   validity	   entailed	   in	   the	  discussions	  of	  ḥujjiyya	  which	  are	  the	  major	  obstacle	  preventing	  al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
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ʿaqliyya	  playing	  a	  substantive	  role	   in	  the	   inferential	  process	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  Accordingly,	   and	   despite	   having	   already	   referred	   to	   the	   terms	   on	   numerous	  occasions,	  at	  this	  point	  a	  deeper	  analysis	  of	  exactly	  what	  the	  terms	  ḥujjiyya	  and	  
ḥujja	  have	  come	  to	  mean	  in	  modern	  Uṣūlī	  discourse	  is	  called	  for.	  This	  will	  allow	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	   the	  different	  relevant	  epistemic	  categories	  referred	  to	   by	   Uṣūliyūn	   that	   range	   from	   definitive	   knowledge	   or	   certainty	   (qaṭʿ)	   to	  probability	   or	   mere	   speculation	   (ẓann).	   This	   background	   will	   allow	   for	   a	  thorough	  treatment	  of	   the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  and	   the	  subsequent	  redundancy	  of	  independent	   rationality	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept.	   However,	   to	   further	  ground	  the	  treatment	  offered	  by	  the	  modern	  Uṣūliyūn	  on	  the	  subject,	  we	  will	  first	  give	   a	   short	   overview	   of	   how	   these	   key	   epistemic	   considerations	   have	   been	  conceived	  of	  through	  the	  history	  of	  Imāmi	  legal	  theory.	  	  	  	  	  
5.2	  From	  surety	  to	  doubt	  and	  back	  again	  Discussion	  of	  ḥujjiyya	  –	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  general	  and	  specific	  criteria	  for	  the	  validity	   of	   sources	   and	   methods	   employed	   in	   the	   actual	   process	   of	   inferring	  
aḥkām-­‐	   has	   gradually	   developed	  within	   the	   history	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   theory	   to	   the	  point	  where	  it	   is	  now	  recognized	  as	  being	  the	  pivotal	  discussion	  (al-­‐ʿumda	  fihā)	  of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh426.	   	   The	   context	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   these	   developments	   are	   no	  simple	   story.	   Despite	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   theory	   emerging	   form	   within,	   being	   highly	  influenced	  by	  and	  having	  parallels	  in	  the	  debates	  that	  ensued	  from	  Sunni	  circles,	  there	   a	   number	   of	   issues	   particular	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   history	   which	   have	   played	   a	  central	   role	   in	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   these	   all	   important	   debates	   regarding	   the	  
ḥujjiyya	  of	  the	  sources	  and	  methods	  employed	  by	  the	  mujtahid	  have	  taken	  shape.	  The	  history	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   theory	   can	  be	   vividly	  drawn	  according	   to	   the	  debates	  that	  have	  revolved	  around	  the	  central	  ideas	  of	  legal	  epistemology	  in	  general,	  and	  the	   criteria	   for	  ḥujjiyya	   in	   particular;	  what	   are	   the	   sources	   of	   knowledge	   upon	  which	  the	  mujtahid	  can	  rely,	  what	  type	  of	  knowledge	  do	  these	  sources	  produce	  and	  how	  can	  action	  in	  accordance	  with	  these	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  be	  justified	  or	  deemed	  valid?	  It	  is	  the	  question	  of	  justification	  or	  validity	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  426	  Muẓaffar,	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  7.	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Mujtahid’s	  reach	  their	  fiqhi	  opinions	  that	  is	  the	  question	  of	  ḥujjiyya,	  and	  as	  shall	  be	  seen,	   it	   is	  a	  question	  which	  cannot	  be	  separated	   from	  the	   ideas	  and	  debates	  held	  by	  Shī	  ͑a	   thinkers	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	   itself-­‐	  be	   that	  knowledge	  from	  textual	  sources	  or	  from	  rational	  ones.	  	  	  The	  early	  Imāmi	  rejection	  of	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām	  that	  were	  seen	  as	  less	  than	  certain	   (ẓannī),	   expressed	   through	   an	   attack	   on	   Ijtihād,	   khabar	   al-­‐wāḥid	   and	  
qiyās427,	  is	  encapsulated	  well	  in	  al-­‐Murtaḍā’s	  statement	  that	  such	  sources	  ‘can	  not	  lead	  to	  either	  knowledge	  or	  action’428.	  Zysow	  notes	  that	  al-­‐Murtaḍā’s	  teacher	  Al-­‐Mufīd,	  can	  be	   traced	  as	   the	  source	  of	   influence	   to	  a	   long	   line	  of	   Imāmi	  scholars	  who	   sought	   ‘an	   expulsion	   of	   uncertainty	   from	   the	   law’429.	   Although	   the	   early	  Imāmi	   rejection	   of	   ẓann	   in	   favour	   of	   ʿilm	   has	   continued	   to	   be	   a	   central	   motif	  under	  scoring	  Shī	  ͑ī	   jurisprudential	  endeavours	  to	  this	  day,	   it	  was	  an	  alternative	  epistemological	  trend	  to	  that	  represented	  by	  al-­‐Murtaḍā	  that	  would	  come	  to	  bear	  most	  influence	  on	  modern	  ideas	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  This	  alternative	  trend	  would	  commence	  so	  soon	  that	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  direct	  student	  of	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  none	  other	  than	  Shaykh	  al-­‐Ṭūsī	  who	  would	  commence	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  the	  epistemology	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   theory430.	  Al-­‐Ṭūsī	  began	   justification	   for	   the	   introduction	  of	   less	   than	  certain	   evidences	   through	   arguing	   for	   a	   juristic	   system	   with	   the	   speculative	  
khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid	  at	   its	  heart,	  a	  system	  which	  would	  be	   further	  developed	   into	  a	  fully	  blown	  theory	  of	  ijtihād	  by	  the	  time	  of	  	  	   ͑Allāma	  al-­‐Ḥillī431.	  	  The	   culmination	   of	   the	   shift	   towards	   an	   incorporation	   of	   less	   than	   certain	  knowledge	   within	   the	   Imāmi	   theory	   of	   ijtihād	   to	   the	   point	   that	   it	   could	   be	  described	   ‘as	  a	  methodology	  of	  doubt’	  was,	  according	   to	  Calder,	  given	  the	  most	  ‘clearest	  possible	  expression’	   in	   the	  Maʿālim	  al-­‐Dīn	  of	  Ḥasan	  bin	  Zayn	  al-­‐dīn	   (d.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  427	  For	  more	  on	  the	  early	  Imāmī	  rejection	  of	  speculative	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  and	  qiyās	  in	  particular	  see	  Robert	  Gleave,	  ‘	  Imami	  Shi’I	  Refutations	  of	  Qiyas’	  in	  Bernard	  Weiss	  (ed.	  )	  Studies	  in	  
Islamic	  Legal	  Theory	  (Leidan,	  Brill,	  2000)	  pp.	  267-­‐291.	  	  428	  Rasā’il	  al-­‐Sharīf	  al-­‐Murtaḍā,	  p.	  202.	  429	  Zysow,	  The	  economy	  of	  Certainty.	  pp.	  498-­‐499.	  430	  Different	  motives	  have	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  impetus	  for	  this	  shift;	  Zysow	  sees	  this	  as	  ultimately	  a	  function	  of	  ‘practical	  pragmatic	  concerns’,	  Ibid.	  p.510.	  Where	  as	  Calder	  brings	  to	  attention	  a	  desire	  to	  accommodate	  difference	  of	  opinion	  (ikhtilāf),	  and	  implications	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  clerical	  authority,	  see	  Doubt	  and	  Prerogative.	  	  431	  See	  Calder,	  Doubt	  and	  Prerogative.	  In	  this	  context	  Calder	  demonstrates	  that	  for	  al-­‐Ḥillī	  the	  very	  endeavor	  of	  fiqh,	  and	  the	  ijithād	  that	  produced	  it,	  was	  to	  produce	  less	  than	  certain	  opinion	  regarding	  normative	  questions,	  pp.	  68-­‐70.	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1011/1602-­‐3)432.	   It	   is	   within	   his	   arguments	   for	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   relying	   on	   the	  
khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid,	  whose	  status	  ‘is	  still	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Imāmi	  legal	  theory’433,	  that	  Ibn	   Zayn	   al-­‐Dīn	   explicates	   a	   methodology	   whose	   justification	   rested	   on	   the	  absence	  of	  the	  very	  ʿilm	  that	  the	  early	  Imāmi	  claimed	  was	  the	  only	  source	  of	  valid	  normativity.	  	  The	  sphere	  of	  definitive	  knowledge	  (bāb	  al-­‐ʿilm	  al-­‐qaṭʿī)	  of	  those	  aḥkām	  al-­‐
Sharʿiyya	   that	   are	  not	  known	  by	  necessity	   to	  be	  a	  part	  of	   the	   religion	   (al-­‐
dīn)	   or	   the	   school	   (madhhab)	   of	   the	   Ahl	   al-­‐Bayt	   is,	   in	   times	   like	   ours,	  certainly	  blocked	  off.	  For	  those	  of	  its	  indicators	  (adillatihā)	  that	  we	  do	  have	  provide	   nothing	   other	   than	   al-­‐ẓann,	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   the	   certainly	  transmitted	   (al-­‐mutawātira)	   Sunna,	   the	   obstacles	   to	   establishing	   Ijmā’	   in	  most	   cases	   except	   through	   al-­‐khabar	   al-­‐wāḥid,	   the	   evident	   nature	   of	   the	  principle	   of	   excusabillity	   [also]	   providing	   nothing	   other	   than	  al-­‐ẓann	   and	  [due	  to]	  The	  Book	  being	  of	  [only]	  ẓannī	  indication	  (dallāla)434.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  a	  manner	  which	  would	  be	   further	  elucidated	  and	  then	  championed	  by	  Mīrzā	  Qummī,	   Ibn	   Zayn	   al-­‐Dīn	   used	   this	   recognition	   of	   the	   impossibility	   of	   definitive	  knowledge,	  outside	  the	  essentials	  of	  religion	  and	  madhhab	  (school),	  as	  a	  platform	  for	   a	   pragmatic	   justification	   for	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   al-­‐ẓann	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   a	  justification	  which	  would	   in	  turn	  be	  used	  to	  accommodate	  reliance	  on	  the	  ẓann	  produced	  by	  the	  khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid435.	  If	   there	   is	   actually	  a	  blocking	  of	  access	   to	  sure	  knowledge	  (Insidād	  bāb	  al-­‐
ʿilm)	  in	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept,	  then	  the	  responsibility	  (al-­‐taklīf)	  with	  regards	  to	  it	  is,	  for	  sure,	  [to	  be	  ascertained]	  by	  means	  of	  al-­‐ẓann.	  And	  reason	  judges	  with	  respect	  to	  ẓann	  that	  if	  there	  are	  numerous	  aspects	  to	  it,	  which	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	   strength	   and	   weakness,	   that	   turning	   away	   from	   the	   strongest	  [possibility]	   towards	   the	  weakest	   is	   blameworthy.	   And	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  432	  Doubt	  and	  Perogative.	  p.	  77.	  	  433	  Zysow,	  ‘The	  economy	  of	  certitutde’,	  p.	  503.	  434Ma	  ͑ālim	  al-­‐din	  fi	  uṣūl,	  (Qum,	  n.	  p.,	  n.d.)	  p.	  192.	  In	  my	  translation	  of	  the	  passage	  I	  have	  benefitted	  from	  elements	  of	  Calder’s	  rendering.	  In	  particular	  his	  translation	  of	  bāb	  al-­‐ʿilm	  al-­‐qaṭʿī	  has	  been	  preffered	  over	  a	  more	  literal	  rendering	  of	  the	  phrase.	  See	  The	  Structure	  of	  Authority.	  pp	  .236-­‐237.	  435	  For	  Mīrzā	  Qummī’s	  championing	  of	  the	  unqualified	  validity	  of	  ẓann	  see	  al-­‐Qawānīn	  al-­‐
muḥkama	  fil-­‐uṣūl	  il-­‐matqana,	  al-­‐juz’	  al-­‐thālith	  (Qum,	  Mu’assasat	  Iḥyā	  al-­‐Kutub	  al-­‐Islāmī,	  2009),	  pp.	  238-­‐302.	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that	   in	   numerous	   akhbār	   al-­‐aḥād,	   the	   [strength	   of	   the]	   ẓann	   acquired	   by	  them	   is	   of	   that	   [strength]	  which	   is	   not	   acquired	   by	   any	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  indicators,	  and	  hence	  it	   is	  obligatory	  to	  prefer	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  it	  [i.e.	  the	  ẓann	  of	  the	  akhbār]436.	  	  	  To	   what	   extent	   this	   move	   towards	   justifying	   a	   recourse	   to	   less	   than	   certain	  knowledge	   from	  akhbār	  (transmitted	   reports),	   based	   simply	  on	   the	   strength	  of	  probabilities,	   opens	   up	   space	   for	   the	  ḥujjiyya	   of	   less	   than	   certain	   judgments	   of	  rational	  morality	  is	  a	  question	  that	  will	  be	  drawn	  out	  in	  subsequent	  discussions.	  At	  this	  stage	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  any	  potential	  shifts	  in	  this	  direction	  were	  hardly	  given	  chance	  to	  raise	  their	  head,	  for	  Ibn	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn’s	  ‘summation	  of	  the	  tradition	  was	   scarcely	   complete’	   before	   ‘it	   was	   attacked	   by	   the	   idealism	   of	   Mirzā	  Muḥammad	   al-­‐Astarābadī’ 437 .	   The	   Akhbārī	   movement	   spearheaded	   by	  Astarābadī	  (d.	  1036/1627)	  438	  was	  directly	  aimed	  at	  the	  developments	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   brought	   on	   by	   al-­‐Ḥillī	   and	   his	   followers.	   Central	   to	   this	   critique	   was	   ‘a	  rejection	  of	   ijtihād	   and	   the	   assertion	  of	   a	   binary	   epistemology	  between	   certain	  knowledge	   and	   ignorance’439.	   Although	   the	   subsequent	   polemics	   that	   ensued	  between	  Akhbārī	   and	  Uṣūlī	   have	   been	  well	   treated440,	   little	   attention	   has	   been	  paid	  to	  the	  lasting	  impact	  Akhbārī	  ideas	  have	  had	  upon	  the	  epistemological	  ideas	  in	  the	  Uṣūlī	  thought	  of	  the	  contemporary	  era.	  A	  cursory	  survey	  of	  any	  advanced	  work	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  will	  demonstrate	   that	  Akhbārī	   ideas	   still	  bear	  strongly	   upon	   the	   minds	   of	   the	   Uṣūliyūn,	   but	   the	   extent	   and	   nature	   of	   any	  influence	   is	   yet	   to	   be	   drawn	   out	   through	   the	   considered	   research	   that	   the	  question	  demands.	  	  Despite	  Bihbahānī	  being	  widely	  acclaimed	  as	   the	  champion	  of	   the	  Uṣūlī	   school,	  two	   generations	   later,	   Murtaḍā	   Anṣārī	   still	   felt	   the	   need	   to	   offer	   a	   systematic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  436	  Ma	  ͑ālim	  al-­‐din	  fi	  uṣūl,	  (Qum,	  n.	  p.,	  n.d.)	  p.	  192.	  437	  Calder,	  Doubt	  and	  Prerogative.	  p.	  72.	  438	  Gleave	  argues	  that,	  despite	  sporadic	  earlier	  references,	  it	  is	  only	  after	  Astrābādi	  that	  the	  term	  Akhbārī	  became	  associated	  with	  a	  defined	  intellectual	  trend	  with	  a	  known	  set	  of	  doctrines.	  See	  
Scriptualist	  Islam;	  The	  History	  and	  Doctrines	  of	  the	  Akhbārī	  Shī	  ͑ī	  School	  (Leiden,	  Brill,	  2007),	  pp.	  1-­‐30.	  For	  a	  contrasting	  view	  on	  the	  origins	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  Akbhārī	  school	  see	  Andrew	  Newman,	  
The	  development	  of	  political	  significance	  of	  the	  rationalist	  (Us ̣ūlī)	  and	  traditionalist	  (Akhbārī)	  
schools	  in	  Imāmī	  Shiʻī	  history	  from	  the	  third/ninth	  to	  the	  tenth/sixteenth	  century	  A.D.	  Unpublished	  PhD	  Thesis	  (Los	  Angeles,	  Universty	  of	  California,	  1986)	  2	  Vols.	  	  439	  Gleave,	  Scriptualist	  Islam,	  p.	  30	  440	  For	  example	  see	  Gleave,	  Inevitable	  doubt.	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Uṣūlī	   response	   to	   Akhbārī	   ideas	   which	   attacked	   the	   non-­‐certain	   and	   extra-­‐scriptural	   elements	   of	   	   ͑Allama’s	   system.	   The	   Farāid	   al-­‐uṣūl	   of	   Anṣārī	   is	   the	  paradigmatic	   work	   of	   modern	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   its	   author	  upon	  contemporary	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  deserves	  far	  more	  attention	  than	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study	  can	  afford441.	  However	  it	  can	  be	  stated	  here	  that,	  beyond	  the	  extensive	  rebuttals	  of	  specific	  ideas	  attributed	  to	  Astarābadī	  and	  his	  like,	  the	  very	  structure	  of	   the	   work	   may	   well	   be	   seen	   as	   indicative	   of	   the	   culmination	   of	   the	   Uṣūlī	  response	  to	  these	  Akhbārī	  challenges.	  	  In	  Anṣārī’s	  thesis	  the	  ‘procedural	  certainty’	  Bihbahānī	  emphasized	  as	  the	  means	  to	  overcome	  the	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  validity	  of	  doubt	  was	  given	  philosophical	  rigor442.	  Structuring	  his	  treatment	  according	  to	  the	  epistemological	  categories	  of	  
qaṭʿ,	  ẓann	  and	  shakk	  (absolute	  doubt),	  Anṣārī	  explicitly	  re-­‐infused	  ʿilm	  back	  into	  a	  methodology	  which	  once	  more,	  polemically	   at	   least,	  would	  be	  able	   to	   re-­‐affirm	  the	  early	  Imāmi	  slogan	  which	  invalidated	  recourse	  to	  anything	  that	  was	  less	  than	  certain.	  Of	   course	  Anṣārī’s	   rejection	  of	  ẓann	   could	  not	  be	  absolute,	   for	  not	  only	  did	  he	  want	  to	  maintain	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  faqih	  in	  cases	  which	  could	  be	  treated	  through	   considerations	   of	   speculative	   akhbār,	   but	   he	   also	   reinforced	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   faqih	   in	   areas	   of	   absolute	   doubt	   (al-­‐shakk)	   through	   his	   re-­‐theorization	   of	   the	   practical	   principles	   (al-­‐uṣūl	   al-­‐ʿamaliyya)443.	   Ultimately	   the	  recourse	   to	  ẓann	   in	   the	   absence	  of	   ʿilm	  had	   to	  be	   accounted	   for,	   but	   the	   subtle	  shift	   in	   Anṣārī’s	   system	  was	   to	  make	   explicit	   that	   recourse	   to	   this	   ẓann	   would	  
only	  be	  considered	  valid	  if	  their	  is	  ʿilm,	  sure	  or	  certain	  knowledge,	  regarding	  the	  
validity	  or	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  these	  sources.	  As	  shall	  be	  seen,	  It	   is	  through	  claiming	  that	  there	  is	  surety	  or	  certain	  knowledge	  in	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  the	  sources	  and	  methods	  employed	   by	   the	  mujtahid	   that	   allows	   him	   to	  maintain	   that	   even	   if	   his	   ijtihād	  produces	   fiqhi	   precepts	   which	   are	   not	   consistent	   with	   ‘the	   real	   precept	   from	  Allah’,	   both	   he,	   and	   those	   following	   his	   opinion	   would	   be	   excused	   from	   the	  responsibility	   of	   their	   error.	   Although	   relying	   on	   less	   than	   certain	   sources	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441	  Modarressi	  talks	  of	  ‘modern	  Shī	   ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh’	  as	  being	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘the	  School	  of	  Anṣārī’,	  
An	  Introduction	  to	  Shī	  ī͑	  Law,	  p.	  11.	  For	  a	  survey	  of	  Anṣārī’s	  work	  and	  influence	  see	  Zackery	  Heern,	  
Shī	  ͑ī	  Law	  and	  Leadership:	  The	  influence	  of	  Mortaza	  Anṣārī	  (Saarbrucken,	  Lambert	  Academic	  Publishing,	  (2010).	  442	  For	  Bihbahānī’s	  procedural	  certainty	  see	  Gleave,	  Ineivtable	  doubt,	  pp.	  23-­‐28.	  443	  For	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  uṣūl	  al-­‐ʿamaliyya	  and	  their	  role	  in	  post-­‐Anṣārī	  system	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference	  see	  Fanaei	  and	  Bhojani,	  ‘Ijtihād	  in	  Traditional	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.’	  pp.	  115-­‐116.	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knowledge	   necessarily	   introduces	   the	   risk	   of	   producing	   incorrect	   opinion,	   the	  risk	  is	  mitigated	  by	  a	  claimed	  surety	  that	  ‘The	  Divine	  legislator	  is	  content	  with	  it	  [i.e.	   the	  source	  of	  speculative	  knowledge]	  being	  considered	  by	  us	  as	  a	  means	  to	  his	  precepts,	  and	  that	  he	  has	  designated	  it	  a	  ḥujja	  upon	  us’444.	  	  	  	  	  	  
5.3	  Ḥujja	  and	  ḥujjiyya	  	  Even	   from	   this	  brief	  overview	  of	   some	  of	   the	  epistemological	   concerns	  held	  by	  Shī	  ͑ī	  Uṣūliyūn	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  sources	  and	  methods	  employed	  by	   a	  mujtahid,	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   terms	   and	   concepts	   of	   ḥujja	   and	   ḥujjiyya	  becomes	  plain.	  Uṣūliyūn	  refer	  to	  a	  number	  of	  different	  usages	  of	  the	  term	  ḥujja,	  it	  is	  used	  both	  in	  its	   linguistic	  sense	  and	  in	  a	  number	  of	  more	  restricted	  technical	  usages.	  Central	  to	  the	  linguistic	  non-­‐technical	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  ḥujja	  is	  a	  notion	  of	   	   ‘overcoming’	  (al-­‐ghalaba)445,	  or	  to	  be	   ‘victorious	  over	  another’	  (al-­‐ẓaffar	  ʿalā	  
al-­‐ghayr)446.	  Muẓaffar	  defines	  the	  terms	  linguistic	  usage	  as	  referring	  to	  ‘anything	  capable	  of	  being	  employed	  in	  an	  argument	  against	  another,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  would	   lead	   to	   victory	   over	   another	   in	   event	   of	   dispute	  with	   it’447.	   Anticipating	  debates	  about	  the	  technical	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Muẓaffar	  notes	  that	  any	  such	  ‘victory’	  or	  means	  to	  winning	  an	  argument	  may	  be	  of	  two	  types;	  either	  the	  ḥujja	  may	  be	  employed	  to	  silence	  the	  dispute	  and	  show	  that	   it	   is	  void,	  or	   it	  may	  be	  employed	  to	  provide	  excusabillity	  (muʿadhdhariyya)	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  one	  possessing	  the	  ḥujja448.	  Stemming	   from	   obvious	   associations	   to	   this	   linguistic	   meaning,	   Muslims	   have	  also	  employed	   the	   term	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  narrower	   technical	  meanings.	   Sanqūr	  mentions	   three	   distinct,	   but	   related,	   usages	   of	   the	   term	   ḥujja	   in	   logic,	  appreciation	  of	  which	  will	  help	  clarify	  the	  particular	  technical	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  The	   first	  of	   these	   is	  used	  to	  describe	   ‘any	  known	  assent	  (maʿlūm	  
taṣdīqī)	  capable	  of	  establishing	  an	  unknown	  assent	  (majhūl	  taṣdīqī)’449.	  	  In	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  444	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.2,	  p.	  3.	  445	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  10.	  446	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.2,	  p.	  12.	  447	  Ibid.	  448	  Ibid,	  p.	  3.	  449	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  Vol.	  2,	  p	  11.	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words,	  any	  proposition	  capable	  of	  being	  used	  as	  a	  premise	  in	  a	  formal	  syllogism	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ḥujja.	  A	  second	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  ḥujja	  is	  found	  where	  it	  is	  used	   to	   refer,	   not	   to	   the	   individual	   premises	   of	   the	   syllogism,	   but	   to	   the	  combination	  of	  the	  premises	  in	  a	  syllogism	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  conclusion450.	  Consider	  the	  following	  example;	  	  Minor	  premise;	  the	  world	  is	  in	  motion	  Major	  premise;	  every	  thing	  that	  is	  in	  motion	  is	  temporal	  Conclusion;	  the	  world	  is	  temporal	  	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  both	  minor	  and	  major	  premises,	  even	  in	  isolation	  of	  each	  other,	  may	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ḥujja.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  second	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  it	  is	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  syllogism	  itself,	  the	  combination	  of	  minor	  and	  major,	  which	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ḥujja.	  Finally	  the	  logicians	  also	  describe	  the	  middle	  term	  (ḥadd	  al-­‐awsat)	   of	   the	   syllogism	   as	   the	  ḥujja,	   in	   the	   above	   example	   the	  middle	  term	   is	   ‘temporal’.	   It	   is	   through	   this	   middle	   term	   that	   the	   syllogism	   seeks	   to	  assert	  the	  conclusion,	  had	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  minor	  premise	  and	  the	  predicate	  of	  the	   major	   premise	   not	   shared	   in	   this	   middle	   term,	   it	   would	   not	   have	   been	  possible	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  world	   is	   temporal.	   In	   all	   three	   logical	   usages	   of	   the	  term,	   albeit	   in	   slightly	   different	   ways,	   the	   ḥujja	   is	   referring	   to	   a	   	   ‘means	   of	  affirming	  a	  thing	  (wāsita	  fil-­‐ithbāt)’451.	  Now	  in	  the	  specific	  Uṣūlī	  sense	  of	   the	  term,	  al-­‐ḥujja	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  the	  ḥujja	  again	   is	  a	  means	  of	  affirming	  a	  thing.	  However	  the	  type	  of	  affirmation	  is	  different	  from	  the	  affirmation	   in	   the	   logical	   usage	   of	   the	   term.	   For	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  ḥujja	   is	   used	   to	  specifically	  refer	   to	   those	  evidences	   that	  are	  not	   conclusive	  or	  certain	   in	  and	  of	  themselves.	   Muẓaffar	   describes	   this	   specific	   technical	   usage	   of	   term	   ḥujja	   as	  being	  applicable	  to	  ‘any	  thing	  that	  establishes	  its	  referent	  whilst	  not	  reaching	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  450	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  Vol.	  2,	  p	  11.	  451	  Ibid,	  p.	  12.	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level	   of	   certainty’452.	   It	   is	   the	   qualification	   ‘whilst	   not	   reaching	   the	   level	   of	  certainty’	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  ḥujja	  al-­‐uṣūlī	  from	  the	  usage	  of	  ḥujja	  in	  logic.	  For	  in	  this	  uṣūlī	  usage	  the	  ḥujja	   is	  explicitly	  not	  a	  means	  of	  attaining	  certainty	   in	   its	  referent,	   rather	   ‘a	   ḥujja	   is	   anything	   that	   gives	   disclosure	   about	   another	   thing	  passing	  judgment	  over	  it,	  as	  though	  it	  is	  actually	  establishing	  it	  (ʿala	  wajh	  yakūnu	  
muthbatan	  lahu)’453.	  There	   is	  actually	  no	  natural	   causative	  relationship	  between	  the	  ḥujja	  and	  its	  referent.	  The	  legal	  testimony	  (al-­‐bayyina)	  of	  two	  just	  witnesses	  has	  no	  natural	  causative	  effect	  upon	  a	   liquid	  which	  they	  have	   testified	  as	  being	  alcoholic,	   but	   their	   testimony	   (the	   ḥujja)	   is	   deemed	   sufficient	   to	   be	   able	   to	  consider	   the	   liquid	   as	   being	   alcoholic	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   due	   to	   there	   being	   an	  external	   designation	   that	   deems	   the	   testimony	   of	   two	   just	   witnesses	   to	   be	   of	  evidential	  worth.	  Thus	  the	  ḥujja	  al-­‐uṣūlī	  is	  that	  which	  establishes	  its	  referent	  due	  only	   to	   a	   designation	   from	   the	   Divine	   legislator	   that	   the	   one	   vested	   with	  responsibility	  may	  consider	  its	  disclosure	  to	  be	  actually	  true	  and	  reflective	  of	  al-­‐
wāqiʿī	  (reality)454.	  Despite	   the	  Uṣūliyūn	   using	   the	   term	  ḥujja	   in	   all	   of	   the	   above	   different	  ways	   in	  their	  writing	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  their	  ultimate	  concern	  when	  talking	  of	  ḥujjiyya	  is	  one,	  and	   that	   is	   to	   establish	   which	   types	   of	   arguments,	   evidences	   and	   methods	   of	  interpretation	   are	   authoritative	   when	   employed	   in	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  This	  notion	  of	  ‘authoritativeness’	  is	  ḥujjiyya455.	  It	  is	  a	  quality	  described	  as	   yielding	   two	   components;	   accountability	   (munajjaziyya)	   and	   excusabillity	  (muʿadhdhariyya).	  The	  aspect	  of	  accountability	  refers	  to	  the	  liability	  before	  God	  for	   one	   vested	   with	   responsibility,	   God	   can	   hold	   one	   to	   account	   before	   an	  authoritative	   source	   of	   knowledge.	   Excusabillity,	   the	   flip	   side	   of	   the	   coin,	   gives	  the	  one	  vested	  with	  responsibility	  an	  excuse	  before	  God	  if	  action	   in	  accordance	  with	  that	  authoritative	  source	  actually	  led	  to	  an	  incorrect	  ruling	  or	  action.	  Thus	  something	   that	   has	  ḥujjiyya	   is	   an	   authoritative	  means	   by	  which	   God	  may	   hold	  responsible	  people	  to	  account	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  an	  authoritative	  excuse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  452	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.2,	  p.	  12.	  453	  Ibid.	  454	  Ibid.	  455	  Although	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  refrained	  from	  offering	  a	  direct	  translation	  of	  ḥujjiyya,	  I	  do	  prefer	  Hallaq’s	  translation	  of	  the	  term	  as	  ‘authoritativeness’,	  as	  found	  in	  ‘On	  the	  Authoritativeness	  of	  Sunni	  Consensus’,	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies,	  Vol.	  XVIII	  p.	  428,	  rather	  than	  Gleave’s	  choice	  of	  ‘probative	  force’.	  See	  Inevitable	  Doubt,	  p.	  31	  n.	  9.	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for	   the	   one	   vested	   in	   responsibility	   to	   seek	   exemption	   before	   God.	   To	   fully	  appreciate	  how	  the	  post-­‐Anṣārī	  criteria	  for	  ḥujjiyya	  allows	  for	  a	  reliance	  on	  less	  than	   certain	   textual	   evidences	   but	   renders	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	  irrelevant	   to	   any	   considerations	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   inference,	   requires	   first	   a	   fuller	  exposition	  of	  the	  two	  key	  epistemic	  categories	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  Uṣūliyūn,	  al-­‐qaṭʿ	  and	  al-­‐ẓann,	  and	  how	  they	  may	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  authoritative.	  	  	  
5.4	  Ḥujjiyya	  of	  qaṭʿ	  In	  modern	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  the	  term	  qaṭʿ,	  thus	  far	  translated	  as	  certainty	  or	  definitive	  knowledge,	   is	   often	   used	   synonymously	   with	   ʿilm-­‐	   the	   category	   of	   knowledge	  contrasted	  with	  the	  speculative,	  and	  at	  best	  probable,	  epistemological	  category	  of	  
ẓann.	  Despite	   the	  ambiguity	   that	   sometimes	  arises	   in	   the	  usage	  of	  qaṭʿ	   and	   ʿilm	  within	   the	   discipline456,	   the	   term	  qaṭʿ	   does	   have	   a	   specific	  meaning	   in	  modern	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   that	  needs	  clarifying	  before	  moving	  to	  discuss	  the	  authoritativeness	  of	  this	  type	  of	  knowledge.	  
Qaṭʿ	  refers	  to	  a	  psychological	  state	  of	  surety	  (jazm)	  established	  when	  one	  holds	  a	  belief	   and	   all	   alternative	   possibilities	   to	   that	   belief	   are	   ‘cut	   off’	   (yaqtaʿa)	   and	  negated457-­‐	   there	   is	   absolutely	   no	   scope	   for	   doubt	   in	  qaṭʿ.	   	   This	   level	   of	   surety	  may	  arise	  in	  one	  of	  two	  situations;	  the	  psychological	  surety	  (jazm)	  may	  actually	  correspond	  with	   reality,	   in	  which	   case	   it	   is	   an	   instance	  of	  yaqīn-­‐	   a	   true	   certain	  belief.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  may	  be	  no	  real	  corresponding	  basis	  to	  the	  surety,	  such	   as	  when	   it	   arises	   out	   of	   compound	   ignorance	   (jahl	  murakkab)458.	   In	   both	  cases	  the	  psychological	  surety	  (jazm),	  whether	   it	   is	  correspondent	  to	  a	  truth	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  baseless,	  is	  described	  by	  the	  Uṣūliyūn	  as	  qaṭʿ	  459.	  As	  shall	  be	  further	  outlined,	  according	  to	  modern	  Shī	  ͑a	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  both	  forms	  of	  qaṭʿ	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  456	  This	  ambiguity	  arises	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  qaṭʿ,	  despite	  some	  overlap,	  the	  technical	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  in	  logic	  (which	  refers	  to	  the	  state	  arising	  form	  a	  true	  certain	  belief)	  is	  different	  to	  its	  technical	  usage	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  (which	  is	  simply	  certain	  belief,	  whether	  it	  actually	  be	  true	  or	  not),	  and	  authors	  rarely	  state	  explicitly	  which	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  they	  intend.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  term	  ʿilm,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  subject	  to	  different	  implications	  across	  different	  disciplines,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  a	  type	  of	  anachronistic	  usage	  when	  authors	  try	  to	  reclaim	  past	  conceptions	  of	  ʿilm	  to	  equate	  to	  more	  modern	  conceptions.	  457	  Al-­‐Faḍli,	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  260.	  458	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  yaqīn	  and	  jahl	  murakkab	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  14-­‐16.	  	  459	  Al-­‐Faḍli,	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  260.	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deemed	  to	  have	  the	  quality	  of	  ḥujjiyya	  and	  hence	  both	  are	  authoritative.	  	  	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  epistemological	  framework	  set	  out	  by	  Anṣārī,	  Muẓaffar	  sates	  that	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  ʿilm,	  (and	  what	  is	  intended	  here	  by	  ʿilm	  is	  the	  broad	  Uṣūlī	  usage	  of	  
qaṭʿ	   just	   outlined),	   is	   essential	   (al-­‐ḥujjiyat	  al-­‐ʿilm	  dhātiyya).	   This	   position	   is	   the	  foundation	   stone	   of	   the	  mainstream	   school	   of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   epistemology.	  Much	  of	  the	  discussion	  amongst	  modern	  Uṣūliyūn	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  ʿilm,	  in	  the	   sense	   of	  qaṭʿ,	  and	   how	   it	   is	   deemed	   authoritative	   employs	   Shaykh	  Anṣārī’s	  comments	  on	  the	  matter	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  further	  deliberation.	  Anṣārī	  states	  that;	  	  [T]here	  is	  no	  doubting	  the	  obligation	  to	  follow	  qaṭʿ	  and	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  it	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  present,	  because	  it	  is,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  a	  means	  (ṭariq)	  to	  reality	  (wāqiʿī)	  .	  And	  its	  instrumentality	  is	  not	  capable	  of	  stipulation	  from	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  affirmation	  or	  negation460.	  	  Anṣārī	   here	   asserts	   that	   qaṭʿ	   has	   a	   disclosive	   quality,	   described	   as	   the	  instrumentality	  (ṭarīqiyya)	  of	  qaṭʿ	  in	  revealing	  reality.	  He	  also	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  follow	  this	  qaṭʿ.	  Muẓaffar	  recognizes	  that	  the	  description	  of	  qaṭʿ	  as	  having	  these	  two	  qualities	  is	  not	  free	  from	  ambiguity	  and	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  psychological	  certainty	  is	  authoritative	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  own	  essence	  (bi-­‐dhātihi)461.	  Somewhat	  sympathetically,	  Muẓaffar	  states	   that	   this	  ambiguity	   in	  Anṣārī’s	  words	  arises	  only	  due	   to	   the	   strictures	  of	  the	   language	   being	   employed.	   For	  Muẓaffar,	   the	   proper	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	  
qaṭʿ	  shows	  that;	  [T]here	   is	   no	   independent	   obligation	   associated	   with	   qaṭʿ	   other	   than	   the	  acceptance	   of	   the	   reality	   which	   is	   considered	   certain…	   there	   is	   nothing	  beyond	  the	  disclosure	  of	  reality	  for	  which	  man	  waits;	  if	  reality	  is	  disclosed	  to	  him,	  it	  is	  necessary	  (lā	  budda)	  that	  he	  accepts	  it462.	  This	   necessity	   (lā	   buddiyya)	   to	   accept	   the	   certain	   disclosure	   of	   reality	   is	  according	  to	  Muẓaffar	  a	  rational	  necessity	  whose	  origin	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  qaṭʿ	  is,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  460	  Farā’id	  al-­‐uṣūl	  (Beirut,	  Mu’assasat	  al-­‐nu	  ͑man,	  1991)	  Vol.	  1,	  p.	  4.	  461	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  vol.	  2,	  pp.	  20-­‐21.	  462	  Ibid.	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in	  of	   itself,	  a	  means	  to	  reality.	  Thus	  Anṣārī’s	  claim	  that	   there	   is	  an	  obligation	  to	  follow	   qaṭʿ	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	   recognition	   that	   ‘qaṭʿ	   in	   itself	   is	   a	  means	   to	  reality,	   its	  essence	  being	   the	  very	  disclose	  of	   reality’.463	  The	   two	  aspects	  of	  qaṭʿ	  described	   by	   Anṣārī,	   its	   disclosive	   nature	   and	   the	   obligation	   to	   follow	   it,	   are	  according	   to	  Muẓaffar	   ‘a	   single	   thing	   in	   reality’	  and	  hence	   it	   can	  be	  understood	  why	   Anṣārī	   stated	   that	   the	   obligation	   to	   follow	   qaṭʿ	   is	   a	   result	   of	   its	   essential	  instrumentality	  (al-­‐ṭarīqiyyat	  al-­‐dhātiiyya).	  464	  	  	  The	   tone	   of	   Muẓaffar’s	   prose	   somewhat	   betrays	   the	   ideological	   esteem	   with	  which	  qaṭʿ,	  and	  the	  ʿilm	  which	  it	  is	  considered	  reflective	  of,	  are	  afforded	  when	  he	  elaborates	  on	  the	  essential	   instrumentality	  of	  certainty	   in	  disclosing	  reality	  and	  impelling	  acceptance;	  It	  has	  already	  been	  said	  that	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  al-­‐qaṭʿ	   is	  the	  disclosure	  of	  reality,	  this	  is	  because	  it	  is	  a	  pure	  luminescent	  reality,	  there	  is	  no	  darkness	  in	  it	  and	  no	  possibility	  of	  error	  is	  associated	  with	  it.	  This	  is	  because	   ʿilm	   is	  illuminating	  of	  its	  own	  self	  and	  illuminating	  of	  other	  than	  itself.	  Its	  essence	  is	  disclosure	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  that	  it	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  has	  disclosive	  properties465.	  Based	  on	  the	  philosophical	  premise	  of	   ‘that	  which	  is	  essential	   is	  not	  caused	  (al-­‐
dhātī	   la	   yuʿallul)’,	   this	   instrumentality	   of	   qaṭʿ	   can	   neither	   be	   affirmed	   nor	  negated;	  qaṭʿ	  simply	  is	  disclosive	  of	  reality.	  The	  emphasis	  this	  position	  receives	  in	  the	  works	  of	  the	  Uṣūliyūn	  may	  seem	  a	  bit	  much,	  even	  by	  Uṣūlī	  standards,	  at	  least	  until	   the	   context	   of	   Anṣārī’s	   polemics	   against	   the	   Akhbārī	   school	   are	   revisited.	  One	  of	  the	  prominent	  contentions	  of	  the	  Akhbārī	  disposition	  refuted	  by	  Anṣārī	  in	  this	  analysis	  of	  qaṭʿ	  was	  that	  only	  certainty	  arising	  from	  specific	  textual	  sources	  is	  relevant	   in	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a,	   with	   the	   certainty	   arising	   from	   rational	  premises	   (muqaddamāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	   not	   deemed	   relevant466.	   However	   the	  Uṣūlī	  position,	   informed	   by	   the	   forgoing	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   qaṭʿ,	   holds	   that	   the	  instrumentality	   of	   qaṭʿ	   and	   the	   subsequent	   rational	   necessity	   to	   accept	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  463	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  21.	  464	  Ibid.	  465	  Ibid,	  p.	  22.	  466	  See	  Anṣārī,	  Farā’id	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  pp.	  15-­‐22.	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disclosure	   is	   essential	   to	   qaṭʿ	   and	   thus	   it	   is	   not	   philosophically	   possible,	   and	  hence	  not	  actually	  possible,	   for	  God	  to	  remove	  this	   instrumentality	  of	  qaṭʿ	   from	  any	  source	  whatsoever	  -­‐be	  it	  rational	  or	  textual.	  	  The	  foregoing	  analysis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  qaṭʿ	  leads	  to	  acceptance	  of	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  
qaṭʿ,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   qaṭʿ	   conferring	   accountability	   and	   excusabillity.	   Qaṭʿ	   is	  considered	   by	   its	   own	   essence	   to	   be	   instrumental	   in	   disclosing	   reality	   and	  impelling	  the	  one	  who	  is	  certain	  towards	  accepting	  the	  object	  of	  certainty,	   thus	  whenever	   there	   is	   qaṭʿ	   in	   a	   duty	   that	   duty	   is	   considered	   to	   become	   an	   active	  (munajjaz)	   responsibility.	   The	   accountability	   side	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   becomes	   present.	  Due	   to	   the	   rational	   obligation	   to	   follow	   this	   certainty,	   even	   if	   the	   certainty	  actually	   leads	  to	  false	  action	  there	  can	  be	  no	  liability	   levied	  upon	  the	  individual	  for	   any	   resultant	   error.	   The	   epistemological	   value	   of	   qaṭʿ	   is	   so	   high	   that	   an	  individual	  has	  no	  option	  but	  to	  accept	  his	  certainty	  and	  God	  cannot	  expect	  him	  to	  do	   otherwise,	   hence	   the	   excusabillity	   element	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   is	   also	   present.	   Any	  source	  of	  knowledge	  producing	  qaṭʿ	  is	  thus	  considered	  a	  ḥujja	  by	  the	  Uṣūliyūn,	  it	  is	   a	  means	   of	   affirming	   (wāsita	   fil-­‐ithbāt)	   the	   religious	   precept	   associated	  with	  any	  given	  instance	  and	  can	  be	  employed	  as	  a	  justified	  means	  of	  inferring	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	   	  However	  describing	  a	  qaṭʿ	  producing	  source	  or	  evidence	  as	  a	  ḥujja	   is	  employing	  the	  term	  ḥujja	  in	  its	  linguistic	  or	  logical	  sense,	  for	  as	  described	  above,	  the	  ḥujja	  al-­‐uṣūlī	  is	  a	  source	  which	  is	  deemed	  authoritative	  but	  in	  themselves	  does	  not	  disclose	  or	  affirm	  reality.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  pivotal	  category	  of	  the	  ḥujja	  al-­‐uṣūlī	  and	  the	  means	  of	  justifying	  its	  validity	  that	  we	  turn	  to	  now	  when	  discussing,	  not	  the	  
ḥujjiyya	  of	  qaṭʿ,	  but	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  ẓann.	  	  	  	  
5.5	  The	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  ẓann	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  although	  he	  himself	  is	  not	  a	  proponent	  of	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning467,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  467	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  claims	  that	  ḥujjiyya	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  function	  of	  the	  discolsive	  properties	  of	  qaṭʿ,	  but	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  function	  of	  God’s	  devotional	  right-­‐	  his	  mawlawiyya.	  The	  disclosure	  of	  responsibility	  attained	  through	  qaṭʿ	  only	  confers	  ḥujjiyya	  if	  and	  when	  that	  responsibility	  comes	  from	  someone	  who	  is	  in	  a	  position	  of	  authority	  and	  to	  whom	  obedience	  is	  owed.	  According	  to	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  God,	  this	  right	  of	  obedience	  (ḥaqq	  al-­‐ṭāʿa)	  extends	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  includes	  not	  only	  responsibilities	  which	  one	  is	  certain	  of,	  but	  also	  suspected	  (maẓnūn)	  responsibilities	  and	  even	  doubted	  (mashkūk)	  ones.	  This	  novel	  position	  seems	  to	  extend	  the	  fiqhi	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recognizes	   that	   the	   above	   position	   is	   the	   popularly	   held	   view	   (al-­‐mashhūr)	  amongst	  modern	  Uṣūliyūn	  regarding	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  qaṭʿ.	  	  With	   regards	   to	   accountability	   (al-­‐munajjaziyya)	   they	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   an	  essential	  correlative	  of	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  qaṭʿ,	  and	  hence	  they	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  accountability	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  qaṭʿ.	  Accordingly	  it	  [the	  popularly	  held	  position]	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  the	   blameworthiness	   of	   punishment	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   explication	   [of	  responsibility]	  (qubḥ	  al-­‐ʿiqāb	  bi-­‐lā	  bayān).468	  Framing	   the	   popularly	   held	   position	   regarding	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   qaṭʿ	   in	   this	   way	  leads	   neatly	   into	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   ẓann.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	  epistemological	  hierarchy	   set	  out	   in	   ʿilm	  al-­‐manṭiq,	  ẓann	   reflects	   a	  qualitatively	  lower	  category	  to	  that	  of	  qaṭʿ,	  for	  to	  have	  ẓann	  regarding	  something	  is	  described	  as	   the	   weakest	   form	   of	   assent	   (taṣdīq).469	  Ẓann	   by	   definition	   admits	   to	   the	  possibility	   of	   error	   but	   is	   of	   higher	   epistemological	   status	   than	   the	   absolute	  doubt	   (shakk)	   that	   is	   considered	   to	  arise	   as	   a	   result	  of	  being	  precisely	  midway	  between	   certain	   knowledge	   (‘ilm)	   and	   absolute	   ignorance	   (jahl).	   Ẓann	   implies	  some	  sort	  of	  preponderance	  (rajḥān)	  in	  the	  mind	  towards	  a	  position	  that,	  unlike	  
qaṭʿ,	   accepts	   the	   possibility	   of	   alternatives	   to	   it	   (iḥtimāl	   al-­‐khilāf)470.	   The	   term	  
ẓann	   is	  then	  broad	  enough	  to	  cover	  the	  range	  of	  epistemic	  states	  which	  include	  mere	  speculation,	  as	   long	  as	   it	   is	  not	  entirely	  baseless,	  all	   the	  way	  to	  the	  highly	  probable-­‐	  all	  of	  which	  are	   less	   than	  qaṭʿ.	  Thus	   to	  have	  ẓann	   regarding	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept,	  means	   that	   one	   is	   less	   than	   certain	  with	   regards	   to	   its	   corresponding	  duty	   or	   status.	   It	   implies	   a	   case	   where	   there	   is	   no	   certain	   bayān	   or	   no	   full	  explication	   of	   responsibility.	   The	   mainstream	   Uṣūlī	   position	   on	   ḥujjiyya	   is	  described	  by	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  as	  operating	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  qubḥ	  al-­‐ʿiqāb	  bi-­‐lā	  
bayān,	   whereby	   holding	   someone	   responsible	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   explication	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  depiction	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  God	  and	  creation	  as	  analogous	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  master	  and	  slave	  to	  an	  even	  greater	  extent	  than	  that	  which	  may	  otherwise	  be	  seen	  in	  Uṣūlī	  discourse.	  	  See	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2,	  pp.	  35-­‐37.	  Despite	  his	  acknowledgement	  that	  even	  suspected	  or	  
maẓnūn	  responsibilities	  are	  potentially	  authoritative,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  comes	  back	  in	  line	  with	  the	  mainstream	  position	  on	  the	  inherent	  non-­‐authority	  of	  ẓann	  due	  to	  textual	  evidences,	  see	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2,	  p	  60.	  	  	  468	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  47-­‐48.	  469	  Muẓaffar,	  al-­‐Manṭiq,	  pp.	  14-­‐15.	  470	  See	  Al-­‐Faḍli,	  Durūs	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  al-­‐Imāmiyya,	  Vol	  1,	  p.	  269.	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considered	   an	   immoral	   act	   not	   attributable	   to	   a	   Just	   God.	   Accordingly	   to	   have	  
ẓann	   regarding	   a	   duty	   (taklīf),	   to	   consider	   it	   as	   a	   possible	   or	   even	   a	   probable	  responsibility,	  is	  in	  itself	  not	  of	  sufficient	  epistemic	  strength	  for	  a	  Just	  God	  to	  hold	  one	   accountable	   before	   it.	   	   Any	   less	   than	   certain	   supposition	   regarding	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  duty	  does	  not	  reflect	  full	  explication	  or	  bayān	  –	  hence	  ẓann,	  in	  and	  of	   it	   self,	   is	  not	   capable	  of	   activating	   responsibility.	  Again	   referring	   to	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  description,	  the	  commonly	  held	  belief	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  
qaṭʿ	  and	  ḥujjiyya	   is	   that	  ḥujjiyya	   is	  nullified	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  qaṭʿ	  471,	  and	  hence	  the	   primary	   principle	  with	   respect	   to	   ẓann	   is	   that	   it	   is	  not	  authoritative	   (al-­‐aṣl	  ʿadam	  al-­‐ḥujjiyyat	  al-­‐ẓann).	  	  As	   outlined	   in	   the	   brief	   historical	   survey	   of	   the	   shifting	   ideas	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	  epistemology	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   chapter,	   the	   rejection	   of	   speculative	   or	  probable	   knowledge,	   in	   itself,	   being	   afforded	   the	   status	   of	   a	   valid	   source	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  inference	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  earliest	  systematic	  Imāmi	  treatments	  of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh.	   However	   the	   pragmatic	   necessity	   of	   incorporating	   sources	   of	  knowledge	   which	   could	   not	   attain	   the	   epistemic	   status	   of	   being	   ‘certainty-­‐bearing’	   within	   the	   Jurists	   interpretive	   arsenal	   led	   to	   a	   progressively	   explicit	  incorporation	   of	   ẓann	   as	   a	   valid	  means	   to	   establishing	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   In	   the	  post	   Akhbārī	   era	   of	   the	   school	   of	   Anṣārī,	   we	   see	   a	   conscious	   and	   explicit	   re-­‐affirmation	  of	  the	  foundational	  principle	  regarding	  the	  inherent	  non-­‐authority	  of	  
ẓann	   before	   an	   argument	   is	  made	   for	   the	   all	   important	   exceptions	   to	   this	   rule	  which	  establish	  the	  authority	  of	  specific	  validated	  sources	  of	  ẓann.	  These	  specific	  validated	   sources,	   which	   are	   discussed	   further	   below,	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐
amārāt	   (validates	   sources)	   whilst	   the	   substantiated	   speculative	   knowledge	  which	   they	   give	   rise	   to	   is	   termed	   al-­‐ẓann	   al-­‐khāṣ	   or	   al-­‐ẓann	   al-­‐muʿtabar.472	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  these	  less	  than	  certain	  sources	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid	  in	  particular,	  that	  determine	  the	  content	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  all	  fiqhi	  precepts	   and	   it	   is	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   offering	   justifications	   for	   the	  authoritativeness	   of	   these	   sources	   that	   this	   whole	   discussion	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   is	  ultimately	   directed.	   	   As	   shall	   be	   seen,	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   validates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  471	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  46.	  472	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.13-­‐14.	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speculative	   textual	  sources	   for	   the	   inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  simultaneously	  undermines	   the	   validity	   of	   any	   potentially	   relevant	   judgments	   of	   independent	  rationality.	   Before	   drawing	   out	   this	   ‘epistemic	   discrimination’473	  there	   is	   still	  space	   for	   further	   analysis	   of	   the	   manner	   and	   tenability	   of	   arguments	   for	   the	  primary	  principle	  regarding	  the	  inherent	  non-­‐authority	  of	  ẓann	  itself	  and	  exactly	  how	  the	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule	  are	  made.	  	  	  	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  analysis	  of	  qaṭʿ	  and	  its	  inherent	  disclosive	  nature	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  
ḥujjiyya	   provide	   a	   philosophical	   framework	   to	   reject	   any	   inherent	   authority	   of	  
ẓann-­‐	  an	  epistemic	  state	  which	  by	  definition	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  same	  level	  of	  disclosure	   as	  qaṭʿ,	   thus	   not	   entailing	   the	   corresponding	   obligation	   to	   accept	   its	  content	   and	   hence	   in	   itself	   conferring	   neither	   accountability	   nor	   excusabillity.	  However	   despite	   this	   philosophical	   premise,	   and	   again	   interestingly	   in	   view	  of	  Akhbārī-­‐	  Uṣūlī	  polemics,	   it	   is	   actually	   textual	   rather	   than	  philosophical	   reasons	  which	   are	   most	   prominent	   in	   the	   modern	   Uṣūlīyūn’s	   justifications	   for	   the	  inherent	  non-­‐authority	  of	  ẓann.	  In	  a	  manner	  typical	  of	  modern	  scholarship	  on	  the	  subject,	  Muẓaffar	  bases	  his	  primary	  rejection	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  ẓann	  upon	  textual	  evidences	  from	  The	  Qur’ān;	  It	   is	   not	   permissible	   to	   rely	   upon	   it	   [ẓann]	   in	   attempts	   to	   establish	   the	  reality	   (al-­‐wāqiʿī)	   [of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a]	   due	   to	   the	   words	   of	   the	   Most	   Exalted	  “assumptions	   (al-­‐ẓann)	   can	  be	  of	   no	   value	  at	  all	   against	   the	  Truth”474.	   And	  Allah,	  exalted,	  in	  His	  glorious	  book	  has	  blamed	  whosever	  follows	  ẓann	  qua	  
ẓann,	   such	   as	   in	  His	  words	   “They	   follow	  nothing	  but	  speculation	  (al-­‐ẓann);	  
they	  are	  merely	  guessing”	  475,	   and	  He,	  exalted	  has	   said	   “Say,	   ‘Has	  God	  given	  
you	  permission	  [to	  do	  this],	  or	  are	  you	  inventing	  lies	  about	  God?”476…	  477.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  473	  Fanaei	  and	  Bhojani,	  Ijtihād	  in	  Traditional	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought,	  p.	  121.	  474	  Muẓaffar	  himself	  does	  not	  give	  the	  references	  to	  the	  verses	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  cited	  in	  this	  passage.	  This	  first	  quote	  appears	  twice	  in	  the	  Qur’ān,	  10:	  36	  and	  53:	  28.	  In	  his	  translation	  of	  the	  latter	  verse,	  M.A.	  S.	  Abdul	  Haleem	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘Guesswork’	  for	  al-­‐ẓann	  in	  place	  of	  his	  rendering	  of	  the	  term	  as	  ‘assumptions’	  in	  the	  former.	  475	  6:	  116.	  The	  exact	  same	  text	  is	  also	  found	  at	  10:	  66,	  where	  	  Abdul	  Haleem	  offers	  a	  somewhat	  different	  translation	  of	  the	  phrase	  rendering	  it	  as;	  “they	  are	  only	  following	  assumptions	  and	  telling	  lies”.	  	  476	  10:	  59.	  477	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  16.	  Other	  verses	  	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  mentioned	  in	  support	  of	  the	  textual	  prohibition	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  ẓann	  also	  include	  4:	  157,	  53:	  23	  and	  17:	  36,	  see	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Irwānī,	  Durūs	  tamhidiyya	  fi	  tafsir	  ayãt	  al-­‐ahkam	  (Qum,	  Dār	  al-­‐fiqh,	  2004),	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  695-­‐696	  .	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At	   this	  point	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  any	  hermeneutical	   system	  that	   fails	   to	  separate	   between	   first	   order	   questions	   of	   normativity	   and	   second	   order	  questions	  of	   epistemology	   leaves	   itself	   open	   to	   a	  degree	  of	   circularity,	   and	   this	  case	   of	   arguing	   for	   the	   invalidity	   of	   ẓann	   based	   on	   textual	   evidences	   is	   no	  different.	   If	   God	   is	   commanding	   what	   the	   primary	   epistemic	   principles	   of	  interpretation	  are	   to	  be	   through	  His	   textual	  dictates,	  what	   epistemic	  principles	  are	   to	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	   these	   commands?	   Yet	   basing	   the	  justification	  for	  the	  invalidity	  of	  ẓann	  on	  textual	  evidences	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  invalidity	  of	  relying	  on	  ẓann	  is	  considered	  a	  devotional	  duty	  commanded	  by	  God.	  Despite	  also	  arguing	  for	  the	  invalidity	  of	  ẓann	  based	  on	  textual	  evidences,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  does	  recognize	  that	  the	  ‘prohibition	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  ẓann	  is	  not	   a	   devotional	   prohibition’;	   rather	   it	   is	   what	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   directive	  prohibition	   (nahī	   irshādī)478 .	   Irshādī	   commands	   and	   prohibitions	   are	   those	  commands	   and	   prohibitions	   that,	   although	   emanating	   from	   Divine	   legislation,	  simply	  outline	  or	  reinforce	  a	  judgment	  of	  reason	  which	  was	  otherwise	  capable	  of	  coming	   to	   the	   very	   same	   position	   independently479.	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr’s	   statement	  that	   the	   prohibition	   of	   acting	   in	   accordance	   with	   ẓann	   is	   ‘nothing	   other	   than	  direction	   (irshād)	   to	   its	   non-­‐validity’,	   thus	   suggest	   that	   he	   recognizes	   that	   it	   is	  rationality	   which	   is	   the	   real	   source	   of	   the	   epistemic	   judgments	   regarding	   the	  invalidity	   of	   ẓann.	   However	   he	   does	   not	   take	   this	   reasoning	   to	   its	   logical	  conclusions	  that	  would	  suggest	  that	  if	  it	  is	  the	  epistemic	  principles	  of	  reason	  that	  are	  the	  actual	  source	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  non-­‐validity	  of	  ẓann,	  then	  any	  limits	  or	   exceptions	   to	   this	   principle	   should	   also	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   rational	   principles	  and	  not	  the	  subject	  of	  devotional	  dictates.	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	   emphasis	   on	   independent	   rationality	   and	   his	   use	   of	   the	   devotional-­‐directive	   (mawlawī-­‐irshādī)	   distinction	   elsewhere480,	   these	   subtleties	   are	   not	  referred	   to	   in	  Muẓaffar’s	   treatment	  of	   the	   textual	  bases	   for	   the	  principle	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  478	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  60-­‐61.	  479	  Zysow	  terms	  the	  	  ‘devotional’	  and	  ‘directive’	  command	  as	  ‘authoritative’	  and	  ‘advisory’,	  see	  ‘Two	  theories	  of	  Obligation’	  p.	  397.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  distinction	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  207-­‐208	  and	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  330-­‐334,	  336-­‐337.	  480	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  207-­‐208.	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non-­‐validity	  or	  impermissibility	  of	  relying	  upon	  ẓann.	  Elaborating	  on	  the	  latter	  of	  the	   three	   cited	   verses,	   Muẓaffar	   emphasizes	   this	   impermissibility	   in	   a	  manner	  that	   simultaneously	   starts	   to	   make	   room	   for	   justifying	   the	   exceptions	   to	   the	  general	  rule;	  In	   this	   last	  verse	   in	  particular	   that	  which	  has	  been	  permitted	   is	  placed	  as	  something	  which	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  that	  which	  is	  ‘attributing	  lies	  to	  Him’,	  thus	  that	   which	   is	   not	   permitted	   by	   Him	   is	   necessarily	   to	   be	   considered	   the	  attribution	  of	   a	   lie,	   due	   to	   the	   oppositional	   relationship	  between	   the	   two.	  Thus	   if	   we	   were	   to	   attribute	   a	   judgment	   to	   Allah,	   exalted,	   without	   His	  permission,	  then	  without	  doubt,	  due	  to	  the	  verse,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  prohibited	  and	  blamed	  act	  of	  attributing	  a	  lie.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  acting	  according	  to	  ẓann,	  considering	  it	  as	  though	  it	  is	  from	  Allah	  and	  a	  means	  of	  establishing	  His	   precepts,	   is	   a	   form	   of	   associating	   a	   judgment	   to	   Him	   without	   His	  permission,	  and	  thus	  it	  falls	  under	  the	  category	  of	  the	  prohibited	  attribution	  of	  a	  lie481.	  	  	  	  
Ẓann	   is	  not	  authoritative	   in	   itself,	   it’s	  employment	   in	   trying	   to	  establish	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   has	  not	   been	  permitted	   and	   is	   non-­‐sanctioned	  by	  God,	   thus	   its	   use	   in	  this	  way	   is	   condemned	  as	  being	   a	  prohibited	   case	  of	   ifitirā-­‐	   attributing	   a	   lie	   to	  God.	  This	  line	  of	  analysis	  opens	  up	  the	  space	  for	  the	  assertion	  of	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	   rule	   of	   the	   non-­‐authoritativeness	   of	   ẓann	   if	   and	   when	   it	   can	   be	  established	  that	  God	  Himself	  has	  defiantly	  allowed	  or	  permitted	  its	  use;	  [I]f	   it	   is	   established	   through	  a	  definitive	   evidence	   and	  a	   certain	   argument	  that	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  has	  designated	  a	  specific	  speculation	  (ẓann	  khāṣ),	  due	  to	  a	  particular	  reason,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  His	  precepts,	  and	  He	  considers	  it	  as	   authoritative	   upon	   them,	   being	   satisfied	   with	   it	   as	   a	   validated	   source	  (amāra),	  then	  it	  is	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  [in	  the	  process	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference]482.	  If	   God	   himself	  were	   to	   permit	   reliance	   on	   any	   particular	   non-­‐certain	   source	   of	  knowledge	  as	  a	  means	  to	  establishing	  His	  aḥkām,	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  objection	  to	  its	  employment.	  It	  is	  held	  that	  God’s	  consent	  in	  allowing	  a	  specific	  speculative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  481	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  16.	  482	  Ibid.	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source	   to	   act	   as	   a	   validated	  means	   of	   understanding	   his	   aḥkām	   ‘removes	   that	  particular	  ẓann	  from	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  primary	  principle,	  because	  [in	  such	  a	  case]	  it	  is	  not	  a	  guess,	  nor	  an	  estimate,	  nor	  the	  attribution	  of	  a	  lie’483.	  	  Although	  ẓann	   is	  unequivocally	  considered	  as	  non-­‐authoritative	   in	   itself,	  due	  to	  the	  textual	  evidences	  cited	  from	  the	  Qur’ān,	   if	  through	  definitive	  evidence	  (dalīl	  
qaṭʿī)	  it	  is	  established	  that	  God	  has	  consented	  to	  the	  use	  of	  a	  particular	  source	  of	  
ẓann	  then	  it	  would	  attain	  the	  status	  of	  conferring	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity.	  	  Such	  certainly	  validated,	  but	  non-­‐certainty	  bearing,	  sources	  are	  referred	  to	  by	  an	  array	   of	   terms	   including	   amāra,	   ẓann	   al-­‐khāṣ	   and	   ẓann	   al-­‐muʿtabar.	   Unlike	   a	  certainty	  bearing	  source,	  which	  as	  we	  have	  stated	  would	  be	  described	  as	  a	  ḥujja	  in	  the	  linguistic	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  described	  as	  a	  ḥujja	  in	  the	   specific	  Uṣūlī	   sense-­‐	   it	   establishes	   its	   referent	  without	   reaching	   the	   level	   of	  
qaṭʿ,	  providing	  disclosure	  as	  though	  it	  has	  established	  it.	  	  Accepting	  the	  assertion	  that	  there	  is	  certain	  evidence	  that	  God	  has	  permitted	  the	  use	   of	   the	   akhābr	   al-­‐aḥād,	   a	   source	   which	   by	   definition	   is	   ẓannī,	   even	   if	   the	  content	   of	   a	   particular	   report	   doesn’t	   have	   the	   epistemic	   strength	   to	   establish	  that	   its	   content	   is	   actually	   real	   or	   true,	   the	   claimed	   permission	   from	   God	  endorsing	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   akhbār	   al-­‐aḥād	   means	   that	   He	   has	   allowed	   us	   to	  assume	   that	   such	   reports	   are	   a	   justifiable	   means	   to	   His	   aḥkām.	   As	   a	   result,	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  sure	  knowledge	  (ʿilm)	  and	  the	  known	  possibility	  that	  the	  report	   may	   be	   leading	   to	   false	   action,	   such	   sources	   of	   ẓann	   are	   accorded	   the	  quality	   of	   ḥujjiyya	   for	   they	   are	   in	   this	   way	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   ẓann	   which	   is	  grounded	  in	  ‘ilm;	  And	   in	   reality	   relying	  on	  a	  validated	   source	  of	   speculative	  knowledge	   (al-­‐
zann	  al-­‐muʿtabar)	  for	  which	  it	  has	  been	  established,	  by	  means	  of	  certitude,	  that	   it	   is	   a	  ḥujja	   is	   not	   like	   accepting	   speculative	   knowledge	   per	   se,	   even	  though	   its	   designation	   from	   the	  Divine	   Legislator	   is	   in	   respect	   to	   it	   being	  speculative.	   Rather	   it	   is	   [a	   case	   of]	   relying	   on	   definitive	   knowledge	   and	  certainty	   (yakunu	   akhadhan	   bil-­‐qaṭʿ	   wal-­‐yaqīn)-­‐	   the	   definitive	   knowledge	  that	   stands	   upon	   the	   designation	   of	   that	   particular	   cause	   of	   ẓann…	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  483	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  16.	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definitive	   knowledge	   is	   authoritative	   due	   to	   its	   own	   self,	   requiring	   no	  stipulation	  from	  any	  one484.	  	  
5.6	  The	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  authority	  	  From	  that	  which	  has	  preceded	  we	  see	  that	  the	  Uṣūliyūn	  accept	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	   epistemic	   categories	   of	   evidences	   which	   may	   be	   considered	   as	  authoritative	   means	   of	   coming	   to	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	  authoritative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  confer	  both	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity.	  A	  mujtahid	  may	  employ	  evidences	  that	  are	  certainty	  bearing,	  those	  that	  produce	  
qaṭʿ	   regarding	   a	   precept.	   Any	   such	   source	   is	   a	  ḥujja	   in	   the	   logical	   sense	   of	   the	  word	   and	   its	   ḥujjiyya	   stems	   from	   the	   inherent	   disclosive	   nature	   of	   qaṭʿ.	   The	  second	   epistemic	   category	   of	   evidence	   employed	   are	   those	   non-­‐certain	   (ẓannī)	  sources	   of	   knowledge	   which	   have	   received	   certain	   validation.	   Sources	   of	   this	  category	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   ḥujja	   in	   the	   technical	   Uṣūlī	   sense	   of	   the	   word.	  Although	   in	   themselves	   they	   are	   not	   of	   enough	   epistemic	   strength	   to	   confer	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity,	  due	  to	  certain	  evidence	  for	  the	  Divine	  validation	  of	  these	  speculative	  means,	  they	  are	  raised	  to	  a	  level	  where	  they	  are	  also	  believed	  to	  confer	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity.	  	  The	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  the	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  any	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge	  is	  thus	  qaṭʿ.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  aspirational	  attachment	  to	  ʿilm	  displayed	  throughout	   the	   history	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   legal	   thought,	   definitive	   knowledge	   or	   certainty	  becomes	  the	  claimed	  foundation	  stone	  of	  how	  the	  Uṣūliyūn	  justify	  their	  choice	  of	  the	  sources	  they	  refer	  to	  and	  the	  methods	  they	  employ	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  It	   is	   through	  this	  claimed	  ultimate	  recourse	  to	  qaṭʿ	   that	   their	  system	  is	  deemed	  authoritative,	  conferring	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity	  even	  in	  the	  cases	  when	  their	  inferred	  precepts	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  actual	  precept	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	  God.	  With	  this	  outline	  of	  the	  basis	  by	  which	  any	  potential	  source	  of	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  may	  be	  considered	  authoritative,	  we	  can	  now	  engage	  with	  the	  question	  of	   the	  ḥujjiyya	   of	   the	   specific	   source	   that	   this	   study	   is	   concerned-­‐	   the	  judgments	  of	  independent	  rationality	  (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	  stemming	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  484	  Muẓaffar,	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  16-­‐17	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the	  ʿAdliyya	  meta-­‐ethics	  central	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theology.	  	  	  	  
5.7	  The	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  	  The	   primary	   aim	   of	   this	   study	   has	   been	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   of	   why	   the	  
ʿAdliyya	   moral	   rationalism	   fundamental	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theology	   has	   not	   led	   to	  independent	   rationality	   playing	   a	   substantive	   role	   as	   an	   actual	   source	   in	   the	  process	  of	  inferring	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  Before	  tracing	  the	  increasing	  sophistication	  with	   which	   the	   principle	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   moral	   rationalism	   has	   been	  conceived	   of	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	   thought	   and	   then	   in	  modern	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   itself	  (chapters	   three	   and	   four),	   chapter	   two	   discussed	   the	   historical	   ambiguity	  with	  which	  the	  term	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  has	  been	  employed	  and	  how	  only	  subsequent	  to	  the	  Uṣūlī-­‐Akhbārī	  polemics	  has	  this	  ambiguity	  come	  to	  be	  somewhat	  resolved	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  modern	  Uṣūliyūn.	  	  	  Following	  on	  from	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  of	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  ḥujjiyya,	  the	  earlier	  cited	  definition	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  offered	  by	  Muẓaffar	  in	  his	  attempts	  to	  clear	  up	  this	  historical	  ambiguity	  should	  now	  fall	  into	  further	  relief.	  For	  Muẓaffar,	  the	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	   that	  may	  be	   considered	  a	   source	   alongside,	   or	   even	  versus,	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Sunna	  is	   ‘any	  rational	  proposition	  which	  leads	  to	  qaṭʿ	   in	  a	  sharʿī	  precept’485.	  Thus	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  is	  no	  different	  from	  any	  other	  potential	  source	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   in	   the	   mainstream	   modern	   framework	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   for	   it	   is	  relevant	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  relies	  on	  certainty.	  Of	  the	  two	  categories	  of	  evidence	  outlined	  above,	  from	  the	  definition	  offered	  by	  Muẓaffar	  we	  see	  that	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐aqlī	  is	   considered	   authoritative	  when	   it	   is	   certainty	   bearing.	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	  chapter	   will	   move	   from	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   general	   criteria	   for	   ḥujjiyya	   to	   this	  specific	   case	   of	   the	   ḥujjiyya	   of	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   again	   primarily	   centred	   on	   Muẓaffar’s	  treatment,	   demonstrating	   that	   it	   is	   ultimately	   purely	   epistemological	   concerns	  which	   render	   the	   independent	   judgment’s	   of	   rationality	   effectively	   redundant	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  485	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  105.	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr’s	  definition	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql,	  ‘any	  proposition	  perceived	  by	  reason,	  through	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  infer	  a	  sharʿī	  precept’,	  although	  not	  explicitly	  mentioning	  qaṭʿ	  is	  not	  substantively	  different	  from	  the	  one	  mentioned	  by	  Muẓaffar.	  See	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  221.	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Qaṭʿ	  has	  been	  avidly	  described	  as	  the	  common	  element	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  
aḥkām486,	  thus	  within	  a	  framework	  which	  sees	  qaṭʿ	  as	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  authority	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   Muẓaffar	   makes	   it	   a	   central	   condition	   in	   his	  definition	  of	  that	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql	  which	  may	  be	  considered	  an	  authoritative	  source	  (a	  
ḥujja)	  alongside	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna.	  
Al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqli,	   alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	   the	  Sunna,	  necessarily	  cannot	  be	  considered	  authoritative	  unless	   it	   leads	  to	  qaṭʿ-­‐	  which	   is	  authoritative	  due	  to	   its	  own	  self	   (huwa	  ḥujja	  bi-­‐dhātihi).	  Accordingly	   it	   is	  not	   correct	   that	   it	  includes	   the	   non-­‐certain	   (ẓanūn),	   nor	   that	   which	   is	   unable	   to	   attain	   qaṭʿ	  through	  rational	  premises.487	  As	   shall	   be	   demonstrated	   the	   exclusion	  of	   any	   rational	   premises	  which	   lead	   to	  less	   than	   certain	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   effectively	   renders	   any	  potentially	   relevant	   judgment	   of	   independent	   reason	   stemming	   from	  considerations	  of	  rational	  morality	  irrelevant	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  	  This	  being	  said,	  the	  definition	  does	  not	  outline	  exactly	  what	  Muẓaffar	  has	  in	  mind	  by	  those	   rational	   judgments	   that	  do	   lead	   to	   certain	   knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	  and	   accordingly	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   ḥujja	   alongside	   the	   Qur’ān	   and	   Sunna.	  Muẓaffar	  addresses	  this	  question	  in	  some	  detail	  ‘crossing	  the	  t’s	  and	  dotting	  the	  i’s’,	  or	  as	  he	  puts	  ‘in	  order	  to	  place	  the	  dots	  upon	  their	  letters	  (waḍʿ	  al-­‐nuqāt	  ʿalā	  
ḥarūf)’	  and	   thus	   complete	   his	   discussion	   of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql488.	   Despite	   the	   space	  afforded	   by	   Muẓaffar	   to	   the	   treatment	   of	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya-­‐	   which	  included	   an	   extensive	   analysis	   and	   argumentation	   for	   both	   the	   theological	  premise	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   praiseworthy	   and	   the	  blameworthy	   and	   the	   jurisprudential	   question	   of	   the	   correlation	   between	   the	  judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator-­‐	  somewhat	  ironically,	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  leads	  him	  to	  express	  a	  position	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  which	  may	  be	  described	  as	  a	  radical	  positivism.	  Precepts	  are	  depicted	  as	  following	  only	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  Divine	  lawgiver,	  accordingly	  knowledge	  of	  the	  precepts	  and	  their	  criteria	  is	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  486	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr,	  Durūs.	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  70-­‐72.	  487	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  105.	  488	  Ibid.	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accessible	  via	  His	  designated	  sources489.	  	  In	   an	   attempt	   to	   clarify	   his	   position	   regarding	   exactly	   which	   type	   of	   rational	  judgments	  do	  lead	  to	  certain	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  Muẓaffar	  returns	  to	  his	  reading	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  distinction	  between	  theoretical	  rationality	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  
al-­‐naẓarī)	   and	   practical	   rationality	   (al-­‐ʿaql	   al-­‐ʿamalī),	   examining	   the	   potential	  
ḥujjiyya	  of	  each	  category	  of	  rational	  judgment	  in	  turn	  and	  identifying	  the	  rational	  correlations	  which	  he	  believes	   can	   indeed	  be	  a	   certain	  and	  hence	  authoritative	  means	  to	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  	  5.7.1	  Theoretical	  rationality	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  Earlier	  Muẓaffar	  defined	  theoretical	  rationality	  as	  being	  ‘the	  perception	  of	  those	  things	  befitting	  to	  be	  known’490,	  within	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql	  he	  re-­‐cites	   this	   definition	   but	   furnishes	   it	   further	   by	   stating	   that	   this	   means	   ‘the	  perception	   of	   those	   things	  which	   have	   reality’491.	   He	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   explicitly	  and	   absolutely	   reject	   any	   possibility	   of	   theoretical	   rationality	   independently	  perceiving	  or	  coming	  to	  now,	   from	  scratch,	   the	  content	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  The	  reasoning	  he	  offers	  for	  this	  is	  related	  to	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  positive	  nature	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  
aḥkām.	   He	   describes	   the	   canonical	   regulative	   instructions	   as	   being	   ‘dictated	  (tawqīfiyya)’	   from	  Allah,	  meaning	   that	  knowledge	  of	   them	   is	  only	  possible	   from	  transmitted	  or	  revelatory	  sources	  designated	  by	  Allah492.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  relevant	  passage	  calls	  for	  its	  citation	  in	  full	  and	  it	  reads	  as	  follows;	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  independently	  know	  the	  aḥkām	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  from	  scratch	  (ibtidā’an),	  that	  is	  there	  is	  no	  means	  for	  al-­‐ʿaql	  to	  know,	  without	  re-­‐course	  to	  the	  correlation	  (al-­‐mulāzama),	  that	  the	  precept	  (ḥukm)	  of	  a	  given	  act	  is	  so	  and	   so	   according	   to	   the	  Divine	   Legislator.	   The	   secret	   behind	   this	   is	   clear,	  because	   the	   precepts	   of	   Allah	   are	   dictated	   (tawqīfiyya),	   and	   thus	   it	   is	   not	  possible	   to	   know	   them	   except	   by	   means	   of	   the	   transmitted	   sources	   (al-­‐
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  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  105.	  490	  Ibid,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  193-­‐194.	  491	  Ibid.	  Vol.	  2,	  p.	  105.	  492	  Ibid.	  p.	  105.	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simāʿ)	   emanating	   from	   a	   propagator	   of	   the	   precepts	   that	   has	   been	  designated	   (manṣūb)	   as	   a	   source	   for	   their	   propagation	   by	   Him	   [Allah],	  exalted.493	  	  	  The	  qualification	   ‘without	  recourse	  to	  the	  correlation’	   is	  crucial	  here	   in	   leaving	  space	   for	  Muẓaffar	   to	  maintain	   that	  al-­‐ʿaql	   can	   still	   have	   some	  sort	  of	   role	   as	   a	  source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge.	   However	   the	   thrust	   of	   the	   passage	   states,	   quite	  unequivocally,	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   theoretical	   rationality	   to	   come	   to	  direct	  knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   Despite	  Muẓaffar’s	   exhaustive	   efforts	   to	   outline	  the	  room	  for	  reason	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  alongside	   the	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna,	   the	  bowing	   to	   textual	   authority	   in	   this	   statement	   has	   led	   to	   it	   being	   held	   up	   by	  Bernard	   Weiss,	   an	   authoritative	   voice	   in	   Islamic	   legal	   studies,	   as	   the	   clearest	  ‘endorsement	  of	  the	  textualist	  position	  as	  one	  could	  hope	  to	  find	  anywhere	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  Muslim	  jurisprudence’	  494.	  Muẓaffar’s	   position	   here	   seems	   to	   stand	   in	   contrast	   to	   that	   of	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr.	  Despite	   being	   upfront	   about	   not	   employing	   independent	   rationality	   in	   even	   a	  single	  instance	  of	  his	  own	  Sharī	  ͑a	   inferences495,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  nevertheless	   maintains	   that	   ‘although	   difficult	   to	   actually	   occur’	   it	   is	   at	   least	  theoretically	   possible	   to	   attain	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   through	   unmediated	  judgments	   of	   theoretical	   rationality.	  496 	  	   Alongside	   his	   pessimism	   about	   the	  efficacy	   of	   the	   actual	   exercise	   of	   the	   often	  mistaken	   faculties	   of	   human	   reason,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  maintains	   that	   there	   is	  a	   rational	   criteria	  and	  wisdom	  behind	   the	  
Sharī	  ͑a,	   something	   which	   Muẓaffar	   rather	   counter	   intuitively	   seems	   to	  undermine	   as	   he	   elaborates	   on	   his	   above	   statement	   by	   further	   describing	   his	  conception	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts;	  	  	  Necessarily	   the	   aḥkām	   of	   Allah	   are	   not	   from	   amongst	   the	   primary	  propositions	   (al-­‐qaḍāyā	   al-­‐awwaliyya)	   [which	   can	   be	   known	   intuitively],	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  attained	  through	  the	  observations	  of	  vision	  and	  its	  like	  from	  amongst	   the	   external	   sensory	   faculties	   (al-­‐ḥiwās	   al-­‐ẓāhira)	   or	   even	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  493	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  105.	  494	  The	  Spirit	  of	  Islamic	  Law,	  pp.	  39-­‐40.	  Emphasis	  added.	  	  	  	  495	  Al-­‐Fatāwa	  al-­‐wāḍiḥa,	  p.	  98.	  496	  Durūs,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  306.	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internal	  (al-­‐bātina),	  and	  they	  also	  can	  not	  be	  attained	  through	  experiment	  (al-­‐tajraba)	  or	  theoretical	  extrapolation	  (al-­‐ḥadas).	   If	   this	   is	   the	  case,	   then	  how	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   have	   knowledge	   of	   them	   [the	   aḥkām	   of	   Allah]	   from	  other	   than	   the	   means	   of	   transmitted	   knowledge	   from	   their	   designated	  source	   (ṭarīq	   al-­‐simāʿ	   min	   mubalighihā)!	   Their	   nature	   is	   like	   that	   of	   all	  postulated	  things	  (al-­‐majʿūlāt)	  stipulated	  by	  man	  (yaḍaʿahā	  al-­‐bashr)	  such	  as	  languages,	  signs,	  symbols	  and	  their	  like.497	  This	  positivist	  depiction	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  stands	  in	  tension	  with	  any	  aspirations	  for	  a	  natural	  law	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  rooted	  in	  an	  ʿAdliyya	  theology	  that	  offers	  a	  rational	  moral	  framework	  for	  the	  aḥkām	  of	  a	  Just	  and	  moral	  God.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  theology	  which	  drives	  Muẓaffar’s	  positivism,	  it	  his	  epistemology;	  	  [T]he	   criterion	   (al-­‐milākāt)	   of	   the	  aḥkām,	   like	   the	  aḥkām	   themselves	   can	  not	   be	   known	   except	   by	   means	   of	   transmitted	   knowledge	   from	   their	  designated	   source	   because	   we	   do	   not	   have	   a	   reliable	   principle	   through	  which	  we	  may	  know	  the	  hidden	  secrets	  of	  Allah’s	  precepts,	  nor	  the	  criterion	  upon	   which	   He	   holds	   that	   the	   precepts	   are	   based,	   and	   “assumptions	   (al-­‐
ẓann)	  can	  be	  of	  no	  value	  at	  all	  against	  the	  Truth”.498	  	  	  	  	  	  With	  the	  Qur’ānic	  reference	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  quote	  (10:36	  and	  53:28)	  Muẓaffar	  brings	   us	   back	   to	   the	   epistemic	   principle	   of	   the	   invalidity	   of	   unsubstantiated	  
ẓann.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  definitive	  knowledge	  and	  surety,	  one	  has	  no	  basis	  to	  rely	  upon	   speculative	   judgments	   of	   theoretical	   rationality	   regarding	  what	  might	   be	  the	  aḥkām,	  or	  the	  criterion	  for	  the	  aḥkām,	  in	  any	  given	  instance.	  	  So	   the	   position	   states	   that	   theoretical	   rationality	   cannot	   or	   does	   not	  
independently	   lead	   to	   definitive	   certain	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   directly.	  However	   this	   does	   not	   prevent	   theoretical	   rationality	   from	   acting	   as	   a	   valid	  certainty	  bearing	  evidence	  by	  way	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  perceive,	  or	  come	  to	  know	  of,	  the	  existence	  of	  necessary	  correlations	  between	  precepts.	  Speaking	  in	  the	  context	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqlī	  as	  being	  inclusive	  of	  both	  categories	  of	  rational	  indicator,	  non-­‐independent	   rationality	   (ghayr	   al-­‐mustaqillāt	   al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	   and	   independent	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rationality	  (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	  Muẓaffar	  states;	  What	  we	  mean	  by	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqlī	   is	  the	  judgment	  of	  theoretical	  rationality	  regarding	  a	  correlation	  between	  established	  precepts,	  canonical	  or	  rational,	  and	   between	   another	   canonical	   precept	   such	   as	   its	   judgment	   regarding	   a	  correlation	  in	  the	  question	  of	  sufficiency	  (al-­‐ijzā’)	  and	  the	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  an	   obligation	   (muqaddamāt	   al-­‐wājib)….	   and	   like	   its	   judgment	   of	   the	  necessity	  of	  a	  concurring	   judgment	  of	  Allah	  when	   the	  rational	  community	  make	   a	   judgment	   in	   the	   case	   of	   al-­‐arā’	   al-­‐maḥmūda	   (universal	   rational	  moral	  propositions)499.	  In	  each	  of	  the	  mentioned	  cases	   it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  necessary	  rational	  correlation,	  which	  can	  be	  known	  by	  theoretical	  rationality.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	   non-­‐independent	   rational	   indicator,	   this	   correlation	   occurs	   between	   an	  established	  canonical	  precept,	  for	  example	  a	  textual	  obligation	  to	  perform	  an	  act,	  and	   another	   rationally	   determined	   canonical	   precept,	   which	   in	   this	   case	   may	  state	   that	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   pre-­‐requisites	   to	   this	   obligation	   are	   also	   a	  canonical	  duty.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  independent	  rational	   indicator	  the	  correlation	  perceived	  by	  theoretical	  rationality	  is	  between	  two	  rational	  precepts	  where,	  for	  example,	   the	   first	   may	   be	   that	   the	   rational	   community	   judges	   that	   justice	   is	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  second,	  being	  its	  correlate,	  that	  according	  to	  reason	  Divine	  legislation	  must	  also	  consider	  justice	  as	  praiseworthy.	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  Fig.	  3	  Theoretical	  rationality	  and	  the	  correlation	  between	  judgments	  	  As	   the	   rational	   correlations	   are	   conceived	   of	   as	   ontologically	   occurring	   real	  entities	  (amūr	  ḥaqiqiyya	  wāqʿiyya)	  these	  can	  be	  known	  by	  theoretical	  rationality.	  Theoretical	   rationality	   can	   come	   to	   know	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   necessary	  correlations	   between	   precepts	   either	   due	   to	   their	   self-­‐evidence	   or	   through	   the	  application	   of	   reasoning	   (bil-­‐bidāha	   aw	   bil-­‐kasab)	   because,	   unlike	   the	   aḥkām	  themselves,	   these	   correlations	   are	   from	   amongst	   those	   certain	   proposition	  ‘which	   can	   be	   known	   by	   reason	   with	   surety	   (ʿala	   sabīl	   al-­‐jazm)’.500	  It	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	  knowing	   these	   correlations	   for	   sure,	  or	   for	   certain,	   that	  allow	   the	  knowledge	   of	   the	   rationally	   discovered	   precept	   (p2)	   to	   be	   an	   authoritative	  source,	  a	  ḥujja,	  which	  confers	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity.	  	  And	   if	   al-­‐ʿaql	   is	   certain	   of	   the	   correlation	   (al-­‐mulāzama)-­‐	   which	  presupposes	   that	   it	   is	   certain	   of	   the	   precept	   necessitating	   the	   correlation	  (al-­‐malzūm,	   P1)-­‐	   then	   accordingly,	   necessarily,	   it	   becomes	   certain	   of	   the	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affirmation	   of	   that	  which	   it	   correlates	   to	   (al-­‐lāzim,	   p2),	   and	   that	  which	   it	  correlates	  to	  is	  the	  [newly	  discovered]	  precept	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator501.	  	  In	  what	  may	   seem	   like	   a	   rather	   convoluted	  manner,	  Muẓaffar	   here	   says	   that	   if	  one	   becomes	   certain	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   correlation	   based	   on	   p1,	   which	  discloses	  p2,	  then	  for	  sure	  that	  yields	  certain	  knowledge	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  p2.	  With	  the	  acquisition	  of	  certainty,	  the	  certainty	  is	  authoritative	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	   prohibited,	   in	   fact	   it	   [certainty]	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	   of	   every	   authoritative	   source	   (ḥujja)	   in	   the	   manner	   previously	  explained502.	  	  It	  is	  theoretical	  rationalities	  certain	  knowledge	  of	  these	  rational	  correlations	  that	  are	   an	   authoritative	   means	   of	   discovering	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts,	   and	   it	   is	   such	  judgments	  which	  are	  identified	  by	  Muẓaffar	  as	  being	  the	  dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaqlī	  which	  is	  an	  authoritative	  source	  alongside	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Sunna.	  Failure	  to	  recognize	  the	  distinction	  between	   the	   impossibility	  of	   theoretical	   rationality	   coming	   to	  direct	  knowledge	   of	   the	   aḥkām	   versus	   the	   possibility	   of	   it	   being	   able	   to	   attain	  knowledge	   of	   the	   aḥkām	   through	   the	   means	   of	   such	   rational	   correlations	   is,	  according	   to	   Muẓaffar,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   confusion	   of	   many	   who	   deny	   the	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  al-­‐ʿaql503.	  	  Chapter	   two	   surveyed	   a	   number	   of	   instances	   of	  where	   knowledge	   of	   a	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  may	  arise	  through	  such	  correlations	  in	  the	  non-­‐independent	  category	  of	  
al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐ʿaql.	  These	  reflect	  instances	  of	  where	  rational	  correlations	  are	  deemed	  authoritative	  and	  thus	  render	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  
aḥkām.	   However	   these	   authoritative	   instances	   of	   non-­‐independent	   rationality	  are	  not	   the	  result	  of	   the	  aspect	  of	  rationality	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   that	  stems	  from	  the	  
ʿAdliyya	   heritage	  of	   a	  moral	   rationalism.	  The	  central	   concern	  of	   this	   study	   is	   to	  determine	  why	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   heritage	  of	   a	  moral	   rationalism,	  which	   leads	   to	   the	  
independent	   category	   of	   rational	   indicator,	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   bear	   effect	   in	   the	  inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   To	   address	   whether	   such	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality,	   be	   they	   based	   on	   social	   rational	   consensus	   or	   reflect	   intuitively	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discovered	  facts,	  can	  lead	  to	  authoritative	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  needs	  us	  to	  first	  re-­‐consider,	  not	  theoretical	  rationality,	  but	  practical	  rationality.	  	  5.7.2	  Practical	  rationality	  and	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   Muẓaffar	   maintained	   that	   practical	   rationality	   is	   a	   distinct	  category	  of	  judgment	  to	  theoretical	  rationality.	  Practical	  rationality	  is	  concerned	  with	   judgments	  regarding	  whether	  an	  act	  ought,	  or	  ought	  not,	   to	  be	  performed.	  Accordingly	   Muẓaffar	   considers	   it	   impossible	   for	   practical	   rationality	   to	  independently	   perceive	   whether	   God	   considers	   something	   as	   befitting	   to	   be	  performed	   or	   not,	   and	   hence	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   it	   to	   come	   to	   independent	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  Such	  judgments	  fall	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  practical	  rationality,	  for	  whether	  an	  ‘act	  is	  considered	  befitting	  or	  un	  befitting	  specifically	  by	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  is	  an	  ontological	  issues	  (min	  al	  amūr	  al-­‐wāqʿiyya)’504,	  it	  is	  a	   proposition	   which	   becomes	   the	   subject	   of	   knowledge	   and	   hence	   theoretical	  rationality,	  it	  is	  not	  directly	  something	  which	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  praxis-­‐	  the	  remit	  of	  practical	  rationality.	  	  The	   whole	   remit	   of	   practical	   rationality	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   to	  independently	   perceive	   that	   a	   particular	   act,	   in	   itself,	   is	   amongst	   those	  things	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   performed	   or	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   performed,	  irrespective	   of	   its	   relation	   to	   the	  Divine	   Legislator	   or	   any	   other	   judge	   for	  that	  matter.	  That	  is,	  practical	  rationality	  is	  the	  judge	  (al-­‐ḥākim)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  act,	  it	  is	  not	  disclosing	  of	  another	  judge	  (ḥākiyan	  ʿan	  ḥākim	  ākhir)’505.	  	  Practical	   rationality	   simply	   judges	   whether	   an	   act	   ought	   or	   ought	   not	   to	   be	  performed.	   As	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   this	   judgment	  may	   be	   based	   on	   a	  range	  of	  factors	  (asbāb)	  including,	  human	  disposition,	  sentiment,	  and	  custom.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	   ‘causes’	   the	   judgment	  of	  practical	  rationality	  may	  arise	  due	  to	  the	   assessment	   that	   an	   act	   may	   lead	   to	   either	   perfection	   or	   imperfection	   and	  utility	   or	   detriment.	   According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   it	   is	   when	   these	   judgments	   of	  perfection/imperfection	   and	   utility/detriment	   are	   universal,	   such	   that	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  504	  Uṣūl	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rational	   beings	   would	   consider	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   relevant	   act	   as	   either	  praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy,	   that	   represent	   instances	   of	   purely	   rational	  judgments	  of	  morality506.	  	  Although	   judgments	   of	   practical	   rationality,	   in	   themselves,	   pertain	   only	   to	  whether	  an	  act	  is	  considered	  worthy	  of	  performance	  or	  otherwise,	  a	  judgment	  of	  theoretical	   rationality	   may	   follow	   them	   disclosing	   a	   correlation	   between	   the	  judgment	   of	   practical	   rationality	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	   Legislator	   as	  depicted	   in	   figure	   3.	   As	   found	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   Muẓaffar	   argues	   that	   a	  correlation	   between	   practical	   rationality	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	  Legislator	  only	  occurs	   in	   the	  case	  where	  the	   judgment	  of	  practical	  rationality	   is	  deemed	  purely	  rational,	  those	  universal	  moral	  judgments	  that	  are	  termed	  al-­‐ārā	  
al-­‐maḥmūda	  and	  that	  arise	  out	  of	  an	  absolute	  rational	  concurrence.	  	  That	   the	   occurrence	   of	   correlation	   between	   judgments	   of	   practical	   rationality	  and	   judgments	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator	   occur	   only	   in	   the	   case	   of	   these	   ārā	   al-­‐
maḥmūda	   is	   identified	   as	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   theoretical	   space	   for	   the	  independent	  rational	  indicator	  (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐ʿaqliyya)	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  is	  seen	   as	   being	   an	   exclusive	   corollary	   of	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   meta	   ethical	   principle	  regarding	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  the	  praiseworthy	  and	  the	  blameworthy.	  	  However	  here	  the	  question	  is	  not	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  correlation	  but	  of	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  any	   subsequent	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   that	   these	   judgments	  may	   give	  rise	  to,	  i.e.	  do	  they	  confer	  accountability	  and	  excusabillity?	  When	   the	   judgment	   of	   practical	   rationality	   is	   what	   Muẓaffar	   deems	   a	   pure	  rational	   judgment	   of	   morality,	   being	   concurred	   upon	   by	   all	   rational	   beings,	  theoretical	   rationality	   judges	   that	   there	   is	   a	   correlation	  between	   this	   judgment	  and	   the	   judgment	  of	   the	  Divine	   legislator	   and	   thus	   ‘the	   judgment	  of	   the	  Divine	  legislator	  is	  revealed	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  is	  certain’,	  and	  of	  course	  certainty	  is	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  authoritativeness	  and	  ḥujjiyya.	  	  Referring	   back	   to	   figure	   3,	   if	   theoretical	   rationality	   is	   certain	   of	   a	   correlation	  based	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  P1,	  which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  independent	  rationality	  is	  a	  pure	  rational	  judgment	  of	  morality,	  then	  necessarily	  it	  leads	  to	  certain	  knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  506	  Uṣūl	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of	   P2-­‐	   the	   corresponding	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator.	   Thus	   practical	  judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	  may	   lead	   to	   authoritative	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   by	   way	   of	   theoretical	   rationality	   perceiving	   the	   correlation	   that	   is	  deemed	  to	  exist	  ontologically	  between	  the	  two	  precepts.	  	  	  5.7.3	  Epistemic	  obstacles	  to	  the	  relevance	  of	  rational	  morality	  Muẓaffar’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  mechanics	  of	  how	  authoritative	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  may	  come	  about	  from	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  is	  problematic	  on	  a	   number	   of	   levels.	   Of	   course	   it	   is	   heavily	   reliant	   on	   his	   conception	   of	   rational	  morality	  and	  how	  and	  when	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  these	  judgments	  and	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  These	  elements	  of	  his	  theory	  were	  subject	  to	  detailed	  analysis	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Throughout	  Muẓaffar’s	  treatment	  of	  the	   distinction	   between	  practical	   and	   theoretical	   rationality	  we	   find	   significant	  ambiguities	  arising,	  not	  least	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  precision	  in	  how	  he	  describes	  the	  different	   functions	  of	   perceiving	   and	   judging.	  We	  also	   saw	  how	  other	  Uṣūliyūn,	  such	   as	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr,	   have	   a	   very	   different	   understanding	   of	   the	   distinction	  between	   practical	   rationality	   and	   theoretical	   rationality	   reflecting	   a	   radically	  different	   conception	   of	   morality	   to	   that	   held	   by	   Muẓaffar.	   In	   the	   earlier	  discussions	   it	   was	   however	   noted	   that	   what	   amounts	   to	   judging	   between	   two	  different	  positions	   in	  moral	  philosophy,	  with	  basic	  morality	  being	  conceived	  as	  either	   the	   product	   of	   rational	   concurrence	   or	   as	   intuitively	   discovered	   facts,	   is	  outside	  the	  remit	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  and	  what’s	  more	  it	  is	  a	  question	  which	  does	  not	  directly	  bear	  upon	  the	  central	  concern	  of	  this	  study.	  	  The	   concern	   of	   this	   study	   has	   been	   to	   identify	   why	   practical	   judgments	   of	  rational	   morality,	   however	   conceived,	   have	   not	   borne	   fruit	   with	   a	   substantive	  impact	  on	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	   reasons	   for	   this	   redundancy	   of	   independent	   rationality	   are	   purely	  epistemological.	   Whether	   practical	   rationality	   and	   theoretical	   rationality	   are	  different	   in	   the	  way	   described	   by	  Muẓaffar	   or	  whether	   there	   is	   no	   substantive	  distinction	   between	   the	   two	   are	   questions	   of	   epistemology	  which	   demonstrate	  the	   shackles	   that	   pre-­‐modern	   Aristotelian	   ways	   of	   thinking	   still	   bear	   upon	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contemporary	   Muslim	   scholarship.	   Serious	   attempts	   to	   resolve	   such	   questions	  must	   surely	   refer	   to,	   if	   not	   rely	   on,	   the	   developments	   and	   insights	   of	   cognitive	  science,	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mind	   and	   epistemology	   per	   se	   in	   order	   to	   produce	  justifiable	   foundations	   for	   their	   proper	   resolution.	   Yet	   beyond	   these	   issues,	  which	  again	  seem	  to	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  this	  chapter	  has	  also	  brought	  to	  light	  a	  theoretical	  obstacle	  that	  does	  fall	  within	  the	  core	  remit	  of	  the	  discipline	   and	   which	   prevents	   either	   conception	   of	   rationality	   and	   morality	  surveyed	   from	   having	   an	   impact	   upon	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   This	  obstacle	   is	   the	   foundation	   stone	   of	   what	   may	   be	   termed	   the	   Uṣūlī	   legal	  epistemology	  and	  lies	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  qaṭʿ	  as	  the	  ultimate	  criteria	  for	  the	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  any	  potential	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  correlation	  between	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  and	  judgments	  of	   the	  Divine	  Legislator,	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  noted	   that	  acquiring	  certainty	  was	  elusive	   in	   light	  of	  human	  experience	   that	  has	  repeatedly	  demonstrated	  the	  errors	  and	   limited	   scope	  of	   rationality507.	  Muẓaffar	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  possibility	  of	  certainty	  in	  the	  correlation	  with	  regards	  judgments	  of	  practical	  rationality	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator,	  but	  instead	  sets	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  to	  what	  constitutes	  a	  relevant	  and	  potentially	  authoritative	  judgment	  of	  practical	  rationality	  so	  high	  that	  it	  effectively	  renders	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  irreverent	  as	  an	  actual	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  According	   to	   Muẓaffar	   a	   certain	   correlation	   between	   judgments	   of	   practical	  rationality	  and	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator	  does	  occur,	  and	  can	  be	  known,	  when	  the	  judgment	  of	  reason	  is	  purely	  rational.	  These	  purely	  rational	  judgments	  of	  morality,	  termed	  al-­‐ārā	  al-­‐maḥmūda	  or	  al-­‐ta’dibāt	  al-­‐ṣalāḥiyya	  are	  deemed	  to	  arise	   when	   there	   is	   absolute	   concurrence	   of	   all	   rational	   beings	   upon	   the	  praiseworthiness	  and	   the	  blameworthiness	  of	   an	  action.	   It	   is	   through	   this	   total	  concurrence	  that	  Muẓaffar	  makes	  his	  argument	  for	  the	  correlation,	  for	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  is	  also	  a	  rational	  being	  or	  rather	  ‘he	  is	  the	  chief	  rational	  being’508.	  If	  we	  can	   come	   to	   know,	   with	   certainty,	   that	   all	   rational	   beings	   agree	   on	   a	   moral	  proposition	   then	   this	   agreement	   must	   necessarily	   include	   and	   disclose,	   in	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  507	  Durūs,	  Vol.	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  p.	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  508	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authoritative	  manner,	   the	  opinion	  of	   the	  Divine	  Legislator.	   	  However	  one	   is	   left	  with	  the	  question	  as	   to	  how	  many,	   if	  any,	  moral	  propositions	  are	  there	  that	  we	  can	   certainly	   know	   are	   agreed	   upon	   by	  all	   rational	   beings?	  Muẓaffar,	   falling	   in	  line	   with	   the	   classical	   Imāmi	   adoption	   of	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   meta-­‐ethics,	   would	   of	  course	  affirm	  that	  there	  are	  some	  moral	  propositions	  which	  we	  can	  be	  certain	  of-­‐	  however	  these	  are	  so	  few,	  and	  then	  so	  basic	  in	  nature,	  that	  they	  play	  no	  relevant	  role	  in	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  when	  in	  comes	  to	  fiqh.	  	  As	  Bāqir	  al-­‐Ṣadr	  puts	  it,	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  is	  concerned	  with	  ‘the	  common	  elements’	  in	  the	   process	   of	   inferring	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts509,	   thus	   its	   remit	   does	   not	   extend	   to	  identifying	  the	  actual	  instances	  (al-­‐ṣughriyāt)	  of	  the	  rational	  moral	  propositions	  that	   can	   lead	   to	   authoritative	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a510.	   However	   the	   epistemic	  conditions	  for	  validity	  described	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  analysed	  here	  justify	  limiting	  the	   possible	   occurrence	   of	   these	   precepts	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   become	  irrelevant	   to	   the	   inference	   of	   precepts	   in	   fiqh.	   Shaykh	   al–Ṭūsī	   cites	   the	   most	  common	   examples	   of	   the	   rational	   precepts	   stemming	   from	   the	   ʿAdliyya	  moral	  rationalism	  in	  his	  al-­‐ʿUddat	  al-­‐uṣūl	  as	   including	  the	  praiseworthiness	  and	  moral	  obligation	  	  	  ‘to	  return	  a	  deposit,	  to	  thank	  the	  benefactor	  and	  [toward]	  justice,	  and	  the	   blameworthiness	   of	   oppression,	   lying	   and	   purposelessness’511.	   Such	   basic	  judgements	  of	  morality	  are	  pivotal	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  theological	  doctrine,	  but	  have	   little	   relevance	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   Sharī	  ͑a	   normativity	   inferred	   in	   fiqh.	  Although	   the	  blameworthiness	   of	   oppression	   can	  be	   established	   rationally	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   correlates	   to	   the	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precept	   on	   oppression,	   it	   is	   a	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	   that	   becomes	   toothless	   in	   any	   envisaged	   moral	   or	   ʿAdliyya	   reading	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a.	  For	  whether	  a	  man’s	  right	  to	  unilateral	  repudiate	  his	  wife,	  and	  whether	  a	  wife’s	  unequal	  ability	  to	  seek	  divorce,	  despite	  being	  say	  beaten	  and	  raped	  by	  her	  husband	  constitute	   instances	  of	  oppression	  are	  all	  propositions	  deemed	  as	  non-­‐certain	   and	   hence	   non-­‐authoritative.	   In	   any	   potentially	   relevant	   judgement	   of	  rational	   morality	   that	   is	   not	   already	   dictated	   by	   textual	   evidences,	   or	   is	  apparently	   conflicting	   textual	   sources,	   the	   judgement	   of	   rational	   morality	  struggles	  to	  claim	  the	  epistemic	  status	  of	  being	  certain	  and	  thus	  is	  rendered	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  509	  Durūs,	  Vol.1	  pp.	  46-­‐49.	  510	  Ibid.	  p.	  	  313.	  511	  al-­‐	   ͑Udda	  fi	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  p.759.	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authoritative	   in	   the	   face	  of	   textual	  evidences	  which	  are	  certainly	  validated.	  Any	  judgement	  of	  rational	  morality	  which	  is	  less	  than	  certain	  amounts	  to	  mere	  ẓann,	  and	  as	  the	  mainstream	  Uṣūlī	  position	  on	  ḥujjiyya	  would	  have	  it	  they	  fall	  under	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  verse	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  which	  states	  “assumptions	  (al-­‐ẓann)	  can	  be	  of	  no	  
value	  at	  all	  against	  the	  Truth”.	  	  
5.8.	  Summary	  	  Justifying	   the	   authoritativeness	   (ḥujjiyya)	   of	   the	   sources	   relied	   upon	   by	   the	  
mujtahid	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  is	  central	  to	  the	  Uṣūlī	  endeavour	  in	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh.	  With	  roots	  in	  the	  polemical	  and	  ideological	  tendencies	  of	  early	  Shī	  ͑ī	  legal	   theory,	  modern	  Uṣūliyūn	  have	  sought	   to	  ground	  their	   justifications	   for	   the	  authoritativeness	   of	   the	   sources	   and	  methods	   of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   inference	   in	   a	   claimed	  surety	  of	  knowledge	  (ʿilm).	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  very	  early	  recognition	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  fiqhi	  precepts	  rely	  upon	  sources	  which	  are	  less	  than	  certain,	  the	  most	  notable	  example	  of	  which	  is	  the	  khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid.	  As	  the	  Imāmi	  theory	  of	  ijtihād	  developed	   there	   was	   an	   increasing	   and	   explicit	   acceptance	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	  incorporating	   and	   justifying	   the	   use	   of	   non-­‐certain	   sources	   within	   the	   juristic	  arsenal,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  likes	  of	  Ḥasan	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn	  and	  Mīrzā	  Qummī	  would	  eventual	  argue	   for	   the	  pragmatic	  prima	   facie	  validity	  of	  non-­‐certain	  knowledge	  due	   to	   an	   impossibility	   of	   certainty	   in	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   cases.	  However	   this	  embrace	  of	  the	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  ẓann	  would	  not	  survive	  the	  intense	  period	  of	  polemics	  between	  the	  Uṣūlī	  and	  Akhbārī	  schools	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centuries.	  	  	  The	   modern	   paradigm	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   epitomised	   in	   the	   works	   of	   Murtaḍā	   al-­‐Anṣārī	   reasserts	   the	   early	   Shī	  ͑ī	   slogans	   of	   the	   prima	   facie	   invalidity	   of	   ẓann,	  claiming	  that	  ḥujjiyya	  (authoritativeness)	  is	  as	  an	  exclusive	  function	  of	  definitive	  knowledge	  or	  certainty	  (qaṭʿ).	  Certain	  knowledge	  confers	  accountability	  upon	  an	  individual	   before	   God,	   and	   simultaneously	   renders	   the	   individual	   excusable	  should	   his	   certainty	   be	   proved	   false.	   Certainty	   is	   conceived	   of	   as	   the	   ultimate	  criterion	   for	   authority.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   in	   line	   with	   their	   aspirational	  conceptions	   of	   sure	   knowledge	   and	   supported	   through	   the	   interpretation	   of	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textual	   evidences,	   less	   than	   certain	   knowledge	   is	   rejected	   as	   being	   un-­‐authoritative	   in	   itself,	  with	   its	   validity	  depending	  upon	  establishing	   the	   certain	  consent	  of	   the	  Legislator	   that	   this	   speculative	  means	   can	  be	   relied	  upon	   in	   the	  process	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference.	  A	  potential	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge	  is	  valid	  then	  in	   either	   one	   of	   two	   situations.	   Either	   it	   is	   should	   be	   certainty	   bearing,	   or	   it	  should	  be	  certainly	  validated.	  	  Despite	   the	   fundamental	   importance	   of	   a	   rational	   ʿAdliyya	   meta-­‐ethics	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	  theology	  and	  the	  theoretical	  space	  this	  affords	  independent	  rationality	  in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh,	   these	  epistemic	  criteria	  for	  validity	  and	  authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  render	  any	  potentially	  relevant	  judgement	  of	  rational	  morality	  redundant	  when	  it	  comes	  to	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   in	   fiqh.	   Rational	  morality	   neither	   acts	   as	   a	  source	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  nor	  as	  a	  qualification	  to	  the	  interpretation	  of	  other	  textual	  evidence.	   Any	   potentially	   relevant	   judgements	   of	   rational	  morality	   not	   already	  found	  in	  textual	  evidences	  are	  deemed	  non-­‐certain	  in	  themselves,	  and	  they	  have	  no	   certain	   validation	   for	   them	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   valid	   speculative	   means.	  	  That	  the	  textual	  evidences	  which	  are	  employed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  potential	  conflicts	  with	   rational	   morality	   are	   themselves	   also	   ẓannī,	   and	   not	   certain,	   adds	   to	   the	  tension	   in	   a	   system	   whose	   epistemic	   principles	   prevent	   the	   potential	   in	   the	  
ʿAdliyya	  meta-­‐ethics	  from	  offering	  a	  rationally	  informed	  moral	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	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6.	  Reassessing	  the	  obstacles	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  
independent	  rationality	  	  
	  
6.1	  Introduction	  In	   what	   has	   preceded	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   Muẓaffar	   acknowledges	   that	  theoretically	   dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql	   does	   have	   an	   independent	   role,	   alongside	   the	   Qur’ān	  and	  the	  Sunna,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  This	  position,	  which	  is	  common	  to	  the	   majority	   of	   Uṣūlī	   scholars	   of	   legal	   theory,	   stems	   from	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	  moral	   rationalism	   fundamental	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theology.	   Although	   there	   is	   significant	  dispute	   about	   the	   nature,	   or	   ontology,	   of	   rational	  moral	   propositions-­‐	   there	   is	  agreement	   that	   some	   judgments	   of	   rationality,	   however	   conceived,	   can	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator	  and	  hence	  lead	  to	  knowledge	  of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   The	   following	   is	   the	   paradigmatic	   example	   of	   a	   syllogism	  leading	  to	  knowledge	  of	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	  that	  is	  constructed	  solely	  from	  rational	  propositions	  and	   thus	  an	  example	  of	   independent	   rationality	   (al-­‐mustaqillāt	  al-­‐
ʿaqliyya)	  as	  a	  source;	  	  Justice	  is	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  [pure]	  rationality	  	  Every	   [purely	   rational]	   judgment	   of	   reason	   is	   a	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	  legislator	  Therefore;	  Justice	  is	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  the	  Divine	  Legislator	  	  However,	   this	   theoretical	   space	   for	   rational	   morality	   as	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	   is	   reduced	   by	   epistemic	   considerations	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   any	  potentially	   relevant	   judgments	   of	   independent	   rationality	   are	   effectively	  rendered	  redundant	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  actual	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  in	  the	  applied	  discipline	  of	  fiqh.	  The	   basic	   moral	   judgments	   that	   ‘justice	   is	   praiseworthy’	   and	   ‘oppression	   is	  blameworthy’	   are	   considered	   fundamental	   moral	   propositions,	   and	   hence	   are	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described	   by	   Muẓaffar	   as	   being	   examples	   of	   	   ‘essential	   praiseworthy	   and	  blameworthy’512 .	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   this	   non-­‐technical	   usage	   of	   the	   word	  essential	   was	   described	   as	   reflecting	   a	   form	   of	   causality	   (ʿilliyya)	   between	   the	  subject	   (either	   justice	   or	   oppression)	   and	   its	   respective	   ruling	   (either	  praiseworthy	   or	   blameworthy)513.	   As	   a	   result	  whenever	   something	   is	   just	   it	   is	  rationally	   praiseworthy,	   and	  whenever	   something	   is	   oppression	   it	   is	   rationally	  blameworthy.	  Despite	   the	   fundamentality	   of	   these	   rational	  moral	   principles,	   in	  this	   form	   at	   least,	   they	   are	   too	   basic	   to	   have	   any	   significant	   impact	   upon	   the	  actual	  normative	  system	  of	  Muslim	  religious	  thought	  extrapolated	  through	   fiqh.	  Crucially,	  potential	  inferences	  to	  particular	  cases	  or	  applications	  of	  these	  general	  principles	  are	  not	  deemed	  to	  meet	  the	  epistemic	  standards	  required	  to	  satisfy	  the	  criteria	   set	   to	   establish	   that	   these	   are	   purely	   rational	   judgments	  which	   lead	   to	  authoritative	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  inference	  from	  a	  basic	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality;	  Justice	  is	  rationally	  praiseworthy	  An	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  justice	  Therefore;	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  rationally	  praiseworthy	  	  For	   Muẓaffar,	   like	   other	   uṣūliyūn,	   the	   first	   premise	   is	   a	   certain	   judgment	   of	  rational	   morality.	   The	   form	   of	   the	   syllogism	   employed	   is	   accepted	   as	   sound.	  	  Thus,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  deductive	  principles	  of	  logic	  embraced	  by	  scholars	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	   if	   the	   second	   premise	   is	   also	   deemed	   valid	   the	   conclusion	  must	  necessarily	  be	  accepted	  514.	  Such	   a	   rational	   indicator,	   dalīl	   al-­‐aqlī,	   would	   then	   be	   a	   relevant	   source	   of	  knowledge	  for	  a	  mujtahid	  seeking	  to	  determine	  the	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  pertaining	  to	  divorce.	   This	   rational	   evidence	   would	   need	   to	   be	   reconciled	   with	   any	   textual	  evidences	   that	   may	   suggest	   that	   women	   should	   not	   have	   an	   equal	   right	   to	  divorce,	  for	  any	  interpretation	  of	  texts	  deemed	  rationally	  unjust	  or	  immoral	  can	  not	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   Just	   and	   Moral	   God.	   Of	   course	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  512	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  199.	  513	  Ibid.	  	  514	  On	  syllogistic	  reasoning	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Mantiq	  pp.	  212-­‐217.	  	  
	  	   208	  
reconcile	   between	   apparently	   conflicting	   evidences	   is	   a	   complicated	   one.	   Yet	  dealing	  with	   conflicting	   evidences	   is	   already	   central	   to	   the	  Mujtahid’s	   practical	  endeavour	  of	  inferring	  Sharī	  a͑	  aḥkām	  from	  their	  sources,	  an	  endeavour	  that	  more	  often	   than	   not	   involves	   reconciling	   apparent	   conflicts	   between	   and	   within	  different	  types	  of	  textual	  evidences515.	  How	  the	  theoretical	  treatment	  of	  apparent	  conflicts	  and	  reconciliations	  would	  be	  impacted	  by	  a	  more	  substantive	  practical	  role	  for	  rationality	  is	  a	  critical	  question	  in	  any	  move	  towards	  a	  moral	  or	  ʿAdliyya	  reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a.	   A	   full	   examination	   of	   if,	   and	   how,	   the	   current	   system	   of	  reconciliations	   needs	   to	   be	   adapted	   to	   systematically	   accommodate	   increased	  reference	   to	   rational	  morality	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   study,	   however	   it	   is	  hoped	   that	   this	   research	   will	   contribute	   to	   the	   grounds	   upon	   which	   such	  questions	  can	  be	  addressed.	  What	   has	   been	   central	   to	   our	   concern	   has	   been	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   uṣūliyūn	  within	   the	   epistemological	   framework	   of	   Murtaḍā	   Anṣārī	   face	   no	   apparent	  conflict	   between	   such	   rational	   judgments	   and	   textual	   indicators	   because	   the	  authority	   of	   inferences	   from	   general	   rational	   principles	   of	   morality	   is	  undermined.	  	  In	  the	  example	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  less	  controversial	  examples,	  it	  is	  at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   second	   premise	   that	   the	   epistemic	   obstacles	   we	   have	   been	  referring	   to	   in	   this	   study	   arise.	   Although	   there	   is	   an	   acceptance	   regarding	   the	  general	   proposition	   that	  whenever	   there	   is	   justice	   it	   is	   rationally	   praiseworthy,	  the	   problem	   comes	   on	   affirming	   that	   ‘an	   equal	   right	   to	   divorce’,	   or	   ‘having	  freedom	   to	   change	   ones	   religion’,	   are	   certainly	   instances	   of	   justice.	   If	   such	  propositions	   are	   not	   deemed	   certain,	   they	   cannot	   be	   considered	   authoritative	  judgments	  of	  rationality.	  	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  epistemic	  obstacles	  preventing	  inferences	   from	   the	   fundamental	   rational	   moral	   principles	   accepted	   by	   Shī	  ͑a	  
uṣūliyūn	  occur	  at	  two	  conceptually	  distinct	  levels.	  The	  first	  level	  is	  at	  the	  criteria	  to	  establish	  that	  a	  judgment	  of	  morality	  is	  indeed	  a	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality,	   whilst	   the	   second	   level	   of	   obstacle	   pertains	   to	   the	   criteria	   for	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515	  For	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  key	  themes	  and	  strategies	  within	  the	  Uṣūlī	  discussion	  of	  conflicting	  evidences	  and	  their	  resolution,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  discussion	  of	  al-­‐ta	  ͑ādil	  wa	  al-­‐tarājīḥ,	  see	  Muẓaffar	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  167-­‐212.	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authoritativeness	  (ḥujjiyya)	  of	  when	  such	  a	  rational	  judgment	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  as	  a	  valid	  means	  to	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	  	  This	   final	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  build	  on	  the	   foregoing	  analysis	  by	  examining	  the	  scope	  for	  re-­‐evaluating	  the	  key	  epistemic	  conditions	  Muẓaffar	  identified	  at	  each	  level.	   The	   limits	   of	   this	   study	   restricts	   us	   here	   to	   simply	   identifying	   possible	  trajectories	   of	   overcoming	   these	   obstacles	   and	   doesn’t	   allow	   for	   the	   full	   and	  rigorous	  work	   up	   that	   these	   questions	   demand.	   A	   systematic	   and	   theoretically	  consistent	  reconsideration	  of	  Uṣūlī	  epistemology	  demands	  scholarship	  dedicated	  to	   the	   question.	   However	   the	   stated	   ‘emic’	   approach	   of	   this	   study	   does	   allow	  space	   for	  a	  normative	   turn	   that	   can	  demonstrate	   that	  a	   reading	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   that	   does	   not	   trivialise	   the	   role	   of	   independent	   rationality	   is	   possible,	   and	  that	  such	  an	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   can	   in	   turn	  produce	  a	  reading	  of	   fiqh	   that	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   ʿAdliyya	  heritage	   fundamental	   to	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theology.	   	  The	  remainder	  of	   this	  chapter	  will	   thus	   seek	   to	  demonstrate	   that	  Muẓaffar’s	   stated	   conditions	   for	   the	  validity	  and	  authority	  of	  independent	  rationality	  are	  not	  all	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  acquiring	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  setting	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  moral	  or	  ʿAdliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  where	  independent	  rationality	  does	  play	  a	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  aḥkām	  attributed	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  Moral	  God.	  	  	  
6.2	  The	  criteria	  for	  a	  relevant	  and	  authoritative	  judgment	  of	  rationality	  In	  a	  passage	  arguing	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  judgment	  of	  rationality	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	   legislator,	  Muẓaffar	   summarises	   his	  conditions	  for	  exactly	  what	  constitutes	  a	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality;	  	  The	   truth	   is	   that	   the	   correlation	   (al-­‐mulāzama)	  does	   rationally	  exist,	   for	  when	   al-­‐ʿaql	   judges	   the	   praiseworthiness	   or	   the	   blameworthiness	   of	   a	  thing-­‐	   that	   is	  when	   there	   is	   a	   concurrence	   of	   the	   opinion	   of	   all	   rational	  beings,	  due	  to	  their	  rational	  faculties,	  upon	  the	  praiseworthiness	  of	  a	  thing	  with	   respect	   to	   that	  which	   is	   in	   it	   relating	   to	   the	  preservation	  of	   society	  and	  the	  continuance	  of	  the	  species	  or	  upon	  the	  blameworthiness	  of	  a	  thing	  due	   to	   its	   disruption	   of	   these-­‐	   then	   this	   judgment	   makes	   apparent	   the	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opinion	   of	   all.	   It	   is	   then	   necessary	   that	   The	   Divine	   Legislator	   judges	   in	  accordance	  with	   their	   judgment,	   for	  He	   is	  amongst	   them	  and	   in	   fact	  The	  Chief	  of	  them516.	  Three	   conditions	   for	   establishing	   a	   relevant	   judgment	   of	   rational	   morality	  emerge	   form	   this	   passage.	   For	   a	   judgment	   of	   morality	   to	   be	   considered	   as	  correlating	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator,	  and	  hence	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept,	  the	  judgment	  must	  be;	  I. Unanimous-­‐	  i.e.	  it	  reflects	  the	  concurrence	  of	  all	  rational	  beings	  II. It	   must	   be	   of	   rational	   issuance-­‐	   i.e.	   it	   should	   not	   be	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	  concurrence	   based	   on	   things	   such	   as	   human	   emotion,	   sentimentality	   or	  imagination,	   for	   the	   judgment	   sought	   should	   be	   the	   product	   of	   purely	  rational	  faculties	  (al-­‐ʿaql	  bimā	  huwa	  al-­‐ʿaql).	  III. It	   should	   be	   based	   on	   criteria	   of	   universal	   human	   welfare	   and	   societal	  preservation.	   	  Elsewhere	  Muẓaffar	  conceives	  of	  universal	  human	  welfare	  and	  societal	  preservation	  as	  being	  a	  function	  of	  universal	  social	  utility	  or	  detriment	  (maṣlaḥa/mafṣada	  nawʿiyya)517.	  It	  has	  been	  seen	  earlier	  in	  this	  study	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   this	   view,	   Bāqir	   al-­‐Ṣadr	   argues	   that	   a	   true	  rational	   moral	   judgment	   must	   correspond	   to	   a	   factual	   reality	   not	  necessarily	  dependent	  on	  utility	  and	  detriment518.	  	  	  These	   three	   conditions	   emerge	   at	   the	   first	   level	   of	   obstacle;	   identifying	   which	  types	  of	  judgments	  of	  morality	  are	  a	  relevant	  means	  to	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge	  by	  way	  of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   correspondence	   between	   them	   and	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  criteria,	  as	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  five,	  there	  is	  a	   further	   condition	   that	   emerges	   when	   considering	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  authoritativeness,	  or	  ḥujjiyya,	  of	  potential	  sources	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  This	  may	  be	  restated	  as	  a	  fourth	  condition;	  IV. There	  must	  be	  certitude	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  correlation	  before	  it	  can	  be	  considered	   an	   authoritative	   means	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge-­‐	   and	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  516	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  206.	  517	  Ibid,	  p.	  199.	  518	  Durūs.,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  302.	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correlation	   is	   considered	   certain	   if,	   and	   only	   if,	   the	   purely	   rational	  judgment	  of	  morality	  is	  itself	  also	  certain.	  	  With	   respect	   to	  Muẓaffar’s	   conditions	   for	   identifying	   that	   a	  moral	   judgment	   is	  indeed	  rational	  and	  thus	  correlating	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator,	  it	  is	  the	  criteria	  of	  unanimity	  and	  rationality	  that	  prevent	  inferences	  from	  basic	  moral	  proposition	   to	   their	  possible	   instances.	  We	  have	  seen	   that	  other	  uṣūliyūn	   differ	  with	  Muẓaffar	  on	  his	  third	  criteria,	  arguing	  that	  instead	  rational	  moral	  judgments	  are	   disclosing	   of	   a	   factual	   reality	   that	   does	   not	   necessarily	   always	   relate	   to	  universal	   social	   utility	   or	   detriment.	   This	   dispute	   refers	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	  nature	   of	   moral	   propositions	   rather	   than	   the	   epistemic	   obstacles	   to	   making	  sound	  inferences	  from	  basic	  moral	  propositions	  that	  are	  accepted	  as	  valid	  by	  all	  
uṣūliyūn	   regardless	   of	   the	   debates	   about	   moral	   ontology.	   The	   immediate	  attention	  here	  is	  thus	  focused	  on	  the	  concern	  for	  the	  unanimity	  and	  rationality	  of	  a	  proposition	  before	   it	  can	  be	  considered	   to	  correspond	  to	   the	   judgment	  of	   the	  Divine	   Legislator.	   After	   pointing	   at	   the	   scope	   for	   re-­‐assessing	   the	   necessity	   of	  these	  two	  conditions,	  we	  can	  then	  turn	  to	  the	  obstacle	  of	  the	  criteria	  of	  certainty	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  actually	  relying	  on	  this	  means	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  process	  of	  inferring	  Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām.	  	  
6.3	  Unanimity	  and	  rationality	  Muẓaffar	   holds	   that	   there	   is	   a	   requirement	   for	   the	   unanimity	   of	   a	   judgment	  regarding	   the	   praiseworthiness	   or	   blameworthiness	   of	   an	   action	   before	   such	   a	  judgment	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  correlate	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator.	  Thus	  if	  there	  was	  rational	  consensus	  that	  ‘an	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  an	  instance	  of	   justice’,	   then	   an	   equal	   right	   to	   divorce	   would	   be	   considered	   as	   something	  praiseworthy	   by	   both	   rationality	   and	   the	   Divine	   legislator.	   If	   authoritative	  (ḥujja),	   this	   knowledge	   would	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   indication	   of	   any	  textual	  evidences	  apparently	  undermining	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  would	  need	  to	  be	  reconsidered.	   	   	  Such	  unanimity	  of	  opinion	  is	  elusive,	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	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even	  the	  slightest	  disagreement	  the	  judgment	  of	  morality	  is	  rendered	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  process	  of	  fiqh.	  To	  seek	  absolute	  resolution	  and	  elimination	  of	  all	  disagreement	  seems	  untenable,	  however	  we	  may	  ask	  about	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  disagreement.	  If	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  moral	   inference	   is	   based	   on	   only	   non-­‐rational	   reasons,	   such	   as	   a	   dream	  or	  through	   the	   ritual	   of	   istikhāra519,	   or	   even	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   text,	   then	  we	  may	   still	   claim	   to	  have	  unanimity	  of	   rational	   opinion.	   Such	   a	  position	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  information	  gathered	  through	  such	  sources	  is	  certainly	  irrational,	  only	  that	  a	  rejection	  of	  a	  moral	  inference	  because	  of	  a	  dream,	  an	  istikhāra	  or	  through	  textual	   evidence	   is	   a	   rejection	   that	   has	   not	  been	   attained	   through	   reference	   to	  rationality.	   Despite	   the	   presence	   of	   non-­‐rational	   disagreement,	   rational	  unanimity	  is	  thus	  still	  maintained	  and	  a	  potentially	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  can	  be	  preserved.	  Of	   course	   if	   the	  source	  of	  disagreement	   regarding	  a	  moral	   proposition	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   non-­‐rational	   reasons,	   on	   face	   value,	  Muẓaffar’s	   system	  would	   not	   allow	   for	   it	   to	   have	   potential	  Sharī	  ͑a	   significance.	  However	  we	  may	  seek	  to	  overcome	  this	  obstacle	  by	  asking	  whether	  the	  criterion	  for	  the	  unanimity	  of	  rational	  opinion	  is	  a	  substantive	  one	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  simply	  regulative.	  	  Muẓaffar’s	   positing	   of	   unanimity	   as	   a	   substantive	   criteria	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   a	  judgment	  of	  rationality	  has	  been	  described	  by	  Nāṣir	  Makārim	  al-­‐Shirāzī	  as	  being	  one	   of	   the	   ‘strangest	   of	   discussions	   (min	   	  ͑ajā’ib	   al-­‐kalām)’,	   for	   in	   his	   view	   the	  criterion	   is	   nothing	   other	   	   than	   an	   individuals	   determination	   that	   a	   particular	  judgment	   is	  rational	  or	  not520.	   	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  reading	  Muẓaffar’s	  criteria	   for	  unanimity	  as	  a	  substantive	  criteria	  renders	  his	  whole	  treatment	  of	   independent	  rationality	   as	   trivial,	   allowing	   no	   significant	   impact	   for	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	   in	   the	   inference	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   	   However,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   emic	  approach	  adopted	  here,	  if	  Muẓaffar’s	  condition	  of	  unanimity	  is	  read	  as	  being	  only	  regulative,	   unanimity	   becomes	   simply	   a	   test	   to	   ascertain	   the	   rationality	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519	  Isitkhāra	  literally	  means	  seeking	  goodness.	  It	  is	  a	  ritual	  performed	  by	  some	  Muslims	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  guidance	  from	  God	  on	  specific	  issues	  through	  various	  ritual	  means	  including	  performance	  of	  prayer,	  or	  through	  reference	  to	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  sometimes	  even	  through	  counting	  of	  beads	  and	  drawing	  of	  lots.	  For	  further	  details	  see	  Muḥammad	  Bāqir	  Haiderī,	  Isitikhara	  (Qum,	  Anṣārīyan	  Publications,	  2002).	  520	  al-­‐Shirāzi,	  Anwār	  al-­‐uṣūl	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  512.	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judgment	   and	   not	   actually	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   identifying	   a	   rational	  judgment	   at	   all.	   Rather,	   the	   substantive	   criterion	   for	   constituting	   a	   relevant	  rational	   judgment	   of	   morality	   should	   be	   nothing	   other	   than	   its	   rationality.	  Muẓaffar’s	   positing	   of	   the	   criteria	   of	   unanimity	  may	   be	   read	   as	   being	   simply	   a	  means	   of	   ascertaining	   that	   a	   judgment	   is	   the	   result	   of	   the	   rational	   faculties	  instead	  of	  being	  a	   result	  of	  human	  emotion,	   sentimentality	  or	   imagination.	   In	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  Muẓaffar’s	  system	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assert	  that	  if	  a	  judgment	  is	  rational,	  whether	  all	  people	  agree	  to	  it	  or	  not,	  God	  ‘The	  Chief	  Rational	  Being’	   would	   also	   judge	   in	   accordance	  with	   it,	   and	   such	   a	   judgment	   of	   reason	  would	  then	  be	  disclosive	  of	  a	  potentially	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  	  Within	  the	  traditional	  framework	  for	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  the	  exercise	  of	  ijtihād	  required	  in	   the	   process	   of	   fiqh	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   individual	   enterprise.	   A	   single	   qualified	  individual	   exerts	   his	   utmost	   effort	   to	   determine	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   from	   their	  sources.	  	  The	  individual	  mujtahid	  is	  either	  accountable	  or	  excusable	  based	  on	  the	  authoritativeness	   (ḥujjiyya)	   of	   his	   appreciation	   of	   the	   sources-­‐	   regardless	   of	  disagreements	  amongst	  his	  peers521.	  Accordingly	  if	  the	  requirement	  of	  unanimity	  is	  seen	  as	  simply	  regulative,	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  rational	  disagreement	  upon	  a	  moral	  proposition,	  an	  individual	  mujtahid	  may	  come	  to	  knowledge	  of	  a	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept	   if	   he,	   as	   an	   individual,	   is	   sufficiently	   convinced	   that	   a	   proposition	   is	  rational-­‐	   for	   according	   to	   Muẓaffar’s	   argument	   for	   the	   correlation,	   if	   a	  proposition	  is	  rational,	  then	  for	  sure	  ‘the	  Chief	  Rational	  Being’	  would	  also	  judge	  in	   accordance	  with	   it.	   Both	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   ideas	   in	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   and	   their	  reading	   of	   fiqh,	   Shī	  ͑ī	   Uṣūliyūn	   operate	   in	   an	   epistemic	   environment	  where	   the	  presence	   of	   disagreement,	   be	   it	   from	   within	   the	   tradition	   or	   from	   without,	   is	  taken	  for	  granted.	  Accordingly	  there	  seems	  no	  reason	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  case	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  521	  For	  an	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  allowing	  moral	  intuitionists	  ‘to	  retain	  their	  convictions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rational	  disagreement,	  provided	  certain	  critical	  standards	  are	  met’	  see	  Robert	  Audi	  ‘Intuition,	  Inference	  and	  Rational	  Disagreement	  in	  Ethics’	  Ethics,	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice,	  Vol.	  11	  (2008),	  pp.	  475-­‐491.	  	  For	  a	  variety	  of	  views	  on	  the	  emergent	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  epistemology	  of	  disagreement	  in	  general,	  see	  Richard	  Feldman	  and	  Ted	  A.	  Warfield	  (Eds.)	  disagreement	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010).	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of	   rational	  moral	   inferences	   an	   individual	  mujtahid	  should	   have	   to	   give	   up	   his	  convictions	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  unanimity	  upon	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  judgment522.	  	  Through	  distinguishing	  between	  rational	  and	  non-­‐rational	  disagreement,	  and	  by	  reading	  unanimity	  as	  a	  regulative	  criterion	   instead	  of	  a	  substantive	  one	  we	  see	  scope	  for	  overcoming	  the	  epistemic	  obstacles	  at	  the	  level	  of	  identifying	  a	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  that	  may	  correspond	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	   	   However	   if	   such	   strategies	   are	   to	   be	   developed	   in	   a	   theoretically	  consistent	  manner,	  they	  immediately	  raise	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  next	  level	  of	  obstacle,	   the	   criterion	   for	   the	   authority	   of	   knowledge.	   As	   identified	   by	  proponents	   of	   the	   tenability	   of	   maintaining	   moral	   convictions	   in	   the	   face	   of	   a	  rational	  disagreement	  even	  with	  an	  idealised	  epistemic	  peer-­‐	  there	  is	  recognition	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  disagreement	  can	  weaken	  the	  ‘degree	  of	  confidence’	  in	  moral	  judgments523.	  Makārim	  Shirāzī,	  who	  strongly	  criticises	  Muẓaffar’s	  adoption	  of	  unanimity	  as	  a	  criterion,	  does	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  ultimate	  criterion	  for	  a	  relevant	   judgment	   of	   rational	   morality	   is	   an	   individual’s	   certainty	   in	   its	  rationality524.	  This	  brings	  us	  back	   to	   the	   tension	  arising	   from	  what	  has	  already	  been	   described	   as	   the	  major	   epistemic	   obstacle	   to	   the	   efficacy	   of	   independent	  rationality	  within	   the	  dominant	   epistemological	   framework	  of	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  and	  that	   is	  the	  criterion	  of	  a	  required	  certainty	  before	  any	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  can	  be	  deemed	  to	  have	  potential	  Sharī	  ͑a	  authority.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  522	  Wedgwood	  argues	  that	  even	  in	  the	  case	  where	  ‘disagreement’	  is	  seen	  to	  come	  from	  an	  idealized	  ‘epistemic	  peer’	  (equally	  rational	  and	  equally	  well	  informed),	  the	  presence	  of	  disagreement	  does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  one	  needs	  to	  give	  up	  ones	  conviction	  or	  suspend	  judgment.	  Nor	  is	  such	  a	  position	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  rational	  disagreement	  necessarily	  inconsistent	  with	  a	  rejection	  of	  relativism.	  However	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  rational	  disagreement	  of	  this	  type	  may	  indeed	  require	  one	  to	  weaken	  ones	  strength	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  proposition	  at	  hand,	  bringing	  to	  the	  fore	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  next	  obstacle	  discussed-­‐	  the	  requirement	  for	  certainty	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  judgments	  of	  rationality.	  	  Ralph	  Wedgewood	  ‘	  The	  Moral	  Evil	  Demons’	  in	  Richard	  Feldman	  and	  Ted	  A.	  Warfield	  (Eds.)	  
disagreement	  (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  pp.	  216-­‐246.	  523	  Wedgewood,	  ‘	  The	  Moral	  Evil	  Demons’,	  p.	  244.	  524	  al-­‐Shirāzi,	  Anwār	  al-­‐uṣūl	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  512.	  
	  	   215	  
6.4	  Certitude	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  in	  the	  post-­‐Anṣārī	  framework	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  certainty	  (qaṭʿ)	  is	  considered	   the	   ultimate	   basis	   for	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   sources	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	   	   For	   a	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge	   to	   be	   considered	   authoritative	  before	  God,	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   it	   leads	   to	  accountability	  or	  excusabillity,	   it	  either	  needs	  to	  be	  certainty	  bearing,	  or	  have	  certain	  validation.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐
ʿaqlī	   its	   potential	   authority	   is	   seen	   as	  being	   a	   function	  of	   the	   first	   of	   these	   two	  cases.	   Only	   when	   theoretical	   rationality	   is	   certain	   that	   there	   is	   a	   correlation	  between	   the	   judgment	   of	   practical	   rationality	   and	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   Divine	  Legislator	   is	   the	   knowledge	   of	   this	   judgment	   considered	   authoritative.	   	   Even	   if	  there	   is	  near	  universal	  consensus	  on	  the	  rational	  validity	  of	  moral	  propositions	  such	   as	   ‘an	   equal	   right	   to	   divorce	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   justice’	   or	   ‘undermining	  freedom	  of	  conscience	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  religion,	  by	  threat	  of	  death,	  is	  unjust’,	  the	  smallest	  possibility	  of	  doubt	  in	  these	  propositions	  renders	  them	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  inference	  of	  textually	  based	  fiqhi	  norms.	  	  The	  apparent	  epistemic	  discrimination	  in	  rejecting	  less	  than	  certain	  indicators	  of	  rationality	  in	  favour	  of	  textual	  indicators	  that	  are	  also	  classified	  by	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  as	  less	  than	  certain,	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  certain	  validation	  from	  God	   for	   the	   authority	   of	   relying	   on	   such	   non-­‐certain	   textual	   indicators.	   The	  apparent	  meaning	   of	   the	   Qur’ān	   (ẓawāhir	  al-­‐Kitāb)	   and	   isolated	   reports	   of	   the	  Sunna	  (akhbār	  al-­‐aḥād)	  are	  by	  definition	  less	  than	  certain	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  (ẓannī),	  and	  it	  is	  through	  these	  less	  than	  certain	  means	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām	  are	   inferred.	  However,	  as	   there	  are	  claimed	  certain	   justifications	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  specific	  sources	  of	  less	  than	  certain	  knowledge	  (al-­‐ẓanūn	  
al-­‐khāṣa),	   they	   can	   be	   removed	   from	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   primary	   principle	   of	   the	  non-­‐authority	  of	  ẓann	  and	  relied	  upon	  as	  authoritative	  sources	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām525 .	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   specific	   validation	   for	   non-­‐certain	  judgments	  of	  rationality,	  any	  potentially	  relevant	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  become	   rendered	   as	   non-­‐authoritative	   resulting	   in	   an	   amoral	   reading	   of	   the	  textual	   evidences	   for	  aḥkām.	   The	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	   validation	   for	   less	   than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  525	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  akhbār	  al-­‐aḥād	  and	  ẓawāhir	  al-­‐kitāb	  as	  specific	  sources	  of	  certainly	  validated	  ẓann	  see	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  59-­‐77	  and	  114-­‐131.	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certain	   judgments	   of	   rationality	   allow	  Mujtahid’s	   to	   entirely	   ignore	   inferences	  from	  rational	  moral	  principles	  such	  as	  	  ‘An	  unequal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  rationally	  blameworthy’	  exclusively	  relying	  on	  textual	  evidences	  apparently	  conflicting	  this	  principle,	   even	   though	   they	   are	   texts	   whose	   transmission	   or	   indication	   (and	  sometimes	  both)	  are	  themselves	  not	  certain.	  	  	  The	  epistemic	  obstacle	  of	   the	   requirement	   for	   certainty	  as	   the	  basis	  of	  ḥujjiyya	  thus	  becomes	  the	  major	  obstacle	  preventing	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theological	  notions	  of	  moral	  rationalism	   and	  Divine	   justice	   from	   influencing	   their	   reading	   of	   fiqh	   through	   a	  substantive	  role	  for	  independent	  rationality.	  This	  obstacle	  is	  not	  theological	  nor	  is	   it,	   strictly	   speaking,	   jurisprudential.	   It	   is	   an	   obstacle	   that	   results	   from	  epistemological	  ideas	  about	  knowledge,	  the	  nature	  of	  certainty,	  its	  possibility	  and	  authority.	   	  A	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  Uṣūlī	  epistemological	  ideas	  and	  their	  tenability	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  epistemology	  per	  se	   is	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  study.	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  unanimity	  and	  rationality,	   the	   ‘emic’	   approach	   adopted	   here	   does	   call	   for	   the	   identification	   of	  internal	   resources	   within	   Uṣūlī	   tradition	   that	   may	   allow	   for	   reassessing	   the	  requirement	  of	  certainty	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  authority,	  thus	  demonstrating	  the	  space	  for	   an	   ʿAdliyya	   reading	   of	   fiqh	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   moral	   rationalism	  fundamental	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theology.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.4.1	  Implications	  of	  the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  ẓann	  The	  preceding	  chapter	  outlines	  how	  the	  current	  paradigm	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ī͑	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh,	  shaped	  by	  Murtaḍā	  Anṣārī	   in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  bitter	  Akhbārī-­‐Uṣūlī	  polemic,	  characteristically	   considers	   the	   ultimate	   criterion	   for	   authority	   (ḥujjiyya)	   to	   be	  nothing	   less	   than	   certainty	   (qaṭʿ).	   In	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   scope	   for	  overcoming	  this	  epistemic	  obstacle	  it	  is	  important	  to	  restate	  that	  Anṣārī’s	  theory	  of	   the	   foundational	   authority	   of	   qaṭʿ	   was	   preceded	   by	   an	   Uṣūlī	   embrace	   of	   an	  unqualified	  acceptance	  of	   the	  authority	  of	   less	   than	  certain	  knowledge	  (al-­‐ẓann	  
al-­‐muṭlaq).	  Here	  we	  aim	  to	  indicate	  at	  the	  great	  scope	  this	  historic	  precedent	  has	  for	   invigorating	   a	   fiqh	   more	   consistent	   with	   the	   Shī	  ͑ī	   moral	   rationalism	  fundamental	  to	  Shī	  ͑ī	  theology.	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In	   the	   survey	   of	   epistemological	   shifts	   through	   the	   history	   of	   Imāmi	   thought	  conducted	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   classical	   theory	   of	  Imāmī	   Ijtihād,	   shaped	   through	   the	   hands	   of	   Shaykh	   al-­‐Ṭūsī	   and	   ͑Allāma	   Ḥillī,	  culminated	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  Ḥasan	  bin	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn.	  In	  his	  influential	  work	  of	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh,	   Ibn	   Zayn	   al-­‐Dīn	   premised	   his	   justification	   for	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   non-­‐certain	   isolated	   report	   (khabar	   al-­‐wāḥid)	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   acceptance	   of	   the	  unqualified	   authority	   of	   ẓann	   (ḥujjiyat	   al-­‐ẓann	   al-­‐muṭlaq)526 .	   Although	   it	   is	  considered	  untenable	  by	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  scholars	  within	  the	  school	  of	  Anṣārī,	  it	  is	  a	  position	  whose	  acceptance	  holds	  that	  probable	  knowledge	  is	  authoritative	  in	  its	  own	  self-­‐	  even	  without	  certain	  validation	  from	  the	  Divine	  Legislator.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	   those	  sources	   identified	  as	  unreliable	  by	   the	  Divine	  Legislator,	  all	   sources	   of	   probable	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge	   -­‐be	   they	   textual	   or	   rational-­‐	   are	  considered	   prima	   facie	   valid.	   Although	   it	   remains	   unclear	   exactly	   why	  proponents	   of	   this	   theory	   did	   not	   allow	   for	   its	   influence	   on	   dalīl	   al-­‐ʿaql,	   this	  would	   suggest	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   probable	   knowledge	   arising	   from	   textual	  sources,	   the	  probable	   knowledge	   acquired	   from	   inferences	   of	   rational	  morality	  are	  also	  potentially	  authoritative.	   In	  such	  a	  system	  a	  Mujtahid	   could	  not	  simply	  ignore	   a	   probable	   judgment	   of	   rational	   morality	   that	   apparently	   conflicts	   the	  indication	   of	   a	   less	   than	   certain	   text	   or	   texts.	   Instead,	   he	   would	   be	   forced	   to	  attempt	  reconciliation	  based	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  conflicting	  indicators.	   This	   clear	   scope	   for	   overcoming	   the	   redundancy	   of	   independent	  rationality	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   calls	   for	   a	   closer	   outline	   of	   the	   most	   famous	  argument	   for	   the	   prima	   facie	   authority	   of	   unqualified	   ẓann,	   the	   basis	   of	   its	  rejection	  within	  the	  school	  of	  Anṣārī	  and	  the	  tenability	  of	  its	  revival	  as	  a	  means	  of	  moving	  towards	  an	  ʿAdliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  	  6.4.2	  Dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  
Dalīl	   al–insidād	   is	   the	   most	   prominent	   of	   a	   number	   of	   possible	   justifications	  discussed	  by	  the	  uṣūliyūn	  for	  the	  prima	  facie	  authority	  of	  unqualified	  ẓann,	  such	  that	   ẓann	   can	   be	   a	   reliable	   means	   to	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge	   irrespective	   of	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  526	  Ḥasan	  Ibn	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn,	  Ma	   ͑ālim	  al-­‐din	  fi	  uṣūl,	  (Qum,	  n.	  p.,	  n.d.)	  p.	  192.	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source527.	   This	   type	   of	   unqualified	   non-­‐certain	   knowledge	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   al-­‐
ẓann	  al-­‐muṭlaq.	  This	  unqualified	  form	  of	  ẓann	  is	  contrasted	  with	  specific	  sources	  of	   less	   than	  certain	  knowledge	  (al-­‐ẓann	  al-­‐khāṣ)	  deemed	  reliable	  due	   to	  certain	  or	  definitive	  (qaṭʿī)	  validation	  of	  their	  authority.	  What	  is	  meant	  here	  by	   insidād,	  literally	  a	  closure	  or	  prevention,	   is	  a	  closure	  of	  access	  to	  both	  definitive	  certain	  knowledge	   (bāb	   al-­‐ʿilm)	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   and	   certainly	   validated	   means	   to	  knowledge	  (bāb	  al-­‐	͑  ilmī)	  of	  Sharī	  a͑	  precepts,	  ‘in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  an	  absence	  of	   any	   means	   by	   which	   sure	   knowledge	   (al-­‐ʿilm)	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   is	  acquired’528.	  In	  a	  context	  of	   insidād	  al-­‐ʿilm	   there	  is	  an	  obstacle	  to,	  or	  an	  absence	  of,	  definitive	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  With	  insidād	  al-­‐ʿilmī	  there	  is	  also	  an	  absence	   of	   the	   certain	   validation	   that	   can	   give	   sources	   of	   less	   than	   certain	  knowledge,	   like	  isolated	  reports	  (akhbār	  al-­‐aḥād),	  the	  authoritative	  status	  of	  al-­‐
ẓann	  al-­‐khāṣ.	  	  The	   argument	   for	   the	   unqualified	   authority	   of	   ẓann	   by	   way	   of	   insidād	   is	  composed	   of	   either	   four	   or	   five	   premises	   depending	   on	   the	   form	   of	   its	  construction529.	  Accepting	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  premises	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	   the	   unqualified	   authoritativeness	   of	   ẓann530.	   The	   argument	   claims	   that	   it	   is	  known	   that	   there	   are	   Sharī	  ͑a	   duties,	   yet	   not	   known	   definitively	  what	   all	   these	  duties	   are.	   These	   duties	   cannot	   be	   discharged	   through	   always	   attempting	   the	  most	  cautious	  praxis,	  nor	  can	  they	  be	   ignored	  entirely.	  Reference	  to	  the	  second	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  527	  Mīrzā	  al-­‐	  Qummī	  describes	  dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  as	  ‘the	  clearest’,	  as	  well	  as	  ‘the	  most	  well	  known’	  (al-­‐aẓhar	  wa	  al-­‐ashhar)	  argument	  for	  the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  ẓann,	  al-­‐Qawānin	  al-­‐muḥhkama	  
fil-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  2	  p.	  420.	  528	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐Uṣūlī	  Vol.	  1	  p.	  269	  (emphasis	  added).	  529	  For	  its	  four	  premise	  construction	  see	  Anṣārī,	  Farā’id	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  183-­‐19	  ;	  	  Muẓaffar,	  Uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  27-­‐28	  and	  Sanqūr,	  Al-­‐Muʿjam	  al-­‐uṣūlī	  Vol.	  1	  pp.	  368-­‐375.	  For	  a	  five	  premise	  construction	  see	  Khurasānī,	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  92-­‐93.	  	  530	  Akhund	  Khurasānī’s	  construction	  of	  a	  five	  premise	  version	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  is	  as	  follows;	  ‘i)	  It	  is	  known,	  in	  summary	  fashion	  (ijmalan)	  that	  there	  are	  extensive	  active	  religious	  responsibilities	  in	  
Sharī	  ͑a.	  ii)	  Access	  to	  definitive	  certain	  knowledge	  and	  to	  certainly	  validated	  knowledge	  in	  much	  of	  these	  [active	  Sharī	  ͑a	  responsibilities]	  is	  inaccessible	  for	  us	  (insadda	  alaynā).	  iii)	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  ignore	  these	  [active	  Sharī	  ͑a	  responsibilities]	  or	  not	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  their	  discharge	  outright.	  iv)	  al-­‐iḥṭiyāt	  is	  not	  obligatory	  for	  us	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  possibilities	  (aṭrāf)	  of	  our	  knowledge,	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  not	  permissible	  in	  this	  context	  at	  all.	  Likewise	  reference	  to	  [any]	  principle	  is	  also	  not	  permissible,	  be	  that	  continuity	  (al-­‐istiṣḥāb),	  choice	  (al-­‐takhīr),	  exemption	  (al-­‐barā’a)	  or	  caution	  (al-­‐ihtihyat).	  Nor	  can	  reference	  be	  made	  to	  the	  opinion	  of	  one	  who	  [claims	  he]	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  [definitively]	  knowing	  the	  aḥkām.	  v)	  Giving	  preference	  to	  the	  less	  justified	  (al-­‐marjūḥ)	  over	  the	  more	  justified	  (al-­‐rājiḥ)	  is	  rationally	  blameworthy.	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  rationality	  independently	  asserts	  the	  necessity	  of	  suppositional	  obedience	  (al-­‐iṭā	  ͑at	  al-­‐ẓanniyya)	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  known	  religious	  obligations.’	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol	  2.	  	  pp.	  92-­‐93.	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tier	  evidences	  of	   the	  uṣūl	  al-­‐	   ͑amaliyya	   is	  not	  practical	  and	  referring	  to	  someone	  who	  claims	  that	  they	  know	  these	  aḥkām	  for	  sure,	  despite	  the	  belief	  that	  they	  are	  unknowable	   in	   that	   way,	   is	   nonsensical.	   In	   addition	   to	   all	   this,	   it	   is	   rationally	  blameworthy	   to	   prefer	   that	   which	   is	   less	   justified,	   or	   less	   probable,	   over	  something	   which	   is	   more	   justified	   or	   more	   probable.	   Accordingly,	   the	   only	  reasonable	  way	  to	  attempt	  discharge	  of	  the	  body	  of	  religious	  duties	  is	  to	  rely	  on	  
any	  probable	   knowledge	   of	   the	   instances	   of	   these	   duties-­‐	   no	  matter	  what	   that	  source	   may	   be,	   accepting	   the	   most	   probable	   and	   the	   most	   justified	   as	  authoritative.	  The	  details	   and	   complexities	   of	   each	   component	   premise	  within	   this	   argument	  have	  received	  significant	  attention	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Anṣārī	  and	  his	  followers	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  complex	  arguments	  put	  forward	  to	  undermine	  each	  of	  the	  initial	  premises	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   study531.	   	   However	   the	   second	   premise,	  which	   claims	   that	   the	   duties	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   cannot	   all	   be	   known	   definitively,	   does	  deserve	   further	   attention	   here.	   Not	   only	   is	   it	   the	   central	   premise	   of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐
insidād,	  but	  the	  rejection	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  by	  post-­‐Anṣārī	  Uṣūlī’s	  rests	  on	  their	  attempt	  to	  undermine	  this	  central	  premise.	  Acting	  as	  the	  corner	  stone	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  
al-­‐insidād,	   this	   premise	   asserts	   that	   access	   to	   definitive	   or	   certain	   ͑ilm	   in	   the	  majority	  of	  aḥkām	  is	  not	  possible	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  distance	  from	  the	  time	  of	  revelatory	  propagation.	  As	  already	  stated,	  this	  phenomenological	  epistemic	  block	  to	   definitive	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   is	   both	   with	   respect	   to	   certainty	  yielding	   evidences,	   such	   as	   through	   explicit	   verses	   of	   the	   Qur’ān	   and	   tawātur	  
Ḥādīth,	  and	  through	  certainly	  validated	  yet	  non-­‐	  certain	  means,	  such	  as	  through	  a	  reliance	   on	   the	   apparent	   meaning	   of	   the	   Qur’ān	   and	   isolated	   non-­‐tawatur	  reports.	   	   Coupled	   with	   the	   other	   premises,	   this	   phenomenological	   epistemic	  block	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  a	  pragmatic	  necessity	  of	  relying	  on	  non-­‐certain	  ʿilm	  and	  establishes	  the	  authoritativeness	  of	  ẓann	  irrespective	  of	  its	  source.	  	  Both	   Ibn	   Zayn	   al-­‐Dīn	   and	   Mīrzā	   Qummī	   referred	   to	   dalīl	   al-­‐insidād	   and	   the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  ẓann	  as	  a	  possible	  basis	  for	  accepting	  the	  authority	  of	  the	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  For	  a	  concise	  yet	  typically	  dense	  treatment	  of	  these	  arguments	  see	  Kifāyat	  al-­‐uṣūl,	  Vol.	  2	  pp.	  92-­‐93.	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isolated	  report532.	  However	  the	  implications	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  as	  employed	  by	  both	  Ibn	  Zayn	  al-­‐Dīn,	  Mīrzā	  Qummī	  and	  described	  by	  Anṣārī	  and	  Khurasānī	  does	  not	  end	  with	  validating	  the	  isolated	  report,	  for	  it	  is	  an	  argument	  which	  validates	  the	  authority	  of	  ẓann	  irrespective	  of	  its	  source,	  be	  it	  textual	  or	  rational.	  If	   any	   source	   of	   probable	   knowledge	   is	   deemed	   potentially	   authoritative	   it	  becomes	   necessary	   for	   the	   Mujtahid	   to	   reconcile	   between	   apparent	   conflicts	  between	   the	   indication	   of	   non-­‐certain	   textual	   evidences	   and	   the	   indication	   of	  non-­‐	  certain	  rational	  evidences	  in	  the	  process	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference.	  Referring	  back	  to	  our	  previously	  cited	  example,	  the	  Mujtahid	  would	  have	  to	  weigh	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  rational	  argument	  which	  states	  that	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  justice,	  and	  hence	  rationally	  and	  religiously	  praiseworthy,	  against	  the	  strength	  of	   any	   textual	   indicators	  which	  may	   suggest	   that	  women	  do	  not	   have	   an	   equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  his	  inference	  of	  the	  relevant	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  The	  mujtahid	   needs	   to	  weigh	  up	   the	   strength	  of	   the	   respective	   evidences,	  with	  the	  most	  probable	  or	  most	  justified	  being	  deemed	  authoritative.	  As	   in	   the	   current	   system,	  where	   the	  mujtahid	   already	   engages	   in	   sophisticated	  reconciliation	  of	  apparently	  conflicting	  textual	  evidences,	  if	  the	  process	  of	  tarjīḥ	  (reconciliation)	   is	   inconclusive	   the	  mujtahid	  would	  need	   to	   refer	   to	   second	   tier	  evidences	  to	  resolve	  his	  situation	  of	  doubt.	  An	  already	  complex	  system	  exists	  in	  Uṣūlī	   literature	   for	  when	  and	  how	  to	  reconcile	  or	  give	  preference	   to	  conflicting	  evidences.	  This	  is	  a	  system	  that	  already	  includes	  the	  case	  of	  how	  to	  treat	  conflicts	  with	   rational	   indicators	   that	   are	   deemed	   definitive	   and	   certain.	   Although	   this	  system	  may	  need	  to	  be	   further	  refined	   in	  order	   to	  systematically	  accommodate	  reference	   to	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   even	   if	   they	   are	   not	   one	   hundred	  percent	   certain,	   what	   becomes	   clear	   here	   is	   that	   such	   an	   acceptance	   of	   the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  ẓann	  ensures	  that	  the	  mujtahid	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  in	  a	  position	   to	   entirely	   ignore	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   in	   the	   face	   of	   non-­‐certain	  textual	  indicators.	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  Ma	  ͑ālim	  al-­‐din	  fi	  uṣūl,	  (Qum,	  n.	  p.,	  n.d.)	  p.	  192;	  al-­‐Qawānin	  al-­‐muḥhkama	  fil-­‐uṣūl,	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6.4.3	  Undermining	  the	  refutation	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  The	  scope	  for	  adopting	  such	  a	  turn	  in	  the	   inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  through	  reference	   to	   dalīl	   al-­‐insidād	   and	   the	   unqualified	   authority	   of	   ẓann	   is	   of	   course	  faced	  with	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  outright	   rejection	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	   by	  Anṣārī	  and	  his	  followers.	  The	  pivot	  of	  this	  rejection	  relies	  upon	  undermining	  the	  second	  and	   central	   premise	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐insidād.	   In	   order	   to	  maintain	   the	   scope	   for	   a	  substantive	   role	   for	   rational	   morality	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   through	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐
insidād	   it	   is	   thus	   necessary	   to	   critically	   consider	   this	   rejection	   and	   to	  demonstrate	   reasons	   for	   maintaining	   the	   tenability	   of	   a	   revival	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐
insidād	  as	  a	  means	  to	  a	  moral	  or	  ʿAdliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a.	  The	   central	   claim	   of	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐insidād	   is	   that	   there	   is	   a	   phenomenological	  epistemic	   block	   to	   definitive	   knowledge	   of	   aḥkām,	   through	   both	   certainty-­‐yielding	   evidences	   (bāb	   al-­‐ʿilm)	   and	   through	   certainly	   validated	   means	   to	  knowledge	   (bāb	   al-­‐ʿilmī).	   Anṣārī	   and	   his	   followers	   accept	   that	   attaining	   direct	  certainty	   in	  the	  majority	  of	  aḥkām	   is	  not	  possible	   in	  our	  context.	  However	  they	  maintain	   that	   access	   to	   knowledge	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   through	   sources	   that	   are	  certainly	   validated	   means	   to	   ʿilm,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   not	   certainty	   bearing	   in	  themselves,	  is	  open.	  It	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  al-­‐ẓanūn	  al-­‐khāsa,	  the	  specific	  sources	  of	  probable	   opinion	   which	   have	   been	   definitively	   or	   certainly	   validated	   by	   the	  Divine	   legislator	   which	   undermines	   al-­‐dalīl	   al-­‐insidād	   from	   the	   outset,	   or	   as	  Muẓaffar	  puts	  it	  ‘burning’	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  down,	  ‘from	  its	  very	  foundations’533.	  	  The	  claim	   is	   that	  we	  have	  specific	   sources	  of	  probable	  knowledge	   that	  God	  has	  definitively	   and	   certainly	   validated	   as	   authoritative	  means	   to	   His	  aḥkām.	   Even	  though	   such	   indicators	   may	   yield	   false	   information,	   they	   can	   be	   relied	   upon	  because	  of	   the	  claimed	  certainty	   that	  God	  has	  validated	  them.	   If	   these	  certainly	  divinely	   validated	   evidences	   lead	   to	   the	   issuance	   of	   an	   incorrect	   precept	   and	  result	  in	  practice	  which	  is	  actually	  contrary	  to	  the	  real	  precept	  in	  the	  knowledge	  of	   God,	   both	   the	  mujtahid	   and	   his	   followers	  would	   be	   excusable	   before	  God	   as	  they	   had	   relied	   upon	   evidences	   which	   God	   himself	   had	   certainly	   validated	   as	  authoritative.	   	  There	   is	   thus	  no	   scope	   for	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	   and	   the	  unqualified	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  Uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  Vol.	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authority	  of	  ẓann,	  for	  God	  has	  validated	  a	  few	  specific	  sources	  of	  ẓann	  himself,	  a	  group	   of	   sources	   that	   does	   not	   include	   less	   than	   certain	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality.	  	  The	   most	   important	   of	   these	   divinely	   validated	   ‘specific	   sources	   of	   probable	  opinion’	  is	  of	  course	  the	  isolated	  report	  (al-­‐khabar	  al-­‐wāḥid),	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  report	  of	  a	  trusted	  source	  	  (khabar	  al-­‐thiqa).	  The	  extent	  of	  the	  concern	  in	  Shī	͑  ī	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   for	   the	  status	  of	   the	  authority	  of	   the	   isolated	  report	   is	  unsurprising	  having	  noted	  that	  it	  represents	  arguably	  the	  only	  independent	  source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  
aḥkām	  for	  most	  uṣūliyūn534,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  through	  the	  isolated	  report	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	   of	   the	   aḥkām	   in	   furū	  ͑	   al-­‐fiqh	   are	   justified.	   Whether	   or	   not	   the	  justifications	   for	   the	  valid	  authority	   (ḥujjiyya)	  of	   the	   isolated	  report	  are	  certain	  and	  definitive	  is	  pivotal	  to	  the	  tenability	  of	  the	  second	  and	  central	  premise	  to	  al-­‐
dalīl	  al-­‐insidād,	   a	   premise	   that	  negates	   access	   to	   ʿilm	   both	  directly	  and	  through	  certainly	  validated	  means.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Anṣārī	  himself;	  The	   acceptance	   or	   the	   rejection	   of	   this	   premise	   can	   not	   become	   clear	  except	  after	  complete	  consideration	  and	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  utmost	  effort	  in	  considering…	  the	  evidences	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  [isolated]	  Report	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  establish	  the	  authority	  of	  these	  reports	  to	  a	  sufficient	  extent	  or	  not535.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  isolated	  report	  is	  reflected	  in	  	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh’s	   extensive	   treatment	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  possible	   justifications.	  	  The	  authority	  or	  ḥujjiyya	  of	  the	  reports	  whose	  transmission,	  by	  definition,	  is	  non-­‐certain	  is	  argued	  for	  by	  way	  of	  the	  indication	  of	  a	  number	  of	  verses	  of	  the	  Qur’ān,	  by	   reference	   to	   the	  Sunna,	   through	  a	  claimed	  consensus	  and	   through	  a	   form	  of	  rational	   convention	   termed	   banā’	   al-­‐	   ͑uqalā’.	   	   Although	   Anṣārī	   understandably	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘complete	  consideration	  and	  exhaustion	  of	  utmost	  effort’536	  in	  analysis	  of	   these	   justifications,	   here	   we	   will	   restrict	   ourselves	   to	   examining	   only	   the	  strongest	   of	   them.	   Demonstrating	   that	   the	   strongest	   of	   the	   evidences	   for	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   isolated	   report	   is	   not	   certain	   and	   definitive	   in	   establishing	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  534	  See	  Fanaei	  and	  Bhojani,	  Obstacles	  and	  Inconsistencies,	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claim	  is	  sufficient	  to	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  certain	  validity	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  isolated	  report,	  thus	  undermining	  the	  existence	  of	  ẓanūn	  al-­‐khāṣa,	  This	  opens	  up	   the	  way	   for	   validating	   the	   unqualified	   authority	   of	   ẓann	   through	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐
insidād,	  allowing	  non	  certain	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  potentially	  authoritative.	  The	   relevant	   verses	   of	   the	  Qur’ān,	   arguments	   from	   the	   Sunna	   and	   the	   claim	  of	  
Ijmā’	  regarding	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  isolated	  report	  are	  all,	  according	  to	  modern	  
uṣūliyūn	  themselves,	  subject	  to	  potential	  criticism	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  establish	  the	  claim	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   isolated	   report537 .	   The	   argument	   by	   rational	  convention	   however	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   cut	   above	   these	   aforementioned	   routes.	  	  Muẓaffar	   quotes	   one	   of	   his	   most	   influential	   teachers,	   Mīrzā	   Ḥusayn	   Nā	  ͑īnī	   (d.	  1276	  A.H),	  in	  describing	  this	  not	  only	  as	  ‘the	  most	  reliable	  evidence	  in	  this	  regard	  (al-­‐	   ͑umda	  fil-­‐bāb)’	  but	  also	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  stands	  out	  above	  the	  other	  means	  of	  justifying	   the	   reliability	   of	   the	   isolated	   report,	   for	   ‘one	   can	   assume	   means	   of	  disputing	   all	   the	   others,	   [but]	   there	   is	   no	   scope	   for	   disputing	   the	  means	   of	   the	  established	  rational	  convention	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  report	  of	  a	  trusted	  source’538.	  	  	  For	   Muẓaffar	   himself	   the	   justification	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   isolated	   report	  through	  an	  argument	  by	  way	  of	  rational	  convention	   ‘is	  a	  certain	  evidence,	  with	  no	   scope	   for	   doubt	   to	   enter	   into	   it,	   because	   it	   is	   composed	   of	   two	   certain	  premises’539.	  These	  two	  premises	  may	  be	  constructed	  as	  follows;	  1. For	   certain,	   there	   is	   an	   established	   rational	   convention	   to	   rely	   and	   act	  upon	  the	  report	  of	  a	  trustworthy	  person.	  2. The	  existence	  of	   this	  rational	  convention	  discloses,	   for	  certain,	   that	   the	  Divine	  legislator	  concurs	  with	  and	  partakes	  in	  this	  rational	  convention.	  	  Accepting	   that	   these	   two	   premises	   are	   indeed	   certain	   leads	   to	   the	   certain	  conclusion	   that	   the	   Divine	   legislator	   considers	   reliance	   upon	   the	   report	   of	  someone	  who	  is	  trustworthy	  as	  a	  reliable	  and	  authoritative	  means	  to	  knowledge.	  The	  reasoning	  implicit	  within	  these	  two	  premises	  is	  somewhat	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  537	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earlier	   discussed	   arguments	   put	   forward	   for	   a	   correlation	   between	   the	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  and	  the	  judgments	  of	  the	  Divine	  legislator.	  If	  there	  is	   an	   established	   convention	   adopted	   by	   all	   rational	   beings,	   in	   this	   case	   the	  convention	  of	  accepting	  reliance	  upon	  the	  report	  of	  a	  trustworthy	  source	  despite	  the	   possibility	   of	   its	   falsity,	   then	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   the	   Divine	   Legislator	   also	  accepts	  this	  rational	  practice.	  The	  assumption	  of	  Gods	  concurrence	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  rational	  community	  in	  accepting	  the	  convention	  is	  based	  on	  the	  conception	  of	  His	  Rational	  nature,	  or	  as	  Muẓaffar	  puts	  it,	  ‘because	  He	  is	  from	  amongst	  them	  and	  in	  fact	  the	  Chief	  of	  them’540.	  	  This	   line	  of	  argumentation,	  which	  claims	   to	  establish	   the	  certain	  validity	  of	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   isolated	   report,	   is	   the	   same	   line	   of	   reasoning	   put	   forward	   for	  what	   is	   arguably	   the	   strongest	   justification	   for	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   apparent	  meaning	  of	  the	  Qur’ān541.	  As	  a	  result	  followers	  of	  Anṣārī’s	  epistemic	  framework	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  rely	  on	  such	  specific	  sources	  of	  probable	  knowledge	  (al-­‐ẓanūn	  
al-­‐khāsa),	  for	  they	  are	  certainly	  validated	  means	  to	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge.	  Although	  direct	  access	  to	  definitive	  knowledge	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  (bāb	  al-­‐ʿilm)	  may	  well	  be	  closed	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  majority	  of	  aḥkām,	  we	  do	  have	  access	   to	  Sharī	  ͑a	  knowledge	  through	   definitively	   or	   certainly	   validated	   sources	   of	   ẓann	   (bāb	   al-­‐ʿilmī).	   This	  undermines	  the	  second	  premise	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  leaving	  probable	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  process	  of	  inferring	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  conviction	  with	  which	  the	  case	  is	  made,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  major	  problem	  with	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  these	  specific	  sources	  of	  ẓann	  through	   the	   argument	   by	   rational	   convention.	   	  With	   the	   ʿAdliyya	   conception	   of	  God,	   the	   second	   premise	   in	   the	   argument	   is	   sound.	   At	   the	   most,	   as	   noted	   by	  Muẓaffar	  himself542,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  premise	  needs	  furnishing	  slightly	  with	  the	  additional	  clause	  that	  states;	  had	  God	  not	  wanted	  us	  to	  rely	  upon	  such	  conventionally	  accepted	  means	  of	  knowledge	  acquisition	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  religion,	  He	  would	  have	  informed	  us	  of	  this,	  and	  He	  has	  not.	  The	  problem	  instead	  lies	  with	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the	   first	   premise	   and	   the	   overly	   simple	   conception	   of	   what	   the	   rational	  convention	  with	  regards	  to	  reports	  from	  trusted	  sources	  actually	  is.	  	  A	  full	  and	  proper	  analysis	  of	  conventions	  adopted	  by	  rational	  agents	  with	  regards	  to	   acting	  upon	   the	   reports	   of	   trusted	   sources	   is	   of	   course	   a	   question	   for	   social	  science	   and	   not	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh.	   However	   within	   the	   context	   of	   this	   study	   it	   is	  important	   to	   note	   the	   overly	   simplistic	   analysis	   of	   the	   rational	   convention	  described	   by	   the	   uṣūliyūn.	   	   It	   does	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   accept	   that	   there	   is	   a	  convention	   to	   rely	   upon	   a	   trusted	   source	   for	   information,	   regardless	   of	   the	  possibility	   that	   this	   report	  may	  be	  unsound	  or	  misunderstood	  by	   the	   recipient.	  	  As	  Muẓaffar	  states,	  social	  order	  and	  the	  communal	  lives	  of	  humankind	  rely	  upon	  the	   practical	   convention	   of	   relying	   upon	   isolated	   trusted	   sources,	   if	   human	  society	  exclusively	  relied	  upon	  certainty	  bearing	  information	  in	  every	   instances	  of	   information	   transmission,	   things	  would	   grind	   to	   a	   halt543.	  However,	   rational	  convention	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  rely	  upon	  isolated	  trustworthy	  sources	  all	  the	  time	  and	  in	  an	  unqualified	  manner.	  Rather	  it	  seems	  that	  rational	  agents	  only	  ordinarily	  rely	  on	   the	   isolated	   report	  of	   a	   trusted	   source	   if	  they	  have	  no	  other	   sources	  of	  conflicting	  knowledge.	  	  Rational	  agents	  will	  not	  blindly	   follow	  an	   isolated	  report	   from	  a	   trusted	  source	  when	   they	   are	   aware	   of	   possible	   reasons	   why	   the	   report	   may	   be	   false.	  Accordingly	   the	   argument	   by	   rational	   convention,	   as	   constructed	   by	   uṣūliyūn,	  cannot	  establish	  the	  absolute	  and	  definitive	  authority	  of	   isolated	  reports,	  or	   for	  that	  matter	  the	  apparent	  meaning	  of	  the	  Qur’ān,	  irrespective	  of	  considering	  other	  sources	  of	  probable	  knowledge	  that	  may	  include	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality.	  Undermining	   the	   claimed	   certain	   and	   definitive	   validation	   for	   the	   authority	   of	  specific	   sources	   of	   probable	   opinion	   in	   this	   way	   opens	   up	   the	   tenability	   of	   a	  revival	  of	  al-­‐dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  and	  the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  probable	  opinion.	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6.5	  Conclusion	  The	   redundancy	   of	   rational	   morality	   that	   results	   from	   Muẓaffar’s	   analysis	   of	  independent	  rationality,	   firmly	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  Murtaḍā	  Anṣārī’s	  school	  of	  Uṣūlī	   epistemology,	   seems	   to	   trivialise	   the	   very	   inclusion	   of	   independent	  rationality	   as	   a	   source	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   alongside	  Qur’ān	  and	  Sunna.	  Despite	  the	   fundamental	   position	   of	   an	   ʿAdliyya	   rational	  morality	   within	   Shī	  ͑ī	   theology	  and	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  theoretical	  role	  for	  rational	  morality	  as	  a	  source	  of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   in	   Shī	  ͑ī	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   epistemic	   obstacles	   relating	   to	   what	  constitutes	  a	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  their	  authority	   (ḥujjiyya)	   stop	   the	   actual	   impact	   of	   these	   ideas	   at	   the	   level	   of	   fiqh.	  Within	   the	   epistemological	   framework	   of	   Murtaḍā	   Anṣārī,	   the	   criteria	   for	   the	  validity	   and	   authority	   of	   independent	   rationality	   act	   as	   obstacles	   to	   specific	  instances	   of	   rational	   morality	   playing	   a	   substantive	   role	   in	   the	   inference	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  whenever	  something	  is	  just	  it	  is	  rationally	   praiseworthy,	   and	  whenever	   something	   is	   oppression	   it	   is	   rationally	  blameworthy,	   inferences	   from	   these	   general	   principles	   to	   specific	   instances	  become	  problematic	  rendering	  independent	  rationality	  effectively	  redundant.	  	  The	  ‘emic’	  approach	  that	  this	  study	  set	  out	  with	  demands	  that	  attempts	  be	  made	  to	   interpret	   Muẓaffar’s	   position	   on	   independent	   rationality	   as	   substantive	   and	  not	  trivial.	  An	  emic	  approach	  allows	  for	  a	  reading	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  that	  can	  regulate	  a	  body	  of	  furū	  	͑  al-­‐fiqh	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  fundamental	  ʿAdliyya	  conception	  of	   a	   Just	   and	  Moral	   God.	   Accordingly	   this	   concluding	   chapter	   has	   revisited	   the	  conditions	  and	  epistemic	  criteria	  set	  out	  by	  Muẓaffar	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  preventing	  independent	  rationality	  from	  having	  a	  substantive	  role	  in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  
aḥkām	   with	   a	   view	   to	   demonstrating	   the	   space	   and	   resources	   internal	   to	   Shī	  ͑ī	  legal	   theory	   that	   can	   allow	   for	   a	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   more	   consistent	   with	   a	  theology	   which	   demands	   that	   precepts	   deemed	   rationally	   immoral	   cannot	   be	  attributed	  to	  God.	  	  Through	  examining	  Muẓaffar’s	  analysis	  of	  independent	  rationality	  as	  a	  source	  in	  
uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   three	   key	   criterions	   became	   apparent	   as	   obstacles	   to	   the	   role	   of	  rational	   morality.	   Potentially	   relevant	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   were	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deemed	   as	   having	   to	   result	   from	   unanimity	   of	   opinion,	   be	   of	   rational	   issuance	  and	   be	   certain	   (qaṭʿī)	   or	   definitive	   in	   their	   nature.	   Through	   distinguishing	  between	  rational	  and	  non-­‐rational	  disagreement	  and	  by	  reading	  unanimity	  as	  a	  regulative	   criterion,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   an	   individual	   mujtahid	   does	   not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  almost	  unachievable	  absolute	  unanimity	  of	  opinion	  before	   considering	   judgments	   of	   rational	   morality	   to	   have	   potential	   Sharī	  ͑a	  relevance.	   If	   an	   individual	   mujtahid	   considers	   that	   a	   judgment	   is	   rational,	  whether	  all	  people	  agree	  to	  it	  or	  not,	   in	  his	  view	  God	  ‘The	  Chief	  Rational	  Being’	  would	   also	   judge	   in	   accordance	  with	   it,	   and	   such	   a	   judgment	   of	   reason	  would	  then	  be	  disclosive	  of	  a	  potentially	  relevant	  judgment	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  for	  that	  mujtahid.	  Accepting	   the	   tenability	   of	   an	   individual	  mujtahid	  maintaining	   the	   validity	   of	   a	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rational	  disagreement	  does	  however	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  disagreement	  may	  lead	  him	  to	  weaken	  his	  belief	  in	  the	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  that	  he	  holds.	  	  This	  emphasises	  the	  necessity	   of	   examining	   the	   scope	   for	   reassessing	   the	   criteria	   of	   maintaining	  certainty	   (qaṭʿ)	   as	   the	   ultimate	   basis	   for	   authority	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   sources	   in	   any	  attempts	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  substantive	  role	  for	  rational	  morality	  in	  the	  actual	  inferences	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām.	  	  Despite	  the	  fundamental	  place	  of	  the	  requirement	  of	  qaṭʿ	  as	  the	  ultimate	  basis	  for	  
ḥujjiyya	  in	  the	  epistemic	  framework	  of	  the	  school	  of	  Murtaḍā	  Anṣārī,	  prior	  Uṣūlī	  tradition	   had	   embraced	   a	   system	   that	   culminated	   in	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  ẓann.	  This	  was	  an	  epistemic	  framework	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  justifications	  for	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  isolated	  tradition,	  a	  textual	  source	  that	   by	   definition	   is	   less	   than	   certain	   in	   its	   transmission.	   Despite	   the	   concern	  with	   the	   isolated	   tradition,	   acceptance	  of	   the	  unqualified	   authority	  of	  ẓann	   is	   a	  position	  whose	  revival	  has	  huge	  scope	   in	  allowing	  a	   fuller	  role	   for	   independent	  rationality,	   for	   it	   considers	   any	   probable	   source	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   knowledge	   as	  potentially	  valid-­‐	  be	  it	  textual	  or	  rational.	  The	  most	  important	  argument	  in	  Uṣūlī	  tradition	  for	  the	  unqualified	  authority	  of	  
ẓann	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   dalīl	   al-­‐insidād.	   The	   central	   premise	   refers	   to	   a	  phenomenological	   epistemic	   block	   to	   definitive	   knowledge	   of	   the	   majority	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	  aḥkām,	  both	  with	  respect	  to	  certainty	  yielding	  evidences,	  such	  as	  through	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explicit	  verses	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  tawātur	  ḥadīth,	  and	  through	  certainly	  validated	  yet	  non-­‐	  certain	  means,	  such	  as	  through	  the	  apparent	  meaning	  of	  the	  Qur’ān	  and	  isolated	   reports.	   	   Coupled	   with	   the	   other	   premises,	   this	   phenomenological	  epistemic	   block	   ultimately	   leads	   to	   a	   pragmatic	   necessity	   of	   relying	   on	   non-­‐certain	   ʿilm	   and	   establishes	   the	   authoritativeness	   of	   ẓann	   irrespective	   of	   its	  source.	   In	   such	  a	   framework	  a	  mujtahid	   cannot	   rely	   solely	  on	   less	   than	   certain	  textual	   evidences	   and	   justifiably	   ignore	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality,	   even	   if	  they	  are	  not	  entirely	  certain.	   If	   inferred	   judgments	  of	  rational	  morality,	  such	  as	  ‘an	   equal	   right	   to	   divorce	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   justice’	   or	   ‘undermining	   freedom	  of	  conscience	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  religion,	  by	  threat	  of	  death,	  is	  unjust’	  are	  in	  apparent	  conflict	   with	   less	   than	   certain	   textual	   evidences,	   the	   mujtahid	   must	   seek	   to	  reconcile	   between	   the	   two	   forms	   of	   sources	   based	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   the	  respective	   evidence.	   	   If	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   judgement	   of	   rational	   morality	   is	  deemed	   greater	   than	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   apparent	   indication	   of	   the	   texts-­‐	   the	  rational	  judgement	  must	  be	  favoured	  in	  inferring	  the	  relevant	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precept.	  In	  this	   way	   rational	   morality	   can	   be	   a	   qualification	   to	   the	   valid	   interpretation	   of	  texts,	  preventing	  the	  attribution	  of	  immoral	  precepts	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  moral	  God.	  The	  main	  obstacle	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  dalīl	  al-­‐insidād	  validating	  unqualified	  ẓann	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  exists	  certain	  and	  definitive	  validation	  for	  specific	  sources	  of	  
ẓann.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   in	   this	   chapter	   that	   even	   the	   strongest	   of	   the	  justifications	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   specific	   sources	   of	   less	   than	   certain	   knowledge	  (ẓanūn	   al-­‐khāsa)	   cannot	   establish	   this	   claim.	   Examining	   the	   argument	   for	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  isolated	  report	  by	  way	  of	  rational	  convention,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  overly	  simplistic	  reading	  of	  the	  rational	  convention	  of	  relying	  upon	  isolated	  trusted	   sources	   of	   knowledge	   is	   problematic.	   	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   rational	  convention	   to	   rely	   on	   isolated	   trusted	   sources	   for	   knowledge,	   despite	   the	  possibility	  that	  this	  information	  may	  be	  false	  and	  misconstrued,	  a	  problem	  seems	  to	  arise	   if	   this	  convention	   is	  seen	  as	  unqualified	  and	  unrestricted.	   It	  seems	  that	  rational	  agents	  only	  ordinarily	   rely	  on	   the	   isolated	   report	  of	  a	   trusted	  source	   if	  they	   have	   no	   other	   sources	   of	   conflicting	   knowledge.	   A	   rational	   agent	  will	   not	  blindly	   follow	   isolated	   reports,	   even	   from	   trusted	   sources,	   when	   they	   have	  conflicting	   reasons	   suggesting	   that	   the	   report	   might	   be	   false.	   Thus	   rational	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convention	  cannot	  establish	  the	  definitive	  and	  absolute	  authority	  of	   the	  trusted	  report,	  or	  apparent	  meaning,	  in	  an	  unqualified	  manner.	  	  The	  certainty	  that	  is	  a	  claimed	  criterion	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  judgments	  of	  rational	  morality	   is	   considered	   unattainable	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   aḥkām	   even	   through	  textual	   sources.	   In	   a	   context	   of	   phenomenological	   epistemic	   block	   to	   definitive	  knowledge,	   both	   directly	   and	   through	   certainly	   validated	  means,	   all	   sources	   of	  probable	   opinion	   are	   potentially	   valid.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   conflicts,	   the	   strongest	  source	   of	   probable	   opinion	   becomes	   authoritative.	   Even	   if	   it	   is	   accepted	   that	  inferences	  from	  basic	  moral	  propositions,	  such	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  equal	  right	  to	  divorce	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  justice	  (and	  hence	  praiseworthy	  according	  to	  rationality	  and	  the	  Divine	  legislator),	  are	  not	  certain,	  they	  are	  a	  source	  of	  probable	  opinion	  which	   can	   not	   be	   ignored	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   apparent	   indication	   of	   a	   limited	  number	  of	  texts	  which	  might	  suggest	  otherwise.	  In	  cases	  of	  apparent	  conflict	  the	  
mujtahid	   must	   weigh	   the	   strengths	   of	   the	   respective	   evidences,	   and	   if	   the	  judgment	  of	  rational	  morality	  is	  deemed	  stronger	  than	  the	  indication	  of	  the	  texts	  then	  he	  must	   issue	  his	   ruling	   in	   line	  with	   the	   judgment	  of	   rational	  morality.	   In	  accordance	  with	   the	   convention	   of	   rational	   beings,	   this	  means	   that	   reliance	   on	  isolated	   reports	   of	   trustworthy	   sources	   and	   the	   apparent	   meaning	   of	   textual	  evidences	   are	   still	   potentially	   authoritative,	   but	   only	   actually	   authoritative	   if	  there	   is	   no	   conflicting	   evidence	   of	   greater	   strength.	   Such	   a	   system	   would	   see	  judgments	  of	   independent	  rationality	  play	  a	  substantive	  role	   in	  the	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   aḥkām	   and	   enable	   rational	   morality	   to	   actually	   be	   a	   condition	   for	   the	  validity	  of	  precepts	  attributed	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  Moral	  God.	  	  
6.6	  Limits	  of	  the	  study	  and	  scope	  for	  further	  research	  The	   stated	   aim	   of	   engaging	   in	   a	   consciously	   reflexive	   critique	   of	   the	   sources	  studied	   here	   can	   not	   be	   complete	  without	   commenting	   on	   the	   impact	   that	   the	  particular	  emic	  approach	  adopted	  here	  imposes	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  study.	  We	  have	  argued	  for	  a	  substantive	  and	  relevant	  relationship	  between	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  
fiqh,	  yet	  the	  pattern	  of	  analysis	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh,	  at	  least	  when	  read	   in	   isolation	   from	  other	  areas	  of	  Muslim	   thought,	  does	  exhibit	  what	  Calder	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described	   as	   a	   tendency	   to	  make	   it	   	   ‘a	   closed	   and	   independent	   science’544.	   The	  nature	   of	   the	  Uṣūlī	   approach	  does	  not	   seek	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   context	   of	  knowledge	   production	   on	   the	   ideas	   and	   reasoning	   that	   emerge	   through	   its	  discourse	  and,	  accordingly,	  neither	  has	  this	  study.	  	  	  Yet	  Muẓaffar’s	  extensive	  treatment	  of	  rationality	  could	  not	  have	  emerged	  entirely	  divorced	   from	   a	   context.	   	   To	   what	   extent	   Muẓaffar’s	   extensive	   discussion	   of	  independent	   rationality	   in	   his	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   context	   of	   his	  attempts	   to	  engage	  Najaf	  and	  the	  broader	  Shī	  ͑ī	  higher	   learning	   system	  with	   the	  competing	   trends	   of	   modernity	   of	   his	   day	   is	   an	   open	   question.	   His	   particular	  treatment	  of	  the	  questions	  surrounding	  independent	  rationality	  may,	  or	  may	  not	  be,	   enriched	   through	   reference	   to	   his	   struggle	   to	   reform	   and	   modernise	   the	  Hawza.	   Clearly	   Muẓaffar	   dedicated	   much	   space	   to	   outline	   the	   concept	   of	  rationality	  as	  a	  source,	  emphasising	  a	  dynamic	  rationalism	  within	  Shī	  ͑ī	  thought	  at	  a	  theoretical	  plane	  yet	  simultaneously	  maintaining	  the	  scripture	  bound	  nature	  of	  a	  positivist	  theory	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  cementing	  the	  need	  for	  religiously	  trained	  experts	  in	   the	   textual	   and	   traditional	   sciences.	   Of	   course	   this	   study	   has	   not	   been	   an	  exercise	  in	  intellectual	  history	  or	  historiography,	  and	  accordingly	  it	  never	  set	  out	  to	   account	   for	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   ideas	   produced	   by	  Muẓaffar	   in	   his	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  and	  Muẓaffar’s	  own	  socio-­‐political	  and	  intellectual	  context.	  	  At	   the	  same	   time	   this	   study	  has	  been	  a	   reading	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   that	  has	  also	  not	  emerged	   without	   a	   context.	   The	   study	   has	   been	   explicitly	   framed	   within	   a	  perceived	   tension	   between	   mainstream	   readings	   of	   fiqh	   and	   the	   fundamental	  Shī	  ͑ī	   theological	  presuppositions	   regarding	  moral	   rationalism	  and	   the	   justice	  of	  God.	  Not	  only	  did	  it	  seek	  to	  explain	  theoretical	  reasons	  for	  this	  apparent	  tension	  but	   also	   it	   embarked	   on	   a	   search	   for	   a	   means	   to	   overcome	   them.	  Will	   such	   a	  framing	  have	   impacted	  my	   reading	   of	   the	   sources?	  Undoubtedly	   yes.	  Does	   this	  undermine	  the	  relevance	  and	  rigor	  of	   the	  study?	  I	  believe	  not.	  The	  unavoidable	  phenomenon	  of	  bringing	  paradigms	  external	  to	  my	  source	  texts	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  these	   texts	   is	  not	   subversive	   to	   the	   tradition;	   rather	   it	   is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	   the	  tradition.	   In	   fact	   it	   is	   this	   very	   practice	   that	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   central	   to	   both	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  development	  of	  ideas	  within	  the	  tradition	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐	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fiqh.	   The	   apparently	  hermetically	   sealed,	   ahistorical	  nature	  of	  works	  of	  uṣūl	  al-­‐
fiqh	   (and	   to	   some	   extent	   fiqh)	   allows	   them	   to	   speak	   across	   horizons.	  Muẓaffar	  read	  his	  predecessors	  in	  a	  similarly	  decontextualised	  way,	  undoubtedly	  bringing	  to	   his	   analysis	   of	   al-­‐Murtaḍā,	   al-­‐Ṭūsī,	   Ḥillī,	  Mīrzā	   Qummī	   and	   Anṣārī	   concerns,	  approaches	  and	  indeed	  questions	  that	  may	  have	  been	  alien	  to	  these	  thinkers	   in	  their	   own	   time.	   The	   openness	   of	   the	   discourse	   in	   this	   way	   reflects	   a	   spirit	   of	  knowledge	  acquisition	  that	  allows	  for	  possibility	  of	  deeper	  understandings,	  or	  at	  least	   understandings	   more	   grounded	   and	   relevant	   to	   the	   time	   of	   their	  production,	  to	  continually	  emerge.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  spirit	  that	  this	  study	  has	  sought	  to	  identify	   the	   epistemic	   obstacles	   to	   the	   fundamental	   place	   of	   an	   	   ͑Adliyya	  meta-­‐ethics	  impacting	  the	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  through	  the	  paradigm	  of	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  
al-­‐fiqh.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  vein	  that	  this	  study	  has	  argued	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  allowing	  these	  resources	  to	  bear	  fruit,	  moving	  towards	  an	   	   ͑Adliyya	  reading	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a,	  such	  that	  textually	  derived	  precepts	  considered	  to	  conflict	  with	  rational	  morality	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  Just	  and	  Moral	  God.	  	  A	  systematic	  and	  rigorous	  framework	  for	  Sharī	  ͑a	  inference	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  scope	   for	   an	   	   ͑Adliyya	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   identified	   in	   this	   study	   still	   has	  many	  difficult	   questions	   to	   answer,	   questions	   that	   demand	   further	   research	   and	  debate.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   presuppositions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   morality	   and	  ideas	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   have	   been	   pivotal	   throughout	   the	   uṣūlī	  treatment	  of	  the	  questions	  at	  hand.	  Yet	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  not	  all	  of	  these	  questions	  fall	   within	   the	   remit	   of	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   rather	   they	   fall	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   moral	  philosophy	  and	  epistemology.	  	  A	  theoretically	  consistent	  and	  justifiable	  system	  of	  
uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   theological	   resources	   of	   the	   ͑Adliyya	   tradition	   to	  impact	   the	   actual	   reading	   of	   Sharī	  ͑a	   at	   the	   level	   of	   fiqh	   requires	   that	   these	  presuppositions	   are	   equally	   rigorous	   and	   justifiable.	   We	   have	   seen	   that	   the	  fundamentals	  of	  both	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  epistemology	  are	  recognised	  within	  the	  Shī	  ͑ī	   tradition	  as	  being	  meta-­‐	  religious,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  basic	  axioms	  of	  each	  cannot	  rely	  upon	  revelation.	  	  Accordingly	  the	  strides	  in	  knowledge	  that	  have	  been	  made	  in	  such	  disciplines	  from	  outside	  Muslim	  religious	  scholarship	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  and	  must	  be	  seriously	  engaged	  with.	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Beyond	   the	   need	   to	   independently,	   further	   explore	   the	   philosophical	  presuppositions	   influential	   in	   uṣūl	   al-­‐fiqh,	   another	   key	   area	   that	   requires	   a	  concentration	   of	   attention	   in	   pursuit	   of	   a	   framework	   for	   an	   ͑Adliyya	   reading	   of	  
Sharī	  ͑a	   is	   clarification	   and	   consideration	   of	   the	   system	   for	   reconciliation	   of	  apparently	   conflicting	   indicators	   to	   Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts.	   	   Reconciliation	   of	  apparently	   conflicting	   evidences	   is	   a	   core	   function	   of	   the	   mujtahid	   in	   his	  inference	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts,	  and	  modern	  Shī	  ͑ī	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	  offers	  a	  sophisticated	  system	   in	  which	   this	   is	   conducted.	  Accepting	   the	   unqualified	   authority	   of	   ẓann	  increases	  the	  scope	  and	  nature	  for	  such	  conflicts	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  would	  call	  for	  greater	   theoretical	   deliberation	   on	   a	   system	   of	   reconciliation	   currently	   more	  concerned	  with	   conflicting	   textual	   sources,	   rather	   than	   conflicts	   between	   texts	  and	   rationality.	   Broadening	   the	   scope	   of	   potential	   indicators	   to	   include	  independent	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality,	   even	  when	  not	   absolutely	   certain,	  demands	   consideration	   of	   previously	   ignored	   conflicts	   throughout	   the	   body	   of	  
furū	   ͑	  al-­‐fiqh.	  Of	  course	  distinctions	  need	   to	  be	  made	  between	  rational	  and	  non-­‐rational	   areas	  of	  Sharī	  ͑a	   regulation,	  with	   judgements	  of	   rational	  morality	  being	  only	  relevant	  to	  the	  former.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   consideration	   of	   the	   system	   for	   resolving	   apparent	   conflicts	  between	   judgements	  of	   rational	  morality	  and	  other	  sources,	   there	   is	  a	  pressing	  need	  again	  to	  refer	  to	  disciplines	  such	  as	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  applied	  ethics	  to	  provide	  the	  content	  of	  potentially	  relevant	  judgements	  of	  rational	  morality.	  It	  is	  only	  after	  rational	  moral	  deliberation	  has	  taken	  place	  that	  textual	  evidences	  can	  be	  appraised	  for	  consistency	  with	  rational	  morality.	  Of	  course	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  to	   say	   that	   the	   judgments	   of	   rational	  morality	  will	   always	   be	   deemed	   stronger	  and	   more	   relevant	   than	   the	   apparent	   indication	   of	   texts,	   there	   may	   well	   be	  instances	  where	  the	   indication	  of	   textual	  evidences	  outweighs	  the	  strength	  of	  a	  rational	   moral	   argument	   and	   indeed	   instances	   where	   apparent	   conflict	   is	  irreconcilable-­‐	  in	  which	  case,	  as	  in	  the	  current	  system	  of	  Ijtihād,	  reference	  would	  be	   made	   to	   the	   second	   tier	   evidences	   of	   the	   uṣūl	   al-­‐	   ͑amaliyya	   (practical	  principles).	  Undoubtedly	  achieving	  both	  tasks,	   firstly	  developing	  a	  rigorous	  system	  to	  allow	  for	   the	   theological	  moral	   rationalism	   of	   Shī	  ͑ī	   thought	   to	   impact	   the	   reading	   of	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Sharī	  ͑a	  and	  then	  to	  actually	  apply	  this	  system	  across	  the	  breadth	  of	  furū	  ͑	  al-­‐fiqh,	  is	  no	  small	  order.	  Not	  only	  are	  these	  theoretically	  challenging	  in	  themselves,	  but	  also	  they	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  practically	  daunting	  due	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  shift	  in	  positive	  doctrine	  that	  is	   likely	  to	  occur	  as	  a	  result.	  However	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  difficulties	  provides	  no	  justification	  to	  Muslim	  thinkers	  for	  not	  engaging	  the	  challenge.	  The	  very	  concept	  of	   the	   Ijtihād	   that	  uṣūl	  al-­‐fiqh	   intends	   to	   regulate	   requires	  no	   less	  than	  a	  complete	  exhaustion	  of	  effort	  (ifrāg	  al-­‐wus	  )͑	  to	  infer	  Sharī	  ͑a	  precepts	  from	  their	   sources.	   Continuing	   to	   read	  Sharī	  ͑a	   precepts	   in	   a	   framework	   that	   ignores	  judgements	   of	   rational	   morality	   despite	   the	   fundamental	   	  A͑dliyya	   theological	  resources	   in	   the	   Shī	  ī͑	   tradition,	   allowing	   the	   possibility	   of	   attributing	   immoral	  precepts	   to	   a	   Just	   and	   moral	   god,	   undoubtedly	   falls	   short	   of	   the	   vigorous	  demands	  of	  ijtihād	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world.	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